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CounterPunch
October
26, 2002
Is America Becoming
Fascist?
by ANIS SHIVANI
Since mainstream left-liberal media do not seriously
ask this question, the analysis of what has gone wrong and where
we are heading has been mostly off-base. Investigation of the
kinds of under-handed, criminal tactics fascist regimes undertake
to legitimize their agenda and accelerate the rate of change
in their favor is dismissed as indulging in "conspiracy
theory." Liberals insist that this regime must be treated
under the rules of "politics as usual." But this doesn't
consider that one election has already been stolen, and that
September's repeat of irregularities in Florida was a clear warning
that more such thuggery is on the way. If the "f" word
is uttered, liberals are quick to note certain obvious dissimilarities
with previous variants of fascism and say that what is happening
in America is not fascist. It took German justice minister Herta
Daeubler-Gmelin to make the comparison explicit (under present
American rules of political discourse, she has been duly sacked
from her cabinet post); but at the liberal New York Times
or The Nation, American writers dare not speak the truth.
The blinkered assertion that we are immune
to the virus ignores degrees of convergence and distinction based
on the individual patient's history. The Times and other
liberal voices have been obsessed over the last year with the
rise of minority fascist parties in the Netherlands, France,
and other European countries. They have questioned the tastefulness
of new books and movies about Hitler, and again demonized such
icons of Nazism as Leni Riefenstahl. Is this perhaps a displacement
of American anxiety onto the safer European scene, liberal intellectuals
here not wanting to confront the troubling truth? The pace of
events in the last year has been almost as blindingly fast as
it was after Hitler's Machtergreifung and the consolidation
of fascist power in 1933. Speed stuns and silences.
Max Frankel, former editor of the
Times, quotes from biographer Joachim Fest in his review
of Speer: The Final Verdict: " . . .how easily, given
appropriate conditions, people will allow themselves to be mobilized
into violence, abandoning the humanitarian traditions they have
built up over centuries to protect themselves from each other,"
and that a "primal being" such as Hitler "will
always crop up again." Is Frankel really redirecting his
anxiety about the primal being that has arisen in America? When
Frankel says that "Speer far more than Hitler [because the
former came from a culturally refined background] makes us realize
how fragile these precautions are, and how the ground on which
we all stand is always threatened," is this an oblique reference
to the ground shifting from under us?
The proposed Iraqi adventure, which is
only the first step in a more ambitious militarist agenda, has
been opposed by the most conservative warmongers of past administrations.
If the test of any theory is its predictive capacity, Bush's
extreme risk-taking is better explained by the fascist model.
Purely economic motives are a large part of the story, but there
is a deeper derivation that exceeds such mundane rationales.
Several of the apparent contradictions in Bush's governance make
perfect sense if the fascist prism is applied, but not with the
normal perspective.
To pose the question doesn't mean that
this is a completed project; at any point, anything can happen
to shift the course of history in a different direction. Yet
after repeated and open corruption of the normal electoral process,
several declarations of world war (including in three major addresses,
and now the National Security Strategy document), adventurous
and unprecedented military doctrines, suspension of much of the
Bill of Rights, and clear signals that a declaration of emergency
to crush remaining dissent is on the way, surely it is time to
analyze the situation differently.
Absent that perspicacity, false diagnoses
and prescriptions will continue. It is fine to be concerned about
tyrannous Muslim regimes, and surely they need to set their own
house in order, but not now, not in this context, and not under
the auspices of the American fascist regime. Liberals don't yet
realize, or fail to admit, that they may have been condemned
to irrelevance for quite some time; the death blow against even
mild welfare statism might already have been struck.
The similarities between American fascism
and particularly the National Socialist precedent, both historical
and theoretical, are remarkable. Fascism is home, it is here
to stay, and it better be countered with all the intellectual
resources at our disposal.
American fascism is tapping into the
perennial complaint against liberalism: that it doesn't provide
an authentic sense of belonging to the majority of people. And
that is a criticism difficult to dismiss out of hand. As the
language of liberalism has become flat and predictable, some
Americans have become more ready to accept an alternative, no
matter how ridiculous, as long as it sounds vigorous and muscular.
