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Will the US Labor Movement Rise Again in Chicago? Or is this just a power play at the top? JoAnn Wypijewski details what's really at stake in the great showdown as some of labor's most powerful bosses threaten to quit the AFL-CIO. No-holds-barred profiles of the SIEU's Andy Stern, Hoffa of the Teamsters and the other "insurgents". Jeffrey St Clair tells the incredible saga of the $30 billion bailout of Boeing. How the scandal reached the White House and Don Rumsfeld screamed, Let the woman take the fall. Plus Alexander Cockburn on the Judy Miller story. Get the answers you're looking for in the latest subscriber-only edition of CounterPunch ... CounterPunch Online is read by millions of viewers each month! But remember, we are funded solely by the subscribers to the print edition of CounterPunch. Please support this website by buying a subscription to our newsletter, which contains fresh material you won't find anywhere else, or by making a donation for the online edition. Remember contributions are tax-deductible. Click here to make a donation. If you find our site useful please: Subscribe Now! or write CounterPunch, PO BOX 228, Petrolia, CA 95558 |
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Other Lands Have Dreams: From Baghdad to Pekin Prison by Kathy Kelly  Today's Stories July 15, 2005 Col.
Dan Smith
July 14, 2005 Jeffrey
St. Clair Subcomandante
Marcos Dave
Lindorff Joshua
Frank Jude
Wanniski Dave
Zirin Kevin
Zeese Robert
Jensen Reza
Fiyouzat Carol
Norris Website
of the Day
July 13, 2005 Brian
Cloughley George
Galloway Carlos
Fierro Sarah
Knopp Norman
Solomon Mickey
Z. Jim
Minick Pat
Williams Andrew
N. Rubin Website
of the Day
July 12, 2005 Laith
al-Saud Kara
N. Tina William
A. Cook Jack
Bratich Amina
Mire Dick
J. Reavis Kevin
Zeese Paul
Craig Roberts Website
of the Day
July 9 / 11, 2005 Alexander
Cockburn Uri
Avnery Sheldon
Rampton Bill
Christison Robert
Fisk Stephen
Winspear Saul
Landau Behrooz
Ghamari Karl
Beitel Brian
Concannon, Jr. Fred
Gardner John
Whitlow Niranjan
Ramakrishnan Lila
Rajiva Laura
Carlsen Jackie
Corr Dave
Lindorff N.
D. Jayaprakash Seth
Sandronsky Norman
Madarasz Ben
Tripp Poets'
Basement Website
of the Weekend
July 8, 2005 Paul
Craig Roberts Tariq
Ali Monica
Benderman Rick
Jahnkow Christopher
Brauchli Kim
Peterson Joshua
Frank Norman
Solomon Website
of the Day
July 7, 2005 Cockburn
/ St. Clair John
Walsh Mike
Marqusee Gilad
Atzmon Nicole
Colson Jack
Random Norman
Solomon Len
Colodny Cockburn
/ St. Clair
July 6, 2005 Elaine
Cassel Sean
Donahue Jeremy
R. Hammond Joshua
Frank Ali
Khan Michael
Dickinson Norman
Solomon Dave
Zirin Gary
Leupp Website
of the Day
July 5, 2005 Behrooz
Ghamari Elaine
Cassel Ron
Jacobs Bob
Libal Dr.
Peter Rost Mark
Engler Gideon
Levy Dave
Zirin Sameer
Dossani
July 2 / 4, 2005 Alexander
Cockburn Lenni
Brenner Laura
Carlsen James
Petras William
A. Cook Brian
Cloughley Saul
Landau Tom
Crumpacker Greg
Moses Dr.
