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The New Campus McCarthyism
There’s a McCarthyite campaign in full spate across higher education in the U.S. today. For every headline case, like Norman Finkelstein or Joseph Massad, there are three or four less-publicized smear campaigns. In the sights of the witch-hunters are faculty targeted as “anti-Israel”, as terror-symps, as leftists. In our latest newsletter we feature the personal history of Victoria Fontan, a Frenchwoman who came to a US campus from field work in the back alleys of Fallujah and found out just how devastating academic warfare can be. ALSO -- Saving the Florida Everglades – Alan Farago reports from the battlefront. PLUS -- They aimed at Moscow, They Hit Kabul: Serge Halimi on Sarkozy and NATO’s Mission Creep. Get your new edition today by subscribing online or calling 1-800-840-3683 Contributions to CounterPunch are tax-deductible. Click here to make a donation. If you find our site useful please: Subscribe Now! CounterPunch books and gear make great presents.Order CounterPunch By Email For Only $35 a Year !
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Today's Stories April 8, 2009 Bill Moyers / April 7, 2009 David Price Uri Avnery Chris Floyd Winslow T. Wheeler Defense Cuts: Gates and the System Marjorie Cohn Dean Baker Diana Johnstone Dave Lindorff Martha Rosenberg Evelyn Pringle Website of the Day April 6, 2009 Michael Hudson Andy Worthington Bagram: Guantánamo's Dark Mirror Ray McGovern Deepak Tripathi Mike Whitney Norman Solomon Jonathan Cook Judith Bello Deena Metzger Blackwater in Liberia Dr. M. Kamiar Website of the Day April 3-5, 2009 Alexander Cockburn Kathy Kelly / Peter Morici Kathy Sanborn Andy Worthington Rob Larson Saul Landau Steve Early John Goekler Rannie Amiri Dave Lindorff Lee Ballinger Ron Jacobs David Macaray John Wight Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor Mychal Bell Missy Beattie Reza Fiyouzat Michael Boldin Christopher Brauchli Charles R. Larson Susie Day Stephen Martin Kim Nicolini David Yearsley Phyllis Pollack Poets' Basement Website of the Day
April 2, 2009 Robert Weissman Eric Toussaint / George Bisharat Russell Mokhiber Franklin Lamb Gareth Porter David Macaray Chris Genovali Sam Smith Suzan Mazur Website of the Day
April 1, 2009 Chris Floyd Stanley Heller Mark Brenner, Mischa Gaus and Jane Slaughter Obama's Perilous Plan for Detroit: Restructure the Big 3, But Not With Bankruptcy Jonathan Cook Eric Walberg Richard Morse Don Fitz Laray Polk Belén Fernández Harvey Wasserman Website of the Day March 31, 2009 Uri Avnery Peter Lee Nicholas Dearden Dave Lindorff Joanne Mariner Ron Jacobs Wiliam S. Lind David Michael Green Benjamin Dangl Johnny Barber Dedrick Muhammad Website of the Day March 30, 2009 Michael Hudson Patrick Cockburn Henry A. Giroux Mike Whitney Ralph Nader Paul Craig Roberts Jeremy Scahill Robert Bryce Jonathan Cook Ray McGovern Website of the Day March 27-29, 2009 Alexander Cockburn Arno J. Mayer Michael Hudson José Pertierra Andy Worthington Mike Whitney Winslow T. Wheeler Souad N. Al-Azzawi Dave Lindorff Ian Masters Barbara Rose Johnston Jami Tarn Diane Farsetta David Ker Thomson Against Democracy Ramzy Baroud Rannie Amiri Wajahat Ali Nick Egnatz Gregory A. Burris Missy Beattie Stephen Martin Charles R. Larson David Yearsley Ben Sonnenberg Kim Nicolini Lorenzo Wolff Poets' Basement Website of the Weekend
March 26, 2009 Paul Craig Roberts Sharon Smith Neve Gordon Patrick Madden Gareth Porter Dave Lindorff Hannah Safran Keith Newell Todd Chretien Nelson P. Valdés Website of the Day
March 25, 2009 Robin Blackburn Conn Hallinan David Rosen Jonathan Cook Dean Baker Ron Jacobs Russell Mokhiber David Macaray Dave Lindorff Sarah Knopp Website of the Day
March 24, 2009 Robert Sandels Harvey Wasserman Franklin Lamb Michael Donnelly Norman Solomon Elizabeth Schulte John Goekler Nicole Colson Global Balkans William S. Lind Website of the Day
March 23, 2009 M. Shahid Alam Uri Avnery Mike Whitney Ralph Nader Brian Cloughley Dave Lindorff Amira Hass Chris Irwin Binoy Kampmark Michael Dickinson Website of the Day March 20-22, 2009 Alexander Cockburn Paul Craig Roberts P. Sainath Robert Weissman Saul Landau David Michael Green Greg Moses Ron Jacobs Michael D. Yates John V. Whitbeck Andy Worthington Linn Washington Jr. David Ker Thomson Laurent Jacque Rannie Amiri Reiko Redmonde / David Macaray Kenneth Couesbouc Martha Rosenberg Alan Farago Missy Beattie Richard Rhames Stephen Martin Charles R. Larson David Yearsley Lorenzo Wolff Poets' Basement Website of the Weekend March 19, 2009 Dave Marsh Paul Craig Roberts Mike Whitney Sam Smith Harvey Wasserman Binoy Kampmark Kathy Sanborn Christopher Brauchli George Wuerthner Diann Rust-Tierney Website of the Day
