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Today's Stories January 2, 2008 Jeff Taylor January 1, 2008 Iain A. Boal B. R. Gowani Shahid Mahmood Linn Washington,
Jr. Harvey Wasserman John Ross Website of the Day
December 31, 2007 Alexander Cockburn Tariq Ali Liaquat Ali Khan Wajahat Ali Robert Fisk Ajai Sahni Marwan Bishara Uri Avnery Mark T. Harris Brenda Norrell Website of the Day
December 29 / 30, 2007 Alexander Cockburn Tariq Ali Fawzia Afzal-Khan Gary Leupp China Hand Jacob Hornberger John Chuckman Missy Beattie Ralph Nader Fidel Castro Robert Fantina Greg Moses Catherine Lutz Kristin Van
Tassel Kim Nicolini Phyllis Pollack Poets' Basement Website of
the Weekend
December 28, 2007 Farzana Versey Wajahat Ali Binoy Kampmark Ayesha Ijaz
Khan Anthony DiMaggio Ray McGovern Jim Goodman Ron Jacobs Russell Hoffman John Murphy Website of the Day
December 27, 2007 Dilip Hiro Murtaza Shibli Stephen Soldz Bill Quigley Paul Craig Roberts Omer Subhani Marjorie Cohn Allan Nairn Jacob G. Hornberger Norman Solomon Patrick Irelan Ben Tripp Website of the Day
Charles Tripp Paul Armentano Rannie Amiri Stanley Heller John Walsh Martha Rosenberg Norman Madarasz Website of
the Day
December 25, 2007 Patrick Cockburn December 24, 2007 Andrea Peacock Tariq Ali Uri Avnery Jill Jameson Steve Melendez Mike Whitney Chuck Munson John Walsh Farzana Versey Richard Neville Website of the Day
Alexander Cockburn Ralph Nader Andy Worthington Ahmad Faruqui Bill Moyers Rev. William
E. Alberts Timothy J. Freeman Anthony DiMaggio Fred Gardner Paul Krassner Seth Sandronsky William Loren
Katz Michael Dickinson Ron Jacobs David Vest Poets' Basement Website of the Weekend
December 21, 2007 John Ross Jacob Hornberger Dick J. Reavis Jeff Cohen
Peter Morici Jack McCarthy Raúl Zibechi Steve Early David Macaray Patrick Bond Lakota Freedom Delegation Website of
the Day
December 20, 2007 David Rosen Alan Farago Laura Carlsen Ashley Dawson Wayne Smith Website of
the Day
December 19, 2007 Saul Landau Paul W. Lovinger Norman Solomon Dave Zirin Marjorie Cohn Sen. Russell
Feingold Sonja Karkar Anthony Papa Christopher Ketcham Davey D Website of
the Day
December 18, 2007 R. F. Blader George Wuerthner Steven Higgs Vijay Prashad David Macaray Ralph Nader Eva Liddell Martha Rosenberg Dave Lindorff Peter Morici Website of
the Day
December 17, 2007 Mike Whitney Tom Barry Uri Avnery Greg Moses Allan Nairn Patrick Bond Stephen Lendman Charles Jonkel Laray Polk Stephen Fleischman December 15 / 16, 2007 Peter Linebaugh Howard Zinn Standard Schaefer Raymond J.
