New Ultra-Gombeen Government in Dublin, Same Old Story on ‘The Left’

Photograph Source: Tibs foxxo – CC BY-SA 4.0

Despite recent social changes in the Twenty-Six Counties of Ireland and the expectation of ‘change,’ last November’s election demonstrated that the political status quo will remain. The election’s outcome underscores that a meaningful shift in power is still out of reach.

A profound irony of the campaign was the sight of posters with the incumbent Taoiseach, Simon Harris, and his slogan ‘A New Energy’ adorning lampposts throughout the state. Harris’s party, Fine Gael, has been in power, in one form or other, for 14 consecutive years. This election’s result, however, confirmed more of the same.

A new coalition government is on the cusp of coming to office, composed of the two centre-right parties, Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael, and nine so-called ‘Regional Independents.’ The hysterical property owners of ‘Middle Ireland’ and their media mouthpieces can rest easy for now.

Gombeenism

In classic brazen gombeen style, the ‘Regional Independents’ want to ‘ride two horses with the one arse.’ No sooner had this group reached a deal with Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael to form a government, and no sooner had the ‘super junior’ ministries been doled out, did they demand the same speaking rights accorded to the opposition.

This bizarre demand stems from the ‘independents’ contradictory class and political positions. Some of the key figures in this group are landlords and business people, with a certified tax dodger also in the mix. Despite their substantial wealth, they play up an image of being downtrodden countrymen, oppressed by ‘them ones above in Dublin.’

There is, without doubt, an economic and infrastructural imbalance between Dublin and some sections of rural Ireland – some of which stems from the country’s colonial past. But rural gombeen types such as the ‘Regional Independents’ astutely foster an ‘us versus them’ mentality, pitting country people against ‘the Dubs.’

This conveniently occludes their own advantageous class position in their communities and disregards entrenched deprivation in parts of the capital. The gombeens can then speak out of both sides of their mouths on a range of issues.

For their supporters, it matters not whether the gombeen might be a landlord contributing to the housing crisis, as long as they bring in some investment to open a new road or community centre. Ultimately, this culture inhibits class solidarity between urban and rural workers.

The development of this rural-based clientelism mirrors similar patterns in Sicily and Southern Italy, identified by Eric Hobsbawm, Luigi Graziano and others. For instance, as Agostino Mantegna has noted, clientelism tends towards corruption, with ‘variations in the territorial distribution of public and infrastructural spending demonstrating that decreasing expenditures … led to an increase in preference voting (i.e. votes of exchange).’

While this gombeen culture is not confined to rural areas—one of the ‘Regional Independents’ was elected in Dublin Bay North on a platform highlighting the structurally underfunded Northside—it retains particular potency in the countryside for the reasons outlined.

We are set, then, for 4-5 more years of neoliberalism. In reality, the election never offered a choice about neoliberalism anyway, since the main party of opposition, Sinn Féin, does not propose to challenge it. What the next period means in practical terms is that instead of Greens attempting to prise cycle lanes from the majority coalition partners, we will have gombeens demanding roads and funding for sports pitches.

Voter Apathy

Why wasn’t this ‘two-and-a-half-party system’ (where Fianna Fáil/Fine Gael are propped up by an alternating choice of a subservient junior partner) effectively challenged this time? After nearly a decade of an ever-intensifying housing crisis, and constant scandals and failures in healthcare, surely ‘the Left’ should have made significant gains?

The pre-election predictions of no unexpected surge towards the professedly centre-left Sinn Féin proved correct. Their support, which peaked at 34% in 2022 opinion polls, appears to have fragmented across smaller centre-left parties, independents, and, worryingly, the far-right.

The real story, however, was voter apathy. Only 60% turned out to vote, the lowest in over a century. The last time such a low turnout was recorded was 1923, when the state was emerging from a vicious British-backed counter-revolution and thousands of Irish republican political activists were imprisoned.

Of the 60% who voted, 40% supported the two centre-right parties, Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael. In essence, 24% of eligible voters have re-elected a conservative government. The legitimacy of elected governments in liberal democracies, not just in Ireland but globally, is rapidly eroding.

Finger-wagging from some on ‘the Left’ ensued in the wake of the result, castigating those who didn’t vote for not ‘exercising their democratic right.’ While venting may feel cathartic for these people, this approach ignores deeper structural causes of low turnout. Globally, turnout has declined since WWII.

A 2023 study, Turning off the base: Social democracy’s neoliberal turn, income inequality, and turnout, highlighted how voters of the centre-left have become apathetic due to ‘socio-economic structural changes, such as the decline of their working-class base stemming from de-industrialization and globalization, but also policy changes, such as [centre-left parties’] embrace of market liberalism.’

