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Read Cockburn and St. Clair's Whiteout: the CIA, Drugs and the Press and discover how the CIA gave a helping hand to the opium lords who took over Afghanistan, thus ushering the Taliban into power and helping to finance Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda network.


CounterPunch: Complete Coverage of 9/11 and the War on Afghanistan

October 15, 2001

Marwan Bishara
Clash of Civilizations? Hardly

Patrick Cockburn
Modern War in
A Medieval Village

October 13, 2001

Carl Estabrook
Letters to Editors

Molly Secours
War: The Procter and Gamble Perspective

Alexander Cockburn
War Can't Save the Economy

October 12, 2001

Imran Khan
Try Them in Court

Vijay Prashad
War in a Passive Voice

Patrick Cockburn
Bombing the Taliban

October 11, 2001

David Vest
Bob Dylan and 9/11

Amb. Edward Peck
Bush War Plan "Dumb"

Hani Shukrallah
West Is As West Does

Patrick Cockburn
Looming Humanitarian Crisis

October 10, 2001

Tom Turnipseed
Earth is Our "Homeland"

Steve Perry
What Is To Be Done?

Simon Jenkins
The Dumbest Weapon

Tariq Ali
The Pakistan Maelstrom

Cockburn/St. Clair
The Empire Strikes Back

October 9, 2001

David Vest
The Rout That Wasn't

Michael Mandel
This War Is Illegal

Patrick Cockburn
Bombs Weaken Taliban

Lenni Brenner
Powell the Owl

Zha
Marginalization and Terror

Steve Perry
It Begins

October 8, 2001

Zbigniew Brzezinski
How Jimmy Carter and
I Started the Muj


Philip Agee
The USA and Terrorism

Mahajan and Jensen
A War of Lies

Patrick Cockburn
Northern Alliance
Builds an Airport

October 7, 2001

John Pilger
Hitchens' Slurs

Tariq Ali
Who Said History
Stopped Being Ironical?

Resources:
100s of Links About 9/11


CounterPunch:
Complete Coverage of 9/11 and Its Aftermath


Five Days That
Shook The World:
Seattle and Beyond

By Alexander Cockburn
and Jeffrey St. Clair
Photos by Allan Sekula

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Published Oct. 3, 2001

8-Page Special Issue

Aftermath Diary

Ashcroft's Onslaught on
Civil Liberties

Ridge Long Groomed for
Cheney's Job

Those CIA Killing Bids
Never Stopped

The Not-So-Great
Mayor Giuliani

Crop Duster Ban
Will Save Lives

Madeleine Albright's
Deadly Legacy

How the Bin Laden Women
Fled Bel Air

Tom Ridge's Vietnam
Same as Kerrey's?

A CounterPunch Journey
to Ramallah

A Word About God

Nostrodamus Jam-maker


Search CounterPunch

Read Whiteout and Find Out How the CIA's Backing of the Mujahideen Created the World's Most Robust Heroin Market and Helped to Finance the Rise of the Taliban and Osama bin Laden

Whiteout:
CIA, Drugs & the Press

by Alexander Cockburn
and Jeffrey St. Clair

A Pocket Guide to
Environmental Bad Guys
by James Ridgeway
and Jeffrey St. Clair

The Phoenix Program
by Douglas Valentine

Al Gore:
A User's Manual
by Cockburn
and St. Clair

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Reviews of Gore:
a User's Manual


Private Warriors
by Ken Silverstein

CounterPunch's Booktalk

New Stories:

CounterPunch's Top 100 Nonfiction Books in Translation

Estabrook:
I Wonder Who's Kissinger Now?

Cockburn on Global Warming
Hot Air Is Bad For You

Spy v. Spy:
A Suicide in Arlington

Cockburn On The Road:
From Texas to Petrolia

Vest on Condit:
If You Can't Lie
No Better Than That

Bruce Babbitt:
I Was Wronged
by CounterPunch!

McCarthy on Florida:
Silence Over The Republican's Dead Intern

CounterPunch Special Report
The Crimes of Bob Kerrey

Will the Democrats Doom the Arctic Wildlife Refuge?

From New Orleans to Midland

Bruce Babbitt:
Sleaze Cashes In

Fear and Torture:
Inside a Genoa Jail

Katharine Graham:
She Needed Fewer Friends

Scenes from the Drug War

Nuked Baltimore?

