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Today's Stories December 15 / 16, 2007 Peter Linebaugh December 14, 2007 JoAnn Wypijewski John Ross Jacob Hornberger Andy Worthington Allan Nairn Dave Zirin Dave Lindorff Misty MacDuffee Ben Terrall Dr. Mustafa
Barghouthi Website of the Day
December 13, 2007 Paul Craig
Roberts Mike Whitney Ron Jacobs Norman Solomon Peter Morici Sandy Mayes Franklin Lamb Jacob Hornberger Nadim Rouhana Dave Zirin Website of the Day
Allan
Nairn Alan
Farago Ray
McGovern Winslow
T. Wheeler Evan
Jones James
Petras Joel
Hirschorn Joshua
Frank Sherry
Wolf Dan
Bacher Website
of the Day
December 11, 2007 Patrick
Cockburn Diana
Johnstone Paul
Craig Roberts David
Macaray Ralph
Nader Andy
Worthington Martha
Rosenberg Steve
Champion / Kim
Nicolini Michael
Dickinson Website
of the Day
Uri
Avnery Debbie
Nathan JoAnn
Wypijewski Steve
Kelly Donna
J. Volatile
December 8 / 9, 2007 Alexander
Cockburn Brenda
Norrell Saul
Landau R.
F. Blader Ray
McGovern Allan
Nairn Linn
Washington, Jr Paul
Craig Roberts
December 7, 2007 Sean
Penn Arthur
Versluis M.
G. Piety Pam
Martens Alan
Farago Allan
Nairn Col.
Dan Smith Alice
Slater Robert
Weissman Website
of the Day
December 5, 2007 Mike
Whitney Sharon
Smith James
Petras Ron
Jacobs Dave
Zirin John
V. Whitbeck Peter
Zinn Niranjan
Ramakrishnan Alan
Farago Heather
Gray Website
of the Day
December 4, 2007 Alexander
Cockburn Andy
Worthington Paul
Craig Roberts Ray
McGovern Winslow
T. Wheeler Allan
Nairn Russell
Mokhiber Nikolas
Kozloff John
V. Walsh Ghada
Ageel Stephen
Soldz Website
of the Day
December 3, 2007 Tariq
Ali Bill
Quigley Eric
Walberg Uri
Avnery Marjorie
Cohn Dave
Lindorff Stephen
Fleischman Martha
Rosenberg Website
of the Day
December 1 / 2, 2007 Alexander
Cockburn Jeffrey
St. Clair Mike
Whitney Shemon
Salam Roger
Burbach Benjamin
Dangl Brian
M. Downing Greg
Moses Sonja
Karkar Saul
Landau Margaret
Kimberley John
Ross Reza
Fiyouzat Judith
Scherr Lance
Olsen Christopher
Brauchli Robert
Fantina Dan
Bacher Michael
Donnelly Website
of the Weekend
November 30, 2007 Peter
Stone Brown Wajahat
Ali Allan
Nairn Alan
Farago John
Ross Corporate
Crime Reporter Lucia
Alvarez James
Rothenberg Website
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November 29, 2007 R.
F. Blader Ismael
Hossein-Zadeh Stephen
Soldz Sheldon
Richman George
Wuerthner Felice
Pace Col.
Dan Smith Harvey
Wasserman Nikolas
Kozloff Paul
Krassner Dave
Lindorff CP
News Service Website
of the Day November 28, 2007 James
Petras Jeff
Halper Pam
Martens Peter
Morici Mohammed
Khatib Helen
Redmond William
S. Lind Ben
Tripp Liaquat
Ali Khan Jeff
Berg Website
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November 27, 2007 Joe
DeRaymond Paul
Craig Roberts Marjorie
Cohn Mike
Whitney Ron
Jacobs Col.
