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January
29, 2002
Alexander
Cockburn
The
Birds of Kandahar
Patrick
Cockburn
Afghan
Opium Trade
Back in Business
January
28, 2002
Larry
Chin
Brosnahan
for the Defense
Mokhiber/Weissman
Tyranny
of the Bottom Line
George
E. Curry
Civil
Rights Nominee Called Affirmative Action "Racist"
Sen. Russ
Feingold
Campaign
Finance Reform?
Think Enron
John Chuckman
Liberal?
Media?
January
27, 2002
Mokhiber
and Weissman
Enron's
Drip, Drip, Drip
Tom Turnipseed
MLK
Jr.'s Dream Perverted
January
26, 2002
Norman
Madarsz
Adieu,
Bourdieu
January
25, 2002
National
Lawyers Guild
Know
Your Rights
Alexander
Cockburn
You
Call This Terrorism?
CounterPunch
Wire
Cal
Energy Crisis Hoax:
It Wasn't A Shortage,
It Was a Shakedown
Tariq
Ali
Kashmir,
Klinghoffer,
the Kurds and Chomsky
Nadine
Strossen
Protecting
MLK Jr.'s Legacy:
Justice and Liberty After 9/11
January
24, 2002
Robert
Fisk
Turkey
Targets Chomsky
Dean Baker
Lying
on Top:
Ken Lay One of Many
David
Vest
Idiot
Wind
January
23, 2002
Terry
Waite
Guantanamo
Prisoners:
Justice or Revenge?
Molly
Secours
The
Case of Abu-Ali:
Racism and the Death Penalty
Robert
Jensen
Speak
Out, Get Slimed
January
22, 2002
Brendan
Cooney
Moby-Dick
and the Hunt
for Osama bin Laden
Rick Giombetti
Progressive
Pols for Enron?
Judith
Resnik
Invading
the Courts?
Kevin
Alexander Gray
The
Crisis in Black Leadership
January
21, 2002
Marjorie
Cohn
Will
Walker's Words
Be Used Against Him?
Ahmad
Faruqui
MLK
Jr. and the Palestinians
January
19. 2002
Jordan
Green
Enron
Stole Our Future
January
18, 2002
Tom Turnipseed
The
Enron Model
Walt Brasch
Enron
at the White House
CounterPunch
Wire
Human
Rights Group Says Guantanamo Prisoners Must
Be Treated as POWs
January
17, 2002
Gideon
Levy
Bulldozing
Rafah
Uri Avnery
That
Weapons Shipment
January
16, 2002
John Chuckman
The
Angel and the Pretzel
Lawrence
McGuire
Subverting
the
Geneva Convention
Kathy
Kelly
An
Open Letter to
Richard Perle on Iraq
January
15, 2002
George
Monbiot
Greenpeace,
Lord Melchett
and the Business of Betrayal
Jack McCarthy
Follow
the Pretzel
William
Blum
Atta
and the Times:
Follow the Changing Story
Edward
Said
Emerging
Alternatives
in Palestine
January
14, 2002
David
Vest
Open
Bag. Eat Pretzels.
Patrick
Cockburn
Collapse
of Georgia
Ignored by the World
Mokhiber/Weissman
Enron's
Accountants:
When In Doubt, Shred It
January
13, 2002
C.G. Estabrook
Why
We Kill People
January
12, 2002
Cockburn/St.
Clair
Forbidden
Truths
January
11, 2002
Lee Balllinger/Dave
Marsh
Neil
Young's Duet with Ashcroft
January
10, 2002
Tom Turnipseed
Bush,
Enron, UNOCAL
and the Taliban
St. Clair/Cockburn
Greenpeace
to Greenwash?
Hans von
Sponek
Iraq:
Is There an Alternative
to Military Action?
Jim Lobe
Israeli
Human Rights Group Assails Army
Marina Mayakova
Russia's
Top Military Astrologer Predicts More Attacks from OBL
January
9, 2002
David
Vest
The
Super-Burqa
and the Big Tent
ND Jayaprakash
Winnable
Nuclear War?
Rafiq
Kathwari
Kashmir
Will Make Ground Zero Look Like a Bonfire
January
8, 2002
Prudence
Crowther
Sting
Like a B-52
Nelson
Valdés
Al-Qaeda
at Guantanamo Bay
John Chuckman
Dark
Tales from the
Ministry of Truth
Richard
Corn-Revere
Do
We Fear Freedom?