Condit and the Lie Detector

Angelina Jolie and
the French Revolution

Edward Said:
Israel Sharpens Its Axe

Rest Easy, John Lee

The Battle for Public Power

Hitchens v. Kissinger

CounterPunch Special Report:
The Crimes of Bob Kerrey
by Douglas Valentine

Meet the Secret Rulers
of the World: the Truth About
Bohemian Grove

Hell Hath No Fury
Like a Dragon Scorned

Tariq Ali: What Blair's Victory Means for Britain's Left

Indian Affairs

Trout and Ethnic Cleansing

The Jeffords Jump

Defunct Dems

Pearl Harbor Revisited

Jesse Jackson and
the Movement

Kerrey the Throat Slitter

Hate Crime Follies

Curtains for Jeb Bush?

Kerrey and His Liberal
Defenders

Shocked About Kerrey?
You Shouldn't Be

The F-22 Fighter:
Tiffany's On Wings

Linebaugh:
a May Day Meditation

October 18, 2001

In Afghanistan

US Planes Pound Taliban Troops

By Patrick Cockburn
in Panjshir valley
The Independent

Taliban troop concentrations in northern Afghanistan became a target of American air strikes for the first time yesterday in what appeared to signal a shift in strategy towards the Northern Alliance.

Washington and London continued to insist the Alliance would not be allowed to capture Kabul and form the next Afghan government, but the air attacks paved the way for the opposition fighters to launch a fierce assault on the strategic city of Mazar-i-Sharif.

Last night Alliance forces appeared to be closing in on the town. Diplomatic and intelligence sources say America and Britain are preparing to let the Alliance take it and the surrounding area with the proviso that its military airport will be turned over to the Allies for a secure base if requested.

Taliban forces defending Mazar-i-Sharif face infantry assaults from the east and the west. The attacks are being led by Commander Ato Mukham- med and General Rashid Dostum. If the city does fall the Taliban's position in Afghanistan north of the Hindu Kush mountains could rapidly unravel.

Abdul Vadud, the Afghan military attaché in Dushanbe, the capital of Tajikistan, said yesterday the Alliance forces were three miles from Mazar-i-Sharif and were shelling its outskirts. He said Ato Mukham-med had seized the military airport. Earlier reports said the Alliance had taken the civil airport but had been driven back. Mohajeddin Mehdi, an Afghan diplomat in Dushanbe, claimed the Taliban had concentrated tens of thousands of fighters in the Mazar-i-Sharif area.

The advance is the first serious military move by the Northern Alliance since the start of the crisis. It is also a critical test of the Taliban ability to resist in a region where they have never been popular.

A senior defence source in London said yesterday: "It does not follow that the United Front [Northern Alliance] taking Mazar-i-Sharif means they will go on to take Kabul. That is something we are totally against and they have assured us they that is something they will not do. We do not believe they have the military capability and co-ordination necessary, at present, to capture the capital without significant outside help."

The allies believe Northern Alliance forces are unfit to govern because of their record, and because of vehement Pakistani objections. Mazar-i-Sharif appears to be the compromise. Access to a secure base inside Afghanistan would give strategists in Washington and London a lot more options. The alternative would be to operate almost entirely from former Russian bases in Uzbekistan and ones in Pakistan.

Allied strategists also believe a secure base inside Afghanistan would help them to avert the impending humanitarian catastrophe. With many roads becoming impassable with the coming winter, airlift appears to be the only way to bring in aid. Food, medicine and clothing can then be distributed by helicopter.

Ideally, the Allies would have preferred to operate from another former Soviet airbase, Bagram. The all-weather airfield could be used by a variety of allied aircraft with comparatively little building work. But Bagram's natural hill defences make it difficult to wrest from the Taliban, and its capture is thought to be beyond the present capacity of opposition forces.

On the Kabul front, the Alliance was making greater use of its artillery and rocket launchers. But there is no sign yet of it making a full-scale military assault.

Local commanders say they have been ready to attack for a week but have no orders. Many of the fighters near the front are, in effect, militia from the villages, varying in age from teenagers to old men. If fighting does not start in the next few weeks on the Kabul front many of these men will probably start to drift back to their homes.

The low military casualties reported by the opposition are in keeping with the history of warfare in Afghanistan over the past decade. Civilian casualties from mines and shellfire have been heavy, but the small armies on both sides have seldom fought serious battles. Kabul fell to the Taliban in 1996 without a fight after Jalalabad was betrayed, opening the capital to assault from the west.

In 1997, after the Taliban first held Mazar-i-Sharif, an uprising in the city left 3,000 of their men dead killed and 3,600 taken prisoner. Many prisoners were later packed into containers and left to suffocate or were thrown into deep wells.

In 1998, the Taliban took Mazar-i-Sharif again and went on a rampage against the Hazara minority, shooting people in the streets and packing others in containers to die. The atrocities and counter-atrocities manifest the bitterness of the animosity between Pashtun and non-Pashtun minorities.