Susan Block Fran
Shor Fred
Gardner Moshe
Adler David
Model Seth
Sandronsky Ramzy
Baroud Suzan
Mazur Ben
Tripp Justin
Taylor Brendan
Bailey Poets'
Basement Website
of the Weekend
July 1, 2005 Christopher
Brauchli Pat
Williams Gary
Leupp John
Stauber John
Chuckman Justicia
y Paz Cockburn
/ St. Clair
June 30, 2005 Kathy
Kelly John
Stauber Virginia
Rodino Jason
Leopold Dave
Lindorff Greg
Moses Norman
Solomon Joshua
Frank Alexander
Cockburn
June 29, 2005 Mike
Schaefer Roger
Burbach / Paul Cantor Sharon
Smith Sam
Husseini John
Stauber Ahmad
Faruqui Linda
S. Heard Stew
Albert Ray
McGovern
June 28, 2005 Paul
Craig Roberts Landau
/ Hassen John
A. Murphy Mike
Whitney CounterPunch
News Service Dave
Zirin Dave
Lindorff Patrick
Cockburn
June 27, 2005 Paul
Craig Roberts Mike
Marqusee Mark
Scaramella Leigh
Saavedra Kathy
Kelly
June 25 / 26, 2005 Alexander
Cockburn Jennifer
Van Bergen George
Corsetti Mark
Chmiel / Andrew Wimmer Kevin
Zeese P.
Sainath John
Stauber Scott
Handleman Tom
Barry John
Walsh Justin
E.H. Smith Alan
Wallis Ben
Tripp Frederick
B. Hudson Poets'
Basement
June 24, 2005 Ray
McGovern Jorge
Mariscal Desiree
Hellegers Zeynep
Toufe Joshua
Frank David
Lindorff Michael
Neumann Website
of the Day
June 23, 2005 Christopher
Brauchli Clay
Conrad Standard
Schaefer P.
Sainath Mark
Engler Norman
Solomon Cockburn
/ St. Clair Kathy
Kelly
June 22, 2005 Kevin
Zeese William
S. Lind Arsalan
Iftikhar Dan
Nagengast David
Krieger Kathleen
& Bill Christison
June 21, 2005 Brian Cloughley Mike Whitney Dave Lindorff Mark Weisbrot Matthew R.
Simmons Dave Zirin Virginia Rodino Paul Craig
Roberts
June 20, 2005 Alan Maass Tariq Ali Mickey Z. William Blum Gary Leupp Jason Leopold Dave Lindorff Alan Maass Uri Avnery Website of
the Day
Hot Stories Alexander Cockburn Subcomandante
Marcos Norman Finkelstein Steve Niva Dardagan,
Slobodo and Williams Steve
J.B. Sheldon
Rampton and John Stauber Wendell
Berry CounterPunch
Wire Cindy
Corrie Gore Vidal Francis Boyle
Subscribe Online
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July 15, 2005 If Vietnam was a Quagmire, Iraq is a Black HoleGeneral Abizaid, I'm Glad You AskedBy Col. DAN SMITH In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on June 23, General John Abizaid, head of Central Command, told the committee: "Maybe it's something we're not doing right in the field. But I can tell you that when my soldiers ask me the question whether or not they've got support from the American people or not, that worries me. And they're starting to do that. So I would say we better have a frank discussion with ourselves. I am not against the debate." Combined with Abizaid's acknowledgement that the insurgent and resistance fighters in Iraq are as strong as they were six months ago, this statement is a remarkably candid warning to U.S. politicians that the present course of U.S. Iraq policy is in trouble. I would expect nothing less than absolute candor from Abizaid and the public should accept nothing less from everyone in the Bush administration. Unfortunately, Abizaid and the public received no real discussion, no direction other than "stay the course" from the president on June 28. It was the same message from General Richard Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on July 12 on Jim Lerher's "Newshour." Thus being equally candid if there is to be meaningful dialogue, it will have to be with the public and in public. Such would be a rare but most apropos development. After all, the people are the ultimate authority and hold ultimate power in a democracy. And while I do not claim to represent the U.S. body politic, someone has to be willing to start the conversation with Abizaid. So... Perhaps the first point is to reassure soldiers that, overall, their battlefield performance reflects well their technical training and their adaptability to changes in the tactics of their opponents. But while U.S. firepower can always carry the day, it is not carrying the Iraqi population or, increasingly, the U.S. population. What is painfully clear, more than 27 months after the U.S.-led coalition invaded Iraq, is that there are not enough security forces to hold Iraqi towns and villages and even some sections of Baghdad once an operation ends. This flies in the face of every modern counterinsurgency experience; it is documented in official reports and accounts of soto voce comments by villagers talking to reporters. The people know from experience that without a steady presence of coalition or trained and equipped government security units, once an operation ends, it will not be long before insurgents resurface. Moreover, the lack of sufficient numbers of security forces leads to heavy reliance on "search and destroy" operations which, in addition to the physical havoc caused, are hardly conducive to winning the hearts and minds of ordinary Iraqis. If it is true that the Iraqi population does not support the terror, then coalition forces and political leaders are not focused on the decisive "center of gravity" of their armed opposition when conducting these punitive sweeps. For the locals, the extent of cooperation with either