Dan Smith Ralph
Nader Karim
Makdisi Christopher
Ketcham Ronan
Bennett Website
of the Day
November 26, 2007 Kathleen
and Bill Christison Paul
Craig Roberts David
Macaray Sameer
Dossani Roger
Burbach Mark
Scaramella Brian
McKinlay Rick
Kuhn Binoy
Kampmark Monica
Benderman Brenda
Norrell Website
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November 24 / 25, 2007 Alexander
Cockburn Robert
Fisk Saul
Landau Jeffrey
St. Clair Rannie
Amiri Christopher
Brauchli Daniel
Gross Mike
Whitney Marjorie
Cohn David
Rosen David
Michael Green Kenneth
Rexroth Muhammad
Iqbal Website
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Gary
Leupp Laura
Carlsen David
Macaray Andy
Worthington Clifton
Ross Seth
Sandronsky Dan
Bacher William
A. Cook Website
of the Day
November 22, 2007 Alan
Farago Greg
Moses Dave
Lindorff Mike
Ely Omar
Azfar
November 21, 2007 Vijay
Prashad Martha
Rosenberg Manuel
Garcia, Jr. John
Ross Brian
McKenna Stephen
Soldz Monica
Benderman Ben
Terrall Website
of the Day
November 20, 2007 Oren
Ben-Dor Wajahat
Ali Alan
Farago Marjorie
Cohn Ralph
Nader Andy
Worthington Sara
Olson Dave
Lindorff Paul
Krassner Website
of the Day November 19, 2007 Winslow
T. Wheeler China
Hand Allan
Nairn Uri
Avnery David
Macaray Dave
Lindorff Bill
Quigley Ron
Jacobs Sunsara
Taylor Binoy
Kampmark Heather
Gray Website
of the Day
November 17 / 18, 2007 P.
Sainath David
Rosen Mike
Whitney George
Wuerthner Brenda
Norrell George
Ciccariello-Maher Karim
Makdisi Marie
Trigona Valerio
Volpi Fred
Gardner Robert
Fantina Mike
Ferner Missy
Comley Beattie Kenneth
Couesbouc Patrick
O'Hayer Poets'
Basement
November 16, 2007 Cockburn
/ St. Clair Dave
Zirin Gary
D. Barnett Alan
Farago Dave
Lindorff Russell
Mokhiber Robert
Ovetz Brenda
Norrell David
Swanson Peter
Letheby Website
of the Day
November 15, 2007 Cockburn
/ St. Clair Adolfo
Gilly Peter
Bohmer Andy
Worthington Gray
/ Derks Liaquat
Ali Khan Dave
Lindorff Christopher
Brauchli Anthony
Papa Martha
Rosenberg Ben
Terrall Website
of the Day
Cockburn
/ St. Clair James
Petras Al
Giordano Paul
Craig Roberts Andy
Worthington Stephen
Lendman Fatima
Bhutto Martin
Smith Jeff
Leys Website
of the Day November 13, 2007 Alexander
Cockburn Jeffrey
St. Clair Robert
Bryce David
Macaray Mike
Whitney Ralph
Nader Nikolas
Kozloff Jordan
Flaherty B.
R. Gowani Website
of the Day
November 12, 2007 Vicente
Navarro Ben
Brown Omar
K. Sadia
Abbas Farzana
Versey Richard
W. Behan Paul
Krassner Cindy
Sheehan Peter
Stone Brown Dave
Lindorff Website
of the Day
November 10 / 11, 2007 Alain
Gresh Mike
Whitney Ron
Jacobs Jeffrey
St. Clair Alan
Farago Binoy
Kampmark Robert
Fantina Fred
Gardner Ayesha
Ijaz Khan Nicola
Nasser Philip
Rizk Michael
Dickinson Joel
S. Hirschhorn Paul
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Weekend
Edition Rachel Carson Kills Millions?The Greening of Big TobaccoBy STANDARD SHAEFER
In May of 2007, near the eve of Rachel Carson's 100th birthday, as Senator Ben Cardin (D-Md) was preparing a congressional bill that would honor the iconic environmental activist, there was sudden surge of opposition. The issue was genocide. Hitler, Stalin, Pol Pot Rachel Carson dwarfed them all, according to The Wall Street Journal, The Washington Post, The New York Sun, and New York Times Magazine. Over decades, they had run opinion pieces by authors associated with rightwing think tanks suggesting she was responsible for killing one child every 15 seconds, three million people annually, and over one hundred million since 1972. Her personal responsibility for the US ban on DDT allegedly caused untold deaths in the developing world where restrictions on pesticide hampered agriculture and set off a chain reaction of needless environmental regulations that threatened economic freedom. The issues brought up in 2007 were not in any way new claims or new findings, just recycled accusations from those papers , but it was enough. Cardin pulled his bill because pro-DDT Senator Tom Coburn (R-Ok) threatened to block it. Why so much fuss over a symbolic act and who was behind it all? Grassroot activists, bloggers, and scientists lit up their glowboxes, especially the greens who have always been the closest readers of rightwing smear campaigns. Tim Lambert, a computer scientist at the University of New South Wales and widely heralded "expert" on DDT thought he had the answer. The only force evil enough to attack his hero Rachel Carson was Big Tobacco. He began to search the public archive of Tobacco Legacy Archive, a collection of formerly secret company documents released only recently thanks to the court cases surrounding their products. Some of the story Lambert got right. In 1998, the new Director-General of the World Health Organization, Gro Harlem Brundtland had established the Tobacco-Free Initiative, an effort to establish an international treaty to enhance tobacco control and promote public health initiatives to reduce smoking. Horrified, Big Tobacco did what they always did when their profits were in jeopardy. They paid third parties to attack their