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A CounterPunch
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Robin Blackburn is former editor of New Left Review,
author of the renowned two-volume history of colonial
slavery and currently visiting professor at The New School,
New York. CounterPunch is proud to publish Robin's booklength
report, Terror and Empire, the first extended radical
analysis of the post September 11 world, what the terror war
is all about, and how a just war on terror could be fought and
won.
Terror and Empire
By Robin Blackburn
Chapter 5
Coming to Terms with
the Revolution in the Islamic World
Today, the Middle East and the Muslim world are
caught up in the maelstrom of modernity
and democracy that perturb the entire globe. Its peoples crave
a better life, a degree of respect, and a say in how their countries
are run, and have done for a long time past. Autocratic, monarchical
and traditionalist regimes were often set up to bar the road
to the sort of secular progress promised by Arab nationalism
or by such figures as prime minister Mossadegh in Iran, until
his overthrow in 1953, and President Kassem in Iraq, until his
overthrow in 1963, or prime minister Bhutto in Pakistan until
his overthrow in 1977. The progress promised, still less achieved,
by these leaders was, of course, incomplete and uneven. But compared
to their rivals and successors they offered hope and a way forward.
Generally the West accommodated to, or actually sponsored, the
forces of reaction, counter-revolution and military overthrow,
with their dismal train of corrupt, wasteful and vicious dictators,
sheikhs, kings and princelings. It should not therefore surprise
us that, as Said Aburish flatly asserts: 'There are no legitimate
regimes in the Arab Middle East.' Often the nearer a regime is
to the West the more discredited it is, and the more hostile
to the United States its population. Saudi dependence on the
US military and Mubarak's dependence on US aid are powerful agents
of de-legitimisation. Washington's countenancing of Israeli settlements
and repression in the occupied areas, its support for the blatantly
unfair Oslo accords, and the televised images of Palestinians
being beaten and killed further discredited all pro-Western governments.
In a context where secular politics failed
to generate progress, political Islam became an increasing force.
Compared to secular nationalists and the left, the Islamists
had the considerable advantage that their activity could for
a time proceed in the shadow of the mosques and seminaries. And
even once they faced repression, Islam gave them communication
with a large following. In some countries, notably Iran at the
time of the overthrow of the Shah, the Islamist movement became,
for better or worse, intimately associated with a popular upheaval
against autocracy. The Iran of Ayatolla Khomenei might appear,
and in some respects be, a throwback to the past. But the constitution
of the 'Islamic republic' was in fact a novel confection, quite
unlike the autocracy of a Caliph.
While the analogy is no doubt a limited one, we should consider
the outlook of Puritan revolutionaries in the early modern period
when assessing developments in Iran. Michael Walzer, in his book
The Revolution of the Saints, explains how Puritanism,
with its fixation on the need to fight Satan, gave rise to new
ways of waging war. Walzer explains of Calvin: 'Pervasive in
his work was a view of the life of the saint as a perpetual,
almost military, struggle with the devil. It was because of the
devil, and his vast cohorts of earthly followers, that the conscientious,
reforming activity of religious men so often resulted in or required
violence and warfare.' [In his "The Revolution of the Saints",
Michael Walzer develops an aspect of Max Weber's famous argument
concerning the protestant ethic and the rise of capitalism. The
broadly Marxist account of the role of the Puritans in the English
Civil War, as advanced by Christopher Hill and Robert Brenner
in Merchants and Revolution, is compelling. But the logic and
passion of Puritanism as a religious current contributed to the
momentous secular outcome. It is here that some parallel with
Islamic radicalism today may be worth exploring. As in the 17th
century, these Islamic radicals are often dealing with the problems
of traditional tribal or feudal social relations in societies
where capitalist modernization has taken hold but is very incomplete.]
Puritan militancy and organisation had
an egalitarian appeal in a decaying feudal order and laid the
basis for secular citizenship. Such an outlook led some English
Puritan soldiers to rid themselves of monarchy and some
to massacre the Irish or persecute witches. The overthrow of
the Shah and the rise of the Islamic republic, both sponsored
by an alliance of clerics and bazaar merchants, witnessed similar
contradictory tendencies. [The Shah's regime did not repudiate
all Mosadegh's reforms and appeared to some as a modernizing
dictatorship. But its bureaucratic and merchantilist character
failed to stimulate capitalist transformation. While some westernizing
compradores, technocrats and professionals supported the Shah,
the bazaar merchants, linked to the internal market, played an
important part in sustaining the opposition.]