The main ‘centre-left’ opposition parties, such as Sinn Féin and the Social-Democrats, mirror their global counterparts by accepting a status quo that perpetuates income inequality, the banking- and developer-led housing system, and underfunded public services.

With the continued rise to power of billionaires, the onward march of fascism, and the environmental collapse we see all around us, one would assume the ‘centre-left’ would realise social democracy is a busted flush – yet here we are.

Immigration

The far-right, government mismanagement, and liberal media mainstreaming of fascist talking points saw immigration become an issue during the electoral year.

Centre-left and left-wing parties struggle to address immigration within the capitalist and imperialist framework. Is there a middle-road, based on a material analysis, that is both pragmatic and humane? Can well-planned integration and a redistribution of resources be advocated effectively?

Ireland is certainly not ‘full,’ but the geopolitical instability caused by imperialism and climate change, alongside the likelihood of increasing migration, must be considered. Even with significant redistribution of resources, such as within a potential United Ireland, those resources remain finite against exponential population growth.

This issue, central to civil cohesion and the economic landscape, must be grappled with by ‘the Left’ to prevent citizens from succumbing to far-right narratives.

Democratic Deficit

It has been dystopian watching some on ‘the Left’ exuberantly celebrate their election or re-election, given the broader context of what is clearly a defeat. In such circumstances, one might opt for a more reserved ‘Roy Keane goal celebration’ over a braggadocious ‘Robbie Keane cartwheel, roll and gun celebration.’

Democracy has been hollowed out by billionaires who control economies, influence politics, and dominate media. As Noam Chomsky notes, key decisions in Europe are often made by unelected bodies such as the European Commission, the IMF, and the European Central Bank, leaving citizens feeling disempowered and disillusioned.

In 2008, the Irish electorate voted No to the Lisbon Treaty, rejecting further EU integration. Yet, following media bombardment and political pressure, a second referendum in 2009 yielded a Yes vote. As one voter put it: ‘Sure didn’t we vote No the first time and they didn’t listen to us? What’s the point in doing it again?’

Such moments reinforce the sentiment that ‘voting achieves nothing’, and subsequent elections only bolstered this mentality further. But where is the effective strategy by ‘the Left’ to involve people in struggle?

Failure to Mobilise

Returning to 2024, disengagement from politics resulted in low turnout in places like working-class Jobstown, where less than 1 in 5 voted. Similarly, turnout was low in Adamstown, with its high immigrant population. Two key groups—the most deprived working-class and immigrants—failed to mobilize.

Other factors contributed to this failure: the Irish Left’s inability to cooperate effectively (unlike their French counterparts), entrenched class and housing structures, and media complicity in manufacturing consent.

More broadly, ‘the Left’ remained wedded to electoralism. The ‘strategy’ now revolves around personal profile-building and harvesting votes every electoral cycle, leading to predictable stagnation. Their approach goes something like this:

1) Attempt to get people angry by highlighting government mismanagement, corruption scandals, media bias etc.

2) Harvest votes for electoral gain

3) Make no significant electoral gain

4) Repeat steps 1-3 every 4-5 years.

Even mainstream commentators have noted ‘outrage fatigue’ among voters. ‘Activist fatigue’ within ‘the Left’ will also be a factor when electoral breakthroughs are promised repeatedly but never delivered. It is often the case of one step forward, two steps back.

The ‘politics of perpetual outrage’ will not inspire people. People will only become involved through direct action and real cultural and workplace struggle that achieves tangible outcomes, not through delegating their voices to elected representatives.

The need for a movement

The last major class-based political mobilization in Ireland—as opposed to cross-class social movements like marriage equality and women’s bodily autonomy—was the anti-Water Tax campaign of 2016. Hundreds of thousands marched, forcing the government to abandon water privatization. However, the movement’s energy was never redirected toward housing or broader radical change.

Where is the movement connecting a fundamental shift on housing, such as Universal Public Housing, with workplace struggles, the demand for an end to the British occupation of the Six Counties, and everyday linguistic, cultural, and decolonial efforts to empower people? On the latter point, ‘the Left’ disregards identity at their peril as the far-right is clearly seeking to build on exclusivist ideas of identity.

Irish Republicans and ‘the Left’ must empower and politically educate ordinary people rather than exploit them for electoral gain or risk losing them to fascism or mé féiner individualism. The current main players on ‘the Left,’ lacking critical self-reflection, seem incapable of this task despite commanding significant financial and infrastructural resources.

It seems this responsibility will fall to grassroots formations, focused both on activism and the digital space, to build a movement of empowerment and mobilization.

Kerron Ó Luain is a historian from Dublin. His forthcoming book “Cath idir an pobal agus an murder machine”: Gluaiseacht na Gaelscolaíochta, 1973-2023, published by Bradán Feasa, analyses the gaelscoil (Irish-medium school) movement through the lenses of class and decolonisation.