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December 9, 2001
John Chuckman
High-Tech
Puritanism
December 8, 2001
Laurence Tribe
Military Tribunals
Undermine the Constitution
Patrick
Cockburn
The
End of a Strange War
December 7, 2001
John Troyer
Blacklist Me!
Sen. Edwards
v. Ashcroft
Military
Tribunals
George Naggiar
Occupation
as Terrorism
Hugo von
Sponek
and Denis Halliday
Iraq
the Hostage Nation
David Vest
The Coen
Brothers'
Minstrel Show
Alexander
Cockburn
Sharon
or Arafat:
Who's the Terrorist?
December 6, 2001
CounterPunch Wire
Hampshire
College the First
to Condemn the War
Robert
Jensen
University
Teaching After
September 11
Jack McCarthy
Does
Tom Friedman Read
the New York Times?
Sam and
Leila Bahour
The
Psychology of a Suicide Attacker
December 5, 2001
Edward Hammond
The Only
Real Way to
Prevent Biowarfare
Harvey
Wasserman
Atomic
Treason in the House
Carl Estabrook
America's
Israel
Don Williams
Questions
Barbara Walters Didn't Ask George Bush
Cockburn/St. Clair
Liberals
Hail War as
Return of Big Government
Robert
Fisk
The
Last Colonial War?
Bahour/Dahan
It's About
the Occupation
December 4, 2001
Dave Marsh
A
Plea for Byron Parker
Rep. Ron Paul
Keep Your
Eye on the Target
Susan
Herman
Ashcroft
and the Patriot Act
Tariq Ali
The Afghan
King and the Nazis
November 30, 2001
Jordan
Green
Disappeared
in the Southland
Willliam Blum
Rebuilding
Afghanistan?
November 29, 2001
Phillip
Cryan
Defining
Terrorism
Robert Fisk
We Are the
War Criminals Now
November 28, 2001
Tom Turnipseed
A
Continuum of Terror
Patrick Cockburn
Tribal
Council:
Don't Blame It All on Taliban
Robert
Fisk
At
Last, The Truth about the Sabra and Chatila Massacres
Harry Browne
The Bill of
Rights:
They Threw It All Away
Sunil
Sharma
Suffer
Palestine's Children
November 27, 2001
Paul Coggins
Kafka and
the Patriot Act
Tariq
Ali
Tigris
and Euprhates
November 26, 2001
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Blood and
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Jeffrey
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Boeing's
Sweet Deal
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Human
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Harry
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December 9,
2001
On Framing and
Being Framed Isaac's
on Chomsky
By John Touchie
A recent criticism of Noam Chomsky by Jeffrey Isaac in the American Prospect offers up an useful opportunity to reflect upon
some often unspoken presuppositions underlying recent political
debate.
Isaac's discussion initially centres
around a quotation from Chomsky's recent book, A
New Generation Draws the Line: Kosovo, East Timor and the Standards
of the West. The quotation states:
The huge slaughter. . . in East Timor
is (at least) comparable to the terrible atrocities that can
plausibly be attributed to Milosevic in the earlier wars in Yugoslavia,
and responsibility is far easier to assign, with no complicating
factors. If proponents of the "repetition of Bosnia"
thesis intend it seriously, they should certainly have been calling
for the bombing of Jakarta -- indeed Washington and London --
in early 1999 so as not to allow in East Timor a repetition of
the crimes that Indonesia, the U.S., and the UK, had perpetrated
there for a quarter-century. And when the new generation of leaders
[an allusion to Clinton and Blair-J.I.] refused to pursue this
honorable course, they should have been leading honest citizens
to do so themselves, perhaps joining the Bin Laden network. These
conclusions follow straightforwardly, if we assume that the thesis
is intended as something more than apologetics for state violence.
The reasoning here is relatively straightforward:
1. Atrocities (such as those that took
place in Bosnia) should be stopped by military force if necessary;
2. X directed such atrocities.
3. Such force would entail bombing X.
Chomsky asks: are we to take such arguments
seriously? Or are they mere apologetics? To test this hypothesis,
Chomsky applies the reasoning above to the factual premise that
Jakarta, Washington and London have directed the committing of
atrocities.
It should be clear that Chomsky's analysis
is of the reasoning of people that he disagrees with. It should
be also be clear that Chomsky is not saying that he supports
this line of reasoning, nor is he saying that he agrees with
the conclusions that are drawn. Rather, Chomsky argues that because
we do not see commentators drawing the conclusion above, we may
conclude that they do not take their own argument seriously.
As he notes, if they took their own argument seriously, then
they would call for bombing of the centres that direct terrorism.
