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February
21, 2002
David
Vest
Reagan
Clone Project?
Mokhiber
and Weissman
Chicago
School and Corporate America: Rotten to the Core
February
20, 2002
Bernard
Weiner
The
Shallow Throat Document
Kay Lee
The
Prison Guard Who Never Owned Up to His Crimes
February
19, 2002
David
Orr
Waylon
Jennings, the Duke,
and the Navajo
John Chuckman
The
Devil and Georgie Bush
Prudence
Crowther
Giblet
Gravitas
Ramzi
Kysia
Caught
in the Iraq DMZ
February
18, 2002
Ron Jacobs
The
US and Iran
George
Lewandowski
Empire
in Declline
Lenni
Brenner
Life
and Death of a Folk Hero
February
17, 2002
Robert
Fisk
Lost
in a Pit of Desperation
February
16, 2002
Phillip
Cryan
Colombia
in War Time
February
15, 2002
C.G. Estabrook
From
New York to Porto Alegre
Robert
O'Brien
The
View from Porto Alegre
Mokhiber/Weissman
Resisting
the Assassins
February
14, 2002
Levy and
Easton
Ante
Pavelic
Real Butcher of the Balkans
Joan Claybrook
Dear
Jeb Bush,
About You and Enron
John Chuckman
Time
for a Woman Prez
Alexander
Cockburn
Banning
the Koran
February
13, 2002
Sen. Russ
Feingold
War
Powers and
the War on Terror
Tom Turnipseed
Bush's
Folly
George
Monbiot
American
Imperialism
February
12, 2002
Uri Avnery
The
Great Game:
Oil, Sharon and Iran
Tommy
Ates
Black
Land Loss
February
11, 2002
Walt Brasch
The
Synergizing of America
John Troyer
Enron's
Deep Throat?
February
9, 2002
John Blair
Criticize
Cheney, Go to Jail
A Photographic Journal of Life
in an Afghan Refugee Camp
By Judith Mann
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February 21,
2002
The Philippines: "Second Front"
in the U.S.'s Global War
By Gary Leupp
After some fits and starts, on February 15 the
U.S. opened up a "second front" in the "war on
terrorism" in the southern Philippines. At least, that's
how the mainstream media is depicting "Operation Balikatan
2002," the joint exercises between U.S. and Filipino forces
in a combat zone on Basilan and nearby islands. Reuters reported
that "The deployment of the US special forces on Basilan
will mark the most significant expansion of the United States
war against terrorism, after its destruction of the Taliban regime
in Afghanistan." Agence Presse-France called Operation Balikatan
"the Southeast Asian phase of the US campaign on terrorism."
Newsweek questioned whether the southern Philippines was really
the best place to hunt al-Qaeda, but depicted it nonetheless
as the "second front,"-"the least complicated
second front after Afghanistan" (February 11, 2002). (The
reference here of course is to more "complicated" alternative
fronts such as Iraq, Somalia, Yemen, Lebanon, Sudan, and Iran,
that have been effectively vetoed to date by European allies
increasingly wary of Washington's bellicose rhetoric and behavior.)
Since President Bush's bizarre State
of the Union Address January 29, it has become clear that the
"war on terrorism" is actually focusing more and more
on states (especially Iraq) and organizations with little or
no relationship to bin Laden's network. Operation Balikatan targets
the Abu Sayyaf Group, allegedly an al-Qaeda affiliate, so it
can be described as a continuation of the Afghan bombing campaign.
But in fact, the connections seem highly tenuous. The U.S. government
has devoted little effort to justifying the deployment; it hasn't
needed to, since the force is relatively small and its role in
the operation has been determined by bilateral negotiations with
Manila authorities. But Americans inclined to question the "war
on terrorism" should be aware that Arroyo herself told Le
Monde in mid-January that there was no evidence for ties between
Abu Sayyaf and al-Qaeda after 1995, and in New York for the World
Economic Forum on February 2, she reportedly asked U.S. Secretary
of State Colin Powell to please not refer to the Philippines
as the "second front" in the "war on terrorism."