Lawrence Alan Farago Saul Landau Jenna Orkin Ahmad Samih
Khalidi Robert Fantina Missy Comley
Beattie Ramzy Baroud James L. Secor Elijah Wald Website of
the Weekend
December 14, 2007 JoAnn Wypijewski John Ross Jacob Hornberger Andy Worthington Allan Nairn Dave Zirin Dave Lindorff Misty MacDuffee Ben Terrall Dr. Mustafa
Barghouthi Website of the Day
December 13, 2007 Paul Craig
Roberts Mike Whitney Ron Jacobs Norman Solomon Peter Morici Sandy Mayes Franklin Lamb Jacob Hornberger Nadim Rouhana Dave Zirin Website of the Day
Allan
Nairn Alan
Farago Ray
McGovern Winslow
T. Wheeler Evan
Jones James
Petras Joel
Hirschorn Joshua
Frank Sherry
Wolf Dan
Bacher Website
of the Day
December 11, 2007 Patrick
Cockburn Diana
Johnstone Paul
Craig Roberts David
Macaray Ralph
Nader Andy
Worthington Martha
Rosenberg Steve
Champion / Kim
Nicolini Michael
Dickinson Website
of the Day
Uri
Avnery Debbie
Nathan JoAnn
Wypijewski Steve
Kelly Donna
J. Volatile
December 8 / 9, 2007 Alexander
Cockburn Brenda
Norrell Saul
Landau R.
F. Blader Ray
McGovern Allan
Nairn Linn
Washington, Jr Paul
Craig Roberts
December 7, 2007 Sean
Penn Arthur
Versluis M.
G. Piety Pam
Martens Alan
Farago Allan
Nairn Col.
Dan Smith Alice
Slater Robert
Weissman Website
of the Day
December 5, 2007 Mike
Whitney Sharon
Smith James
Petras Ron
Jacobs Dave
Zirin John
V. Whitbeck Peter
Zinn Niranjan
Ramakrishnan Alan
Farago Heather
Gray Website
of the Day
December 4, 2007 Alexander
Cockburn Andy
Worthington Paul
Craig Roberts Ray
McGovern Winslow
T. Wheeler Allan
Nairn Russell
Mokhiber Nikolas
Kozloff John
V. Walsh Ghada
Ageel Stephen
Soldz Website
of the Day
December 3, 2007 Tariq
Ali Bill
Quigley Eric
Walberg Uri
Avnery Marjorie
Cohn Dave
Lindorff Stephen
Fleischman Martha
Rosenberg Website
of the Day
December 1 / 2, 2007 Alexander
Cockburn Jeffrey
St. Clair Mike
Whitney Shemon
Salam Roger
Burbach Benjamin
Dangl Brian
M. Downing Greg
Moses Sonja
Karkar Saul
Landau Margaret
Kimberley John
Ross Reza
Fiyouzat Judith
Scherr Lance
Olsen Christopher
Brauchli Robert
Fantina Dan
Bacher Michael
Donnelly Website
of the Weekend
November 30, 2007 Peter
Stone Brown Wajahat
Ali Allan
Nairn Alan
Farago John
Ross Corporate
Crime Reporter Lucia
Alvarez James
Rothenberg Website
of the Day
November 29, 2007 R.
F. Blader Ismael
Hossein-Zadeh Stephen
Soldz Sheldon
Richman George
Wuerthner Felice
Pace Col.
Dan Smith Harvey
Wasserman Nikolas
Kozloff Paul
Krassner Dave
Lindorff CP
News Service Website
of the Day November 28, 2007 James
Petras Jeff
Halper Pam
Martens Peter
Morici Mohammed
Khatib Helen
Redmond William
S. Lind Ben
Tripp Liaquat
Ali Khan Jeff
Berg Website
of the Day
November 27, 2007 Joe
DeRaymond Paul
Craig Roberts Marjorie
Cohn Mike
Whitney Ron
Jacobs Col.
