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September 2,
2004
Jeffrey St.
Clair
High
Plains Grifter: Part 3: More Pricks Than Kicks
James Petras
President Chavez and the Referendum: Myths and Realities
Website of
the Day
[Redacted]
September 1,
2004
Alexander Cockburn
The
Stench of Doom
Kathleen and Bill Christison
Poor Larry Franklin
Dave Lindorff
Kerry's Litmus Test
Josh Frank
Protest in White: Not All of New York Rises Up
John L. Hess
Moles, Scoops and Flip Flops
Mike Whitney
Deconstructing Arnold
Jack Random
Kindergarten Night at the RNC
Andrew Wilson
War on the Pachyderms: Why Do Elephants Hate Us?
Jeffrey St.
Clair
High
Plains Grifter: Part Two: Mark His Words
August 31,
2004
Joseph Nevins
Escapism
and Global Apartheid: The Dominican Republic & the NYTs
Matt Vidal
Beyond
Bush's Rhetoric on the Economy
Neve Gordon
Kerry and the Middle East
Dave Lindorff
Bush
the Peace Candidate?
Mike Whitney
NPR Leads the Charge for War Against Iran
Jack Random
Opening Night: Playing the War Card
Jeffrey St.
Clair
High
Plains Grifter: the Life and Crimes of George W. Bush (Part One)
CounterPunch Photo of the Day
Pete Seeger in NYC
August 30,
2004
Justin Podhur
The
Disappeared Mayor
Shaun Joseph
The
Hypocrites at TheNaderbasher.com
Mike Whitney
Israeli Moles in the Pentagon: What More Could They Possibly
Want?
Ron Jacobs
Live, From New York: the Majority of Protesters Claimed No Candidate
David Lindorff
Sunday in Manhattan: the Sound of Marchin', Chargin' Feet, Boy
Dave Zirin
USA Basketball: The Team White America Loved to Hate
Sam Husseini
Israeli Spying on the US: a Long History
Sex,
Drugs & the Blues!
Serpents in the Garden
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Sizzling New Book on Culture and Sex is Now Available
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August 28 /
29, 2004
Alexander Cockburn
Zombies
for Kerry
Patrick Cockburn
Najaf Ceasefire Good for Iraq, But Weakens Allawi and US
Ray McGovern
Blowing Smoke on Intelligence
Dr. Juan Romagoza
From El Salvador to Abu Ghraib: Reflections of Torture Survivor
Ray Hanania
An Israeli Spy in the Pentagon? Ridiculous!
Fred Gardner
Eddie Lepp Busted by DEA: Facing Life for Growing Medical Pot
Diane Christian
Big Men: the Better Leader Lets You Live
William S. Lind
The Desert Fox
Paul D'Amato
The Left Takes a Dive for Kerry
Joshua Frank
Greens at the Crossroads
Mickey Z.
Media Declares War on Anti-War Protests
Winslow T. Wheeler
Sen. McCain's Pork Chops: an Exchange
Justin E.H.
Smith
The New Age Racket and the Left
Thomas St. John
Burning Slaves at the Stake: On "Sinners in the Hands of
an Angry God"
Ali Tonak
Help the NYPD?
Mark Engler
New York Says "No"
Justin Felux
Haiti: the Attica of the Americas
Poets' Basement
Gelman, Albert, Ford and Hamod
August 27,
2004
Gary Leupp
Neocon
Musings
Robin Cook
The
Ghosts of Abu Ghraib
Diane Christian
Disarming
Michael Donnelly
Situational Democracy: the Show Me the Green Party?
Jack Random
4F and Other Heroes: an Army of War Resisters
Mike Ferner
"To the Swift Boats!"
Mazin Qumsiyeh
7000 Palestinian Political Prisoners
Veronza Bowers, Jr.
"You Won't Be Leaving Tomorrow"
August 26,
2004
M. Shahid Alam
The
Clash Thesis: a Failing Ideology?