enemy. As Lambert realized, this worked best if some other issue, so-called larger issue could be used to distract attention, as had happened in the well-known efforts by the FDA to regulate nicotine. But Lambert kept investigating. He announced that he had found the man behind the Carson smear- Roger Bate. Bate had started a fake grassroots group called Africa Fights Malaria and used it to criticize the WHO as implementing an inept approach to the malaria crisis. Bates attempted to get Big Tobacco to support the group, citing his ability to triangulate. The idea was to use the DDT issue to distract people from tobacco and the debate around environmental tobacco (ETS or second-hand smoke). The key elements of Africa Fights Malaria strategy were articulated as:
The idea was to make the choice appear to be a question of people or birds. That such a strategy would appeal to Big Tobacco was certainly true, and Lambert found documents connecting Bate to Philip Morris, but that is where Lambert began to go awry. Philip Morris never hired Bate, or at least there is no such record. There are only records proving that he tried to pitch a smear campaign but did not get far. In fact, there is some indication that Helmut Reif, Philip Morris' Director of Science & Technology for it's R&D facility in Neuchatel, Switzerland (Fabriques de Tabac Reunies), was not thrilled that Bate had approached other tobacco companies. More importantly, Reif had been successfully undermining the World Health Organization's science throughout the 1980s and 1990s; and as one report suggests, he had developed a host of tactics far more sophisticated than the one's Bate proposed. Reif had no need of a freelance shill and he no doubt knew better than to risk exposure by going head to head against someone like Rachel Carson, whether she was alive or not, especially by using an amateur. Bate got tobacco money anyway, just not from Philip Morris and not until after the Africa Fights Malaria campaign. RJ Reynolds documents show that they paid (via a front group) for the publication of What Risk?, a book Bate edited that had a chapter on secondhand smoke. Even then, documents suggest RJR wanted to be sure they had their kind of person handling the chapter of ETS. Bate would later work for the Competitive Enterprise Institute, an organization that Philip Morris had used during their expensive anti-FDA campaign, where he would oppose environmental regulations, but he was by no means an agent provocateur for Big Tobacco. He was just a free-market fundamentalist and avowed enemy of environmental regulation. Though Bate denied that he was personally behind the Carson attack, he was attached to several rightwing think-tanks and would eventually join the Competitive Enterprise Institute, the force behind several laughable "CO2: We call it life" ads. Also, by the time Lambert had pieced together his story on the popular Grist environmental news site, The Union of Concerned Scientists had already exposed the tobacco industry's role in denying global warming in January of 2007 and connected the Competitive Enterprise Group to both Big Tobacco and Big Oil. The real impact of Lambert's digging is that it reveals how Big Tobacco's malfeasance had become so widely known that there is almost an army of freelancers like Roger Bate begging to get in on the game. Lambert is quite right, though, to point out that Bate was using Africa Fights Malaria to bolster his credentials with rightwing think-tanks. But, Lambert's suggestion that Big Tobacco is a monolithic entity so greedy and corrupt that it willingly takes on its enemies in bold, public fashion is at best a distraction. True, it has been the case from time to time, as Alan Brandt made clear in The Cigarette Century, that Philip Morris will embrace flamboyant tactics such as embracing the bill of rights, even arranging to distribute copies of it to undermine anti-smoking activists. But the bulk of Big Tobacco's strategy has been to work in the shadows, using its own PR firms, its own "safe science" advocates. Even when Big Tobacco has suffered major setbacks, they have striven to maintain their invisibility, creating a corporate culture arguably as secretive as the CIA and a business model of undermining efforts to expose their other damage. Tobacco is without a doubt one of the most destructive plants on the planet even before it hits the lungs. Only when anti-tobacco advocates understand how the tobacco industry has deflected notice of these other evils will they be able to widen the war. And the environment is good place to start because it is easy to document and already a hot issue. "The time is now for anti-tobacco advocates and environmentalists to unite," according to Judith McKay, senior policy consultant for the World Health Organization. If so, then it is crucial to x-ray the secret documents and see how Big Tobacco has been able to keep environmental threats separate from public health concerns, and keeping their actions as opaque as possible.