Dan Smith Ralph
Nader Karim
Makdisi Christopher
Ketcham Ronan
Bennett Website
of the Day
November 26, 2007 Kathleen
and Bill Christison Paul
Craig Roberts David
Macaray Sameer
Dossani Roger
Burbach Mark
Scaramella Brian
McKinlay Rick
Kuhn Binoy
Kampmark Monica
Benderman Brenda
Norrell Website
of the Day
November 24 / 25, 2007 Alexander
Cockburn Robert
Fisk Saul
Landau Jeffrey
St. Clair Rannie
Amiri Christopher
Brauchli Daniel
Gross Mike
Whitney Marjorie
Cohn David
Rosen David
Michael Green Kenneth
Rexroth Muhammad
Iqbal Website
of the Day
Gary
Leupp Laura
Carlsen David
Macaray Andy
Worthington Clifton
Ross Seth
Sandronsky Dan
Bacher William
A. Cook Website
of the Day
November 22, 2007 Alan
Farago Greg
Moses Dave
Lindorff Mike
Ely Omar
Azfar
November 21, 2007 Vijay
Prashad Martha
Rosenberg Manuel
Garcia, Jr. John
Ross Brian
McKenna Stephen
Soldz Monica
Benderman Ben
Terrall Website
of the Day
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January 2, 2008 A Pakistani TragedyThe Life and Death of Benazir BhuttoBy M. SHAHID ALAM On December 27, a little more than two months after her return to Pakistan from years of exile, Benazir Bhutto was killed while leaving the grounds of Liaquat Bagh after addressing a rally of party faithfuls. Daughter of the charismatic Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, with no inconsiderable charisma of her own, driven, talented, distinguished, the career of Pakistan's best-loved political leader had been cut short by unknown assassins. She was still young at 53. Did Benazir Bhutto's life have to end this way? Benazir Bhutto had entered politics to 'avenge' her father's hanging in April 1979 by Zia-ul-Haq, Pakistan's third military dictator. Having twice avenged her father's murder by assuming the office of Pakistan's prime minister in April 1988 and October 1993 she has now paid with her life trying to reach that office a third time. Sadly, the truth is that her violent end could have been foretold with near certainty. What are the circumstances that made her violent end very nearly a certainty? She did not have the military security and luck, one must add that has shielded General Parvez Musharraf from several assassination attempts. With some expense and planning, Benazir Bhutto too could have made better security arrangements, but, fatefully, she seemed to be in too much of a haste to be slowed down even by 150 deaths during the first attack on her life in Karachi. Immediately after her death, a spokesman for Al-Qa'ida operations in Afghanistan claimed that this was their work. "We terminated," the spokesman claimed ominously, "the most precious American asset which vowed to defeat mujahideen."1 That Benazir Bhutto was a 'precious
American asset' perhaps, even the 'most precious'
few anywhere would deny, least of all the Americans. It is widely
known that her return to Pakistan was brokered by the United
States. She could return to Pakistan's politics and, most
likely, to the prime minister's office by dropping her
opposition to another term of five years for President Musharraf.
One of the most remarkable developments in Pakistani politics since the events of 9-11 is the transparency shall we say, daring with which the United States now intervenes in Pakistan's affairs. Conversely, Pakistani leaders also work openly to advance American interests in Pakistan. In an earlier era, the Americans generally took care to conceal their meddling in Pakistani politics. As a result, only the politically astute understood the depth of their influence over Pakistan. Now, this knowledge has become commonplace. Although greatly weakened since the protests that erupted over his firing of Pakistan's Chief Justice in March 2007, the Americans believe that General Parvez Musharraf is still the best person to lead their war against the militants in Pakistan. However, they were now convinced that the General's badly battered reputation had to be salvaged: and a partnership with the pro-American Benazir Bhutto would do just that. In turn, the General, under duress, had accepted a partnership with Bhutto as the price he must pay or lose US support. A tripartite deal was brokered involving the US, General Musharraf and Benazir Bhutto. This deal freed Bhutto from the corruption cases pending against her in Pakistani courts. She was also allowed to return to Pakistan to lead her party to she was convinced a nearly certain electoral victory: and a third term as Pakistan's prime minister. The elections would give the General the democratic veneer that he now so badly needed. As the New York Times reveals in a recent article, "How Bhutto won Washington," Benazir Bhutto's deal-making with the Americans has a long history.2 She had decided quite early that she would return her party to power by