America today is seeking a return to
some form of vitalism, some organic, volkisch order that
will "unite" the blue and red states in an eternal
Volkgemeinschaft; is in a state of perpetual war and militaristic
aggression targeting all potential counters to hegemony; has
been coercing and blackmailing its own victims and oppressed
(justified by anti-political correctness rhetoric) to return
to a mythical national consensus; has introduced surveillance
technology to demolish the private sphere to an extent unimaginable
in the recent past; and fetishizes technology as the futuristic
solution to age-old ills of alienation and mistrust.
And we are right in the mainstream of
the Western philosophical and political tradition in this subtle
(overnight?) transformation. Liberal democracy was replaced by
Mussolini by these two Holy Trinities: Believe, Obey, Fight,
and Order, Authority, Justice. These slogans seem to replace
every liberal system sooner or later. Italian propagandistic
slogans included: War is to man as childbirth is to woman, and
Better to live one day as a lion than a hundred years as a sheep.
Sooner or later, the mob is persuaded that fascism best addresses
its unfulfilled spiritual and psychological needs. Sooner or
later there is a Hitler, and even if there isn't a leader as
charismatic as him, there is an anti-modernity counter-revolution.
The enlightenment everywhere has contained
the seeds of its own destruction. Fascism merely borrows from
the enlightenment's credo that violence may sometimes be necessary
to achieve valid political ends, and that human reason alone
can lead humanity to utopia. Is Nazism an absolute aberration?
Is America totally immune to fascism? Then we might as well discredit
Rousseau's "general will," Hegel's historical spirit,
Goethe and Schelling's romanticization of nature and genius,
Darwin's natural selection, and Nietzsche's superman. When all
is said and done, a Kant or Mill is never a match for a Nietzsche
or Sorel. Industrial malaise (now post-industrial disorder),
evaded by the dead-ends and delusions of liberalism, leads only
to a romantic revolution, which is fine as long as it is in the
hands of Byron, Keats, Carlyle, Ruskin and Arnold, but becomes
eventually converted to a propaganda-saturated Third Way. Since
liberalism doesn't take up the challenge, fascism steps in to
say that it offers an answer to centrifugal difference and lack
of common purpose, and that it will dare to link industrial prosperity
with communal goals.
How great a deviation from the roots
of the enlightenment, the foundations of its self-justification,
is the Manichean demonization of enemies, aliens, impure races,
and barbaric others? America today wants to be communal and virile;
it seeks to overcome what is presented by propagandists as the
unreasonable demands for affirmative action and reparations by
minorities and women; it wants to revalorize nation and region
and race to take control of the future; it seeks to remold the
nation through propaganda and charismatic leadership, into overcoming
the social divisiveness of capitalism and democracy.
We have our own nationalist myths that
our brand of fascism taps right into. In that sense, America
is not exceptional. In the near future, America can be expected
to embark on a more radical search to define who is not part
of the natural order: exclusion, deportation, and eventually
extermination, might again become the order of things. Of course,
we can notice obvious differences from the German nationalist
tradition: but that is precisely the task of scholars to delineate,
rather than pretend that fascism occurred only in Italy and Germany
and satellite states in the first half of the century, and occurs
today only in Europe in minor movements that have no chance of
gaining political supremacy.
It is wrong to pretend that fascism takes
hold only in the midst of extreme economic depression or political
chaos. (A perception of crisis or instability is indispensable
to realizing fascism, however.) Fascism can emerge when things
are not all that bad economically, politically, and culturally.
The surprise about Weimar Germany is how well the political system
was at times working, with proportional representation (almost
an ideal of strong democracy theorists) providing political expression
for a full range of ideologies. Germany was economically strong,
an industrial powerhouse, despite having had to overcome massive
disabilities imposed by the Versailles Treaty. In the early thirties,
Hitler's rise was facilitated by massive unemployment (perhaps
forty percent of Germans were unemployed), but this was a phenomenon
throughout the Western world.
The key point to note is that at many
junctures along the way, it was possible that Hitler's rise might
never have happened. And that the elites accepted Hitler as the
best possible option. All this makes Hitler and Nazism unexceptional.
