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November 4,
2000
Rob Simmons,
the CIA, and
the Issue of War Crimes in Vietnam
The Spook Who
Would Be a Congressman
By Douglas Valentine
Congressional candidate Robert
Simmons vehemently denies that he committed war crimes while
serving as a CIA officer in South Vietnam. According to
the five-term state representative from Stonington, Connecticut,
the charges amount to "character assassination."
"Any veteran,
anybody who served his country in war, should be offended,"
Simmons claims.
The specific charge
against Simmons is that he routinely violated the Geneva Conventions
while interrogating civilian prisoners during his 20 months of
service with the CIA in Vietnam. The charge stems from
a profile of Simmons published by the New London Day in May 1994.
In that profile Simmons said he would threaten to withhold medicine
from injured prisoners, in order to obtain information, but that
he would never actually make good on the threat. According
to Simmons, such coercive
tactics are perfectly legitimate and do not reach the threshold
of a war crime.
On the contrary,
"If I hadn't involved myself, many people would have lost
their limbs or their lives," Simmons said in May 1994.
But Simmons, who is a Lector at his Episcopal
Church, has not been totally forthcoming about his CIA activities
in South Vietnam. His reticence, notably, is partly a result
of non-disclosure agreements he has with the CIA and Senate.
These secrecy agreements prevent him from divulging certain types
of information, such as names of his colleagues and informants,
and the "methods" he used.
While these secrecy
laws restrict Simmons in certain respects, they also protect
him from the type of public scrutiny that might resolve, once
and for all, the question of his involvement in war crimes in
Vietnam. Without access to CIA records and reports, there
is no way to determine what Simmons did or did not do in
Vietnam.
However, based on
information and documents Simmons provided to this writer in
an interview conducted in September 1988, there is evidence that
his involvement in questionable activities was greater than he
publicly admits.
This is a most sensitive
subject that requires factual background information.
From November 1970 until June 1972, Rob Simmons
served as a CIA officer in Tuy Hoa, the capitol city of Phu Yen,
a coastal province in South Vietnam's Military Region II.
His job was twofold, and involved both "liaison" with
the South Vietnamese special police, as well as mounting and
conducting "paramilitary" operations.
As the liaison officer
and advisor to the special police, Simmons assisted his Vietnamese
counterpart in identifying civilian members of the Viet Cong
Infrastructure (the VCI) and in penetrating their organization
with "double agents." He also advised the special
police chief of the Phu Yen Province Interrogation Center, located
in Tuy Hoa.
With the assistance
of Simmons, suspected members of the VCI, including women and
youngsters, had their names placed on a blacklist and were subjected
to surveillance by the special police. If they appeared
to be doing something suspicious, or if they were accused by
an anonymous informer, the suspects could be arrested and held
in the Interrogation Center, in "administrative detention,"
for as long as two years, without any access to due process.
If they survived their interrogations, prisoners were eventually
brought before the Province Security Committee, a non-judicial
body that disposed of captured VCI.
During the Vietnam War there were repeated allegations
that innocent people were being tortured in CIA Provincial Interrogation
Centers, including the one in Tuy
Hoa. As a result, several U.S. Congresspersons traveled
to Vietnam to investigate the situation. Their investigation
culminated in 1971 with Congressional Hearings. At
the end of these Hearings, U.S. Representatives Paul McCloskey,
John Conyers, Bella Abzug and Ben Rosenthal stated their belief
that "The people of these United
Stateshave deliberately imposed upon the Vietnamese people a
system of justice which admittedly denies due process of law,"
and that in doing so, "we appear to have
violated the 1949 Geneva Convention for the protection of civilian
people."
They also stated
their belief that "torture is a regularly accepted part
of interrogation," and that "U.S. civilian and military
personnel have participated for over three years in the deliberate
denial of due process of law to thousands of people held in secret
interrogation centers built with U.S. dollars."
Congressman Ogden
Reid asked CIA Director William Colby if any CIA officers had
ever resigned on the grounds that they could not be morally satisfied
that they were identifying, interrogating, and in some cases
assassinating the right individuals. Colby replied that
not one CIA officer had ever resigned.
Although the CIA
acknowledged that it funded the special police and the interrogation
centers - one of which existed in each of South Vietnam's
44 provinces -- it refused to acknowledge or accept responsibility
for the torture that occurred in those facilities.
Rob Simmons likewise absolves himself of responsibility
for any abuses that occurred at the Phu Yen Province Interrogation
Center. He said he never let himself
get into the sort of "untenable situations" that prompted
the four members of Congress to conclude that the interrogation
centers, which the CIA built and maintained,
were de-facto torture chambers.
