Photo by Jon Tyson
The Democrats came out of the midterms with a mandate, but not a plan. Valid questions are being asked about what to do, whether to focus on affordability or impeachments and commissions of inquiry into corruption and nepotism. While it is obvious that the Democrats have no Project 2025, there are too few indications that they are ready to rectify what Trump and Musk have done to the federal bureaucracy. Will it be possible to return the federal bureaucracy – the deep state – to the way it was before Musk and the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) tore down a vibrant, functioning system? Institutional destruction is much easier and faster than institutional reconstruction.
According to the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), about 24,000 federal employees were involuntarily dismissed in 2025 following DOGE’s workforce-cutting campaign. At the Department of Education, for example, nearly 50% of the workforce was dismissed or furloughed in 2025, crippling the agency’s ability to manage financial aid and oversee programs for vulnerable student groups. The federal bureaucracy has been hollowed out; civil servants’ relationships and institutional memory have been lost.
There were certainly things to be improved in the federal bureaucracy before Trump and DOGE. But Michael Lewis’s recounting of how the Internal Revenue Service, the National Institute of Standards and Technology and the National Institutes of Health were dismembered in Blockers: Rebels in the Deep State reflects not only the unconscionable way Musk and DOGE irresponsibly cut off the excellent work these organizations were doing but also raises the question of whether they or any other federal bureaucracy can ever be reconstructed.
Bureaucracies are the foundations of a successful democracy. “The needs of mass administration make it today completely indispensable,” Max Weber wrote in Economy and Society. “The choice is only between bureaucracy and dilettantism in the field of administration,” he observed. The alternative to a competent bureaucracy, in other words, is amateur hour.
Or, as Michael Lewis wrote elsewhere; “The next time a politician or a pundit traduces the IRS, or JD Vance suggests firing half the civil service and putting in ‘our people,’ consider whether a system that filled out its ranks with a new batch of political loyalists every four years would have the expertise of these dedicated, lifelong civil servants.”
Indeed, there were people in the federal bureaucracies who dedicated their lives to the common good. The United States Institute of Peace (USIP), which Lewis uses as his prologue in Blockers, is a good example. Lewis focuses on a security guard, Colin O’Brien, Chief Security Officer at USIP, and describes him as a kind of modern-day Davy Crockett defending the institution against DOGE intruders at the Alamo.
The president of USIP, George Moose, is a friend. But more important, he represents the very best tradition of American public service. A former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations and Other International Organizations in Geneva and Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, George has devoted his entire professional career to the proposition that public institutions exist to serve the common good.
The DOGE people threw George out, almost literally, and USIP has been neutralized. It’s still in court, fighting to stop Trump from controlling a congressionally mandated agency and having his name slapped on the building.
The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) provides perhaps the most consequential international test of the important role of a federal bureaucracy. USAID was much more than a foreign aid agency; it was the principal instrument through which the United States provided international development and humanitarian assistance. Its work included emergency food and medical relief, vaccination programs, the fight against HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis, maternal and child healthcare, agricultural development, education and support for democratic institutions in more than 100 countries.
In 2025, the dismantling of USAID under DOGE went far beyond ordinary budget cuts. Approximately 90% of USAID’s awards were terminated—6,780 out of 7,510—representing $79.1 billion in aid commitments. The Trump administration also announced the cancellation of 83% of USAID programs. These cuts affected humanitarian relief, food security, HIV/AIDS treatment, maternal and child health, education, and emergency assistance worldwide. This was not simply a reduction in expenditure; it was a massive withdrawal of American support for some of the world’s most vulnerable people.
The consequences of dismantling most of USAID’s operations are being felt in the field. A study published in The Lancet in July 2025 estimated that cuts to USAID funding could result in more than 14 million additional deaths by 2030, including 4.5 million children under age five. Recent estimates by the Center for Global Development put the potential additional deaths from the 2025 cuts at 500,000 to one million.
The costs of this institutional dismantling are not confined only to Washington and the field. They are visible in Geneva, where the American retreat from international cooperation has contributed to a broader crisis affecting international organizations, humanitarian agencies, and the wider ecosystem of International Geneva. The Geneva International Welcome Center (CAGI) reports a 12% elimination of positions across Geneva’s organizations. That loss erased institutional memory—procurement rules, partner vetting, and crisis planning. By November 2025, reported cuts and redundancies included: World Health Organization—800 positions eliminated; International Committee of the Red Cross—200 positions cut; UNAIDS—a reduction of the Geneva headquarters staff from 127 to 19.
The reconstruction of the bureaucracy now has a potential positive upside with a Democratic Senate. Besides its role in passing a budget, the Senate vets and confirms Cabinet secretaries, agency heads, the FBI Director, U.S. Attorneys, ambassadors, and commissioners on boards like the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Federal Communications Commission.
What would a full reconstruction of a functioning federal bureaucracy ideally look like? It would: Rebuild the professional civil service by recruiting and retaining people based on competence rather than political loyalty. Restore institutional independence by protecting agencies and civil servants from arbitrary political intervention. Recover institutional memory by replacing lost technical expertise, experience and accumulated knowledge. Rebuild external relationships by restoring confidence among international partners, implementing organizations and allies. Establish accountability and safeguards by ensuring that future administrations cannot dismantle institutions through similarly abrupt and inadequately prepared processes.
Sound too ideal? It is. Institutional destruction can be much easier and faster than institutional reconstruction. But we can hope for serious changes if institutional reconstruction becomes a priority.