Diane Christian
War
Rules: Bush is No Sun Tzu
Derek Seidman
"They're As Bad As Wal-Mart:" Starbucks Workers Get
Organized
David Lindorff
Court to RNC Protesters: Drop the Rally
Christopher
Brauchli
Signs of Dissent: the Bush in the Bubble
Stew Albert
Reporting Suspicious Activity
Mark Donham
Judgement in Athens: Give the Koreans Their Day in Court
Saul Landau
Pinochet:
the Al Capone of the Southern Cone
Website of
the Day
The Kerry 527 Ad You'll Never See
August 25,
2004
Amelia Peltz
Can
I Have 9.8 Seconds of Your Time?
Noah Leavitt
Defining and Redefining Torture
Ron Jacobs
Takin' It to the Streets: It's Not About the Election, It's About
Democracy
James Brooks
Coronado Crosses the Jordan
Akiva Eldar
How to Win the Jewish Vote: Turn Gaza into a "Mini-Afghanistan"
Gemma Araneta
Chavez's New Brand of Populism
Philip Cryan
Uribe's Boys: the Death Squads of Colombia
CounterPunch Wire
Cheney Opens the Closet Door
August 24,
2004
Jeremy Scahill
John
Kerry: the Warchurian Candidate
Gary Leupp
"We
Want Them to Go Away"
David Domke
God
Willing: an Echoing Press and Political Fundamentalism
William Loren Katz
The Meaning of Hugo Chávez: Black and Indian Power in
Venezuela
Jonah Gindin
With Chavez? Reading the International Private Media
Fran Schor
Denying Atrocities: From Vietnam to Fallujah
Joe Bageant
Driving
on the Bones of God
Website of the Day
The Great America Lockdown: a Primer for the RNC
August 23,
2004
Winslow Wheeler
Don't
Mind If I Do: Porkbarrel and the War on Terror
John Pilger
Bush
May Be the Lesser Evil
Stan Goff
Swift
Boat Dogfight
Bill and Kathleen
Christison
Notes
from the West Bank: Build, Demolish, Rebuild
Mike Whitney
The Unraveling of Afghanistan
William Blum
Brave
New World of Iraqi Sovereignty
Ralph Nader
A Letter to the Washington Post: a Shameful and Unsavory Editorial
August 21 /
22, 2004
Cockburn /
St. Clair
"They
Want Blood:" The Bi-Partisan Origins of the Total War on
Drugs
Landau / Hassen
Failing
the Mission? Form a Commission
Brian Cloughley
The
Bush Team in Iraq: Moral Cowardice, as Practiced by Experts
Josh Frank
Nader as David Duke? The ADL Wants You to Think So
Mike Whitney
Reincarnating Mengele: the Torture Doctors of Abu Ghraib
Ron Jacobs
Day Labor Blues
Mickey Z.
Shooting at Whales: 40 Years After Tonkin
Fred Gardner
Dr. Wolman Comes Out: The Cannabis Consultants
Dave Zirin
Uprising in Athens: Iraqi Soccer Team Gives Bush the Boot
Josh Saxe
Witnessing Police Brutality in LA
Yanar Mohammed
Letter from Baghdad: a Democracy of Killings and Bombings
Helen Williams
Ali's Story: a Taste of Reality from Baghdad
Michael Donnelly
Elemental and NaturalForests, Fire and Recovery
Elizabeth Schulte
The Crisis in Affordable Housing
Poets' Basement
Adler, Albert, Virgil, Ford and Krieger
Hot Stories
Alexander Cockburn
Behold,
the Head of a Neo-Con!
Subcomandante
Marcos
The
Death Train of the WTO
Norman Finkelstein
Hitchens
as Model Apostate
Steve Niva
Israel's
Assassination Policy: the Trigger for Suicide Bombings?
Dardagan,
Slobodo and Williams
CounterPunch Exclusive:
20,000 Wounded Iraqi Civilians
Steve
J.B.