Women kept the vote but were still policed
and subordinated. The war with Iraq led to terrible loss of life
and elements of a war economy. But gradually a more vigorous
civil society emerged. The hardline clerics lost ground from
1990, opposed by bazaar merchants who had tired of their populist
experiments. A more pragmatic leadership resorted to a programme
of privatisation. In the 1997 presidential election the more
moderate and tolerant, but cautious, cleric Khatami won, to be
re-elected with even more support in 2001. This whole process
resumes the trajectory of the interrupted bourgeois revolution
in Iran.
Today political Islam still has an egalitarian
resonance in feudal societies like those of Pakistan and the
Arabian peninsula. The first bourgeois revolutions came into
the world animated by Puritan righteousness, by hatred of Satan
and by a belief that the Elect must prove themselves in purifying
and terrifying deeds. The Enlightenment and the French Revolution,
the defeat of fascism and decolonisation, the Russia and Chinese
revolutions, opened up different paths to modernity in succeeding
centuries. But apparently, because of the defeat of secular revolutionary
forces in the Islamic world, we now witness a throwback to the
dawn of the bourgeois epoch. [The path of 'bourgeois democratic
revolution' has always been uneven, yoking together new freedoms
with new and old slaveries. The actuality of the bourgeois or
bourgeois-democratic revolution used to be a Marxist theme but
is now also encountered in non-Marxist authors.]
If the Puritans represented a kind of
progress in the seventeenth century could the same be said of
today's hardline Islamic clerics? The answer is no. The secular
spaces of the modern world create other possibilities (and weapons
of mass destruction create other dangers). Indeed even in the
seventeenth century there were proto-secular currents, like the
Levellers, to which Walzer gives too little attention. Anyway
it would be wrong to exalt the Puritans above such counter-currents
as humanism and the baroque, as reflected in, say, Montaigne
and Shakespeare, which also made a contribution to modernity
and civility. However, where radical Islam has become a mass
force, as it did in Iran, its evolution may bear comparison with
that of the Puritans. Those Iranian clerics who wish to keep
a theological straitjacket on Iranian society, and who mystify
political realities with pseudo-religious categories like the
Great Satan, are losing ground. Over two decades after the overthrow
of the Shah some of the processes noted by Walzer seem to be
at work in Iranian society, with student revolts, the assertion
of women's civic rights, a flourishing Iranian cinema, and the
tussle between elected officials and hard line clerics. In these
we see some rays of light in a darkening landscape. It is interesting
that Iranian developments are closely followed by the Al Jazeera
TV station which projects them to the Arabic world. The fact
that the Iranians are Shi'ite, and the Taliban are Sunni, apparently
does not lend the latter greater authority in the eyes of the
Sunni majority in the Muslim world, because of the manifest excesses
and failures of Taliban rule.
Thus Iran escapes the crisis of legitimacy
in the region. That is why the best way to overthrow the Taliban
and undercut the bin Laden network would be to let Iran, and
other neighbouring states, take the lead in strengthening the
Northern Alliance and other forces of the Afghani opposition.
The Taliban has not been a deep-rooted,
popular force. They are young men brought up abroad and indoctrinated
in madrassas, or religious colleges, sponsored by the ISI. Their
movement would not have prevailed without foreign backing. Their
rule was baneful for most of the population though some Afghans
will support them because of tribal or family ties. This is why
an indigenous opposition, supported by regional powers, is best
placed for political reconstitution. The contribution that the
US could make is to ensure that all Pakistani and Saudi support
for the Taliban ceases immediately.
If Iran was left to play a leading role
within a genuinely international coalition that would be quite
different from the course the US has embarked on. Washington
could regard its willingness to see this happen an embodying
a Kissingeresque realism like the recognition of 'Red China'
but without the cynicism and in a better cause. Such an approach
would also be congruent with Samuel Huntington's advice, in The
Clash of Civilisations, that the United States should work
in concert with the leading powers in other major civilisations
and not intervene militarily itself. Huntington's approach does
not properly register the importance of the democratic revolution
or make enough allowance for secular forces and the need to encourage
them. His approach portrays a few great world civilisations without
noting the cross-currents and mixtures that complicate the picture.
