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Today's
Stories
December
8, 2004
Ann
Harrison
The Ohio Recount: Reluctant Officials
and Few Rules
December
7, 2004
Patrick
Cockburn
Running Battles in Baghdad
Behrooz
Ghamari
Lost Muslim Voices of Dissent
Dave
Lindorff
American Fantasies: Psst! Hey Buddy,
Did You Hear How Well the War's Going?
Joshua
Frank
Dean at the DNC?
Richard
Oxman
Down with Dylan: the Insufferable Interview
Ray
McGovern
All Mosquitoes, No Swamp
John
Chuckman
The Invasion of Hallifax: The Imperial Wizard Visits Canada
James
Petras
Latin America: the Empire Changes Gears
Website
of the Day
ToxMap: Who's Poisoning You
December
6, 2004
Paul
Craig Roberts
Paranoia and Pre-emption: Is the
Bush Administration Certifiable?
December
4 / 6, 2004
Alexander
Cockburn
Politicize the CIA? You've Got to
be Kidding
Joe
Bageant
Dining with the Rhinos
Alan
Maass
Reporting from the Ground in Iraq: an Interview with Patrick
Cockburn
Brian
Cloughley
Democracy, Bush-style, in the Gulf
Laura
Carlsen
Latin America Shifts Left
Lenni
Brenner
Jefferson, Madison, Bush and Religion
Anna
Ioakimedes
Brazil's Haitian Mission: Doing God's Work or Washington's?
Uri
Avnery
Widow of Opportunity?
Fred
Gardner
Supreme Court Hears Medical Pot Case
Dave
Zirin
Steroids to Heaven
Jackie
Corr
Mining Camp Blues: the Red State Variation
Don
Fitz
Will Greens Abandon IRV?
Lucy
Herschel
"Art can be a Weapon of the Oppressed": an Interview
with Artist Anthony Papa
Richard
Oxman
No Angels in America: Bashing the Gay Play
Ron
Jacobs
Holiday Greeting Card
Poets'
Basement
Collins, Albert, LaMorticella
December
3, 2004
Dave
Lindorff
Lie Then Escalate
Ben
Tripp
Fun With Boycotts: How to Shop in a
Time of Crisis
Joe
Allen
Murder in El Salvador: the Assassination of Teamster Organizer
Gilberto Soto
Matthew
B. Riley
Human Rights Court Fails Lori Berenson
Meir
Shalev
In the End, It is the Violin that Wins
Bob
Wing
The White Elephant in the Room: Race and Election 2004
Christopher
Brauchli
When McCain Bit His Tongue
Sasan
Fayazmanesh
The EU, the US, Israel and Iran
December
2, 2004
Tito
Tricot
No Justice in Chile: I'm a Torture
Survivor in a Country Where Torturers Still Run Free
Behzad
Yaghmaian
The Murder of Theo Van Gogh and Muslim Migration
Dr.
Susan Block
Lana and Me: Meetings with Remarkable Apes
Frank
/ Chowkwanyun
Liberalism and Its Bounds
Lee
Sustar
Standoff in Ukraine: the Bad v. the Corrupt
Patrick
Cockburn
Another Grim Record in Iraq
Mark
Engler
Seattle at Five
Michael
Donnelly
Something Stinks in South Bend: the Firing of Tyrone Willingham
Nate
Collins
The Bay Area Mall on an Ohlone Burial Grounds
Saul
Landau
The Assassination of Danilo Anderson
December
1, 2004
Phillip
Cryan
Associated with Whom? Rightist Bias
in Wire Coverage of Colombia
Dave
Zirin
What's the Matter with "Leon"?:
Budweiser's Racist Commercial
Ghali
Hassan
Iraq's Health Care Under the Occupation:
200 Children Die Every Day
Donna
J. Volatile
Beware Western Nations Threatening "Democracy"
Patrick
Cockburn
How Saddam Tried to Arm the Insurgency
Nick
Meo
Chemical War Over Afghanistan
Mike
Ferner
The Battle of Toledo
Mokhiber
/ Weissman
Shame and Determination on Global AIDS Day: 40 Million and Rising
Kathy
Kelly
Looking the Other Way: the Real Crimes
of the UN in Iraq
November
30, 2004
Jennifer
Van Bergen
The Veil of Secrecy
Toni
Nelson Herrera
Meeting Kurtz: When Art is a Crime
Paul
Craig Roberts
The Bush Delusions: Successful at Incompetence
Patrick
Cockburn
The Insurgency Strikes Back: There Are No Safe Havens in Iraq
Chuck
Munson
WTO Protests Five Years Later: Seattle Weekly Trashes Anti-Globalization
Movement
Adam
Williams
Citizenship Sold: Back to Business in Indiana
Gregory
Elich
A Dangerous Turn in the US Plans for
North Korea
Website
of the Day
Read Lynne Cheney's Lesbian Novel Online!