Prison Bitch
Sheldon
Rampton and John Stauber
True Lies: the Use of Propaganda
in the Iraq War
Wendell
Berry
Small Destructions Add Up
CounterPunch
Wire
WMD: Who Said What When
Cindy
Corrie
A Mother's Day Talk: the Daughter
I Can't Hear From
Gore Vidal
The
Erosion of the American Dream
Francis Boyle
Impeach
Bush: A Draft Resolution
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September 2, 2004
Myths
and Realities
President
Chavez and the Referendum
By
JAMES PETRAS
Between rightwing frustration and leftwing
euphoria, little has been written about the complex and contradictory
reality of Venezuela politics and the specificities of President
Chavez policies. Even less discussion has focused on the division
between ideological Washington and pragmatic Wall Street, between
the politics of confrontation and conciliation, and the convergences
and divergences between Venezuela and the rest of Latin America.
Both the right and left have substituted myths about the Chavez
government rather than confronting realities.
Myth 1--Chavez is an unpopular
President who the rightwing opposition is capable of defeating
in the referendum.
But the rightwing and its backers
in Washington miscalculated on several counts. First the weakest
moment of the Chavez government was right after the PVDS executive
lock-out (December 2002--February 2003), when oil prices were
much lower, the economy was devastated, the social welfare programs
of the government were under funded and grass roots political
organizations were weak. By the time the referendum took place
(August 2004), one and a half years later, socio-economic and
political conditions had dramatically changed. The economy was
growing by 12%, oil prices were at record highs, social welfare
expenditures were increasing and their social impact was highly
visible and widespread, and the mass social organizations were
deeply embedded in populous neighborhoods throughout the country.
Clearly the initiative had passed from the right to the left,
but both the US and its opposition collaborators were blind to
the realities. Having lost control over the state petroleum
industry and allocation of funds via the failed lockout in early
2003, having lost influence in the military after the failed
coup of April 2002, the opposition possessed few resources to
limit the government's referendum campaign and no leverage in
launching a post election 'civic-military' coup.
Myth 2--According to the rightwing
analysts the referendum was based on the issue of Chavez 'popularity',
'personality', charisma and 'autocratic' style.
In reality the referendum was
based on class/race divisions. Non-opposition trade union leaders
indicated that over 85% of the working class and working poor
voted for Chavez, while preliminary reports on voting in affluent
neighborhoods and circumscriptions showed just the reverse over
80% voting for the referendum. A similar process or class/race
polarization was evident in the extraordinary turnout and vote
among poor Afro-Venezuelans: The higher the turnout, the higher
the vote for Chavez, as an unprecedented 71% of the electorate
voted. Clearly Chavez was successful in linking social welfare
programs, class allegiances to electoral behavior.
Myth 3--Among both the Right
and Left there is a belief that the mass media control mass voting
behavior, limit political agendas and necessarily lead to the
victory of the Right and the domestication of the Left.
In Venezuela the Right controlled
90% of the major television networks and print media and most
of the major radio stations. Yet the referendum was crushed
by an 18% margin (59% to 41%).
The results of the referendum
demonstrates that powerful grass roots organizations built around
successful struggles for social reforms can create a mass political
and social consciousness which can easily reject media manipulation.
Elite optimism in their 'structural power'--money, media monopoly,
and backing by Washington--blinded them to the fact that conscious
collective organization can be a formidable counterweight to
elite resources. Likewise referendum results refute the argument
put forth by the center-left that they lose elections because
of the mass media. The center-left justify embracing neo-liberalism
to "neutralize" the mass media during elections. They
refuse to recognize that elections can be won despite mass media
opposition if previous mass struggle and organization created
mass social consciousness.
Myth 4--According to many leftist
journalists, Chavez victory reflected a new wave of popular nationalist
politics in Latin America.
Evidence to the contrary is
abundant. Brazil under Lula has sold oil exploration rights
to US and European multinational corporations, provides a contingent
of 1500 troops (along with Argentina, Chile etc) to Haiti to
stabilize Washington's puppet regime imposed through the kidnapping
of President-elect Aristide. Likewise in the other Andean countries
(Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia and Colombia) the elected regimes propose
to privatize public petroleum companies, support ALCA and Plan
Colombia and pay their foreign debts. The Broad Front in Uruguay
promises to follow Brazil's neo-liberal policies. While Chavez
promotes the regional trading bloc MERCOSUR, the major members
Brazil and Argentina are increasing their trade relations outside
the region. In effect there is a bloc of neo-liberal regimes
arrayed against Chavez's anti-imperialist policies and mass social
movements. To the extent that Chavez continues his independent
foreign policy his principle allies are the mass social movements
and Cuba.