March 18, 2009 Michael Hudson Paul Craig Roberts Nelson P. Valdés Jonathan Cook John Ross Yifat Susskind Dave Lindorff Frances Moore Lappé Richard Grossman Rev. William E. Alberts Website of the Day March 17, 2009 Michael Hudson James G. Abourezk Harry Browne Joanne Mariner Alan Farago Dean Baker Peter Morici Bill and Kathleen Christison Richard Gott Walter Brasch Website of the Day
March 16, 2009 Pam Martens Uri Avnery Mike Whitney Ralph Nader Nikolas Kozloff John Walsh Ron Jacobs Binoy Kampmark Stephen Fleischman Christian Christensen Scott Handleman Website of the Day March 13 / 15, 2009 Alexander Cockburn Peter Lee Diana Johnstone David Harvey Petrino DiLeo David Ker Thomson Eric Ruder Fred Gardner David Yearsley Saul Landau Laura Carlsen Robert Weissman John Goekler / Tom Barry Kathy Sanborn Chris Mobley / Leela Yellesetty David Michael Green Alan Maass / Christopher Brauchli Richard Morse Lorenzo Wolff Poets' Basement Website of the Weekend March 12 , 2009 Sharon Smith Christopher Ketcham Mike Whitney Ray McGovern Eric Toussaint / John Ross M. Reza Pirbhai Chris Floyd Steve Early Quentin Gee Website of the Day March 11 , 2009 Mike Roselle Paul Craig Roberts Henry A. Giroux Nikolas Kozloff Norm Kent Mitu Sengupta Ludwig Watzal David Macaray William S. Lind Martha Rosenberg Website of the Day March 10 , 2009 Franklin Spinney Vijay Prashad Stan Cox Zoltan Grossman Reuven Kaminer Jonathan Cook Dave Lindorff Brian McKenna Harvey Wasserman Corey Pein Website of the Day
March 9 , 2009 Pam Martens Ralph Nader Peter Lee Mike Whitney Peter Morici Dean Baker Steve Ault Stephen Lendman Farooq Sulehria Belén Fernández Website of the Day March 6-8 , 2009 Alexander Cockburn Chris Floyd Uri Avnery Dave Lindorff Mark Weisbrot David Ker Thomson Phil Aliff Rebekah Ward Tracey Briggs Dean Baker Daniel P. Wirt, M.D. Carl Finamore Wajahat Ali David Michael Green David Macaray Michael Dickinson Susie Day Bob Sommer Ben Sonnenberg David Yearsley DC Larson Lorenzo Wolff Poets' Basement Website of the Weekend March 5 , 2009 James G. Abourezk Kathleen and Bill Christison Robert Weissman Patrick Cockburn William Blum Robert Fantina Saul Landau Benjamin Dangl Christopher Brauchli Website of the Day March 4, 2009 Marjorie Cohn Mike Whitney Ron Jacobs Ashley Smith Joanne Mariner Dan Bacher Mark Engler Franklin Lamb Cal Winslow David Mandelzys Website of the Day March 3, 2009 Conn Hallinan Fawzia Afzal-Khan Brian M. Downing Robert Larson Daniel P. Wirt, MD Russell Mokhiber William Loren Katz Kathy Sanborn Pauline Imbach Christopher Ketcham Website of the Day March 2, 2009 Andrea Peacock Paul Craig Roberts Peter Lee John Blair Peter Morici Uri Avnery Michael Donnelly Fred Gardner Sonia Nettnin Andrew Lehman Website of the Day
Tom Barry Harvey Wasserman Adam Turl David Macaray James McEnteer Website of the Day
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April 8, 2009 No Exit?The Af-Pak ParadoxBy JOHN PRADOS There is a new acronym in the lexicon of Obama administration national security moguls. "AfPak" stands for Afghanistan and Pakistan. The term denotes the administration's desire to take a unified approach to policy and strategy for these two countries. President Barack Obama correctly views them as the central front of the war on terrorism and — also accurately — sees so many aspects of the strategic problem of the Afghan war playing out in both countries that it is far more useful to consider them intertwined. Obama entered the White House determined to pursue this conflict, having stated repeatedly that he would reinforce U.S. troops in Afghanistan. He also hinted at a more muscular CIA covert operation in the unacknowledged parallel war across the Pakistani border. Yet last week on the television show Sixty Minutes, Obama stepped back, declaring that there "has to be" an exit strategy for this war. What's going on here? Obama just made final decisions based upon the policy review he ordered at the beginning of his administration. He'll carry this decision to a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) summit in Strasbourg, France, on April 3. The new president will try to resolve this paradox with European allies, but the contradictions of the new AfPak policy may well doom the enterprise. Bush Legacy As Obama came