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September
14, 2001
Will Pakistan Jump
to US Demands?
"Get Us Bin Laden"
Order from Bush Could Spark Pakistani Army Mutiny
By Tariq Ali
On a trip to Pakistan a few years ago
I was talking to an ex-General about the militant Islamist groups
in the region. I asked him why these people, who had happily
accepted funds and weapons from the United States throughout
the Cold War, had become violently anti-American overnight. He
explained that they were not alone. Many Pakistan officers who
had served the US loyally from 1951 onwards felt humiliated by
Washington's indifference.
'Pakistan was the condom the
Americans needed to enter Afghanistan', he said. 'We've served
our purpose and they think we can be just flushed down the toilet.'
The old condom is being fished out for use once again, but will
it work? The new 'coalition against terrorism' needs the services
of the Pakistan Army, but General Musharraf will have to be extremely
cautious. An over-commitment to Washington could lead to a civil
war in Pakistan and split the Armed Forces. A great deal has
changed over the last two decades, but the ironies of history
continue to multiply.
In Pakistan itself, Islamism
derived its strength from state patronage rather than popular
support. The ascendancy of religious fundamentalism is the legacy
of a previous military dictator, General Zia-ul-Haq who received
solid backing from Washington and London throughout his 11 years
as dictator.
It was during his rule (1977-89)
that a network of madrassahs (religious boarding schools), funded
by the Saudi regime, were created.
The children, who were later
sent to fight as Mujahedeen in Afghanistan, were taught to banish
all doubt. The only truth was divine truth. Anyone who rebelled
against the imam rebelled against Allah. The madrassahs had only
one aim: the production of deracinated fanatics in the name of
a bleak Islamic cosmpolitanism. The primers taught that the Urdu
letter jeem stood for 'jihad'; tay for 'tope'(cannon), kaaf for
Kalashnikov and khay for khoon (blood).
2500 madrassahs produced a
crop of 225,000 fanatics ready to kill and die for their faith
when asked to do so by their religious leadersDespatched across
the border by the Pakistan Army, they were hurled into battle
against other Muslims they were told were not true Muslims. The
Taliban creed is an ultra-sectarian strain, inspired by the Wahhabi
sect that rules Saudi Arabia. The severity of the Afghan mullahs
has been denounced by Sunni clerics at al-Azhar in Cairo and
Shi-ite theologians in Qom as a disgrace to the Prophet.
The Taliban could not, however,
have captured Kabul on their own via an excess of religious zeal.
They were armed and commanded by 'volunteers' from the Pakistan
Army. If Islamabad decided to pull the plug, the Taliban could
be dislodged, but not without serious problems. The victory in
Kabul counts as the Pakistani Army's only triumph. . To this
day,the former US Secretary of State, Zbigniew Brezinski remains
recalcitrant: 'What was more important in the world view of history?'
he asks with more than a touch of irritation, 'the Taliban or
the fall of the Soviet Empire? A few stirred-up Muslims or the
liberation of Central Europe and the end of the Cold War?'
If Holywood rules necessitate
a short, sharp war against the new enemy, the American Caesar
would be best-advised not to insist on Pakistani legions. The
consequences could be dire: a brutal and vicious civil war creating
more bitterness and encouraging more acts of individual terrorism.
Islamabad will do everything to prevent a military expedition
to Afghanistan. For one thing there are Pakistani soldiers, pilots
and officers present in Kabul, Bagram and other bases. What will
be their orders this time and will they obey them? Much more
likely is that Ossama Bin Laden will be sacrificed in the interests
of the greater cause and his body dead or alive will be handed
over to his former employers in Washington. But will that be
enough?
The only real solution is a
political one. It requires removing the causes that create the
discontent. It is despair that feeds fanaticism and it is a result
of Washington's policies in the Middle East and elsewhere. The
orthodox casuistry among loyal factotums, columnists and courtiers
of the Washington regime is symbolised by Tony Blair's Personal
Assistant for Foreign Affairs, ex-diplomat Robert Cooper, who
writes quite openly: 'We need to get used to the idea of double
standards'.
The underlying maxim of this
cynicism is: we will punish the crimes of our enemies and reward
the crimes of our friends. Isn't that at least preferable to
universal impunity? To this the answer is simple: 'punishment'
along these lines does not reduce but breeds criminality, by
those who wield it. The Gulf and Balkan Wars were copy-book examples
of the moral blank cheque of a selective vigilantism. Israel
can defy UN resolutions with impunity, India can tyrannise Kashmir,
Russia can destroy Groszny, but it is Iraq which has to be punished
and it is the Palestinians who continue to suffer.
Cooper continues: 'Advice to
post-modern states: accept that intervention in the pre-modern
is going to be a fact of life. Such interventions may not solve
problems, but they may salve the conscience. And they are not
necessarily the worse for that' Try explaining that to the survivors
in New York and Washington.
The United States is whipping
itself into a frenzy. Its ideologues talk of this as an attack
on 'civilization', but what kind of civilization is it that thinks
in terms of blood-revenge. For the last sixty years and more
the United States has toppled democrat leaders, bombed countries
in three continents, used nuclear weapons against Japanese civilians,
but never knew what it felt like to have your own cities under
attack. Now they know.
To the victims of the attack
and their relatives one can offer our deep sympathy as one does
to people who the US government has victimised. But to accept
that somehow an American life is worth more than that of a Rwandan,
a Yugoslav, a Vietnamese, a Korean, a Japanese, a Palestinian...that
is unacceptable. CP
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