November
29, 2004
Dave
Lindorff
Blowback in Ukraine: The Hand of
the CIA?
Omar
Barghouti
"The Pianist" of Palestine:
Roadblock Concerto at Gunpoint
Mike
Whitney
The US Media and Fallujah: How to
Market a Siege
Uri
Avnery
The Abu Mazen Style: "Give Me
Some Credit!"
Matt
Vidal
Globalization and Economic Inequality: a Look at the Numbers
Patrick
Cockburn
An Interview with Iraq's Foreign
Minister
Alan
Farago
Sex Change and Salvation: God, Girly Men and Endocrine Disrupters
Justin
Huggler
Bhopal 20 Years Later
Antony
Loewenstein
How Australia Reported Arafat's Death and Legacy
Gary
Leupp
Ukraine: Poll Results Aren't the Real
Issue
Website
of the Day
Mosul: Images from a Kill Zone
November
27 / 28, 2004
Peter
Linebaugh
Torture & Neo-Liberalism with
Sycorax in Iraq
Alexander
Cockburn
What Happened to O'Reilly's Loofa?
Fred
Gardner
Ashcroft v. Raich: Medical Marijuana and the Supreme Court
Kathy
Kelly
What We Can Control
Diane
Christian
The Other Cheek: "Empire Doesn't Analyze, It Acts"
Gary
Leupp
One More Neocon Target: South (Yes, South) Korea
Lenni
Brenner
Equality and Rights of Return: Jefferson Instructs the New York
Times
Ron
Jacobs
Death Squads and Iraq's Elections: the Mysterious Murders of
the AMS Clerics
Joshua
Frank
An Interview with Kevin Zeese on Nader, Kerry and the ABB Crowd
Toni
Solo
The Murder of Danilo Anderson
Saul
Landau
Fallujah, the 21st Century Guernica
JoAnn
Wypijewski
Matthew Shepard Case 6 Years Later: Why Hate Crimes Laws are
No Cure for Homophobia
Justin
Taylor
Empire's Lawless Opportunities
Amos
Harel
The Case of Captain R.
Walter
A. Davis
Tabloid Justice
Stephen
Hendricks
God's Kind of Men
Poets'
Basement
Albert, LaMorticella and Ford
November
26, 2004
Peter
Feng
Gavin Newsom: Man or Machine?
Greg
Moses
It's the White Vote, Stupid
Liaquat
Ali Khan
The Devil's Work: Bush's Minority Appointments
Michael
Mandel / Gail Davidson
Why Bush Should Be Banned from Canada: a Memo to the Ministry
of Immigration
Dave
Lindorff
Nation of Sheep, Turkey of an Election: Urkrainians Show the
Way
Gary
Corseri
When Black Friday Comes...
Paul
Craig Roberts
Whatever Happened to Conservatives?
Website
of the Day
Iraq Pipeline Watch
November
25, 2004
Willliam
Loren Katz
Giving Thanks to Whom?: "Thanks
to God We Sent 600 Heathen Souls to Hell Today"
Mitchel
Cohen
Why I Hate Thanksgiving
Mike
Ferner
An Uncommon Mom
November
24, 2004
Gila
Svirsky
License to Kill: the Example of Violence
is Set by the State
Winslow
T. Wheeler
The
Other Mess in Congress
Christopher
Brauchli
The Company He Keeps: the Syndicate of Tom Delay
Dave
Lindorff
Double Standards on Exit Polls: Hypocrisy Sans Irony
Ron
Jacobs
The Occupation of Iraq is the Root of t he Problem
Ken
Sengupta
Witnesses: War Crimes in Fallujah
Diana
Barahona
The Final Holocaust or Why I Voted for Ralph Nader
John
L. Hess
Safire the Shameless
Jason
Leopold
Did Harvard Hire (Another) War Criminal?