side becomes a life and death decision especially if government forces are seen to be as ruthless as the resistance. When a population is beset by armed groups trying to intimidate and turn the people against their government, the government must ensure that any military response it undertakes scrupulously observes human rights and international agreements protecting noncombatants and combatants alike. The next two points are related to the first. In response to calls to send more U.S. troops to Iraq, the Pentagon and the White House fall back on the excuse that the field generals you and General Casey have not called for more troops. But what never is spelled out convincingly is the reason(s) for not asking for more when the intuitive reaction would be an increase in troop strength on the ground. You can say that the Iraqis are the ones who need to respond and field a larger security force a process underway. You can say that more U.S. troops would simply provide more targets for the resistance. As valid as these points may be, and as real as are those Iraqis who do stand against the terror strikes, all of this is discounted when the U.S. public reads that Iraqi police, ill-equipped and outgunned by insurgents, leave their posts (or never get there) at the first indication of an attack. What response is there to those who ask: "If Iraqis will not stay and fight for their country's future, why should foreign forces fight and die?" Then there is the suspicion that CENTCOM has been told that the personnel well is dry. That is to say, there are no more active, reserve, and National Guard units of the type needed (e.g., infantry, transportation, military police, civil affairs, aviation) that can be rotated into Iraq without subverting policies on intervals between combat tours. And while surges in troop strength will happen in anticipation of milestones (e.g., elections) or in reaction to events, changing the policy is not an option because, among other considerations, it would depress further the steep decline in new enlistments for the active duty Army. (June's achievement, after falling short four months in a row, may be an anomaly.) In this context, the active duty Army's reorganization from 33 to 43 brigades appears more like simply rearranging the pawns on the chessboard than a real change. The recruiting shortfalls have led to speculation about and calls for resuming the draft, either on its own or as part of a larger mandatory national service program. In this regard, the illegal activities of a few recruiters, the pressures on them, the large monetary bonuses as much as $70,000 for joining the military, and the imposition of "stop-loss," extended tours, and mobilization of thousands of soldiers in the Individual Ready Reserve suggest that in Iraq, as in Vietnam, something important is being concealed from the public. Add in administration actions that amount to data-mining on the 16-25 year-old population for the purpose of increased targeted recruiting, and the public has more reason to suspect that the truth is being concealed just as the very existence of the data-mining operation was not reported, as required by law, for more than three years. In a phrase, truth once again has become a casualty in this war. Whether it is a fatality or "only" wounded depends, unfortunately for the military, on how candid the administration will be over the next half year. You will recall that at the end of the Paris talks about U.S. disengagement from Vietnam, a U.S. colonel observed that the North Vietnamese had never won on the battlefield to which a North Vietnamese officer replied that this was immaterial in that the U.S. was leaving, not the North Vietnamese. In Vietnam neither the various Saigon regimes nor U.S. troops ever won the psychological war. This failure set the stage for the collapse of the entire effort as the public rebelled against the whole enterprise. The same possibility exists in Iraq, as evidenced by the Iraqi who lamented: "We have transformed from a dictatorship into something far worse. We have lost our country." (Los Angeles Times, June 24, 2005) Living conditions are far worse today than before the invasion; billions of dollars have disappeared, regime-induced violence, targeted against regime opponents, has given way to massive, unpredictable violence which is much more stressful and is compounded by sometimes heavy-handed reaction by Iraqi authorities or coalition forces. If Vietnam was a quagmire,
Iraq is a black hole that is sucking lives and treasure and talent
into its maw. And as already noted, as in Vietnam, it is tearing
at the public's trust in the government and the veracity of administration
officials. Richard Nixon had a secret plan to end the Vietnam
War; many today believe George Bush has no plan other than to
"stay the course" for as long as one terrorist remains
alive and free. As far as the U.S. public ever knew, Nixon's
plan if it existed at all was to bomb North Vietnam
back to the Stone Age (or some approximation thereof), if necessary,
to force Hanoi to come to the negotiating table on U.S. terms.
