
Photograph Source: President Of Ukraine – CC0
As the European Heads of State and Government will meet this week, the war between Russia and Ukraine is raging on and is in danger of reaching a point of no return.
The fact that the conflict is further escalating is the result of two serious miscalculations. In February 2022, Russia believed it could crush Ukraine’s resistance within forty-eight hours. Many in the West, on the other hand, have been convinced that prolonging the war would significantly weaken Russia and curb its imperial ambitions. Those continuing to pay the highest price today for both these errors are the people of Ukraine.
Russia’s massive attacks on Kyiv, Kramatorsk and Zaporizhzhia have resulted in a growing number of civilian casualties. As winter approaches, Putin’s strategy is designed to make the cities of Ukraine increasingly uninhabitable and to undermine the population’s morale. And at the same time, Europe itself faces growing risks triggered by the intensification of the hybrid war being pursued by Russia.
This ongoing conflict has also dangerously widened the transatlantic rift, to the advantage of Putin and to the detriment of Ukraine. Trump, with his ‘America First’ policy built on short-term Realpolitik, is prepared to entertain the possibility of making territorial concessions in return for the normalization of economic and financial ties with Moscow, because this would pave the way for the new trade opportunities that Putin is prepared to offer Washington.
Europe, on the other hand, remains committed to defending Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. It has sought, as far as possible, to make up for the cut in US military and financial support while simultaneously increasing the pressure of sanctions on Moscow.
To date, however, neither approach has resulted in a game-changing breakthrough. A separate agreement between Russia and the United States – as shown by the sham energy truce that Trump announced yesterday – cannot offer a sustainable solution to the conflict, while Europe on its own does not have sufficient leverage to enforce an accord capable of ensuring a just and lasting peace.
Europe has voiced its astonishment and its outrage over the diesel agreement between Trump and Putin and over Trump’s verbal attacks on Zelensky’s leadership. Yet indignation, however morally justified it may be, carries little political weight. And in any case, by now we should have taken on board the fact that Trump thinks strictly in terms of national interest. He wants to put an end to a war that he considers to be ‘not his’ war, a war that has no bearing on US interests – in particular, on its economic interests – and this, not simply with a view to the mid-term elections.
The truth of the matter is that Washington continues to be a crucial player in any serious attempt to resolve the war, just as Europe continues to be a crucial partner for the United States. Europe should stop viewing the transatlantic rift as an obstacle simply to moan about and should start devising a diplomatic strategy capable of having an impact on developments on the ground.
Europe, therefore, should move beyond sanctions and military support to promote a multilateral diplomatic initiative capable of containing the war before the winter. Under no circumstances would this mean either leaving Ukraine in the lurch or allaying the pressure on Russia. A diplomatic initiative of this nature would act alongside military assistance and sanctions because, however indispensable they may be, they are insufficient to achieve a political solution in and of themselves.
A move of this kind demands that Europe engage not only with Washington but also with those influential countries and players that have ties with all the parties, including with Moscow, and in whose shared interest it would be to limit the repercussions of the clash on security and the economy. Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, India, Brazil and the African Union could all contribute to a coordinated diplomatic effort. Their involvement would broaden the negotiations’ international base and make it more difficult for both Moscow and Washington to monopolize the diplomatic process.
This new diplomatic initiative around Ukraine should be designed to pursue two objectives. Firstly, and most urgently, it should aim before the winter to broker a de-escalation accord providing for the cessation of attacks on civilians in urban areas, on the country’s energy infrastructure and on the infrastructure it uses for exporting its agricultural produce. The protection of civilian lives and the prevention of any further deterioration in humanitarian conditions must be the immediate priority.
Secondly, the initiative should draft a road map designed to broker a lasting cease-fire and to organize the start of talks addressing all the crucial issues. This road map should address the issue of security guarantees for Ukraine, the monitoring and enforcement of the cease-fire and the conditions required to embark on substantive negotiations. It should in no way assume the outcome of those negotiations in advance, nor should it impart legitimacy to territorial gains obtained through the use of force.
For the initiative to carry any real weight, the EU must keep up the military pressure and the pressure of sanctions on Moscow, while at the same time showing that it is willing to pursue a political solution. It must remain strongly committed to the defense of Ukraine’s sovereignty and the country’s future in Europe, including the prospect of full EU membership, but at the same time, it needs to conduct an internal debate to discover the best way to engage Russia in a negotiating process without jeopardizing Ukraine’s fundamental interests.
This approach is also necessary for Europe’s own security in the longer term. Russia will continue to be a country bordering on Europe, and the problem of how to handle relations with Moscow is not just going to vanish overnight once the fighting ceases. A strategy combining deterrence and diplomatic commitment is not an alternative to Europe’s determination; it is a crucial part of that determination.
As Finnish President Alexander Stubb has pointed out: ‘The fact of the matter is that we will always be Russia’s neighbors. So we have to ask the question: how do we engage?’