Joan Hoff
The
Nixon You Haven't Heard
January
7, 2002
Lawrence
McGuire
Confusing
Economic Tales About Argentina
Wael Masri
They
Are Taking
Our Rights Away
Philip
Farruggio
Better
Medicine
A Photographic Journal of Life
in an Afghan Refugee Camp
By Judith Mann
Resources:
100s of Links
About 9/11
CounterPunch:
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Five
Days That
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War Diary
CIA's Assassination Plan a History of
Torture in US Prisons
bin Laden and Bush
Business Connections
Aisha Ikramuddin on the Hidden Hype
of US Food Bombs
Peter Linebaugh on
Pakistan
Christopher Hitchens' Love for Mrs. Thatcher
Jiang Zemin Tells Bush:
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and Jeffrey St. Clair
The Memphis Blues Again:
Six Decades of Memphis Music Photographs
Photos by Ernest Withers
Text by Daniel Wolff
The New Intifada:
Resisting Israel's Apartheid
Edited by Roane Carey
A Pocket Guide to
Environmental Bad Guys
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The
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by Douglas Valentine
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January
29, 2002
Why This War Was, and
Remains, Utterly Wrong
By Gary Leupp
Last semester, following the September 11 attacks,
faculty at Tufts and many other universities spoke out against
war preparations. As U.S. attacks upon Afghanistan began on October
7, we spoke out against the bombing. The Tufts Daily editorially
disparaged our statements, dismissing them as "60s rhetoric."
Meanwhile, a national right-wing think tank inveighed against
academics as the "weak link" in the "war on terrorism,"
while some mainstream pundits found antiwar intellectuals less
threatening than "irrelevant." In the view of the latter,
the marvelous success of the bombing in bringing down the Taliban
and routing al-Qaeda, and the continuation of relative stability
in Pakistan, proved the propriety of the president's course and
rendered the standpoint of the anti-war left merely ludicrous.
In fact, our dissent has been wholly
justified by the events since. What has the bombing brought to
Afghanistan and the world? Two positive developments: the overthrow
of the Taliban regime, and the perhaps fatal weakening of al-Qaeda.
Not that one should overstate these successes. Many members of
the Taliban, including some former leaders like the notorious
Justice Minister Nooruddin Turabi, have been released or were
never under detention; while the Taliban's fundamentalist Islamic
ideology retains a social base and dangerous influence in the
country. Many believe that tribesmen hired by the U.S. to search
the caves of Tora Bora actually allowed hundreds of al-Qaeda
forces to escape into Pakistan. But the thugs that pulverized
the Buddhas of Bamiyan have been toppled, and while al-Qaeda
may survive, its command center has probably been shut down.
But what about these other results?
1. The bombing has produced a power vacuum,
in which violence and drug-trafficking flourish. Shootings, looting,
murder and kidnapping, in Mazar-e Sharif, Balkh, Kabul, Kandahar
and elsewhere, have been reported by journalists, humanitarian
workers and UN spokespersons. In Kabul, a man interviewed by
a reporter from the Observer said, "We were expecting peace,
but we were much happier before. We don't want to see anyone
with a gun walking in the streets." An MSNBC reporter wrote
January 25, "In spite of the widespread popular perception
that the war is over, the bourgeoning reports of threats against
foreign targets in Kabul suggest the conflict cannot be considered
over even within the capital itself."
Bandits infest main roads. There is no
functioning national military or police force, and the warlords
who are really in charge routinely violate human rights. In November,
U.S. ally General Abdul Raschid Dostum's forces summarily executed
over 400 captured Taliban in Mazar-e Sharif. Militias control
the streets of major cities, abusing women, demanding money from
foreigners, and squabbling with other militias over turf. Opium
production, successfully curbed by the Taliban, is back big-time.