Jeffrey
St. Clair
The Mark of McCain: the Senator Most Likely to Start a Nuclear
War
Map
of the Day
Now and Then: 2004 v. 1860
November
23, 2004
Forrest
Hylton
Bush and Uribe at the Beach
November
22, 2004
Dave
Zirin
Fight Night in the NBA: Selective Outrage
in Detroit
Paul
Craig Roberts
On to Iran: We Won't Get Fooled Again?
Michael
Mandel / Gail Davidson
Why Bush Should be Banned from Canada
Kathie
Helmkamp
Our Son: a Marine Who Won't Kill
Ken
Sengupta
The Triangle of Death: "This is Now the Most Dangerous Place
in Iraq"
Mike
Whitney
Greenspan's Hammer
Roger
Burbach
Why They Hate Bush in Chile
Website
of the Day
Fed Up with Government Lies and Corporate Spin?
November
20 / 21, 2004
Alexander
Cockburn
The Poisoned Chalice
Todd
May
Religion, the Election and the Politics of Fear
Abbas
Ahmed Ibrahim
The Horrors of Fallujah: a First-Hand Account
Kevin
Zeese
Mishandling Nader
Landau
/ Hassen
After Arafat
Tom
Barry
The Vulcans Consolidate Power: The Rise of Stephen Hadley
Fred
Gardner
Pot Shots: Ask Dr. Todd
Justin
E.H. Smith
Triumph of the Will: the Sequel
Carl
Estabrook
Where We Are Now
Gary
Leupp
Imperial History-Making vs. Reality-Based Thought: a Dialogue
Dave
Lindorff
Apocalypse Soon
Jenna
Michelle Liut
Plans Colombia and Patriota: Wanton Wastes of Money, Manpower
and Lives
Mickey
Z.
The Granma Moses of Radical Writing: an Interview with William
Blum
Greg
Moses
The Same Old Struggle Against Imperial America
Sharon
Smith
Abortion Rights and the Election: What Now?
Ron
Jacobs
Sandwiches and Car Bombs
Ben
Tripp
Raising d'Etre: Finding Money in Hollywood These Days
Richard
Oxman
Basketbrawl Two Pointer: Iraq Rules!
Gilad
Atzmon
Politics and Jazz
Poets'
Basement
LaMorticella, Albert, Ford, & Anon.
Website
of the Day
Voice of the Forest
Hot Stories
Alexander Cockburn
Behold,
the Head of a Neo-Con!
Subcomandante
Marcos
The
Death Train of the WTO
Norman Finkelstein
Hitchens
as Model Apostate
Steve Niva
Israel's
Assassination Policy: the Trigger for Suicide Bombings?
Dardagan,
Slobodo and Williams
CounterPunch Exclusive:
20,000 Wounded Iraqi Civilians
Steve
J.B.
Prison Bitch
Sheldon
Rampton and John Stauber
True Lies: the Use of Propaganda
in the Iraq War
Wendell
Berry
Small Destructions Add Up
CounterPunch
Wire
WMD: Who Said What When
Cindy
Corrie
A Mother's Day Talk: the Daughter
I Can't Hear From
Gore Vidal
The
Erosion of the American Dream
Francis Boyle
Impeach
Bush: A Draft Resolution
Click
Here for More Stories.
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December 8, 2004
Rules of Engagement in Iraq
Rules
to Live...and Die...By
By
Col. DAN SMITH
"What difference does
it make to the dead...whether the mad
destruction is wrought under the name of totalitarianism or
the holy name of liberty and democracy."
Mahatma Gandhi
"Don't fire 'till you
see the whites of their eyes."
Attributed to William Prescott,
Battle of Bunker Hill, 1775
The stories broke within 24 hours of
each other.
First came the video recorded
by a journalist embedded with U.S. Marines of what appears to
be the execution of an unarmed, wounded Iraqi in a mosque.
Next came a video aired by
the Qatar-based Arabic television station, Al Jazeera, showing
the execution of a western woman thought to be Margaret Hassan,
the kidnapped director of CARE International in Iraq.
Then the U.S. military said
it was investigating whether three more wounded insurgents were
killed by other Marines just before the shooting that was filmed
by the embedded cameraman.
Clearly, Margaret Hassan's
murder was a calculated, unemotional ritualistic act of terror
meant to intimidate those attempting to relieve the suffering
of innocent Iraqis caught up in the violence. Those connected
in any way with her abduction and killing have been condemned
throughout the Islamic world for waging war against the innocent
in violation of all strictures of Islam as well as of the international
laws of war.