Big Tobacco hardly twitched on the release of Rachel Carson's Silent Spring in 1962. They were certainly aware of the book. They did not, however, attack it or fear it might draw attention to their own massive use of pesticide. They embraced it through the public relations firm of Hill & Knowlton, Inc., one of the most notorious PR firms in the world having played a hand in everything from greenwashing the chemical industry to deceiving the US to the start of the first Gulf War. Confidential documents reveal that they boasted to the Tobacco Industry Research Committee (TIRC) about how they had influenced the content of several science journalists covering tobacco issues. The TIRC was an industry funded entity that granted awards to study the link between smoking and disease. In effect, it was part of a four-decade effort to spread scientific disinformation about the link, but as these minutes from Hill & Knowlton reveal, they liked their doubt cast in nonscientific terms as well. Hill & Knowlton had a long going effort to influence media coverage of tobacco issues, but they also liked to find opportunities to contrast the tobacco industry with other problem industries. One of the jobs Hill & Knowlton was most proud of concerned a journalist named George Dusheck, who was not writing about tobacco at all, but reviewing Silent Spring. After consulting with H & K, Dusheck inserted a passage about the tobacco industry into his review:
The Duschekexample proves both more typical of Big Tobacco's modus operandi and more enlightening than the Bate/Carson episode. Of course Clarence Cook Little was exactly the kind of shill anti-tobacco forces love to vilify and rightfully so. Few have done more to undermine the concept of "sound science" than he. But here he appears the voice of reason and moderation. What is more noteworthy, however, is how the missteps of the chemical industry are used as an occasion for contrast with the tobacco industry. The tobacco industry appears socially responsible, prudent, and respectful of its opposition. Even more remarkable is the fact that Silent Spring was almost devoid of tobacco references. Carson had mentioned- almost as an aside-that arsenic content in tobacco increased six hundred percent since the mid-1940s as result of DDT remaining in the soil even after its use on tobacco had ceased. Her point was simply that pesticide residue remained in the soil and was in no way critical of tobacco itself. There was no necessity to bring the tobacco industry into the review unless the intention was to substitute one health crisis for another, and deflect attention from Big Tobacco's connection to the pesticide issue entirely. Amusingly enough, in 1964, a stockholder wrote to A.H. Galloway, the president of RJ Reynolds about Silent Spring. The stockholder suggested the book might be helpful. He wanted the company to fund the natural foods movement or what is now thought of as organic or local food movements. He thought doing so would distract from the crusades against the golden leaf. No doubt environmentalists like Lambert would have preferred that Big Tobacco follow that more salacious and more risky route. Should RJR have distributed the book or promoted it, it might easily have caused readers to wonder about what they were really smoking. But even if RJR had done so quietly and with plausible deniability, it would have been entirely consistent with the industry's pattern of divorcing public health from larger environmental issues, and in particular, its pattern of triangulation. It seems, as is often the case, the stockholders understood the business model well before the business' critics.