trolling the corridors of power in Washington. In the words of her friend from Oxford days, Peter Galbraith, who was on the staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee at the time, Benazir Bhutto first began her campaign in Washington in the spring of 1984. She was on a mission to persuade the Reagan administration that "she would much better serve American interest in Afghanistan than Zia." Under the tutelage of Galbraith and his friend, Mark Siegel formerly executive director of the Democratic National Convention she cultivated the friendship of important power brokers in Washington. These Washington contacts paid off handsomely. In the parliamentary elections of November 1988 Benazir Bhutto's party gained only a plurality of seats. Since Pakistan's military establishment looked upon her with considerable distrust, they could easily have pulled strings to deny her the right to form the government. US pressure, however, persuaded Ghulam Ishaq Khan, the President at the time, to invite Benazir Bhutto to form the government. Benazir Bhutto never gave up on this winning strategy. As the NYT writes, "she kept up her visits to Washington, usually several a year." She continued to cultivate friends amongst the Washington elite, including the Congress and the media. In the first six months of 2007 alone, Benazir Bhutto spent $250,000 in lobbying fees to gain access to Washington insiders. Once again, to win American backing for her return to Pakistan in 2007, which could only happen with US pressure on General Musharraf, Benazir Bhutto used the same strategy that had worked before: she would promise to do better than General Musharraf in advancing American interests in Pakistan. Over the past year, Benazir Bhutto has repeatedly pointed out that General Musharraf's war against terrorism in Pakistan was failing. Instead of curbing terrorism, the militants had become more daring during the General's tenure. She promised to do better. She would wipe out the "religious extremists," shut down "extremist" madrasas, and even hand over Dr. Qadeer Khan the architect of Pakistan's nuclear program to the US for questioning. Insistently, and loudly, Benazir Bhutto was seeking to assure the United States that she would do a lot better than their General. This strategy won her the support of the United States, but it was fatally flawed. If Musharraf had not acted more vigorously against the militants that was not because he had gone soft in his commitment to America's plan. Instead, it was because he faces restraints on three fronts: the opposition within the army, especially from its lower ranks; the very real fear that stronger measures against the militants would provoke a domestic outcry and, worse, a more determined response from those militants; and, there are concerns too that defeating the Taliban would entrench Indian influence over Afghanistan. Would these constraints be any different for Benazir Bhutto? In presenting herself as the only Pakistani politician to openly challenge the militants, wasn't Benazir Bhutto in effect also daring them to target her? Since these Islamists were regularly targeting the Pakistan military itself even inside the security of their cantonments would they hold back from attacking a politician who threatened to take even stronger actions against them than General Musharraf? General Musharraf's decision to make Pakistan the leading partner in America's war against terrorism had already revealed its deep flaws. Most ominously, it had provoked the Islamists into targeting the Pakistani military. Already there were defections from the army, and if the clashes continued, there could be rebellion in the ranks of the army: or clashes between Pukhtoons and the Punjabis within the army. In pushing Benazir Bhutto into this dangerous corner, a corner in which she could not have survived, the US too has shown its gross ineptitude. By openly anointing her as the American candidate, the US had effectively hastened the violent end that she has now met. The US helped to bring about the untimely death of the 'Daughter of the East' by transforming her into the 'Daughter of the West.' In the process, Pakistan too has lost a flawed but charismatic leader, who might have risen to the occasion at a time of crisis. Benazir Bhutto crafted her political career by embracing her father's populism, but decisively rejected what was its natural complement: his independent foreign policy. Could she have followed a different path? Was she free to claim the legacy of her father's independent foreign policy? Benazir Bhutto's embrace of her father's populism was indispensable: without it, she could not lay claim to his charismatic following amongst Pakistan's largely illiterate masses. On the other hand, by rejecting