In Iraq, "staying the course" is nothing more than
"Iraqization," replacing coalition forces and coalition
(especially U.S.) casualties with Iraqis. Another assault on truth is the "happy news" syndrome that manifests itself in congressional pronouncements and administration announcements. The daily press briefings in Saigon at 5:00 pm were so transparently a farce they were nicknamed the "five o'clock follies." The nearest equivalents today are the Pentagon press briefings, but these are not held everyday. Nonetheless, Vietnam's false assurance of a "light at the end of the tunnel" is matched by "we've turned the corner," or "we've broken the back of the insurgency," or the insurgents are "dead-enders about to reach the end of the line," or the "insurgency is in its last throes." All are serious misjudgments at best, intentional obfuscation at worst. Yet, again, the worst case seems the operational one. Every reason propounded by those favoring the war has been confounded by careful investigation by the U.S.-led Iraq Survey Group, interrogations, or other means. Among the latter is a series of nine pre-March 19, 2003 British cabinet-level memos addressing London's view of the Bush administration's evolving policy to go to war with Saddam. By June 2002, the British were convinced that Bush would go to war. Significantly, they also noted that intelligence would be molded to fit policy. Politically, it is true that the Iraqis have been in charge of running their country for a year and a half (since January 28, 2004). But with foreign military forces still numbering 160,000, with the transitional government taking three months to organize itself and elect constitutional drafters, with the government and national assembly having to work inside the highly defended "Green Zone" because physical security is so unpredictable, are the Iraqis really in charge of anything? Most observers would, I suspect, heavily qualify that assertion. So... Given the above, General Abizaid's response to the litany of concerns, misjudgments, missteps, misanalyses, exaggerations, and at least a few lies might well be similar to another part of his Senate testimony: "We that are fighting the war think it's a war worth fighting but we can't win the war without your support and without the support of our people." Undoubtedly, senior officers would agree, if for no other reason than to maintain troop morale. In principle, many others would agree; after all, who would oppose elections, freedom, liberty, and the other accoutrements of a market democracy? Actually, there would be many, or many who would reject parts of this package or possibly wish to suspend certain features for a few years. For example, most Iraqis would reject attempts to separate Islam from the functioning of government. Islam is woven into the fabric of daily life in many countries, forming and directing the activities of believers. Without Islam, Arab culture atrophies not news to Abizaid who is a scholar of all things Islamic and Arabian, but easily a revelation to key members in the U.S. political hierarchy. In other words, other than to maintain unit spirit in a difficult situation, what is important is not what the U.S. commanders and soldiers on the ground think about the war. What the Iraqi people think, what they hold as "worth it," ought to be the determining factor. It is their country; the U.S. invaded and occupied it, has killed many thousands of Iraqis and injured many more thousands, all without showing any concrete intention of leaving (although showing quite a bit of concrete for permanent bases for U.S. forces). Given sentiment in Iraq today, declaring a clear intention to withdraw all U.S. troops and bases from Iraq could well be the key to really ameliorating armed opposition and separating the nationalist-inspired Iraqi resistance from hard-core perpetrators of terror and in winning the support of Congress and the U.S. public for a policy under which foreign forces withdraw without foreign countries abandoning Iraq. Iraq's ultimate future, like that of all nation-states, lies in the political realm, and insofar as its future poses political uncertainty, it must search for or devise a political path that can remove this uncertainty. But after nearly 25 years of continuous warfare, the Iraqi people expected to have seen much less war and more political progress as a result of regime change in Baghdad. This failure to meet a not unreasonable expectation may, in the end, be the catalyst that accelerates the departure of coalition forces, with the Iraqis finally resuming full sovereignty in their land. Five and a half months after Iraq's January 2005 parliamentary election, forbearance is thin. As one Iraqi observed: "We sacrificed our soul and went out to vote. What did we get? Simply nothing." It's time to give them something. Col. Daniel Smith, a West Point graduate and Vietnam
veteran, is Senior Fellow on Military Affairs at the Friends
Committee on National Legislation, a Quaker lobby in the public
interest. He can be reached at: dan@fcnl.org
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