The basic paradigm remains more or less intact: we only have
to account for variations in the American model. Capitalism today
is different, so are the postmodern means of propaganda, and
so are the technological tools of suppression. Besides, American
foundational myths vary from European ones, and the romanticism
propounded by Goethe, Schelling, Wagner and Nietzsche contrasts
with a different kind of holistic urge in America. But that is
only a matter of variation, not direct opposition. Liberals who
say that demographics work against a Republican majority in the
early twenty-first century do have a point; but fascism can occur
precisely at that moment of truth, when the course of political
history can definitely tend to one direction or another. A mere
push can set things on a whole different course, regardless of
underlying cultural or demographic trends. Nazism never had the
support of the majority of Germans; at best about a third fully
supported it. About a third of Americans today are certifiably
fascist; another twenty percent or so can be swayed around with
smart propaganda to particular causes. So the existence of liberal
institutions is not necessarily inconsistent with fascism's political
dominance.
With all of Germany's cultural strength,
brutality won out; the same analysis can apply to America. Hitler
never won clear majorities; yet once he was in power, he crushed
all dissent. Consider the parallels to the fateful election of
2000. Hitler's ascent to power was facilitated by the political
elites; again, note the similarities to the last two years. Hitler
took advantage of the Reichstag fire to totally change the shape
of German institutions and culture; think of 9/11 as a close
parallel. Hitler was careful to give the impression of always
operating under legal cover, even for the most massive offenses
against humanity; note again the similarity of a pseudo-legal
shield for the actions of the American fascists. One can go on
and on in this vein.
If we look at Stanley Payne's classical
general theory of fascism, we are struck by the increasing similarities
with the American model:
A. The Fascist Negations
- Anti-liberalism
- Anti-communism
- Anti-conservatism (though with the understanding
that fascist groups . . .[are] more willing to undertake temporary
alliances with groups from any other sector, most commonly the
right).
B. Ideology and Goals
- Creation of a new nationalist authoritarian
state.
- Organization of some new kind of regulated,
multi-class, integrated national economic structure.
- The goal of empire.
- Specific espousal of an idealist, voluntarist
creed.
- C. Style and Organization
- Emphasis on aesthetic structure . .
.stressing romantic and mystical aspects.
- Attempted mass mobilization with militarization
of political relationships and style and the goal of a mass party
militia.
- Positive evaluation and use of . . .violence.
- Extreme stress on the masculine principle.
- Exaltation of youth.
- Specific tendency toward an authoritarian,
charismatic, personal style of command.
American fascism denies affiliation with
liberalism, communism, and conservatism. The first two denials
are obvious; the third requires a little analysis, but fascism
is not conservatism and it takes issue with conservatism's anti-revolutionary
stance. Conservatism's libertarian strand, an American staple
(think of the recent protestations of Dick Armey, the departing
Bob Barr, and the Cato Institute against some of the grossest
violations of civil liberties), would not agree with fascism's
"nationalist authoritarian state." Reaganite anti-government
rhetoric might well have been a precursor to fascism, but Hayekian
free market and deregulationist ideology cannot be labeled fascism.
Continuing to look at Payne's list, we
note that the goal of "empire," that much proscribed
word in official American vocabulary, has found open acceptance
over the last year among the fascist vanguard. Voluntarism has
been elevated to iconic status in the current American manifestation
of fascism. It takes a bit more effort to notice American fascism's
"emphasis on aesthetic structure. . .stressing romantic
and mystical aspects," but reflection suggests many innovative
stylistic emphases. The mass party militia, especially large
bands of organized, militarized youth, seems to be missing
for now. Violence is glorified for its own sake. The masculine
principle has been elevated as the basis of policy-making. Command
is authoritarian, charismatic, and personal. It is true that
a charismatic leader like Hitler is missing from the scene; but
one would have to ask if this is not a redundancy in the American
historical context. Perhaps we are a society mobilized by very
small degrees of charisma, unlike more informed, impassioned,
ideologically committed electorates.