Myth 5--The defeat of the referendum
was a major tactical defeat of US imperialism and its local vassals.
But a defeat of imperialism
does not necessarily mean or lead to a revolutionary transformation,
as post-Chavez post-election appeals to Washington and big business
demonstrate. More indicative of Chavez politics is the forthcoming
$5 billion dollar investment agreements with Texaco-Mobil and
Exxon to exploit the Orinoco gas and oil fields. The euphoria
of the left prevents them from observing the pendulum shifts
in Chavez discourse and the heterodox social welfare--neo-liberal
economic politics he has consistently practiced.
President Chavez's policy has
always followed a careful balancing act between rejecting vassalage
to the US and local oligarchic rentiers on the one hand and trying
to harness a coalition of foreign and national investors, urban
and rural poor to a program of welfare capitalism. He is closer
to Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal than Castro's socialist revolution.
In the aftermath of the three political crises--the failed civil-military
coup, the debacle of the oil executives lock out, and the defeat
of the referendum--Chavez offered to dialogue and reach a consensus
with the media barons, big business plutocrats and US government,
on the basis of the existing property relations, media ownership
and expanded relations with Washington.
Chavez's commitment to centrist-reformist
policies explains why he did not prosecute owners of the mass
media who had openly called for the violent overthrow of his
government and also why he took no judicial action against the
association of the business leaders (FEDECAMARAS) who has incited
military rebellion and violent attacks on the constitutional
order. In Europe, North America and many other regions, democratically
elected governments would have arrested, and prosecuted these
elites for acts of violent subversion.
President Chavez has constantly
reiterated that their property, privileges and wealth is not
in question. Moreover the fact that these elites have been able
to engage in three unconstitutional efforts to overthrow the
regime and still retain their class positions, strongly suggest
that President Chavez still conceives of their playing an important
role in his vision of development based on private-public partnership
and social welfare spending. After 5 years of government and
after 3 major "class confrontations", it is evident
that at least at the level of the government, there has been
no rupture in property or class relations and no break with foreign
creditors, investors or oil clients. Within the fiscal framework
of foreign debt payments, subsidies to private exporters, low-interest
loans to industrialists, the government has increased the allocation
of state spending for social programs in health, education housing,
micro-enterprises and agrarian reform.
The Venezuelan government can
maintain this balance between big business and the poor because
of the high prices and revenue from petroleum exports. Like
President Roosevelt, Chavez's positive social welfare programs
attract millions of low income voters, but do not affect money
income levels, nor create large scale employment projects. Unemployment
is still in the vicinity of 20% and poverty levels still remain
over 50%. Comprehensive social spending has positively affected
the social lives of the poor but has not improved their class
position. Chavez is both confrontational and radical when his
rulership is threatened and conciliatory and moderate when he
successfully overcomes the challenge.
Myth 6--The Left and Right
have failed to recognize a divergence of tactics between an ideological
Washington and a pragmatic Wall Street. The US political class
(both Republican and Democrats, the Presidency and Congress)
have been actively threatening, intervening and supporting destructive
lockouts, violent coups and a fraudulent referendum to oust Chavez.
In contrast the major US and
European oil companies and banks have been engaged in stable,
sustained and profitable economic relations with the Chavez government.
Foreign creditors have received prompt and punctual payments
of billions of dollars in payments and have not spoken or acted
in a fashion to disrupt these lucrative transactions. Major
US multi-national oil companies project between $5 billion and
$20 billion in new investments in exploration and exploitation.
No doubt these MNCs would have liked the coup to succeed in
order to monopolize all Venezuelan oil revenue, but perceiving
the failures of Washington they are content to share part of
the oil wealth with the Chavez regime. The tactical divergences
between Washington and Wall Street are likely to narrow as the
Venezuelan government moves into the new conciliatory phase toward
FEDECAMARAS and Washington. Given Washington's defeat in the
referendum, and the big oil deals with key US multinationals,
it is likely that Washington will seek a temporary 'truce' until
new, more favorable circumstances emerge. It will be interesting
to see how this possible "truce" will affect Venezuela's
critical foreign policy.