2. The bombing has re-empowered the Northern
Alliance. The human rights record of the main Northern Alliance
leaders (mostly Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazaras) is abysmal. The
State Department is well aware of it; most of the warlords had
cordial ties with the CIA in the 1980s. They are particularly
feared and hated by the population of Kabul, who suffered under
their rule from 1993 to 1996. The Pakistani military, which plays
a significant role in the "coalition against terrorism,"
hates them because of their abuses of Pashtuns, and was therefore
disturbed when Alliance forces moved into Kabul November 12,
reinstalling former president Burhanuddin Rabbani, before a coalition
government could be formed insuring Pashtun representation. The
interim government created in Bonn three weeks later was supposed
to be such a coalition government, but over half its 30 seats
went to Northern Alliance representatives. Interim head of state
Hamid Karzai was once deputy minister of foreign affairs in a
Rabbani cabinet. Interior, Foreign Affairs, and Defense ministries
all went to Tajik Northern Alliance figures. Alliance warlords
like Ismail Khan and Dostum, who command private armies and head
ethnically based Islamic political organizations, control most
of the country. Dostum demanded and received the post of deputy
minister of defense on the day of Karzai's inauguration.
Consider the history of these warlords.
In January and February 1994, Dostum and former CIA favorite
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar jointly attacked Rabbani's forces; killing
4,000, injuring 21,000, and forcing 200,000 to flee Kabul. Various
Northern Alliance militias killed about 50,000 around Kabul before
the Taliban came to power. Indeed, it was the general climate
of lawlessness that made the Taliban, with its emphasis on restoration
of law and order, based strictly on Islam, appeal to many.
Already, factions of the Northern Alliance
have again skirmished in northern Afghanistan. Forces loyal to
Defense Minister Fahim have exchanged fire with forces loyal
to the Deputy Defense Minister Dostum! (Not encouraging.) Of
course, the infighting extends beyond the Northern Alliance.
Two Pashtun factions have clashed in Khost, and Kandahar warlord
Gul Agha Sherzai has threatened to lead 20,000 troops to attack
Ismail Khan's fief around Herat. Many fear a return to the Rabbani-era
violence. A few thousand international peacekeepers around Kabul
will do little to comfort them. (Small wonder that the UN is
now talking about maybe sending 30,000 peacekeepers to Afghanistannot
that that would liberate its people.)
Some argue that at least women's status
is somehow improving through all of this. In fact, the prospect
that once rid of the Taliban, women would be able to come out
from behind the veil hasn't materialized. It was Rabbani who
issued a rule in 1994 making the burqa obligatory for women in
Kabul. Between 1978 and 1992, many women had adopted western
or modified traditional dress; the post-Soviet leadership (back
in power now) deplored that. The Taliban did not invent the burqa
nor were they the first attempt to impose it on all women; key
figures in the current power structure seem as committed as the
Taliban to restricting Afghan women's progress in the struggle
for sexual equality.
3.. The bombing has killed thousands
of civilians. It looks likely that the Afghan civilian toll now
far exceeds the loss of life in New York and Washington DC September
11. A study by University of New Hampshire Professor of International
Relations Marc W. Herold, published in mid-December, cited credible
journalistic reports indicating that over 3700 Afghani civilians
had been killed by U.S. bombing to that point. These included
about 100 killed in Karam in November (reported by Time); at
least 128 civilians when bombs destroyed the village of Shahagha
November 10 (CNN); and 150 in Kama Ado December 1 (Boston Globe,
NBC). Since then, some of the more destructive attacks killed
60 in a civilian convoy in the village of Asmani Kilai December
21 (Guardian), and up to 107 were at Qalaye Niazi, on December
28 (Reuters). Herold now puts the reasonably documented minimal
civilian death count at over 4000.
The imprecision of the bombingmanifest
from the outset, when four U.N. landmine-sweeping specialists
were killedwas never better illustrated than on December 2, when
three U.S. Special Forces, and five Afghan allies, were killed
by "friendly fire" north of Kandahar. Hamid Karzai
himself was wounded by shrapnel. Meanwhile, unexploded bomblets,
like those that killed seven children in a village near Mazar-e
Sharif this month, will pose a threat for a long time.
In late December, Defense Minister Fahim
stated that now that al-Qaeda was defeated, the U.S. should stop
bombing Afghanistan. A Defense Ministry spokesman added that
the "remaining [al-Qaeda] forces are few in number and may
be annihilated in a maximum of three days, and once this is done
there is no need for the continuation of the [U.S.] bombing.