Unfortunately, the story that
four wounded and unarmed men might have been purposely killed
by Marines quickly displaced the accounts of Margaret Hassan's
murder and stifled further condemnation and thoughtful commentary
about that incident within the Islamic world. No matter how
thorough the investigation into the circumstances of the shooting
in the mosque and no matter what the findings of fact are relative
to the law of land warfare or the rules of engagement in effect,
the video of what appears to be a deliberate killing of a wounded
man will be the dominant image of the Fallujah operation. And
in that one incident, the U.S. lost another round in the struggle
to influence perceptions both in Iraq and around the world
Of course, much more is at
stake than who has scored the latest propaganda coup. Justice,
the rule of law, accountability, and the contest for humanity's
soul embodied in competing ethics of life and death, peace and
war, have reclaimed their central position in the affairs of
states and dialogue between individuals. A public that largely
had ignored the post-1973 all-volunteer military (unless a relative
or close friend had volunteered or to watch holiday or "victory"
parades following quickly-won "wars,") suddenly became
conversant with the concept and technicalities of international
law--primarily the third and fourth Geneva Conventions of 1949--because
of media coverage of detainee abuses in Abu Ghraib, in Afghanistan,
and at Guantanamo Bay. (And the longer Afghanistan and Iraq go
on, the more numerous the reports of prisoner abuse, including
incidents, observed by FBI agents and employees of the Defense
Intelligence Agency, involving members of the special Task Force
121 whose mission is finding "high value" individuals.)
The Geneva Conventions are
again central in this Fallujah action, but this time the first
convention on the "Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armies in the Field" is the primary
document setting the minimal standards of behavior toward and
care of the wounded. And because active combat could be expected
at any time, Marines also had "rules of engagement"
which they were to follow.
Starting with the First Geneva
Convention, for example, Articles 14 and 15 read in part:
- the wounded and sick of a
belligerent who fall into enemy hands shall be prisoners of war,
and the provisions of international law concerning prisoners
of war shall apply to them (Article 14);
- at all times, and particularly
after an engagement, Parties to the conflict shall, without delay,
take all possible measures to search for and collect the wounded
and sick, to protect them against pillage and ill-treatment (Article
15).
How might these directions
translate to Fallujah on that November 13?
From information in the public
domain, Marines who initially seized the building the day before
the video was filmed killed ten insurgents and wounded five.
The latter were treated and left for following units to collect
and transfer to appropriate medical or prisoner encampments--all
in accord with international law. But the system then broke down;
the wounded were not removed from the general battle area. Information
that insurgents were in the building and again posed a threat
to U.S. forces triggered a second sweep during which the dead
and wounded were re-discovered.
At this point, the mental state
of individual Marines--their personal experiences of battle and
loss, possible expectations that no insurgents would be alive
because of the previous day's action, wariness about feigned
death by still-armed insurgents and the possibility that any
bodies might be booby-trapped--becomes a critical factor. Legitimate
fear of imminent deadly assault created by the actions of even
a wounded insurgent triggers the legal right of self-defense.
But because soldiers are trained to act reflexively in active
combat and then are psychologically "pumped" by leaders
to see the enemy as evil, they are prone to err on the side of
killing. A key question thus becomes to what extent did the Marines
have time to evaluate what they saw of the wounded insurgents
in the mosque.
Also newly familiar is the
phrase "Rules of engagement" (ROE). This is the authority
for the use of force--that is, the when, where, to what end,
and against whom organized large-scale violence is employed.
How does it differ from the Geneva Conventions?
The Pentagon's Dictionary
of Military and Associated Terms, updated October 7, 2004,
defines the phrase as "Directives issued by competent military
authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations under
which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat
engagement with other forces encountered."
Army training about ROE envisions
two general circumstances for using weapons: self-defense and
to achieve mission completion. Whether ROE are "permissive"
(allowing more use of force) or "restrictive" (limited
use of force) depends on the anticipated conditions extant in
the mission--e.g., presence or absence of quantities of small
arms and light weapons; existing, organized opposition groups,
armed and unarmed; competency of local security forces, etc.
"Other forces encountered"
is very broad. It encompasses guerrilla, police, para-military,
military, and terrorists with or without national designations
or insignia. Actions or indications of imminent intent to employ
force to stop or impede U.S. forces are enough to consider any
gathering as hostile. (Another avenue is for "competent
authority" to declare a group as "hostile.")