She and others, even in the pro-U.S. Filipino elite, are (despite
their public enthusiasm for Operation Balikatan) plainly uneasy
that an exercise directed at a tiny bandit group on Basilan Island
might result in violations of Filipino sovereignty, triggering
mass opposition in this former U.S. colony.
How did this curious situation develop?
In November Arroyo visited Washington and had talks with both
President Bush and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld. She brought
with her a shopping list, including military equipment. Bush,
eager to expand his terror war, reportedly urged her to accept
U.S. ground troops in the southern part of the country to fight
Abu Sayyaf. Arroyo had to refuse on constitutional grounds; the
Filipino Constitution, revised in 1992 as the U.S. withdrew from
its bases in the country, bans deployment of foreign combat troops
on Filipino soil. She told Bush that the Filipino army was perfectly
capable of handling the situation. But the U.S. sent her home
with $92.3 million in military equipment, including two C-130
military transport plane, a naval patrol boat, Huey helicopters
and 30,000 M-16 rifles plus ammunition, and in January, it was
revealed that the U.S. troops would to be sent to "train"
Army of the Republic of the Philippines (ARP) forces in the combat
zone of Basilan island.
What is the operation really all about?
The State Department estimates the armed strength of Abu Sayyaf
at only a couple hundred fully armed troops. This is not the
Taliban, nor the thousands-strong al-Qaeda force that once operated
in Afghanistan. Specializing in kidnappings for ransom, they
are widely regarded in the Philippines as bandits, rather than
guerrillas. Local ARP forces (6,000 strong) have alternately
fought them and collaborated with them. (On June 2, 2001, 35
Abu Sayyaf rebels, thought to include the leadership, were trapped
by Philippine government forces in Lamitan, on Basilan, but allowed
to escape after releasing a millionaire construction magnate
in return for ransom. Army Chief of Staff General Diomedio Villanueva
has since been accused of accepting some of the money as a bribe
to pull back troops, and President Arroyo of covering up the
event under pressure from army.)
What do we really know about Abu-Sayyaf's
al-Qaeda connection? A brother-in-law of Osamu bin Laden, who
has two Filipino wives, reportedly dispensed money to Abu Sayyaf
in the early 1990s. He also, according to the first substantial
CNN report on the Filipino action ("Live from the Philippines,"
January 25), funded the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF),
which signed a ceasefire with the Arroyo government last August.
Some Abu Sayyaf leaders, living and dead, may have participated
in the Mujahadeen's anti-Soviet campaign in Afghanistan the 1980s.
But as Arroyo notes, there does not seem to be a close al-Qaeda
link to Abu Sayyaf at present.
Nevertheless, the "war on terrorism"
must find some new venue, and the Philippines may be, as Newsweek
suggests, the "least complicated" available. But even
the Philippines poses problems. One has only to consider the
behavior of Vice-President Teofisto Guingona following Arroyo's
return from Washington to understand the degree of anxiety this
operation has produced in the Philippines. When informed of the
details of the planned operation, Guingona, who doubles as foreign
minister, opposed the operation and threatened to resign. As
foreign minister, Guingona had the legal authority to implement
the Washington agreement as head of the Visiting Forces Agreement
Commission. The executive order giving him that authority had
been signed by former President Estrada. But that order was overturned
by Arroyo in her Executive Order 67, signed January 22, which
shifted responsibility for the implementation of the Visiting
Forces Agreement to Arroyo herself. The next day, she convened
a National Security Council meeting (including all the top Filipino
mainstream political leadership, plus military leaders), in which
she apparently received support for her arrangement with the
U.S., but demands for its modification.
Following the NSC meeting, Guingona withdrew
his threat to resign over the issue of U.S. troops, apparently
having won a major concession from the president. National Security
Adviser Roilo Golez stated that Arroyo's policy was "that
the Americans are not going to be engaged in combat, period."