Nevertheless Huntington's is a vision of the world which challenges
the arrogant messianism of the Bush administration and the jingoes
of the press.
All Iranian groupings were strongly opposed
to the Taliban. There are some two million Afghan refugees within
its borders, most of whom have been eager to return. The Iranian
government has had links with resistance groups in the country
and could easily help to strengthen them. While the Iranian government
could help assemble a powerful reconstituting force it obviously
will not aid or abet a US occupation. So the US authorities have
to choose between a medium-to-long range policy which could work
and their present policy, which will not meet the objectives
set except very partially and at great risk.
Unfortunately the chances that the US
will opt for the effective medium-to-long range policy any time
soon are not good. The administration's response to the Iranian
government supplies the litmus paper, since Iran has had such
a potentially critical role to play in sponsoring an effective
Afghan resistance and in de-legitimating Al Qaeda. The mayor
of Teheran sent a message of sympathy and support to mayor Guiliani
of New York in the immediate aftermath of the attack on the World
Trade Center. The Economist informs us that the US State Department
cold-shouldered Iranian overtures: 'On September 16th a State
department official said that Iran's help in the campaign against
terrorism would be welcomed only if it withdrew support from
Hizbullah hardly a realistic demand, not least because
few countries, apart from America and Israel, consider Hizbullah
to be a terrorist organisation..' On September 30 the Iranian
assistant foreign minister gave an interview to the New York
Times in which he explained the critical failings of US diplomacy
and strategy: '"No single nation can take up this fight",
Zarif said"This is a global fight. And a cold warrior mentality
against the global menace of terrorism is not going to produce
the results necessary to eradicate terrorism." He said the
coalition must both be inclusive and authorised by the United
Nations. "Everybody has to be in", he said, "you
can't pick and choose the members". Zarif extended his condolences
to the American people. "The magnitude of this attack has
been unprecedented", he said, "it is difficult for
the world to comprehend that in a few seconds so many people
have been lost. Certainly in Iran we understand the trauma that
the American people are suffering and will continue to suffer
for many years to come."While expressing sympathy for the
victims of the attacks, Zarif criticised statements by Secretary
of State Colin L. Powell about Iran's possible inclusion in an
American led coalition. "The notion that you are either
with the US or with the terrorists is problematic. People are
not in line to join the coalition. There is no queue. In the
Iranian psyche the United States is not the center of the world.",
he said, "So it would be advisable if the American people
look at themselves from the perspective of others."'
While the US is reluctant to allow Iran
a leading role it will strive for, and probably achieve, a covert
understanding. Unlike the governments of most other large Muslim
states the government of Iran is not financially or militarily
dependent on the United States. It has a long border with Afghanistan
and many ties with its population. Washington knows that Iran
will not wish to see another hostile government formed in the
neighbouring state. But any tacit understanding will always be
limited by Washington's insistence on its own determining role.
The existing Afghan opposition was backed
by Iran, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Iran alone has standing
within the Muslim world and is manifestly better placed than
they are to appeal for a broader internal post-Taliban coalition.
The best that can be said about the regimes in Tajikistan and
Uzbekistan is that they do have a broadly secular character,
and could allow secular Afghan refugees to return to their homeland.
Uzkekistan has a functioning state based on the former Soviet
order which has permitted a modicum of economic and social development.
Tajikistan has suffered from civil war but now has a coalition
government that includes former Communists and an Iranian-backed
Islamic movement. Because of their autocratic character, past
subservience to Moscow, and ethnic links, the support of the
Uzbek and Tajik governments will not itself strengthen the appeal
of any post-Taliban coalition. Such an opposition would be more
convincing if it incorporated more diverse secular and civilian
forces, such as the RAWA, or association of Afghan women. Those
military leaders like General Dostum, who faithfully served the
former Communist government, may prove more open to democratic
and secular themes than the avid clique around President Rabbani.
But the critical weakness of the Northern Alliance is its failure
to rally a more representative coalition of forces. Iran can
help but, because of religious and ethnic affiliations, not very
much so far as the large Pushtun people are concerned. The adhesion
of the king may help a little with the Pushtun but he is aged,
out of touch and does not speak Pushto. However a democratic
opening in Pakistan could help here.