Some ROE are included in unit
"standing operational orders" (SOP) and form the basic
structure from which adjustments are made to develop operational-specific
ROE issued to forces just prior to the start of an operation.
For example, the following replicates a pre-September 11, 2001
set of standing ROE for Joint Task Force 6, the multi-service
command at Fort Bliss, Texas that is the Defense Department's
interface with counter-drug U.S. law enforcement agencies.
Personnel WILL make every effort to avoid confrontation
or armed conflict with civilians.
Personnel MAY:
Use only the amount of force
necessary and proportional to the threat;
Use deadly force in self-defense and in defending others from
death or serious bodily injury;
Detain any person posing an imminent threat of death or serious
bodily harm, releasing them to civilian LEA [law enforcement
agents] as soon as possible;
Pursue armed persons only to defend or retrieve personnel;
Pursue unarmed forces to retrieve military equipment.
Personnel MAY NOT:
Use deadly force to protect
property;
Use deadly force if other measures would be reasonably effective;
Enter Mexico or Canada;
Participate in arrests, searches, seizures, or interrogations;
Trespass on private property.
These ROE provide for the use
of deadly force to counter deadly force as an absolute right.
They do not sanction deadly force to accomplish a mission. The
use of force for the latter purpose is conditional on the grounds
of necessity (a hostile act is imminent or has occurred) and
proportionality (reasonable in intensity, duration, and magnitude).
For example, destroying the house and livelihood of relatives
of insurgent suicide car bombers is neither necessary nor proportional;
it is vindictive.
Moreover, while remaining flexible
enough to respond to changes in the level of risk posed by operational
conditions, ROE--as illustrated by the JTF-6 rules--should be
drawn so as to discourage "mission creep" that significantly
and abruptly alters the rules under which troops operate. In
fact, ROE can serve as a brake on potential escalation in the
level and extent of violence.
A recent example of mission
creep occurred in March 2004 when U.S. Marines entered Haiti
after President Jean-Bertrand Aristide left under U.S. pressure.
Troops originally were sent to protect the U.S. embassy from
rebel bands. U.S. commanders in Haiti said their mission was
to "stabilize the country" sufficiently for Haitian
police to return to their posts, not disarm militants, while
the Pentagon said Marines would confiscate weapons. In specific
encounters, trying to disarm civilians actually could create
confrontations while in others, prudence might dictate disarming
potential belligerents as the best way to avoid the future use
of deadly force. Then the mission expanded again, moving more
toward law enforcement and new ROE that permitted use of deadly
force to protect Haitians from violence and--perhaps reflecting
criticism from inaction by U.S. forces when Baghdad fell--to
preclude rampant looting.
Another example of ROE, this
one more permissive in that it permitted violations of the airspace
of countries with which the U.S. was not at war, is found in
a Defense Department cable of September 28, 1964, regarding U.S.
air defenses over Laos early in the Vietnam War (as recounted
in Daniel Ellsberg's Pentagon Papers):
U.S. air defense forces are
authorized to engage and destroy hostile aircraft in Laos. Hot
pursuit may be conducted as necessary and feasible over Thailand
and South Vietnam.
No pursuit is authorized at
this time over North Vietnam or Cambodia except when actually
engaged in air combat. No pursuit is authorized into Communist
China.
Unless specifically directed
otherwise, U.S. air defense forces are not authorized to attack
other hostile forces or installations unless attacked first,
and then only to the extent necessary for self-defense.
As with all military considerations,
ROE should be devised to contribute to furthering the political
objectives underlying the employment of military power. These
objectives may not always be obvious, as in the case of Japan's
Self Defense Force. To avoid raising fears among its neighbors
of resurgent militarism, the Japanese constitution prohibits
dispatch of combat troops--a restrictive ROE in a nation's most
fundamental document.
Conversely, the Bush "preventive
war" doctrine could be considered a more permissive ROE
national security policy statement than any in the past (e.g.,
no first use of nuclear weapons). It is also a policy that runs
counter to the Charter of the United Nations, which the U.S.
has signed, that recognizes only the right of "national
self-defense" against an imminent threat of attack, not
some possible threat that might or might not materialize in the
indeterminate future. In some respects, the Bush doctrine has
simply elevated to national policy the Vietnam War practice of
declaring "free fire zones." Yes, there were restrictive
ROE actually printed on cards handed to every soldier that directed:
-no bombing of villages without
warning the inhabitants, even if the village was "known"
to be communist;
-no attacking of villages without
a warning even if U.S. troops had received fire from the village;
-evacuating all civilians before
a village could be declared a free fire zone.