But this meant confining their actions to on-base training, whereas
the Americans clearly intended and desired to participate in
combat patrols which might result in exchanges of fire with Abu
Sayyaf forces; Robert Fitts, top U.S. diplomat in the Philippines,
has noted the "possibility of hostile contact" between
U.S. forces and local guerrillas. The Pentagon still calls the
operation "a robust military exercise," and U.S. officials
say U.S. troops are prepared to suffer casualties in helping
to defeat al-Qaeda.
Manila also demanded that the U.S. troops
serve under Filipino commanding officers; after some delay the
U.S. agreed to this. While debate raged over the Balikatan exercises,
Arroyo declared her opponents "protectors of terrorists,
allies of murderers and Abu Sayyaf lovers You are not a Filipino
if you are against peace. You love the terrorists more than your
own soldiers" (Feb. 9). Prominent politicians such as Sen.
Joker Arroyo, a member of the ruling People Power Coalition,
and opposition leader Sen. Edgardo Angara, criticized this simplistic
"us versus them" mentality, obviously patterned after
the Manichaean pronouncements of George W. Bush and John Ashcroft.
In sum, Arroyo's cooperation with the U.S. effort to create a
"second front in the war on terrorism" has sparked
a political crisis in the Philippines.
Given this background, it is not surprising
that the operation has begun with minimal fanfare. (The first
stage of deployment made page A16 of the February 16 issue of
the Boston Globe). But it cries out for critical analysis. Consider
the Palace Statement issued by Arroyo's spokesperson February
16, devoted entirely to quelling popular anxiety that Operation
Balikatan will result in "permanent [U.S.] military bases"
in the Philippines. The vital passages:
"The Abu Sayyaf and the New People's
Army are now panicking to stop Balikatan 02-1, since a stronger,
better-trained, and better-equipped Armed Forces of the Philippines
will crush their plans to foment chaos in this country.
"We appeal to the unwitting critics
of Balikatan 02-1 to see through this plain fact, and to see
that quite scandalously, it is the Communist Party of the Philippines
that has never recognized our sovereignty, and which has been
deceiving people in their all out propaganda campaign that a
joint military training exercise weakens our nationhood."
(Italics added.)
Whence this concern with the Communist
Party of the Philippines (CPP) and the New People's Army (NPA),
the guerrilla force it has led in a Maoist People's War against
the regime since 1969? (Note that here the NPA and Abu Sayyaf
are slickly conflated, despite the fact that the CPP and NPA
despise Abu Sayyaf and believe that it was created by security
forces in 1991 to split the Moro National Liberation Front.)
It's because the CPP, and the National Democratic Front of the
Philippines (NDF) which also takes leadership from the CPP, have
effectively mobilized public opinion against the joint military
operation.
I don't suppose this is very hard to
do. The Philippines was a U.S. colony from 1889 to 1946. One-tenth
of the Filipino population was wiped out in the first U.S. exercise
in counterinsurgency in Asia, the suppression of the "Philippine
Insurrection" in the early twentieth century. The U.S. backed
a series of vicious regimes after the Philippines' independence,
most notably that of Ferdinand Marcos. In opposition, communist
guerrillas have challenged the state since the 1950s. Since 1969,
the NPA (at its height, a force of about 25,000) has gained control
of significant regions, especially in the northern islands but
in Mindanao as well. There have been off-and-on peace talks between
the Maoists and the government since 1986, but these recently
broke down over the issue of Operation Balikatan.
Thus the Arroyo regime, implicitly recognizing
CPP influence in the creation of public opinion, seeks to tar
the CPP, NPA and Abu Sayyaf with the same brush. >From the
beginnings (January 31) of the smaller ("routine")
joint U.S.-Philippine operation in the north called "Balance
Piston," Philippine officials have focused attention on
the NPA. Thus, after an American tourist was killed by gunmen
at the base of Mt. Pinatubo on January 31, Philippine Army spokesman
Lt. Col. Jose Mabanta stated, "We have reason to believe
[the attackers] were NPAs." (The NPA denied responsibility.