ASTROTURF AND SECONDHAND HOT AIR Even the best attempt to link tobacco with environmental crisis has garnered little attention: the January 2007 report by the Union of Concerned Scientists, for example, is arguably the best and boldest salvo on record. That report documented, much more carefully than British journalist George Monbiot's recent work Heat, how Big Oil is now using not only Big Tobacco's disinformation techniques to contest global warming, but also the very same public relations firms, and in many cases the same bogus scientists. However, subsequent UN reports on the need to act now include not one word about the 1 billion people slated to die from cigarettes and certainly not a word about the well-documented role of the tobacco industry as a leading cause of deforestation, desertification, and thus global warming. Well-documented is not well told, it seems, especially when the subject is disaster. The task is not to just tell the story about how Big Tobacco used deception in both health and environmental matter, but to show how Big Tobacco managed to separate health and the environment in the public discourse insofar as their products were concerned. An internal Philip Morris memo from 1996 shows the general trend continued long after the health risks had become clear. In discussing the increasing pressure on corporations to pay for the environmental damage their product manufacturing might cause, an unidentified Philip Morris executive writes:
The Philip Morris statement could easily describe the modus operandi of the entire industry since the early 1970s, a time in which health professionals had largely agreed that smoking itself was the cause of many diseases, but during which the controversy around ETS ("environmental tobacco smoke" or secondhand smoke), was just beginning. As tobacco historian Alan Brandt points out in The Cigarette Century, Philip H. Abelson, the editor of Science became one of the first and most prominent voices in the United States to describe secondhand smoke as "air pollution," in 1967. Abelson specifically placed emphasis on the fact that nonsmokers often had no choice about accepting its risks. That emphasis seems prescient today given that so much of the controversy around smoking has hinged on the fact smokers have felt they were only endangering themselves. But Abelson was one man sitting on high, an elite editor. He could have been neutralized with methods like the ones Hill & Knowlton had bragged about to the TIRC or with the usual quote mining that is the modus operandi of oppositional research. Abelson's finest contribution was to inspire grassroots activists such as GASP (Group Against Smoking Pollution). By virtue of their very name they deployed the word "pollution" in public discourse more than anyone else. During the 1970s, they were the ones who pushed and got local laws to restrict smoking. Of course, they were somewhat offset at least initially by Astroturf organizations (fake grassroots groups) such as the smokers-rights groups funded by Big Tobacco. To be clear, the smoker's rights groups were not a pure PR invention. There was legitimate anger among smokers as they began to feel more and more like third-class citizens. But if they found smoking turned them into pariahs, it had as much to do with the flimsy defense that tobacco companies offered as it did anything relating to a New Puritanism. To counteract secondhand smoke concerns, Big Tobacco first produced reports suggesting that building ventilation would offset indoor smoke. The suggestions ranged from simply opening windows to installing air filters in offices. However, by 1981, thanks to the National Academy of Sciences, the industry could no longer effectively compartmentalize this issue. By the end of the 1980s, ETS had been implicated in everything from children's earaches, childhood asthma, cervical cancer (often in nonsmoking wives of smokers), sudden infant death syndrome, and cardiopulmonary disorders. Even Philip Morris lawyers conceded this and more in 1994. Even as smoking was banned on airplanes and other common areas, the industry kept hoping to keep the issue compartmentalized as an issue of nuisance and personal decorum, especially in the US and the UK. When Philip Morris began to reflect on who and what threatened their efforts to divorce the environment from health issues, it issued an "Executive Summary of Paper on PM Environmental Giving" that acknowledged that it was the largest contributor to the nation's packaging stream and that it was well aware that environmental activists were beginning to make cigarette executives uncomfortable. It insisted: Grassroots mobilizations and environmental politics are not to be underestimated. Our products have been boycotted by environmentally-concerned groups as diverse as state Public Interest Research Groups, recycling advocates, and the "Wise Use" movement. What is striking is the concern over boycotted products, rather than in mobilizing for local laws and regulations that was historically the real catalyst for Philip Morris' decline in stature. The second striking aspect of this report is how throughout it repeatedly states that appearing green is crucial to sustaining their business model. It also reveals that by 1994, citizens had come to regard the environment as "second only to guns and crime." In essence, the furor over ETS did not rank as a major concern either to Philip Morris or what it called "citizens." Furthermore, the stakes would forever seem higher if opposition were focused on the environment: "Everything we produce relies on agricultural production." This document even acknowledges that Philip Morris' Corporate Affairs had a five-year plan that emphasized environment, image, and