Roger Griffin holds that fascism consists
of a series of myths: fascism is anti-liberal, anti-conservative,
anti-rational, charismatic, socialist, totalitarian, racist and
eclectic. If one wishes to argue that American fascism is by
no means socialist, one ought to take a deeper look at National
Socialism's conception of socialism. In a sense, America is a
socialist society, to the extent that the government is the main
driving force behind technology, innovation, and science: the
military-industrial-academic complex. National Socialism was
comforting to the right-wing capitalists because they believed
that socialism was a convenient fiction for the ideology. Nevertheless,
fascism's vitalism and holism militate against any facile interpretations
of what socialism means. Fascism is eclectic and ready to abandon
economic principle for what it perceives as the greater good
of the nation. As Sternhell has described it for Germany, fascism
in the American synthesis is a cultural rebellion, a revolutionary
ideology; totalitarianism is of its very essence. There are more
similarities than immediately apparent between Marxism as it
was put into practice by the twentieth century communist states,
and "socialist" ideology put into practice by the various
fascist states.
Ian Kershaw has evaluated the similarities
between Italian and German fascism:
- Extreme chauvinistic nationalism with
pronounced imperialistic expansionist tendencies;
- an anti-socialist, anti-Marxist thrust
aimed at the destruction of working class organizations and their
Marxist political philosophy;
- the basis in a mass party drawing from
all sectors of society, though with pronounced support in the
middle class and proving attractive to the peasantry and to various
uprooted or highly unstable sectors of the population;
- fixation on a charismatic, plebiscitary,
legitimized leader;
. extreme intolerance towards all oppositional and presumed oppositional
groups, expressed through vicious terror, open violence and ruthless
repression;
. glorification of militarism and war, heightened by the backlash
to the comprehensive socio-political crisis in Europe arising
from the First World War;
. dependence upon an "alliance" with existing elites,
industrial, agrarian, military and bureaucratic, for their political
breakthrough;
. and, at least an initial function, despite a populist-revolutionary
anti-establishment rhetoric, in the stabilization or restoration
of social order and capitalist structures.
Viewed in this perspective, in only the
last few months America has advanced tremendously from emerging
to realized fascism. Its imperialist and expansionist tendencies
need to be couched less and less in Wilsonian idealist terms
for mass acceptance. Unions can still be considered an oppositional,
populist force, but working class cohesion has nearly been destroyed.
Still, it needs to be said that instead of fascism appealing
across class and geographical lines, the country remains divided
between the liberal (urban, coastal) and proto-fascist (rural,
Southern) factions. Also, the plebiscitary leader has not yet
fully emerged. Oppositional groups are often self-silencing,
but the most of the ruling establishment continues to practice
a mild form of liberalism, and hopes that if things get too out
of hand it can mobilize public opinion against brutal suppression.
Although not all elites have yet been co-opted, think of Dershowitz's
advocacy of torture and Larry Summers's patriotic swing. There
is general agreement on militaristic aims. The attempted stabilization
of the social order in the form of the culture wars fought in
the previous decade is one of the less appreciated manifestations
of emerging fascism.
George Mosse describes fascism as viewing
itself in a permanent state of war, to mobilize masculine virile
energy, enlisting the masses as "foot soldiers of a civic
religion." As Mosse points out, fascism seeks a higher form
of democracy even as it rejects the customary forms of representative
government. Propaganda is pervasive in America; we only need
to delineate its descent from the Nazi form. Mosse rejects the
notion that fascism ruled through terror; "it was built
upon a popular consensus." Fascism is a higher consensus
seeking to bring about the "new man" rooted in Christian
doctrine. Can there be a better description of the nineties American
culture wars instigated by the proto-fascists than the following?:
When fascists spoke of culture, they
meant a proper attitude toward life: encompassing the ability
to accept a faith, the work ethic, and discipline, but also receptivity
to art and the appreciation of the native landscape. The true
community was symbolized by factors opposed to materialism, by
art and literature, the symbols of the past and the stereotypes
of the present. The National Socialist emphasis upon myth, symbol,
literature and art is indeed common to all fascism.