The formation of a government in Pakistan
committed to holding elections, and incorporating the main political
parties on an interim basis, could help to weaken the Islamic
jihad network . These civilian forces are not favourable to the
Islamicists, whose parties have never been able to demonstrate
electoral support in Pakistan. Notwithstanding the main parties'
hostility to the Taliban, they will see good reasons to make
sure that a post-Taliban government has friendly relations with
Pakistan. The ISI has been strongly attached to the Taliban and
the problem this poses is increased by the fact that, like other
intelligence services, it has sources of revenue stemming from
the drugs trade that are not controlled by its government. Pakistan's
civilian governments have previously had little or no control
over the intelligence network , but they have been scared to
challenge it. But public opinion and the aspiration to be free
of military misrule also count for something in the country.
As Robert Fisk explains: 'Corrupt, drug-ridden, and inherently
unstable Pakistan may be, but General Musharraf allows a kind
of freedom of speech to continue.' The public opinion to which
this allows expression is not favourable to the ISI or the Taliban
but neither does it like the United States and Musharraf. Fisk
notes: 'Aqil Shah put it very well when he wrote in Lahore's
Friday Times last week that, by allying himself with America's
"War on Terror" , General Musharraf had secured de
facto international acceptance for his 1999 coup.' (According
to The Economist, "the one country that all drug traffickers
try to avoid is Iran." Some 204 tonnes of opium and 29 tonnes
of heroin and morphine were seized in Iran in 1999 by a combination
of army and police units. In Turkey, by contrast, only one-third
of a tonnes of opium was confiscated in the same year.) Musharraf
has promised elections and should be held to his word. A civilian
government formed now would have a far better chance of tackling
the ISI than was ever previously the case.
Thus a regional solution should centrally
involve Iran, Pakistan and Uzbekistan and outside powers can
mainly help by offering a really large aid package to reward
cooperation between them. The West expended huge sums in prosecuting
a proxy war in Afghanistan and the United States and Britain
are currently engaged in very costly military operations. If
similar sums were available for reconstruction and development
in the region this would powerfully assist the chances of a joint
approach in Teheran, Tashkent and Islamabad. And only such an
approach will offer the hope of an Afghan settlement.
The spectacle of a desperately poor and
ravaged country being bombarded by two rich and powerful countries
was counter-productive as well as repugnant. Robert MacFarlane,
a former National Security adviser to Ronald Reagan, argued that
it would be better if the overthrow of the Taliban is encompassed
by the Afghans themselves since 'the undoing of the Taliban by
Afhans would remove any claim of martyrdom from Osama bin Laden,
as well as reduce the risk of losing our Muslim coalition partners.
The alternative is for much larger U.S. forces to do the job.
They would surely succeed but at a much larger cost in lives.'
Russian and China should not, of course,
directly intervene, and will not wish to, since their presence
would also risk uniting Afghans against foreigners. They could
supply useful logistical help, though they will not wish to see
a permanent US or NATO military presence close to
their sensitive central Asian border zones. However Russian and
Chinese help will do nothing to alleviate the 'clash of civilisation'
danger in the wider Muslim world.
Clearly the UN should have a crucial
role to play, as the Iranian Foreign Minister observed, and as
the Northern League has requested. The Taliban are not recognised
as the Afghan government. The Security Council adopted a strong
resolution against terrorism on 28 September but no UN police
body was set up to enforce it. Instead each member state was
asked to take its own measures and to report back within 90 days
on its success in identifying and stamping out terrorist support
networks. While seemingly multi-lateralist this approach allows
Washington to retain control of all cross-border initiatives
and to act as judge in 90 days of the adequacy of the measures
reported. This is also clear from the explanations of the US
Secretary of Defense. In an article entitled 'A New Kind of War',
Rumsfeld explains, that this 'will not be waged by a grand alliance
united for the single purpose of defeating an axis of hostile
powers'. Instead of such an alliance, in which the US would have
to compromise with allies, there will be 'floating coalitions'
adopted or discarded at will by the directing center: 'Countries
will have different roles and contribute in different waysIn
this war the mission will determine the coalition, not the other
way round.' And the mission will be set by Washington.