Later police suggested that the tourist's German companion may
have shot him, or the attacker may have been a bandit of the
indigenous Aeta people.) On the same day, a U.S. MC-130 special
operations cargo plane taking part in joint exercises in the
northern Philippines was damaged by small-arms fire. Defense
Secretary Angelo Reyes blamed the attack on "New People's
Army or criminal elements." Communist Party of the Philippines
spokesman Gregorio "Ka Roger" Rosal denied any NPA
involvement, and suggested that Reyes' comment might be part
of a ploy to justify U.S. involvement in combat operations against
communist insurgents.
Vice-President Guingona meanwhile sought
assurances from Powell that the war games would be limited to
Basilan and will not involve operations against the NPA and the
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). "We would like to
confine the exercises, in relation to the Abu Sayyaf, in Basilan.
We do not want to initiate activities against the NPA or the
MILF because our policy is to forge peace with them," he
said February 10.
The concerns of Rosal and Guingona--two
very different men--are not unfounded, despite statements from
U.S. military officials that Operation Balikatan will not target
the NPA. Statements by top U.S. officials suggest that the "war
on terrorism" may well strike at revolutionary leftist organizations
in the future.
Item: Colin Powell, the first U.S. secretary
of state to ever visit Nepal, alluded during his January trip
to the significant Maoist insurgency in that country. "You
have a Maoist insurgency that's trying to overthrow the government
and this really is the kind of thing that we are fighting against
throughout the world." He thanked the unpopular and repressive
regime of King Gyanendra and Prime Minister Deuba for "fighting
international terrorism" and offered military aid.
Item: CIA director George J. Tenet reported
to Congress on February 6 about various "terrorist groups"
that have no al-Qaeda ties, but could be future U.S targets.
These include the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC),
a Castroite guerrilla organization which, Tenet acknowledges,
has not attacked American citizens anywhere. Still, FARC in his
view "poses a serious threat to U.S. interests in Latin
America because it associates us with the government it is fighting
against." (For the record, this association is thoroughly
valid. The Bush administration is requesting in the fiscal 2003
budget $98 million in new Pentagon training and equipment for
the Colombian military. Colombia is the third largest recipient
of U.S. aid. U.S. military assistance, presently provided as
part of the "war on drugs," will almost certainly be
placed in service of a Colombian "war on terrorism"
in the near future.)
In conclusion: Operation Balikatan, hastily
planned, designed to further extend the U.S. military presence
in the world and provide a follow-up to Afghanistan while war
fever is still widespread in the U.S., is at best a disproportionate
response to a limited, local problem. It was not initiated by
the Filipino side, and indeed its implementation has produced
a political firestorm in the country. The justification of the
operation, hinging upon the al-Qaeda connection, is weak. But
a much larger U.S. counterinsurgency role in the Philippines,
and other nations where liberation movements threaten U.S.-backed
governments, is altogether likely. In that event, the rhetoric
of the "war on terrorism" will be employed against
rebels more akin to the Viet Cong than al-Qaeda. Are such rebels
our enemies? I don't think so.
A lot of people in this country bought
on to this most nebulous and ill-defined of wars in the aftermath
of the September 11 attacks. Many will continue to support it,
at least short term, wherever Bush, Cheney, Rumsfeld and Powell
choose to steer it. It should be clear at the opening of this
"second front," however, that this is no longer about
al-Qaeda, or even about terrorism. It's about the U.S. government's
pursuit, on behalf of those it best serves (including, of course,
the big oil companies) of absolute global hegemony.
Gary Leupp
is associate professor of History and Adjunct Associate Professor
of Comparative Religion, Tufts University, Medford, MA. He can
be reached at: gary.leupp@tufts.edu
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