Most of this is obvious, except the reference
to literature and art; but think of the fetishization of the
Great Books and the mythical classical curriculum by Bennett
and his like. In thus viewing fascism above all as a cultural
movement, the objection might be raised that American fascism
lacks a distinctive stylistic expression that iconizes youth
and war. Instead, it might be argued that it suffers from callow
endorsement by dour old white males, whose cultural appeal is
limited in the discredited stylistic forms they employ. To some
extent this is true, but one must never underestimate the fertile
ground American anti-intellectualism provides for more banal
forms of propaganda and cultural terrorism than needed to be
deployed by Nazism. (Eminem does electrocute Cheney in his video,
but in real life Cheney rules.) American communication technology,
as was true of Nazi Germany, has pioneered whole new methods
of trivialization of "mass death" and elevation of
brutality as a "great experience."
War is both necessary and great, and
that is America's continuation of the fascist fascination with
revitalization of "basic moral values." Furthermore,
the puritanism of American fascism does not necessarily conflict
with the Nazi emphasis on style and beauty: Nazism annexed "the
pillars of respectability: hard work, self-discipline, and good
manners," which explains "the puritanism of National
Socialism, its emphasis upon chastity, the family, good manners,
and the banishment of women from public life." The analogs
to Karl May's widely circulated novels in Weimar and Nazi Germany
can probably be found here, as can America's answer to Max Nordau,
rebelling against decadence in art and literature, and maintaining
that "lack of clarity, inability to uphold moral standards,
and absence of self-discipline all sprang from the degeneration
of their [artists'] physical organism." Think only of the
demonization of Mapplethorpe and others, the emasculation of
the NEA, and the continued attack on alleged artistic degeneracy.
We must be willing to consider expanded definitions of how romanticism
has been incorporated by American fascism.
Liberals might complain that in America
there hasn't been a declared revolution, a transformation that
asserts itself as such. But as noted above fascism simply takes
over the liberals' language of "clarity, decency, and natural
laws," as well as its ideals of "tolerance and freedom."
That sounds like the sleight-of-hand performed by the fascists
here. As Mosse says:
Tolerance. . .was claimed by fascists
in antithesis to their supposedly intolerant enemies, while freedom
was placed within the community. To be tolerant meant not tolerating
those who opposed fascism: individual liberty was possible only
within the collectivity. Here once more, concepts that had become
part and parcel of established patterns of thought were not rejected
(as so many historians have claimed) but instead co-opted - fascism
would bring about ideals with which people were comfortable,
but only on its own terms.
So to be liberal means to be intolerant,
out of sync with the American democratic spirit. That suggestion
has taken hold among large numbers of people.
The current American aesthetic appreciation
of technology ("smart" bombs) is also of a piece with
Hitler's passion. Fascism is not a deviance from popular cultural
trends, but only the taming of activism within revived nationalist
myths. Mosse holds that fascism didn't diverge from mainstream
European culture; it absorbed most of what held great mass appeal.
It never decried workers' tastelessness; it accepted these realities.
The same principles apply to American fascism.
Umberto Eco, in his essay "Ur-Fascism,"
identifies fourteen characteristics of "eternal fascism":
not all of them have to be present at the same time for a system
to be considered fascist, and some of them may even be contradictory:
"There was only one Nazism, and we cannot describe the ultra-Catholic
Falangism of Franco as Nazism, given that Nazism is fundamentally
pagan, polytheistic, and anti-Christian, otherwise it is not
Nazism." Eco is intelligent enough to suggest a family of
resemblance, overlap, and kinship, and the analyst's task is
to note which particular characteristics apply to a system, and
understand the reasons for the absence of others, rather than
dismiss the fascist categorization if a single feature from a
previous fascist variant doesn't apply: "Remove the imperialist
dimension from Fascism, and you get Franco or Salazar; remove
the colonialist dimension, and you get Balkan Fascism. Add to
Italian Fascism a dash of radical anti-Capitalism (which never
appealed to Mussolini), and you get Ezra Pound. Add the cult
of Celtic mythology and the mysticism of the Grail (completely
extraneous to official Fascism), and you get one of the most
respected gurus of Fascism, Julius Evola."