After the gains in Afghanistan there will be pressure to turn
against Iraq. On September 19 the US press ran stories reporting
that Mohammed Atta, an Egyptian who had taken part in the September
11 attack, had met with an Iraqi official in Europe in the previous
month. Unnamed US government officials were quoted as saying
that this might point to Iraqi involvement. The plausibility
of such allegations is reduced by the fact that the Iraqi regime
would have nothing to gain and everything to lose by participating
in or supporting an Al Qaeda terrorist operation. Against the
background of unrelenting Anglo-American bombing, Iraqi diplomacy
has had great success in fostering opposition to UN sanctions
and has significantly reduced their incidence. Should proof be
forthcoming of Iraqi involvement, renewed sanctions would be
the very least Bagdad would expect.
An earlier New York Times profile of
Atta, made him seem a most unlikely follower for Saddam Hussein.
His German friends described his increasing resentment against
Western policies in the Middle East but also his deep religious
views. His thesis-supervisor at a technical university in Hamburg
mentioned a striking quotation from the Koran placed as a thesis
dedication: 'I cant remember it precisely', Michule said, "But
it is something like this: 'My life, my death, my sacrifice belongs
to Allah, the lord of worlds.' ). On the following day The Wall
Street Journal's report concluded: 'current and former US counterterrorism
officials remain skeptical that Iraq and Mr bin Laden's Al Qaeda
have formed a lasting bond. They cite important differences of
temperament and history. Saddam Hussein's government has deep
secular roots, exposing it to threats from fundamentalists such
as Mr bin Laden.' The advice left behind by the attackers promised
them martyrdom in the service of Allah, and paradise, with no
reference to secular objectives. They were urged to bless their
weapons, to keep them sharp, and to kill quickly, so as to observe
the Koranic instruction not to cause 'pain to the animal'. These
religious instructions were quite at variance with the modus
operandi of the Iraqi intelligence services.
Both the New York Times and the Wall
St Journal explained that that there was a rift in the administration
with a faction that wanted the toppling of Saddam 'even if he
cannot be linked to the terrorists who struck New York and Washington'
as the New York Times put it. Colin Powell was reported to be
worried that there was not the international support for an attack
on Iraq because 'its civilian population draws great sympathy
in the Middle East for the suffering it has endured since 1991.'
In the wake of the anthrax sent to US media and political figures
it was reported: '(T)he Pentagon was already pushing the theory
that Iraq was involved in the attacks, arguing that Bagdad had
both the means and the motive to wage bio-terrorism against the
United States. But officials said federal investigators, as well
as the Central Intelligence Agency, believed there was little
evidence linking Iraq to the Sept 11 attacks or to anthrax bioterrorism.'
Subsequently it was reported that the anthrax strains employed
in the attacks could have originated in many countries.
Since the US and British governments
have been relentlessly bombing Iraq for years the question arises
what more could they do? Bomb cities? Embark on a full-scale
invasion? Both would multiply civilian casualties and suffering.
And an invasion would require more troops and allies; short of
convincing proof of Iraqi involvement these allies will be very
difficult to find. In fact most of the evidence coming to light
in the two months after September 11 pointed to surreptitious
Saudi, not Iraqi, backing for Al Qaeda.
The US is compromised by the fact that
its cause is still yoked to Saudi Arabia, the Emirates and Egypt,
as well as Israel. For Bush to imagine that the US stands for
liberty and justice in the Middle East is a strange delusion.
It could only ever be seen in this light if it broke with the
Saudi monarchy and obliged Israel to withdraw completely from
the occupied territories, something that would obviously require
a revolution in its policy and priorities in the region. This
is not about to happen but Washington does now see that American
interests would be better served by curbing Israel. The US has
already insisted, over-ruling Sharon, that Israel resume talking
to the Palestinians. In an answer to an Iranian journalist the
British Foreign Secretary went considerably further, observing:
'I understand that one of the factors that helps to breed terrorism
is the anger which many people feel at the events over the years
in Palestine.'