Myth 7--The main thrust of
the current phase of Chavez revolution is a moral crusade against
government corruption and a highly politicized judicial system
tightly aligned with the discredited political opposition.
For many on the Left, the radical
content of the 'No' vote campaign was rooted in the proliferation
of community based mass organizations, the mobilization of trade
union assemblies, and the decentralized democratic process of
voter involvement based on promises of future consequential social
changes in terms of jobs, income and popular political power.
Moralization campaigns (anti-corruption)
are commonly associated with middle class politics designed to
create "national unity" and usually weaken class solidarity.
The Left's belief that the mass organizations mobilized for
the referendum will necessarily become a basis for a 'new popular
democracy' has little basis in the recent past (similar mobilizations
took place prior to the failed coup and during the bosses' lockout).
Nor do government-sponsored moralization campaigns attract much
interest among the poor in Venezuela or elsewhere. Moreover
the focus of the Chavista political leaders is on the forthcoming
elections for parliament, not in creating alternative sources
of governance. The Left's facile projection of popular mobilization
into the post-referendum period creates a political mythology,
which fails to recognize the internal contradictions of the political
process in Venezuela.
Conclusion
The massive popular victory
of the 'No' vote in the Venezuelan referendum gave hope and inspiration
to hundreds of millions in Latin America and elsewhere, that
US-backed oligarchies can be defeated at the ballot box. The
fact that the favorable voting outcome was recognized by the
OAS, Carter and Washington is a tribute to President Chavez strategic
changes in the military, guaranteeing the honoring of the constitutional
outcome.
At a deeper level of analysis,
the conceptions and perceptions of the major antagonists among
the Right and the Left however are open to criticism: The Right
for underestimating the political and institutional support for
Chavez in the current conjuncture and the Left for projecting
an overly radical vision on the direction of politics in the
post-referendum period.
From a 'realist' position,
we can conclude that the Chavez government will proceed with
his "New Deal" social welfare programs while deepening
ties with major foreign and domestic investors. His ability
to balance classes, leaning in one direction or the other will
depend on the continued flow of high returns from oil revenues.
If oil prices drop, hard choices will have to be made--class
choices.
James Petras, a former Professor of Sociology at
Binghamton University, New York, owns a 50 year membership in
the class struggle, is an adviser to the landless and jobless
in brazil and argentina and is co-author of Globalization
Unmasked (Zed). He can be reached at: jpetras@binghamton.edu
Weekend
Edition Features for August 7 / 8, 2004
James Petras
The
Anatomy of "Terror Experts": Meet the Mandarins of
Abu Ghraib
Fred Gardner
Run
Ricky Run: Football, Pot and Pain
Justin Delacour
Anti-Chavez Pollsters Panic: Fix Numbers; Reinvent Venezuela
Brian Cloughley
Persecuted by All; Supported by None: Who Would Be A Kurd?
Joshua Frank
The
Outsider: a Talk with Ralph Nader
Iain A. Boal
On "Shame": Warmed-Over Orientalism and Racist Projection
Chris Floyd
All About Eve: Open Season on Women in DC and Rome
Andrew Fenton
Fighting for Democracy and Justice in Haiti
Aseem Shrivastava
Saga of an Anguished Afghan
Neil Corbett
See Cuba: Sometimes a Cigar is Just a Cigar, Mr. Bush
Carol Miller
/ Forrest Hill
Rigged Convention; Divided Party: How David Cobb Won with Only
12% of the Vote
Tarek Milleron
Breaking the Principled Voter
Donald Macintyre
The
Battle of Najaf
Ron Jacobs
Spirits of The Dead: Why I Love My Petty Bourgeois Tendencies
Mickey Z.
Kid
Gavilan's Grave: Propaganda Scores a TKO
Poets' Basement
Adler, Ford and Albert
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