corporate contributions. Why then did people like Ableson or even GASP not then widen the terms of the debate? Why did they not start investigating exactly what kind of environmental contributions the companies had in mind? Or, put another way, why did they not attack the very idea of Philip Morris as a legitimate business? Were they exhausted even in victory from the prolonged battle over ETS? Activist-journalist Alexander Cockburn, who had written about Big Tobacco's impact on developing countries in the 1970s, described the problem like this, "The left generally didn't get involved in taking on the tobacco companies because they all smoked like chimneys, and many still do." But part of the answer might also do with the experts, who felt perhaps hemmed-in by their field of expertise, usually health related. But what experts do best is draw attention to the unseen externalities, the fallout and the spillover such as the role tobacco plays in deforestation and global warming. They could have reached out to people involved in those struggles. If the truth is told, though, the greens and anti-tobacco advocates were behind the curve by 1977, not 1994. Secret documents from that year reveal that already Big Tobacco had anticipated a wider assault on its environmental impact and particularly that its environmental impact could be easily shown to affect people on a global scale. Nowhere perhaps is this clearer than in inter-office correspondence from 1977 in which Murray D. Rosenberg briefed Philip Morris executives on the "greenhouse effect." Rosenberg credited Helmut Wakeham, Vice President and Director of Research & Develop at the time, and arguably one of the most cold-blooded characters in the entire tobacco saga, for anticipating the issue. Rosenberg's report tutored the other executives on the potential threat to the tobacco industry. Unlike Big Oil's contention that carbon dioxide is a natural component of the atmosphere and thus harmless, Rosenberg's report acknowledged that man-made carbon dioxide is a dire threat to life on the planet, particularly the amount produced from fossil fuels. Rosenberg calculated the annual contribution of cigarette-produced carbon dioxide at 0.0018% of the annual total generated by man. The 0.0018% figure while seeming to exonerate the tobacco industry could easily be shown as incomplete and that is probably why it was never released to the public why attract attention to an issue no one was paying monitoring? The figure did not take into account issues like deforestation, paper waste, fuel used to ship tobacco and cure it, nor did he mention that smoking also releases methane, another greenhouse gas. Currently, the anti-tobacco advocates estimate smoking across the globe generates about 2.6 billion kg of CO2 and 5.2 billion kilograms of methane every year. It takes one acre of forest to cure (dry) an acre of tobacco , which is quite a separate calculation from the amount of forest consumed in packaging, newsprint ads, and paper to wrap the cigarettes. In Uruguay and South Korea and Uruguay, forty percent of the annual deforestation is tobacco-related. In Malawi, where only three percent of farmers grow tobacco, almost 80 percent of the trees cut down for curing it. These are more recent numbers than Rosenberg's but even then, the best deforestation estimate is over a decade old. That is precisely the problem. It's safe to say that by the late 1970s, anti-tobacco advocates had fallen behind, drained in part by the necessary struggle against second-hand smoke, and unaware that Big Tobacco anticipated a much larger war. Philip Morris, for example, claimed in a 1997 document it gave its first environmental grant "to help create Keep America Beautiful," in 1956. In fact, the organization began in 1953. Nevertheless, Philip Morris received a letter from K.A.B. in 2000 that allowed them to maintain the language "founding member" for its timeline advertisements. The discrepancy would hardly be worth mentioning except that Keep America Beautiful was from the start a greenwash vehicle started by business executives in the beverage and packing industry. At the time, they were afraid Congress might start requiring them to be responsible for the litter their products contributed. Though often credited as a successful anti-litter advertising campaign, Keep America Beautiful was really a lobbying arm of the packaged products industries, designed to make those industries look responsible, names and dates forever not withstanding. According to Wally Lamb's investigation of secret tobacco documents, Keep America Beautiful's own anti-butts policy was molded by Philip Morris and even then reluctantly embraced. This is but one example of the industry's attempts to enhance its opacity even as it tried to address the question of litter that was just starting to be raised. Even without the secret documents available today, Keep America Beautiful's famous crying "Indian" billboards and commercials should have been enough to build some outrage. The history of 19th century conservation is the history of not only the genocide of Native Americans, but also the ecocide of the Great Plains and the overgrazing of pastoral lands by westward settlers. It may be that to oppose the corporations sponsoring those ads would have required a collective introspection few imperial nations ever approach. Nevertheless the exploitation of the crying Indian on that 1971 billboard was undeniable proof that among Americans, the only environment that mattered was the one beneath their own feet. Outside the US, where secondhand smoke had hardly been a mobilizing issue, there were rumblings about deforestation and environmental devastation as early as 1914, when World War I brought smoking into vogue. SMOKING TREES AND COOKING NUMBERS In lesser developed countries where increasingly more and more tobacco was grown only to end up being shipped to the US and England for processing, indigenous people noticed that the crop altered their traditional agricultural heritage. One of the earliest mentions of how tobacco affected Africa comes from the Director of Agriculture in Nyasaland (currently Malawi). He cited the tobacco industry's environmental hazards as early as 1914 when he declared:
There are a few more scattered mentions of the problem in the developing nations after this one, but almost entirely they consist of anecdotes like the one above. The first concerted wave of documented, quantitative attention by Westerners does not occur until the 1980s. The sporadic attention given to the issue in the 1970s on issues such as deforestation, pesticide use, and the industry's effects on the "third world" was met by an active campaign to undermine the few statistics being compiled by anti-tobacco forces, most vociferously in the pages of Tobacco Briefing, an industry publication devoted almost exclusively to confronting environmental research into tobacco. One of their main tactics was elementary use of misdirection. For example, in order to minimize reports on forest acreage lost to tobacco farming, Tobacco Briefing would cite a greater amount of wood lost to fuel cooking in lesser-developed countries, thus finessing the fact that cooking is essential to feeding humans and tobacco is not. Just as with the Rosenberg report never being released to the public, despite its seeming exoneration of the tobacco industry, the propaganda within Tobacco Briefing remained largely in-house. Big Tobacco understood clearly that fighting on the terrain of incomplete science and cooked numbers-while helpful to the morale and control of its subordinates such as growers and their advocates-opened them to jeopardy in the larger public discourse. It was better for Big Tobacco to attack its opponents from within more opaque institutions such as advertising regulative bodies. The anti-tobacco advocates, however, felt brash ads and salacious statistics would help them win the war for public opinion. Sometimes it would, but often they were all too willing to narrow their focus whenever Big Tobacco attacked from behind bureaucratic machinery. A case of brash assault, followed by timid withdrawal began on June 5th, 1978 when an independent television agency in the UK broadcast a report by "World in Action," roughly the UK equivalent to "20/20". The event coincided with the publication of "Tobacco and the Third World: Tomorrow's Epidemic?" by journalist Mike Muller, one of the first to draw mass attention to the industry's environmental impact. Muller drew attention to many economic injustices in regard to tobacco farming such as the tobacco crops replacing food crops. He also produced eye-catching environmental statistics. He estimated that cigarette manufacturing machine use four miles of paper per hour to roll and package cigarettes. But his most sensational statistic was that for every 300 cigarettes made in the developing world, one tree is burned in the curing process. The World Health Organization in 1980 (WHO) and the Word Bank in 1984 both reprinted the statistic. But in 1993 tobacco industry forces had sufficiently undermined its legitimacy that ads using it and likeminded statements were pulled from the air in the United Kingdom. "World in Action" continued for over a decade producing hard-hitting shows about the tobacco industry's advertising to children and the dangers of secondhand smoke. It did not, however, return to the environmental impact of Big Tobacco, nor ever mention the occasional academic papers quietly piling up that held far harsher verdicts on Big Tobacco's contribution to deforestation or environmental degradation. The most glaring evidence that anti-tobacco forces had failed to embrace Muller's innovation occurred in July of 1983 when Simon Chapman produced a 64 page pamphlet called The Lung Goodbye, A Manual of Tactics for Counteracting the Tobacco Industry in the 1980s. A deliciously noirish piece of agitprop full of concrete suggestions, the pamphlet contained not a word about expanding the fight to include environmental alliances; this was true despite Chapman's insistence that the best tactic of all was to inflict constant scorn on the industry with the hope of "radicalizing the movement." His suggestions were so aggressive that he felt compelled to remind readers that most of his tactics were legal. The omission of environmental alliances seems even more of historical significance given the fact that Simon Chapman, an Australian sociologist, would later win the World Health Organization's World No Tobacco Day Medal in 1997, along with many other accolades. More importantly, he later produced Tobacco in the third world: a resource atlas in 1990. That publication, perhaps more than any other, marked the single strongest and most widely cited environmental assault on Big Tobacco to date. It contained an entire chapter dedicated to the issue, albeit culled from several admittedly thin but frequently cited sources. It also included references to other environmental issues such as overuse of pesticide as well as its debilitating effect on farmers. It certainly could have marked the moment when Big Tobacco became tagged an environmental menace. Instead it serves to document how little the issue had been studied. In 1992, however, US Surgeon General Novello issued what the industry perceived as a denunciation of the deforestation claim, specifically the 300 to 1 statistic. It came almost ad hominem in a report issued primarily to address smoking and health in