September
13, 2001
Nuclear Sites in Days
of Terror
Now That We Are All
Onsite
by Don Moniak
I want to apologize upfront
if this report strikes anyone as being cold and objective.
The reason is that we all deal with traumatic events differently,
not that I am considering applying for a job with the RAND Corporation.
I spent much of Tuesday, September 11, 2001 reviewing years
of files upon electronic files and filling the holes in the
knowledge base through Internet searches. Incidentally, the
Internet was running quite normal all day outside of the major
network sites.
US Terrorism Policy: What is
It?
In its haste to point fingers,
the media was largely remiss in its knowledge of the fundamentals
of this issue--which are available at the tip of their fingers.
The defining directives appear to be PDD-39, The United States
Policy on Counterterrorism (no link available, but try
<http://www.terrorism.com>)
PDD-62, and PDD-63, The Clinton Administration's Policy on Critical
Infrastructure Protection, May 22, 1998, the latter is available
at
<http://www.terrorism.com/homeland/PDD-63.pdf>
The defining document for
Government Operations appears to be: "United States Government
Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept of Operations Plan (CONPLAN)",
which "represents a concerted effort by a number of Federal
departments and agencies to work together to achieve a common
goal, to provide overall guidance to Federal, State and local
agencies concerning how the Federal government would respond
to a potential or actual terrorist threat or incident that occurs
in the United States, particularly one involving Weapons of
Mass Destruction (WMD). The CONPLAN outlines an organized and
unified capability for a timely, coordinated response by Federal
agencies to a terrorist threat or act."
These threats are broken
out at four levels:
1. Level #4 - Minimal Threat:
Received threats do not warrant actions beyond normal liaison
notifications or placing assets or resources on a heightened
alert (agencies are operating under normal day-to-day conditions).
2. Level #3 - Potential Threat:
Intelligence or an articulated threat indicates a potential
for a terrorist incident. However, this threat has not yet
been assessed as credible.
3. Level #2 - Credible Threat:
A threat assessment indicates that the potential threat is
credible, and confirms the involvement of WMD in the developing
terrorist incident.
4. Level #1 - WMD [Weapon of
Mass Destruction] Incident: A WMD terrorism incident has occurred
which requires an immediate process to identify, acquire, and
plan the use of Federal resources to augment State and local
authorities in response to limited or major consequences of
a terrorist use or employment of WMD. This incident has resulted
in mass casualties.
The Federal response is primarily
available via the following route: <http://www.fbi.gov/publications/terror/terroris.htm>
where the FBI's Annual Reports on Terrorism from 1996-1999
are kept, and then just hit the link to Publications. Does it
appear that somehow they missed a level, as this was not a weapon
of mass destruction event but a mass casualty event in which
innovation was used to create massive destruction and high casualties?
If the scenes that haunt everyone now are bad, keep in mind
that a nuclear explosive "fizzle" can still create
a 1 kiloton blast, a blast equal to 1,000 metric tonnes of high
explosives and coupled with intensely radioactive fission products.
Keep in mind that the responders were spared the greater horror
of having to enter a biological, chemical, and/or radiological/nuclear
contamination zone. The Presidential Panel Undoubtedly anyone
listening to the news heard several members of terrorist review
panels offering insights.
<http://www.rand.org/organization/nsrd/terrpanel>
is where you can find: First Annual Report to The President
and The Congress of the ADVISORY PANEL TO ASSESS DOMESTIC RESPONSE
CAPABILITIES FOR TERRORISM INVOLVING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTIOn.
A few quotes are relevant, because this panel, which included
consultants like Brian Jenkins of RAND Corporation (one of the
few level headed speakers I witnessed, along with Senator John
Kerry and Rudolph Giuliani), considered the threat of WMD events
to be over-emphasized. "The Panel concludes that the Nation
must be prepared for the entire spectrum of potential terrorist
threats both the unprecedented higher- consequence attack,
as well as the historically more frequent, lesser-consequence
terrorist attack, which the Panel believes is more likely in
the near term. Conventional explosives, traditionally a favorite
tool of the terrorist, will likely remain the terrorist weapon
of choice in the near term as well."
"By continuing a policy
that emphasizes high-end threats, there is a very real danger
of failing to optimize state and local response capabilities
to deal with the more probable terrorist threats confronting
the United States today."
"Indeed, of the more than
9,000 incidents since 1968, fewer than 100 evidence any indication
of terrorists plotting or attempting to use chemical, biological
or radiological weapons, or to steal or otherwise fabricate
nuclear devices on their own."
