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CounterPunch
March 10,
2003
A Rebuttal of Perry Anderson
An Unfounded
Rush to Cynicism
By MICHAEL NEUMANN
Perry Anderson has written a
clever piece which journeys far, but not to much of a destination.
His conclusion is
"Simply this. Mewling about Blair's
folly or Bush's crudity, is merely saving the furniture. Arguments
about the impending war would do better to focus on the entire
prior structure of the special treatment accorded to Iraq by
the United Nations, rather than wrangle over the secondary issue
of whether to continue strangling the country slowly or to put
it out of its misery quickly."
But one suspects here the intellectual's
love of investigating 'structures' has caused Anderson to play
fast and loose with lowlier particulars of fact and morals.
This is apparent from some of the debunking
claims made in the (admittedly transitory) defense of Bush and
Blair. Anderson maintains, for example, that "the United
States has always reserved the right to act alone where necessary".
On its own, this amounts to no more than claiming rights of
self-defense recognized in the UN Charter, and it is quite apparent,
pace Anderson, that those rights do not apply. But Anderson
continues: "In recent years it acted alone in Grenada,
in Panama, in Nicaragua, and which of its allies now complains
about current arrangements in any of these countries?"
Since Anderson is far from obtuse, this can only be disingenuous
refusal to acknowledge that, on the international stage, justification
involves questions of degree.  Unilateralism in an area claimed
as a special sphere of influence for over 180 years, a claim
that has every mark of de facto international recognition, is
hardly comparable to an assault on a vastly more powerful state,
with vastly greater implications for the whole world, far outside
that sphere. Anderson may be right that the moral principle
involved is the same, but it would be hypocritical not to allow
the world a bit of hypocrisy in distinguishing between major
and minor violations of that principle. Besides, whether or
not America's allies complain about its unlilateralism in the
Americas, plenty of those who oppose the war quite consistently
do complain, and vehemently.
Similarly, Anderson's claim that the
US response to Iraq might cow Al Qaida cannot be sincere; it
is so silly that even the Americans haven't made it. You might
as well say that the ticks will keep their distance from the
lioness after seeing what she does to the zebra.
Anderson makes the same herculean effort
to be obtuse when he discusses the world's previous acceptance
of pre-emptive strikes. Israel, in 1967, at least faced a real
or imagined threat comparable to the US confronting massive armies
mobilized in Canada and Mexico, not the threat of non-massive
armies not mobilized and thousands of miles from its borders.
And again, even the Americans are not dumb enough to claim that
"in attacking Iraq, we will be doing no more than completing
the vital preventive strike against the Osirak reactor of 1981."
The strike was already complete. It destroyed the reactor,
which was not rebuilt. Had the Iraqis actually restarted a nuclear
program, and had the US and Britain hit nuclear-related installations
with another air strike, indeed no one would have complained
too much. How on earth is that comparable, in scale or seriousness,
to what is now contemplated? Anderson's feigned inability to
distinguish between a relatively small bombing raid and all-out
war is disturbing.
Again, Anderson seems to think that,
where matters of principle are involved, there can be no differences
of degree. A small raid, a full-scale war, what's the difference?
But it may even be a matter of principle to distinguish between
serious and not-so-serious violations: action is required only
when a certain threshold of harm is crossed. Indeed this is
one of the main reasons for opposing an invasion of Iraq: sure
Iraq is violating the accords or resolutions, but not that seriously.
As for overreach, Anderson again steers
clear of what is essential. There was a reason the allies left
the government of Iraq in place after the Gulf War: they did
not want to destabilize the region. Anderson claims to think
that replacing the government will be no huge deal; he cites
Kuwait, Jordan and Egypt as examples of "stable regimes
created or guided by foreign powers ...in the Middle East."
But Jordan is an insignificant mini-state, and certainly no
model of peace or stability. Kuwait and Egypt were not created
or guided by foreign powers in anything remotely like the relevant
sense. Moreover, they are far more homogeneous than Iraq, and
they are not encircled by countries whose vital interests involve
the fates of diverse and hostile ethnic groups. Yet these are
the sorts of comparisons that pave the way for Anderson's assertion
that "the Administration's case against its critics is iron-clad."
As for the United Nations and other international
bodies, Anderson's desire to discredit them incites him to the
very sort of myopia he condemns. He says: "Annexations
of territory--conquests, in more traditional language--whose
punishment provides the nominal justification of the UN blockade
of Iraq, have never resulted in UN retribution when the conquerors
were allies of the United States, only when they were its adversaries."
Well of course such actions have never resulted in retribution
when the perpetrator held a veto, but this circumstance did not
favor only US or its allies. It was also one reason why the
Soviet Union never suffered retribution. The other reason is
perfectly simple and valid: the UN doesn't visit retribution
on any countries too powerful to discipline, e.g., Russia and
the US. To expect more from an international organization is
to expect the impossible. Anderson also forgets that several
non-aligned countries have also got off scott-free in their annexations.
China (in Tibet), India (in 'French India', Goa, and Sikkim),
Morocco (mentioned by Anderson but hardly a vital US ally) in
the Western Sahara, are some examples. When the UN acted against
the annexation of Kuwait, it may have been acting as an American
puppet. But it was also resisting an annexation that, unlike
any of those mentioned, was likely to result in a destabilizing
change in the balance of power, far moreso than any of Anderson's
examples. So, mixed in with bad reasons, there was a good reason
why this annexation should have been more vigorously opposed
than the others.
Why this posturing? Anderson is upset
that critics of Bush and Blair are too respectful of the United
Nations and tribunals claiming to adjudicate international law.
Maybe he's right. But most of the critics' objections don't
depend on this respect. However illegitimate these institutions
may be, unilateralism and patently bogus claims of pre-emptive
self-defense are both unjustified and very dangerous to any prospects
for a stable international order. And while it may indeed be
right for states to intervene in other states to prevent massive
human rights abuses, this doctrine fits what was the real situation
in Rwanda and the imagined situation in Kosovo. It does not
fit even the imagined current situation in Iraq. Besides, the
US does not claim that, as in the earlier cases, concern for
human rights is the primary or sufficient casus belli.
Anderson's piece, in short, is an unfounded
rush to cynicism. He may be right that many within the anti-war
movement are myopic hypocrites. The same has been true in the
anti-slavery movement, the trade union movements, the civil rights
movement, and virtually all political movements that have ever
improved anything. And if principles or institutions have been
dishonestly or badly invoked in the past, that is no reason why
they shouldn't be well invoked in the present. Rather than
focusing on "on the entire prior structure of the special
treatment accorded to Iraq by the United Nations", it seems
not inappropriate to focus on what must happen, or not happen,
right now. This focus makes it easy to imagine alternatives
other than "whether to continue strangling the country slowly
or to put it out of its misery quickly."
Michael Neumann
is a professor of philosophy at Trent University in Ontario,
Canada. Professor Neumann's views are not to be taken as those
of his university. His book What's
Left: Radical Politics and the Radical Psyche has just
been republished by Broadview Press. He can be reached at: mneumann@trentu.ca.
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March 8 /
9, 2003
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