to the plate, NATO forces in Afghanistan were hard-pressed and losing ground to Taliban insurgents. The Bush years of the Afghan war were hollow, the campaign largely ignored despite the fact Bush had started it. The tide of disaster has been swelling since at least 2005. American battle casualties are running at a high rate — even though wintertime in the high plains is supposed to be the off-season for combat — and are on track to match or exceed those of 2008, the costliest year to date. Military commanders were promoting a "surge" along the lines of what took place in Iraq, adding 30,000 troops to the U.S. battle force. Obama approved 17,000, calling it a down payment on Afghan security, but rejected the full program. The first brigade of reinforcements has already deployed. Two more The United States provides the largest single component of the NATO army, which is called the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), as well as its own independent fighting contingent in the form of a joint task force of the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). The current CENTCOM commander, General David A. Petraeus, considered a wizard by the previous administration for turning Iraq around, has sent mixed signals. He reportedly leaked information on Obama's refusal to reinforce AfPak at the maximum rate in order to pressure the president to reverse himself. On the other hand, Petraeus supports opening talks with Taliban factions, along the lines of the tribal "awakening" in Iraq, so as to divide the enemy. Meanwhile, Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, a holdover from the Bush presidency, has already spent much of the past year encouraging NATO, with marginal results, to increase its commitment. Overall forces in Afghanistan have grown from about 47,000 to 55,000 over the last year without seeming to affect the war situation. But some key NATO allies have signaled their intent to leave the war. Others are under mounting pressure at home to do so. One of Obama's aims at the NATO summit is clearly to use the reinvigorated American focus to stem the erosion of international support. Larger resources mean nothing, however, unless the strategy is right. The latest counterinsurgency approach embraces the very elements of nation-building and local development Bush rejected in his first presidential campaign, and eschewed until they seemed to succeed in Iraq under Petraeus. The current U.S. commander in Afghanistan, General David D. McKiernan, interviewed recently on Jim Lehrer's Newshour, said this of success in the Afghan morass: "It's going to take security, it's going to take governance, and it's going to take socioeconomic progress — all three of those in a comprehensive way." This sounds good until you peel away the layers of the onion. Peeling the Onion The security outlook in Afghanistan is bleak no matter how you cut it. High casualty rates are merely one indicator. Attacks along the Ring Road, the national highway, are up 40% over 2007 rates. Engagements and terrorist incidents are unusually high for the off season, and a disturbing number have occurred around the Afghan capital. In early February, a series of simultaneous assaults and bombings on the Justice and Education ministries and a prison administration facility paralyzed Kabul for hours. In other incidents, car bombs rocked the German embassy and nearly destroyed the Indian embassy, kidnappers have seized diplomats, and gunmen have attacked neighborhoods housing the Afghan elite. Americans and ISAF personnel no longer dare make the 60-mile road trip between Bagram Air Base, the port of entry for Kabul, and the city itself, despite the presence of powerful U.S. units in both locations. The centerpiece of security strategy is expansion of Afghan security forces. Obama's extra advisors will support a ramp up of the Afghan army to 134,000 (during their war in Afghanistan, the Soviets claimed to have built the local forces up to 130,000 but probably didn't put more than 60,000 Afghans under arms). A second problem — common to our effort in Iraq — is that troop units have been created without commensurate support forces, ensuring a need for U.S. or NATO "residual" forces even after the Afghan army is complete. At one point the bulk of Afghan troop increases for 2009 were slated for corps-level logistics units. As of last November, only seven Afghan battalions were rated as fully combat-capable. And the Afghans didn't have a national command center capable