This seems an obvious inference to draw.
Much weaker, in my view, is Chomsky's
suggestion that that if one were committed to the reasoning above
as a serious proposal, but for some reason the leaders of their
governments were unwilling to act, one might expect that such
leaders might none the less encourage alternative forms of response,
such as joining terrorist networks, as in Chomsky's comment that
"honest citizens" might be encouraged to take up arms
to stop such atrocities (by "joining the Bin Laden network",
for example). Although it does make sense to claim that alternatives
would be encouraged, and it also makes sense to say that the
reasoning advocates a violent solution to the problem of atrocities,
the idea that this would imply that the proper course of action
would be to encourage private citizens to take matters into their
own hands goes too far. The "joining the Bin Laden network"
is, it would seem, an unjustified rhetorical flourish.
Isaac, however, takes this to be of much
greater significance, and argues that such comments point to
the question of Chomsky's "intellectual responsibility",
not of the "the actual influence of his words on the atrocities
that have taken place", but "rather the view of intellectual
responsibility that could even entertain words like those quoted
above".
There are a number of difficulties with
Isaac's position, however.
First, as one basis of his indictment
of Chomsky, Isaacs claims that the conclusions of the reasoning
discussed above are "no longer logical possibilities. The
conclusions have been drawn, and acted upon". Clearly, Isaac's
is claiming that the bombings of 11 September were based upon
the reasoning Chomsky criticizes. There is no evidence offered
to support this claim; it is simply assertion. I, for one, would
be curious to know how Isaacs is able to access the reasoning
of those involved, as his claim clearly seems to entail.
Second, Isaac persistently and mistakenly
represents the reasoning that Chomsky is attacking as Chomsky's
own. Chomsky takes the reasoning of those he is criticizing and
points out its implications. This is standard fare in argumentation
and reasoning. As such, it should be clear that Chomsky does
not adopt such reasoning. Chomsky does not argue for bombing
to stop atrocities. Nor does he claim that "honest citizens"
ought to be encouraged to be terrorists. Rather, Chomsky
argues that these are the implications of the argument that
he is criticizing. As I've noted above, while the final implication
has little to support it, it should be obvious in all of this
that none of this implies that Chomsky is supporting such reasoning.
Rather, they are the arguments of those Chomsky views as apologists.
It is interesting, then, to see Isaac
claiming that Chomsky draws "his quasi-conclusion that Washington
and London deserve the terrorism of Bin Laden". While the
very next sentence notes that while "Chomsky does not endorse
such terrorism", Isaac nonetheless claims that from his
"ever-so-acute vantage point, there is a certain justice
to it". It should be clear, however, that Chomsky is not
arguing for the "justice" of such results. Rather,
it is the reasoning of those Chomsky is criticizing that would
support the "justice" of such a result. It is difficult
to see how it can be said that Chomsky adopts such reasoning;
indeed, he is openly critical of it. From this we should conclude
that Isaac's attempt to attribute such reasoning to Chomsky is
without a sound logical basis.
Even more difficult to understand as
rational argument is Isaac's ruminations about whether "Chomsky
ever considered the possibility" that someone reading his
book might "carelessly draw the conclusion that the bombing
of Washington is required". There seems to be an innuendo
here that Chomsky is in some way responsible for the consequences
of his arguments, even if misunderstood. Yet the idea that Chomsky
is responsible for such carelessness - particularly given that
he is criticizing such reasoning is as bizarre as
it is unwarranted. Isaac is clearly on shaky ground here.
Yet the quality of the argument goes
from bad to worse.
Isaac's asserts that Chomsky "sincerely
desires" an "end to American "imperialism"";
however, since Chomsky is "[e]ver the moralist, [he] fails
here, as elsewhere, to say anything about how this result might
be brought about in a reasonable way". The idea here is
that Chomsky, by refusing to say how things might be made better,
is acting irresponsibly.
The addition of "as elsewhere"
would seem to imply that Chomsky has never discussed how
achieve such a result. I would have thought that the obvious
corrective here would be to refer to the numerous Chomsky works
that discuss at some length how this might be achieved. Chomsky's
oft-repeated suggestion that the US Government conforming to
international law might be a good place to start, for it is both
"reasonable" and widely published. It would seem that
Isaac's argument has no basis in this instance, and that he is
simply ignorant of Chomsky's numerous discussions of such matters.