the Americas, and it occurred not in a section about the environment, but in a section on "economic externalities," about which it was generally favorable to the industry as a whole. Still, Novello noted in no uncertain terms that data on tobacco and deforestation was relatively slim, often produced by the industry itself, and that most of it was out of date. Regardless, Novello, much to the industry's delight, concluded "deforestation associated with tobacco curing cannot currently be considered a significant negative externality." The statement, taken out of context, would quickly become a major talking point in tobacco industry publications such as Tobacco Briefing, published by the International Tobacco Growers Association (IGTA), a shadowy, quasi-governmental alliance organized around little more than the idea of actual growers. Despite the fact that Novello clearly contradicted what the industry declared was the "definitive report," the ITGA declared 300 to 1 statistic dead. It would resurface occasionally often in independent journalists' broader stories about the tobacco industry, but anti-tobacco advocates simply passed over it in silence. They concentrated on fighting youth smoking and second-hand smoke almost exclusively throughout the 1990s. What is remarkable, however, is that after the Surgeon General's Report of 1992, rather than publicize the other damaging articles about tobacco and deforestation that began to come out, anti-tobacco advocates rarely returned to the theme. Nevertheless, the industry's
targeting of children and the obfuscation they manufactured around
secondhand smoke sufficiently damaged their image, and anti-tobacco
advocates deserve a great deal of the credit for that. As result,
during the 1980s until about 1992, the tobacco industry continued
its meager environmental giving, as a glance through their annual
reports reveals, but they remained reserved about publicizing
it. Evidently, they did not want to overstate their environmental
record and receive further scorn. HOW GLOBAL IS YOUR WARMING? By 1993, the tobacco industry had to address deforestation more directly at least within the United Kingdom. An organization with a title more officious than official, the Health Education Authority (HEA) began a series of magazine ads that linked tobacco to the destruction of the rainforest. The timing seemed exactly right for an organization devoted largely to issues of youth smoking. Their target was a generation of kids growing up in the aftermath of Earth Day and "save the rainforest" campaigns. Artists such as Sting and a commercially resurgent, MTV-oriented Grateful Dead were prominent donors to rainforest campaigns at this time and their influence on fans and younger bands brought great visibility to the rainforest issue. None of the celebrities, however, drew attention to the role of the tobacco industry in deforestation. That fell to the rather puny HEA. These ads are nearly impossible to track down, but they were pivotal from the point of view of the tobacco industry. From ITGA propaganda there remain hints about what the ads contained. For example, one slogan was "When tobacco companies burn the rainforest only one plant survives." The plant in question was not, as one might expect, the tobacco plant, but the cigarette manufacturing plant; perhaps a slightly awkward play on words, but with visual aid, perhaps poignant overall. The UK's Advertising Standards Authority, the regulative entity charged with handling reckless promotional claims, (and prompted by the IGTA) ruled that the ads were too broad. Too many other factors and industries caused rainforest devastation. The law simply would not allow the type of scorn Simon Chapman favored to be piled on any business. As result, the Advertising Standards Authority pulled the ads and as confidential "media response" documents show, the tobacco industry was prepared to use the incident to intimidate other like-minded tree-hugging upstarts. The HEA continued to push the deforestation issue and published a booklet in which it alleged 150 large trees were cut and burned down to cure one acre of tobacco. Perhaps so. The HEA also alleged that the average smoker thus causes one tree every two weeks to be felled. Here their bold assertions backfired because they assumed one tree per 5.56 kg of tobacco, equivalent to 5,600 cigarettes in two weeks time or 397 cigarettes each day. A smoker would then have to consume 12 cigarettes every hour for more than 33 hours in order to fulfill the HEA's claims. This kind of bloated rhetoric opened the HEA up for what would become a typical IGTA attack. Not simply a matter of choosing a less outrageous number of trees per cigarette, the issue became a matter of why a health advocacy group should be able to pronounce on environmental concerns. From that point on, the HEA dissipated, eventually swallowed by another entity called the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) and most importantly, it no longer focused on the intersection of health and the environment. In retreating from the tobacco/environment debate, the HEA missed an opportunity to raise the stakes because nearly every document the industry produced in response to deforestation claims reiterated that wood was not the main source of curing fuel. Coal was. The logical move would have been to link tobacco curing not simply to deforestation, but to the greenhouse effect. In a 2000 World Health Organization report outlining, among many other cloak-and-dagger episodes, how the IGTA undermined several tobacco control efforts within the UN, it becomes clear that the IGTA learned a great deal from the HEA episodes. Essentially, the ITGA argued that health organizations had no business disc |