It is noteworthy about Eco's matrix that all fourteen of his
characteristics of ur-fascism apply to America to some degree:
1. "the cult of tradition" (which may be "syncretic"
and able to "tolerate contradictions"); 2. "the
rejection of modernism" and "irrationalism"; 3.
"the cult of action for action's sake"; 4. "dissent
is betrayal"; 5. "fear of difference,"
or racism; 6. "the appeal to the frustrated middle classes"
[this seems to cause the most trouble to American liberals; Eco
clarifies, "In our day, in which the old 'proletarians'
are becoming petits bourgeois (and the lumpen proletariat has
excluded itself from the political arena), Fascism will find
its audience in this new majority.]; 7. "obsession with
conspiracies," along with xenophobia and nationalism;
8. "the enemy is at once too strong and too weak" [note
the simultaneous characterization of Osama bin Laden, Saddam
Hussein and no doubt future Islamic "terrorists" as
capable of irrevocably harming us and being impotent to really
do so]; 9. 'Pacifism is. . .collusion with the enemy,"
"life is a permanent war," and only a "final
solution" can herald an age of peace; 10. "scorn
for the weak" imposed by a mass elite; 11. "the
cult of death" [American fascists ascribe this characteristic
to terrorists, when in fact it is one of their own supreme defining
characteristics]; 12. transferring of the "will to power
onto sexual questions," or "machismo";
13. "individuals have no rights," and fascism "has
to oppose 'rotten' parliamentary governments"; and 14.
"Ur-Fascism uses newspeak."
No doubt, fascism is a descriptor too
carelessly thrown around; but Nixon and Reagan, no matter how
reprehensible their politics, were not quite fascist. Bush is
the most dangerous man in contemporary history: Hitler didn't
have access to weapons that could blow up the world, and no American
or other leader since World War II with access to such weapons
has been as out of control. Perhaps a non-controversial statement
may be that the fascist tendency always exists, at the very least
latent and dormant. But when more and more of the latency becomes
actualized, there comes a point when the nature of the problem
has to be redefined. We may already have crossed that point.
As Eco notes, "Ur-Fascism can still return in the most innocent
of guises. Our duty is to unmask it and to point the finger at
each of its new forms every day, in every part of the world."
And as Eco reminds us, Roosevelt issued a similar warning.
Since liberals don't understand the magnitude
of the crisis global capitalism faces, they don't understand
the extent of the desperate, last-ditch effort to find an ideological
glue ("terror") to hold together the centrifugal forces
in the American population. Part of the confusion is that this
is fascism but not really fascism it is only its simulation,
although no less horrifying for that reason because all
the twentieth-century ideologies (liberalism, conservatism, and
socialism) are rapidly dissolving.
Anis Shivani
studied economics at Harvard, and is the author of two novels,
The Age of Critics and Memoirs of a Terrorist. He welcomes comments
at: Anis_Shivani_ab92@post.harvard.edu
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October 14,
2002
Harry Browne
Ireland:
No to War; No to Nice
Don Atapattu
The Tragedy of Alan Dershowitz
Linda Heard
So You
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Bob Feldman
Flashback: Inspecting Nuclear Israel
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Philip Farruggio
Sleepers
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Islamic
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Dan Brook
An Open Letter to Barbara Lee
October 12
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The American
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Congratulations! It's a War!
Susan Davis
Proverbial
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David Krieger
A Bleak Day for America
Anis Shivani
George W. in Therapy
Ken Paff
Where Do Hoffa's Tactics Belong in a Mob-Free Teamsters?
Carol Norris
The Politics of Fear
Elaine Cassel
The Lynne Stewart Case:
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Seattle and Beyond
By
Alexander Cockburn
and Jeffrey St. Clair
Photos by Allan Sekula
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Read
Whiteout and Find Out
How the CIA's Backing of the Mujahideen Created the World's Most
Robust Heroin Market and Helped to Finance the Rise of the Taliban
and Osama bin Laden
Whiteout:
CIA, Drugs & the
Press
by Alexander
Cockburn
and Jeffrey St. Clair
|