Similar comments would apply to Isaac's
claim that "Chomsky rarely if ever has said what, in his
mind, the antithesis to this American imperialism is, leaving
his critics to charge him with moral tone deafness and with sheer
political emptiness". Again, one would think that, as a
starting point, Chomsky's numerous calls for the US Government
to accept the rule of law, rather than the rule of force, might
merit some comment. Surely the rule of law presents an antithesis
to the resort to arbitrary power. It seems odd that Isaac, as
a teacher of political science, would be unaware of such considerations.
But perhaps Isaac's point is a different
one. Chomsky's has repeatedly argued that governments must conform
to the rule of law and should dedicate effort to the protection
of human rights and moral decency. Yet Isaac asserts that Chomsky
puts forward with no practical or reasonable suggestions for
action. The implication from this could be that Isaac is assuming
that the enforcement of legal and moral rights are impractical
or unreasonable suggestions for action. That this might be a
reasonable interpretation is tied to Isaac's charges that "critics"
charge Chomsky with "moral tone deafness" and "political
emptiness". I suspect that such charges often confront those
who refuse to engage in compromise and in the trade-off the human
rights of some for the benefit of others, in the interests of
striking a "practical" political bargain. Not emphasized
is the possibility that some things simply aren't up for exchange,
particularly when the bargain is expected to produce a loss for
one party and a gain for the other. Or that human rights under
a rule of law are not merely one interest among many, but rather
the foundation of the interest that we all have in keeping society
from degenerating into nothing more than the naked struggle for
power.
It is ironic, then, to hear Isaac's charge
Chomsky with a "moral tone deafness" and "sheer
political emptiness". Isaac asserts that Chomsky does not
"take sides in this struggle" of "us" versus
"them, of "'American imperialism' and the terrorists
and tyrants who hate it". True enough, for Chomsky does
not agree with a simplistic dichotomization of the world into
"friend" and "foe". Isaacs conceptualizes
the world in this way, as a world in terms of power groups. But
Chomsky argues for a third way, based on legal and moral right,
and a world in which both friend and foe can be in the wrong.
This point continually eludes Isaac.
Being unable to grasp it, Isaac continually frames Chomsky's
position in the only way he seems capable of understanding it:
as a retreat from "practicality" and "realistic"
policy, based on a power politic of "us" versus "them".
Yet given Chomsky's advocacy of the rule
of law and human rights, it should be clear that Isaac is unable
to escape the intellectual limitations of his own position and
is, consequently, unable to properly understand Chomsky's position.
For example, Isaacs bases part of his
criticism on the fact that Chomsky doesn't "take sides".
Given Chomsky doesn't dichotomize the world into "our side"
and "their side", a classic move of power politics,
but instead argues for the right rather than the expedient, for
human rights and the rule of law rather than for power politics
and the rule of force, it makes little sense to criticize Chomsky
for refusing to adopt the a position he has consistently criticized.
In a similar vein, Isaac asserts that
by refusing to conceptualize of the world in terms of power,
and by refusing to take sides with "us" versus "them",
Chomsky is precluded from advocating "realistic policies
that might actually bring peace to the Middle East" or a
"decisive response" to terrorism. Yet this conclusion
is simply the result of Isaac's own framing of the issues, and
his blindness to the possibility that there exists anything beyond
power politics and a "friend" or "foe" mentality.
Given such a framing, Isaac is simply unable to appreciate Chomsky's
emphasis on rights embodied in his calls for the rule of law
rather than the rule of force. Given the uncompromisingly and
overwhelmingly politicized nature of Isaac's view, it is hardly
surprising that critics view Chomsky's position as embodying
a "sheer political emptiness". From their perspective,
a position that focuses on human and moral rights that are not
applicable solely on the basis of political considerations, but
rather on a consideration of what is right, would indeed be apolitical.
And such a depoliticized position is disturbing precisely because
it constitutes an essential precondition for a social life based
on something other than domination and the rule of force.
The final irony here is Isaac's claim
that Chomsky's stance is simply "cynicism". On the
one hand, we have Isaac, who emphasizes power politics, who sees
the world as a struggle for power, and who adopts an "us"
versus "them", "friend" or "foe"
mentality. This is a position that emphasizes the enthronement
of politics over everything and everybody. On the other hand
we have Chomsky, who emphasizes the rule of law and human and
moral rights, a position that emphasizes that conduct will be
judged according to what is right rather than whether you are
for us or against us. Isaac claims you are either for "us"
or against "us"; hence, Chomsky is "against".
Chomsky, alternatively, reject the "us" versus "them"
mentality and advocates human rights and the rule of law for
the benefit of all. Now, which one of these would you call cynical?
CP
John Touchie
is a lecturer on the law faculty at the Griffith University in
Brisbane, Australia.
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