an independent foreign policy, she opened a path to the centers of American power without losing any of her popularity. The mostly poor and illiterate Pakistanis could not have cared much for the arcana of foreign politics. Benazir Bhutto saw her courting of the US as necessary to her ascent to power? The Americans have long cultivated Pakistan's military as the best vehicle for subordinating Pakistan to its ends: first, Pakistan's military became a US partner in the Cold War, and since 9-11 it has been drafted as a leading ally in the 'global war against terror.' The 1990s the interim between the two wars was a window of opportunity for Pakistan's politicians. But Benazir Bhutto first had to neutralize the Pakistani generals whose power had been challenged only once by her father, and, who, therefore, were opposed to the return of his populist party to power. She had used this strategy to neutralize Pakistan's military establishment before. Now, with the generals in trouble, she struck the same bargain. Tragically, this time, it was fatal mistake. Benazir Bhutto was binding herself to a strategy waging America's war against the militants that had already pushed Pakistan to the brink of a civil war and disintegration. In her impetuous quest for power, she had acted in blind disregard of realities. But did Benazir Bhutto have an alternative? Perhaps she did. Pakistan has a chance of averting a civil war, but only by distancing itself from the United States. This distancing is now vital for Pakistan: and one could argue, for the United States too. Only by distancing itself from the United States does any Pakistani government now have a chance of preventing the militants from overwhelming Pakistan itself. No government that cleaves to the United States and Israel has a chance of winning popular support in its efforts to contain the spread of the Islamist insurgency. Sadly, Benazir Bhutto too like Musharraf has cultivated the Israeli lobby in the United States.3 It is perhaps unrealistic to expect that Benazir Bhutto, had she had wanted to, could have done this on her own. However, if she had joined a pro-democracy and nationalist partnership with Nawaz Sharif and perhaps some of the other parties in the opposition together they had a fair chance of sending the Pakistani generals back to the barracks. It would not take Hazrat 'Ali's oratory to convince the Pakistanis that this partnership and an independent foreign policy were at this juncture indispensable for the integrity of Pakistan. Sadly, this was an option that Benazir Bhutto rebuffed. She did not want to remove the generals: she sought to join their fight against the Islamist militants as a civilian cheerleader. Perhaps, she could not think of another option, given how much of her political capital she had invested in gaining the support of the United States. Trapped in her myopia, she saw this as the easier option, the only option. Sadly, she had chosen to enter a blind alley. Worse: it was a death trap. That is what makes her death a Pakistani tragedy. It is a tragedy because she was the only political figure in Pakistan who commanded the charisma to try to galvanize Pakistanis into a vital coalition that could reverse the damage done by the military generals. But, instead, she chose to outdo the failed generals. That was Benazir Bhutto's fatal flaw; but it was not only a personal flaw. Behind this fatal flaw lay the a sad history of a country whose elites time and again chose to prostitute the state, to compromise national interests, and sacrifice the lives of Pakistanis for their personal gains. That is what makes Benazir Bhutto's murder a Pakistani tragedy. In a single tragic event, it crystallizes the malfeasance of Pakistan's political classes and the failure of Pakistanis to bring them to account for their treasonous crimes. M. Shahid Alam is professor of economics at Northeastern
University, and author of Challenging the New Orientalism: Dissenting Essays on America's
'War Against Islam'.
He may be reached at alqalam02760@yahoo.com. Footnotes 1. Syed Saleem Shehzad, "Al-Qaeda claims Bhutto killing," Asia Times (December 29, 2007). 2. Elisabeth Bumiller, "How Bhutto won Washington," New York Times (December 27, 2007). 3. According to Dan Gillerman, Israel's ambassador to the UN, Benazir Bhutto send him a copy of new autobiography, Daughter of Destiny, including "a warm dedication to Israel." He added, " She {Benazir Bhutto] wrote me of how she admired Israel and of her desire to see a normalization in the relations between Israel and Pakistan, including the establishment of diplomatic ties," Tali Rabinovsky, "Gillerman: Bhutto told me she feared for her life," (December 28, 2007).
© M. Shahid Alam ![]()
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