In the absence of
any documentary evidence, it is impossible to know what really
happened at the Phu Yen Province Interrogation Center.
The CIA will never
make public whatever records it has in this regard.
However, there is
documentary evidence that, as the CIA's paramilitary advisor
in Phu Yen Province, Rob Simmons mounted operations that were
designed to kill specific "targeted" members of the
VCI.
Prior to arriving in Vietnam, Simmons had received
intensive training in paramilitary operations. He knew
how to handle weapons and make bombs, in order to
efficiently kill people and blow things up, and in this "paramilitary"
capacity he worked with Phu Yen's Provincial Reconnaissance Units,
or PRU.
Like the special
police interrogation centers, the PRU were a creation of the
CIA. But while the job of the special police was to identify
and "turn" VCI into double agents in the interrogation
centers, it was the job of the PRU teams to identify, capture,
and kill VCI, depending on the circumstances.
Throughout the Vietnam
War, the PRU were accused of rampant war crimes. Called
"The CIA's Hired Killers" by acclaimed journalist Georgie
Anne Geyer, the PRU were recruited by CIA "talent scouts"
from South Vietnam's minority ethnic and social groups.
PRU teams were composed mostly of Chinese Nungs, Montagnards,
Muslim Chams, Cambodians, convicts and former VC. The one
thing they had in common was a complete lack of any personal
connection to Vietnamese community --
and the ability to assassinate without remorse.
As the CIA's paramilitary
officer, Rob Simmons worked with the Phu Yen PRU teams, which
in 1971 and 1972 were still funded by the CIA. Simmons
used PRU files and sources to develop intelligence on targeted
individuals, and in return, he let the PRU use his radio.
But the PRU teams were controversial, so Simmons was instructed
to develop his own "special action" paramilitary unit
for capturing and killing individual VCI.
Simmons likened
this aspect of his job to "fishing for bluefish. When
you're fishing for bluefish, you need a bluefish lure and bluefish
bait. Going after the VCI is the same thing."
During the interview with this writer in 1988,
Simmons produced reports of paramilitary operations in Phu Yen
Province. One of the reports tells how a special police
team killed three VCI in November 1970. Based on information
provided by an anonymous informer, the VCI were ambushed at night
while digging a spider hole
outside Vinh Phu hamlet. One of the people killed was Nguyen
Van Toan, described as the Secretary of the Communist Party Chapter
Committee and chairman of the
Village People's Revolutionary Committee. Toan was 20 years old
and a native of Vinh Phu hamlet.
As a result of this
operation, Simmons was directed to develop the region's paramilitary
capability. In response he created the prototype "special
action" team in Military Region II. Called the Special
Intelligence Force Unit (SIFU) it was formed and trained in October
and November of 1971. Recruits came from five nearby districts.
All were volunteers from the special police and the National
Police Field Forces. Eventually there were six teams, each
team consisting of four men from the special police, and four
men from the National Police Field Forces. The Phu Yen
SIFU detachment, which had its own facility, was commanded by
special police officer Nguyen Van Quy, and was advised and funded
by Rob Simmons.
Simmons did not
say if he accompanied the SIFU team on its missions, but in order
to command respect, CIA paramilitary officers routinely did go
on missions.
Documents provided
by Simmons indicate the SIFU had continued success. In
a report dated December 1971, the National Police Commander in
Phu Yen Province discussed several recent SIFU operations.
Colonel Nam specifically used the word "exterminate"
to describe one particular mission, in which two VCI were killed
in an ambush.
As another example of SIFU effectiveness, Simmons
provided this writer with a copy of a 29 January 1972 letter
he sent to one of his superiors. The letter was a request
for awards and medals for the members of the SIFU who had participated
in "the recent Lien Tri operation."
The Lien Tri operation
began on 26 January 1972, when an anonymous informer reported
to the special police that elements of the Tuy Hoa City Party
Committee Action Team were planning to enter Lien Tri hamlet
to build secret hiding places in preparation for an attack against
Tuy Hoa and its northern suburbs. According to the letter
provided by Simmons, the SIFU moved into the area the following
day to intercept the VC Action Team. At 9:00 pm four VC,
three women, and seven youths were seen digging a hole.
They were "taken under fire." Killed were Trinh
Tan Luc, Tuy Hoa Party Committee member, and Nguyen Dung, Tuy
Hoa Current Affairs Committee.