We demand America stop its bombing of Afghanistan after this
goal is achieved." Gen. Tommy Franks' response (from President
Bush's Texas ranch): "We will not be pressed into doing
something that does not represent our national objectives, and
we will take as long as it takes." The new Afghan "government"
has no veto power over U.S. bombing of its own territory.
4. The bombing has produced further destabilization
from the Middle East to Central Asia. The bombing has confirmed
many Muslims' (and not only "fundamentalists'") perception
of the U.S. as anti-Muslim, while encouraging leaders engaged
in conflict with movements rooted among Muslim populations (Sharon,
Vajpayee, Putin, Jiang etc.) to depict their agendas as part
of the "global war on terrorism." Governments of Muslim
countries closely associated with the U.S. are becoming increasingly
concerned about by the level of outrage towards U.S. actions
evident among their populations. The recent Washington Post story,
indicating that Saudi Arabia's rulers feel the U.S. has "overstayed
its welcome" in the country since the Gulf War, suggests
that even this most intimate of U.S. allies is concerned that
the U.S. presence at Prince Sultan Air Base might lead to its
own downfall, in an Iran-style Islamic revolution. Meanwhile
the Israeli government feels it has the green light to go to
war on the Palestinian Authority (as a "terrorist"
organ), and the Indian government to attack Pakistan as a sponsor
of terrorism. The world seems a more, rather than less, dangerous
place now than before the bombing began October 7.
5. The success of the bombing, and accompanying
(cheerleading) press reports, in sustaining widespread popular
war support, have emboldened the administration to carry the
war into a second reckless phase, with no end of targets in sight.
Bush announced last year that 2002 will be a "war year;"
Cheney has stated that he anticipates a long war beyond our lifetimes.
Rumsfeld has stated that the war is about "a lot more than
just al-Qaeda." The administration plainly hopes that an
"America United" will enthusiastically endorse whatever
expansion of the amorphous "war on terrorism" it announces.
The early favorite for Target Number Two seems to have been Iraq.
Allies may have vetoed that, and there are problems with attacking
Iran, Lebanon, Somalia and Yemen as well. Oddly, it became the
fate of the Philippines, a close U.S. ally, to become the second
venue for U.S. action.
In mid-January the U.S. began dispatching
over 600 Green Berets and other U.S. forces to the Philippines
to assist the Armed Forced of the Philippines (AFP) in crushing
the Abu Sayyaf group of Islamic separatists in the southern Philippines.
The Abu Sayyaf group is supposedly a component of al-Qaeda and
its destruction a next natural step in the "war on terrorism."
But consider the following.
The State Department's website on international
terrorist groups puts Abu Sayyaf's fighting strength at only
about 200. The highest estimate I've seen is 1000. The AFP has
107,000 troops, about 7000 deployed in the area where Abu Sayyaf
is active. President Arroyo has stated that the AFP is perfectly
capable of handling Abu Sayyaf and other counterinsurgency matters
in the Philippines. (It reportedly killed 18 Abu Sayyaf members
January 24.)
But when Arroyo met President Bush last
fall, he offered her U.S. ground troops to fight Abu Sayyaf insurgents.
Arroyo declined; the constitution of the Philippines prohibits
the deployment of foreign combat troops, and acceptance of such
an offer would mean political suicide. This offer rebuffed, Bush
offered U.S. Special Forces to "train" Philippines
troops. Arroyo (for whatever reasons) agreed. This produced a
political crisis in the Philippines, particularly when it was
announced that the U.S. forces would be deployed in a combat
zone in the southern Philippines, where they would necessarily
exercise the right to self-defense. The vice-president and foreign
secretary threatened to resign; even the former defense minister,
now-senator Juan Ponce Enrile, called the agreement unconstitutional.
That crisis forced the Arroyo government
to reverse its earlier statement that the U.S. troops would join
AFP in combat areas and announce that they will train Filipino
troops on bases only. But it's not clear that the U.S. will accept
that. The U.S. government appears to be pressuring an uneasy,
unenthusiastic host to accept a greater degree of U.S. involvement
in counterinsurgency than the host requires or desires. The presence
of U.S. troops can become a major political liability, in the
Philippines as in Saudi Arabia.
It is obvious that Arroyo did not go
to Washington eager to invite U.S. soldiers to her country, nor
does she believe that the Philippines has a big al-Qaeda problem
that can only be solved with U.S. help. Indeed, she told Agence
Press-France this month that there is no evidence for Abu Sayyaf
contacts with al-Qaeda since 1995, and that there is no al-Qaeda
operation in the Philippines.