Nuclear
Terrorism
and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
One of the first emails I
saw asked whether the jets were in the vicinity of a nuclear
power plant. Obviously they were if they were in the East where
the majority of the nations 103 operating nuclear reactors are
kept. So are they ready?
From "05/07/01 Responses
to Preliminary Questions for 05/08/01 Senate Appropriations
Committee on U.S. Federal Efforts to Combat Terror" (NRC
document available upon request) The NRC is responsible for
regulating the safety of "103 nuclear power reactors, 39
nonpower reactors, 8 fuel cycle facilities, 2 gaseous diffusion
enrichment plants, and approximately 5,300 licensees authorized
to use nuclear and radiological material in the private sector."
"Based on current threat projections, the NRC's funding
level for its safeguards and security programs is both realistic
and proportional to the perceived threat to licensed facilities
and materials. While the consensus in the U.S. government is
that the threat of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction
worldwide has increased, threats to NRC-licensed facilities
and materials have been low."
From "06/15/01 Letter
to Vice President Cheney concerns NRC's role in combating terrorism"
by NRC Chairman Richard Meserve. "The NRC also imposes
obligations to prevent or control a terrorist incident. The
NRC requires that power reactors and certain sensitive fuel
facilities have the capacity to defend against a Design Basis
Threat (DBT). We assume for this purpose that the adversaries
will consist of several well-trained and dedicated individuals
with knowledge of the facility and possessing weapons (up to
and including automatic weapons) and specialized equipment,
such as incapacitating agents and explosives. See 10 <C.F.R>.
sec 73.1(a)." A jet crash is not considered a DBT.
A very good link to the situation
is:
<http://www.tmia.com/sabter.html>,
Sabotage and Terrorism at
Nuke Plants Anther useful one is
http://www.stimson.org/policy/peace-cv.htm
Containing Nuclear Terrorism with Andrew and Leslie Cockburn
authors of
One Point Safe 9/27/01
And always be sure to check
<http://www.nci.org>,
the Nuclear Control Institute.
30 Tonnes of
Plutonium at Pantex.
Don't Put More There
The Department of Energy is
responsible for the nation's nuclear weapons complex, which
includes about 55 tonnes of plutonium in various forms and an
unholy amount of dangerous radioactive wastes. On the day of
the attack, Secretary of Energy Abraham issued the following
statement: "Yesterday, I ordered that all DOE facilities
be placed in high security status. All non-essential DOE personnel
were evacuated and sent home. All shipments of nuclear materials
were halted. Nuclear operations around the country were ceased,
and nuclear material was secured. We monitored key energy infrastructure
measures, and we especially heightened security at nuclear plants,
and at refineries, pipelines, distribution points, and along
the electricity transmission
grid."
<http://www.energy.gov/HQPress/
releases01/seppr/pr01155.htm>
By far the most vulnerable
place in the country to this kind of attack is the Pantex Nuclear
Weapons plant near Amarillo, Texas, where more than 12,000 plutonium
triggers called pits (containing more than 30 tonnes of Pu total)
are stored in 1940's and 1960's designed above ground bunkers
a mere five miles from the Amarillo International Airport. Air
Force touch and go training flights are still a common site
above the 21 square mile plant, sometimes flying just a few
hundred feet above the plutonium. No more plutonium should
go to Pantex, and unannounced contingency plans by the DOE to
use Pantex facilities to store Rocky Flats plutonium should
be canceled immediately. Links from the Pantex area: <http://www.amarillonet.com/stories/
091301/new_burnedwhen.shtml> describes a bomb going off
in Clovis New Mexico.
<http://www.amarillonet.com/stories/
091201/ter_aresenthome.s html> is about "Pantex Response:
Nonessential Pantex employees were sent home Tuesday and normal
operations shut down in response to the terrorist attacks."
<http://www.amarillonet.com/stories/091101/
ter_cropdusting.shtml> is about "Cropduster Cancels
Flight," which gives a sense of how vulnerable the place
is.
A Long List
of Links
Nuclear Smuggling Sources
<http://www-safeguards.lanl.gov/
nis7_projects/nuc_smug.html>
Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Program Quarterly
Reports: <http://www.lanl.gov/ossquarterly/>
US Dept of Transportation Security
and Intelligence Page
http://152.122.41.10/
<http://152.122.41.10/library_OIS.html>
Others:
<http://nsi.org/Terrorism.html>
<http://www.st-and.ac.uk/academic/
intrel/research/cstpv/publications1a.htm> <http://www.st-and.ac.uk/academic/intrel/
research/cstpv/publications.htm>
<http://www.rand.org/hot/newslinks.html>
<http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR989/>
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