The need for Arab and Muslim allies drove
the Bush administration to redefine its Israel policy and offer
some concessions to Arab opinion. The oil and industrial interests
so linked to the Bush regime could perceive the need for a fresh
start in the region and the President is now so strong that he
doesn't need to fear even the hostility of AIPAC, the influential
pressure group which backs Israel. But alliance with the 'moderate'
Arab states and the sort of token sops that might satisfy
them - will not help since these are autocratic, repressive and
discredited. So a replay of the Gulf War coalition will not work
even on its own terms. An attempt simply to re-start the flawed
and discredited 'peace process' would not be convincing even
to most 'moderate' Arabs. The minimum should be compliance with
UN Resolution 242 and willingness to discuss a territorial settlement
that gives both Israelis and Palestinians contiguous land and
reasonably defensible borders.
Compared with the killing power of states
bent on war or exemplary punishment the actions of terrorists
are often puny as well as counterproductive. But in this case
the terror action was not just symbolic and spectacular, though
it was that too. In terms of lives lost, or economic and political
impact, it transcends the usual limits of terror actions, including
those to which this network has previously been linked. The skill
and calculation involved were of a high order. The intended audience
of the September 11 action was the Islamic world in general,
and disaffected young men in particular. Anger at the West's
acquiescence in the killing of hundreds of Palestinian youths,
or at Sharon's use of state terror against whole communities,
or at the suffering of the Iraqi people directly at the hands
of the US and UK, were only the most recent provocations. Osama
bin Laden and his followers or co-thinkers have a political as
well as identitarian project in so far as they are prepared to
seize power wherever it may be possible in the Islamic world.
They are revolutionaries as well as warriors.
Al Qaeda is animated by affronted religious
sentiment and projects great changes undertaken in the name of
Allah and the faithful, such as the forcing out of all 'crusaders
and Jews' from Arabia, the overthrow of corrupt monarchs, and
the virtuous use of oil wealth. The ideology of Al Qaeda is,
in US parlance, 'neo-conservative'. It does not dwell on social
inequality or injustice requiring state action, as Khomeini used
to do in the early days of the Iranian revolution, but instead
stresses the need for faith-based charity and ethical Islamic
business. But the key appeal is to directly religious goals.
In the tape he released on 8 October bin Laden saluted the September
11 attackers as 'a group of vanguard Muslims', who had 'stood
in defense of..their brothers and sisters in Palestine' and who
had avenged a Muslim nation that had been humiliated for eighty
years. He also attacked Muslim 'hypocrites' who ignored Iraq:
'A million innocent children are dying at this time as we speak,
killed in Iraq. We hear no denunciation, we hear no edict from
the hereditary rulers.' Such apparently secular references are
incorporated within a religious world view. 'These events have
divided the world into two camps, the camp of the faithful and
the camp of the infidelsEvery Muslim must rise to defend his
religion.' He concluded with a surprisingly specific demand and
threat: 'America will not live in peace before peace reigns in
Palestine, and before all the army of infidels depart from the
land of Muhammad, peace be upon him. ' This last sentence could
hint that bin Laden would like to see himself as the adviser
to a reconstituted Saudi government, laying down terms to the
United States. Though when bin Laden refers to 'peace in Palestine'
what he probably means is driving all Jews, Christians and atheists
in the sea.
Bin Laden's aims are expressed in terms
calculated to appeal to mainstream Islam, apparently with some
success. Many Muslims believe that unbelievers should not control
their holy places. It is not only 'fundamentalists' who are likely
to be offended by the presence of US troops in the Saudi kingdom,
custodian of Mecca and Medina, and Israeli military control of
Muslim holy places in Jerusalem. Since there is a large Muslim
population in Arabia, in Jerusalem and on the West bank it is
not unreasonable to take some account of these views, so long
as they respect the non-aggressive sentiments of those of other
religious faiths or none. Even the narrow-minded Saudi authorities
have generally permitted Shi'ites access to Mecca and Medina.
There is no good reason for US troops to be in Saudi Arabia and
so they should be withdrawn, as Chalmers Johnson proposed prior
to September 11. This would, at a stroke, remove Al Qaeda's biggest
single recruiting issue. It would also begin to disentangle the
United States from the Saudi regime, the fount of religious hatred
and fortress of reaction in the Islamic world.