On January 25 CNN aired a half-hour special
"Live from the Philippines" that gave the U.S. public
its first "in-depth" view of the "second phase
of the war on terrorism." This was highly sympathetic to
the deployment of U.S. forces (this was, after all, CNN: there
was an invitation at the bottom of the screen to go online and
"vote" on "what country should be the next target
in the war on terrorism?") But it also noted the existence
of widespread opposition to U.S. military presence, especially
among "nationalists" and "leftists."
The most surprising revelation in the
report was that in the late 1980s bin Laden visited the Philippines
and primarily assisted a group called the Moro Islamic Liberation
Front, rather than Abu Sayyaf. This is apparently a much larger
group centered on Mindanao. The CNN report sought to link them
closely with al-Qaeda, as if to assure anyone questioning the
legitimacy of this "second phase" that this is, indeed,
still all about September 11 and 2,900 dead.
How arrogant U.S. action must seem to
many Filipinos! The Philippines was a U.S. colony from 1898 to
1946. The U.S. bought the Philippines from Spain following the
Spanish-American War, and refused to accept the independent republic
announced by Emilio Eguinaldo. In the "Philippines Insurrection"
(1898- 1902), one-tenth of the Filipino population was killed
by U.S. occupation forces. In the postwar period the U.S. has
assisted unpopular Philippine governments in anti-communist counterinsurgency
campaigns, notably under the martial law regime of Ferdinand
Marcos overthrown by the "People Power" revolution
of 1986. (The notoriously corrupt Marcos found comfortable exile
after that in Hawai'i, having stashed away hundreds of millions
in foreign banks.)
There is a well-organized political left
in the Philippines, including a Maoist guerrilla force, estimated
by the U.S. State Department at six or seven thousand, engaged
in on-and-off peace negotiations with the government. These guerrillas
(like so many other disparate groups, like the African National
Congress at once time) are regarded as "terrorists"
by the State Department, and the media is already beginning to
conflate all listed groups as an ubiquitous threat to Americans.
Given the extreme vagueness of the objectives of the current
"war," who knows what new targets it may choose? "A
lot more than just al-Qaeda," said Secretary Rumsfeld. Hamas
in Palestine? Hezbullah in Lebanon? When does the net widen to
include the radical left, like Maoists in Nepal, the Philippines
and India? Will it really make any difference a year from now
whether the target of U.S. rage has anything at all to do with
September 11?
6. The bombing campaign has resulted
in the projection of U.S. military power even further around
the world. There has never been a more ubiquitous imperialist
power than the U.S.A. Now U.S. bases designed for indefinite
operation have been established in Afghanistan, Uzbekistan and
Kyrgystan, and the Pakistanis have turned over at least one base
to exclusive U.S. use. Although the U.S. government has assigned
"peacekeeping operations" in Afghanistan to European
allies, the U.S. commander of "Operation Enduring Freedom"
will oversee all foreign troops in the country. While the U.S.
has not colonized Afghanistan, and is probably incapable of controlling
the many armed groups and factions in the country, it will undoubtedly
be in a position to control Afghanistan's future in the near
term, as new rulers negotiate lucrative contracts for the construction
of oil and gas pipelines from Turkmenistan to the Indian Ocean.
Is this a good thing for the people of the planet?
The "war on terrorism" has,
in short, itself unleashed much terror on the world (while failing
to apprehend Osama bin Laden or Mullah Omar). Its planners, drawing
political support from the feelings of grief and outrage, and
carefully manipulated patriotic sentiment, have sought to win
from the American public a blank check to bomb anywhere, anytime,
to fight any source of what they label "terrorism."
Public opinion polls showing widespread U.S. support for an attack
on Iraq (which seems to have had no connection to the September
1 events) confirm their success so far, but I think that will
change. I am proud in this context to be part of the "weak
link" of thinking people opposed to this unconscionable
war, and urge my colleagues and everyone in the Tufts community
to question it and speak out against it.
Gary Leupp
is associate professor of History and Adjunct Associate Professor
of Comparative Religion, Tufts University, Medford, MA. He can
be reached at: gary.leupp@tufts.edu
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