Under South Vietnamese
law, it was perfectly legal for CIA officer Simmons to target
these South Vietnamese civilians for assassination. Indeed,
these two VCI had organized a recent attack on Tuy Hoa, and Simmons
was especially happy to have eliminated them. The operation
was over by 11:00pm.
"This operation
epitomizes the type operation we encourage the police to run
against the VC/VCI in Phu Yen province," Simmons reported
to his boss. "The special police prepared detailed
information on the individual VC, tasked their local sources
for information on the individuals targeted which was of immediate
value and then were able to mount a strike force which was sufficiently
well-equipped to effectively react to the information in a timely
manner. The results speak for themselves."
Prior to leaving Vietnam in June 1972, Simmons conducted one
last major operation in Phu Yen. In the spring of 1972
the North Vietnamese Army and the VCI launched an offensive against
the South Vietnamese government and military. A bridge
in Phu Yen was a major target, as were CIA and special police
installations. Binh Dinh Province, directly north of Phu
Yen, was overrun by enemy forces, which were advancing on Tuy
Hoa.
As Simmons recalls, everyone was in a panic.
For several harrowing days they were cut-off from the rest of
Military Region II. Simmons himself spent one night alone
in the compound monitoring the radio, and the next day he helped
move reinforcements and "re-supply" across the Tuy
Hoa beachhead. It was touch and go, and even after
the main attacks were repulsed, Simmons and his CIA colleagues
were confronted with a dangerous situation. Tens of thousands
of refugees were fleeing Binh Dinh Province, and the VCI were
using the refugees as cover to smuggle in their own assassins.
CIA officers had been targeted for assassination in Binh Dinh,
and intelligence reports indicated that the CIA officers in Phu
Yen were next on the list.
There was tremendous
fear and apprehension, but Simmons and the SIFU saved the day.
Documents captured in March, during an SIFU operation, revealed
that the VC were infiltrating Tuy Hoa in Lambros.
"So,"
Simmons explains, "we rolled them up and we put them all
in the PIC. That's fifteen to twenty people.
"We interrogated
the Lambro drivers," he continues, "and learned they
had all been conscripted. They were bringing VC cadres
posing as farmers into Tuy Hoa. The Lambros were driven
by VCI, including a few women. They had weapons hidden
under seats, to attack government offices."
As a CIA officer, Rob Simmons traveled 12,000
miles to take the lives of Vietnamese men and women in their
own backyards. He did so unflinchingly.
""I'm
a poor farm girl," he says, mocking a woman he had in the
PIC. "So we released her and watched her for three
months, and then we put her name in the paper. Arresting and
watching suppressed her. It suppressed the organization
too."
What Simmons is
describing is psychological warfare - the application of
terror to subdue people.
Terror is what Simmons
took to his enemies, in the secret war between the CIA and subversives
in South Vietnam. But the effects of psychological warfare
are insidious and one must wonder if, as a Congressman, Rob Simmons
might apply the same tactics in the United States that he applied
in South Vietnam? If Simmons was willing to deny suspected
subversives due process in South Vietnam, might he not deny due
process to suspected subversives here? Will he apply, in
America, the psychological warfare tactics he learned in Vietnam?
When asked about
the morality of interrogation centers and hit teams, he said,
"Most of what we did was benign."
He admits only to
negligent cruelties, and there is very little evidence to contradict
what he says.
To some extent,
the lack of evidence is attributable to Simmons himself.
As Staff Director of the Senate's Select Committee on Intelligence,
a position he held for over three years, he helped sponsor the
Agency Identities Bill, making it illegal to name CIA officers.
To this day he is required to clear anything he publishes with
the
CIA and the Senate.
This fact raises
the issue of his ability to function as a representative of the
citizens of Connecticut's 2nd congressional district. Can
the voters be certain they know everything they need to know
about him? Can they be certain he is free to speak his
mind?
If it is true, as Simmons says, that "Politicians
Don't Belong In The Classroom," then perhaps CIA officers
do not belong in the legislative process? How can anyone
know for sure they aren't playing a double game?
Indeed, unless Simmons
submits to the democratic process, and fully discloses, explains,
and justifies his past actions, in the legal and moral context
in which they occurred, he is, by his own hand, disqualified
from holding public office.
Congessman Sam Gejdenson,
a liberal Democrat, has represented the 2nd Congressional District
of Connecticut since 1981. On Thursday, November 3rd, Gejdenson
fired two campaign workers for inciting students at Wesleyan
University to charge that Simmons had committed war crimes.
Douglas Valentine (douglasvalentine.com)
is the author of The
Phoenix Program and the recently published novel about Vietnam,
TDY.
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