Matters are a little more complicated
in Palestine since Jews, Muslims and Christians all have holy
sites in Jerusalem. But if the Israelis were willing to treat
with a viable Palestinian state on terms of equality it should
not be so difficult to arrange for de-militarisation of the holy
sites and a right of access to them. Since Palestine and Israel
also contain cultural and archaelogical sites of importance to
non-believers one must hope that they can be catered to as well.
Inter-faith agreements over access to holy sites have worked
in the past in Jerusalem and there is no reason why they could
not work even better in the future.
The militants of Al Qaeda and Islamic
jihad have some very unattractive, indeed repellent, beliefs
and there is no need to respect or compromise on any of these.
They are willing to pitilessly destroy believers and non-believers
alike since the believers will go to paradise and the infidels
deserve to die anyway. This was already evident before September
11 : the East African embassy bombings wounded and maimed 4,000
people. But Al Qaeda and its allies also try to gain support
by appearing to champion causes which are popular and justified.
Al Qaeda is manifestly a threat to the cause of democracy and
progress. But to oppose measures simply because they are supported
by Al Qaeda plays into their hands.
Islamic jihad believes in a draconian
subordination of women and the drastic curtailment of cultural
and intellectual life. They urge that better prices should be
obtained for oil and that Islamic banks and corporations would
make better use of oil revenues than the hereditary states. While
apparently secular objectives are proclaimed in its videos these
are wrapped up in a religious world view. The ability of Al Qaeda
to attract sympathy and support in the Islamic world can certainly
be undercut by initiatives favourable to democracy, economic
development, self-determination and respect for the peaceful
exercise of religious rites (and rights). Although, in current
circumstances, it is dangerous to under-estimate Al Qaeda's appeal,
it is not a mass force anywhere in the Muslim world. It is a
network of several thousands, not millions or even hundreds of
thousands. There is evidence of bickering, factionalism and disorganisation
within it. Without continuing subventions its finances would
be strained. So for all these reasons the network could shrivel
if the peoples of the Muslim world saw real opportunities to
achieve recognition, justice and progress.
Islamic jihad has a political logic which
feeds off the need for revolutionary transformations in the Islamic
world and the failures of existing regimes, whether conservative
or nationalist. The excessive and 'symbolic' dimensions of the
September 11 action could further its political objectives if
it drives Washington mad, if it makes the custodians of global
capital forget how much they have to lose and if it plays to
the Manichean phobias still evident in US political culture.
The Belgian Marxist Ernest Mandel used
to say that the hugely prosperous American bourgeoisie had no
rational interest in blowing up the world in a nuclear conflagration.
Once again bourgeois America is in a like situation and does
not have an interest in, say, promoting the fundamentalist network
in the Pakistani armed forces. But this does not mean that American
political leadership can find within itself the wisdom, imagination
and patience to see that the main role must now be played by
others. The Islamic warriors who immolated themselves in the
World Trade Center and Pentagon were armed only with knives and
cardboard cutters. They turned their opponent's civilian airliners
into devastating instruments of destruction. They are also ready
to turn American belligerence into their ally.
Bush may wish to claim an extensive victory
and to avoid the charge laid against his father that he did not
finish the job. Sections of the US military and frustrated jingoes
throughout the land may find a rolling state of emergency very
congenial. Many Republicans see it as the best way to stave off
setbacks in next year's elections. Even 'rational' capitalists
may favour belligerent action say against Iraq or to shore
up the Saudi monarchy if they come to believe that this
could secure future control of Middle Eastern oil.
The US way of life owes much to cheap
oil and gasoline but the real interests at stake are easy to
over pitch. In recent years the Middle East has been supplying
only about fifteen per cent of total US oil imports. Even if
the US government and oil companies lost all privileged leverage
in the Middle East they would still be able to buy some supplies
from the region. The advocates of radical Islam speak of raising
prices or using oil revenues differently not keeping the oil
to themselves. The prices which eventually prevail will before
long reflect supply and demand in what is an internationally
competitive market. Mercantile activity, as we have pointed out,
has always been compatible with Islam. It could be that average
prices would be a little higher but this would scarcely be a
disaster for the United States. On the other hand the risks entailed
by allowing Islamic jihad to gain substantial state power are
of a quite different description and Mandel's argument applies.
Chapter
6
Cosmopolitics Versus Terror
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