of communicating with field forces until late last year. A third issue goes to the pervasive corruption in Afghanistan: The Government Accountability Office reported recently that more than 370,000 weapons supplied to the Afghans by the U.S. or NATO — 30-40% of the total — cannot be accounted for. In sum, the United States expects an infant military to take over the fight against the Taliban, with weaknesses that will inevitably necessitate foreign assistance. Governance in Afghanistan is a thin reed in any U.S. strategy. President Hamid Karzai, beset with charges of ineffectiveness, corruption, and relations with those who meddle in drugs, is probably no longer a credible political figure in his country. There have been difficulties over the nation's planned election for this year, with voter registration running too slowly. Political cleavages in Kabul do not seem amenable to any immediate solution. Government administration is weak, almost absent in some parts of the country, and police forces, though strong in numbers (about 65,000), remain poorly trained and ineffective. Drug trafficking also contributes to undermining the system. The Afghan government is so little regarded that some ISAF commanders prefer to operate without reference to them. The Seduction of Reconstruction Nation-building and the socioeconomic aspects of counterinsurgency are the specialty of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and draw on the U.S. experience of "pacification" during the later years of the Vietnam War. The PRTs are building schools, digging wells, providing medical evaluations, and funding local development, but they labor under great burdens. Afghanistan is suffering an acute food shortage. Farmers are diverting significant acreage to the growing of poppies. Agricultural production in 2008 was less than in 2001, the last year of Taliban rule. Unemployment stands at 40%, with 53% of the population under the poverty line. Foreign aid isn't turning the tide, with the one notable exception of the Ring Road, close to being reconstructed, and which may one day improve these conditions. Many efforts of the PRTs are presently focused on election preparations and on simply emplacing local government structures. U.S. and ISAF military operations are destroying much of the goodwill earned by the PRTs. There has been a steady stream of incidents in which U.S. aircraft, supposedly targeting the Taliban, have harmed Afghan civilians. As a result, even President Karzai has denounced the air raids, which are an integral element of military action. Special operations forces conducting raids without coordinating with local authorities have also provoked negative reactions among Afghans. The Problem of Pakistan Meanwhile in Pakistan, the center of Taliban (and al-Qaeda) power lies beyond the reach of U.S. forces. An elaborate border surveillance network has attempted to impede insurgent infiltration into Afghanistan, but this is likely to be no more effective than similar American efforts in Vietnam or French ones in Algeria. Pressure on Pakistan to take action against the insurgents has had marginal payoff. Worse, the delicate balance of political forces in Pakistan militates against success in this area. Indeed there have been repeated — and increasingly more concrete — allegations that Pakistani intelligence is actually helping the Taliban. The CIA covert operation that has used armed drones to attack insurgent targets is worth a detailed investigation elsewhere, but here it is sufficient to say that this has become as controversial in Pakistan as are American air operations in Afghanistan. Leader "plinking" is not going to win the Afghan war and may end up destabilizing a U.S. ally. In short, AfPak poses a paradox for the Obama administration. No course presently on the table offers any sure way forward. Benchmarks aren't likely to be met, which will crystallize Obama's original doubts about an exit strategy. When that happens, the greater size of the U.S. military commitment, and the extremely limited capacity to transport forces into and out of Afghanistan, will make any withdrawal difficult if not impossible. This problem isn't going away; it's getting worse. John Prados is a senior fellow of the National Security Archive in Washington, DC. His current book is Vietnam: The History of an Unwinnable War, 1945-1975 (University of Kansas Press). This article originally appeared in Foreign Policy in Focus.
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