But in practice, over time
the few restraints fell away; evacuations were incomplete; warnings
delivered by leaflet missed their intended audience (or could
not be read by the largely uneducated peasantry); ground fire
by "Viet Cong" brought immediate and massive retaliation.
And it was the perception that U.S. forces did not consider Vietnamese
lives as of equal value to U.S. lives that lost Washington the
battle for the hearts and minds of the Vietnamese and cost Vietnam
another generation of its youth.
Lastly, in Iraq and Afghanistan
today, there is a new wrinkle in ROE. While the military can
enforce discipline for violations of ROE by service members,
it is less clear who has authority to draw up and enforce ROE
on private companies that provide physical security in war zones.
By some estimates, in mid-2004 there were as many as 20,000 private
security "guards" in Iraq alone, all operating under
their own ROE which, if anything, were less restrictive than
those for coalition troops.
The sole ROE for the murderers
of Margaret Hassan seems to be to kill anyone--men, women, children,
Muslim or non-Muslim, Sunni or Shi'ite--who opposes their self-appointed
agenda. They probably will never be brought to justice. If committed
"jihadists," they will probably choose death to surrender;
if common criminals engaged in hostage-taking for profit, their
true identities may not be widely known. It is the duty of a
reconstituted Iraqi national police establishment, not foreign
troops, to pursue all those who have been involved in any of
the thirty cases in which foreigners have been kidnapped and
killed in Iraq.
Meanwhile, the U.S. government
in general needs to re-examine its diplomatic ROE with the rest
of the world while the Pentagon in particular needs to look at
its training regimen for ROE for military forces in combat. Among
the first steps ought to be the frank admission that weapons
of war, even those guided by laser or by the global positioning
system, cannot be one hundred percent on target every time and
avoid unintended casualties and destruction. This in turn should
create a strong predisposition at the national level to avoid
armed conflict altogether and not, as seems the case with respect
to Iranian and North Korean policy today, only when military
forces are overcommitted or the potential enemy might possess
and be able to use unconventional weapons.
Just as there are ROE for situations
fraught with death, there are ROE for life. Just as wartime ROE
will not always be followed, so too will humans fail in applying
the ROE of life. But if governments will resort to peace as the
first option in international and national affairs, there will
be fewer breaches of conflict-related ROE because there will
be fewer armed conflicts.
The genius of the U.S. political
revolution was to shift the locus of sovereignty and political
legitimacy from the ruler to the people. This change set the
conditions for the development of ROE for personal relationships--respect
for the fundamental dignity of all; honoring the human rights
of others; insisting on the equality of civil rights of every
person. That this development remains incomplete should be taken
as a challenge to broaden and more deeply engrain the practice
of these ROE across U.S. society and around the globe.
Col. Daniel Smith, a West Point graduate and Vietnam
veteran, is Senior Fellow on Military Affairs at the Friends
Committee on National Legislation, a Quaker lobby in the public
interest. He can be reached at: dan@fcnl.org
Weekend Edition
Features for November
27 / 28, 2004
Peter
Linebaugh
Torture & Neo-Liberalism with
Sycorax in Iraq
Alexander
Cockburn
What Happened to O'Reilly's Loofa?
Fred
Gardner
Ashcroft v. Raich: Medical Marijuana and the Supreme Court
Kathy
Kelly
What We Can Control
Diane
Christian
The Other Cheek: "Empire Doesn't Analyze, It Acts"
Gary
Leupp
One More Neocon Target: South (Yes, South) Korea
Lenni
Brenner
Equality and Rights of Return: Jefferson Instructs the New York
Times
Ron
Jacobs
Death Squads and Iraq's Elections: the Mysterious Murders of
the AMS Clerics
Joshua
Frank
An Interview with Kevin Zeese on Nader, Kerry and the ABB Crowd
Toni
Solo
The Murder of Danilo Anderson
Saul
Landau
Fallujah, the 21st Century Guernica
JoAnn
Wypijewski
Matthew Shepard Case 6 Years Later: Why Hate Crimes Laws are
No Cure for Homophobia
Justin
Taylor
Empire's Lawless Opportunities
Amos
Harel
The Case of Captain R.
Walter
A. Davis
Tabloid Justice
Stephen
Hendricks
God's Kind of Men
Poets'
Basement
Albert, LaMorticella and Ford
|