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May 20, 2002
Dave Marsh
Music Monopolies
Jordy Cummings
Israel, Jews and the Left
Francis Boyle
In Defense
of a Divestment
Campaign Against Israel
Christian Salmon
The Bulldozer War
Edward Said
Crisis for
American Jews
May 19, 2002
Philip Farruggio
Where's Twain's Protector Government
Now?
Norman Madarasz
Canada,
NAFTA and Kyoto
May 18, 2002
M.G. Piety
Economic Fiction:
From Here to Annuity?
Michael Colby
Bush Fiddled
While
New York Burned
May 17, 2002
Wayne Madsen
Fox News Flashback:
Defending McKinney
James T. Phillips
Ceasefires
and Terrorists
Phillipe Dambournet
The Truth at Last:
Bush as the Energizer Bunny
Lori Berenson
In Defense
of Political Prisoners
Rep. Cynthia McKinney
Terrorist Warnings
Hussein Ibish
Clarifying
the Obstacles
to Peace in Palestine
Alexander Cockburn
Israel and "Anti-Semitism"
May 16, 2002
Marylin Robinson
A Garden
in Tent City, But Where Do You Bathe?
Paul de Rooij
Worse than CNN?
The BBC and Israel
David Krieger
The Bush/Putin
Agreement:
Nuclear Dangers Remain
Steve Perry
Unsafe at Any Speed:
Youth, Sex and the Heresies
of Judith Levine
May 15, 2002
Ahmad Faruqui
Revisiting
Camp David
Rick Giombetti
Spiderman v. Pentagon:
Working Class Hero Battles Corrupt Defense Contractors
Stanton / Madsen
When the
War Hits Home:
Planning for Martial Law, Telegovernance and Suspension of Elections
May 14, 2002
Jacob Levich
Leaving the Truth Out?
Alternative Online Publication
Tells the Big Lie about Palestine
Michael Colby
Bush's
Cuba Blunder
Dave Marsh
Scapegoats: the Music Industry's War
on Cassettes
Jensen / Mahajan
US Power
Mideast Power Plays
May 13, 2002
Robert Fisk
Why Does John Malkovich
Want to Kill Me?
Mokhiber / Weissman
IMF
and World Bank:
Out of Control
Dean Baker
Will Darth Vader do Time?
The Enron Saga Continues
Nelson Valdés
American
Democracy:
A Lesson for Cubans
May 12, 2002
Bernard Weiner
Why Is America Acting Like This? A
Letter to European Friends
John Patrick Leary
Aiding Colombia
Kathleen Christison
Israel
and Ethics
May 11, 2002
Joady Guthrie
The Holy Lands:
A Peace Vision
Patrick Cockburn
Bombing
Iraq:
the Pentagon Prepares a Prolonged Campaign
George Sunderland
CounterPunch Special
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May
20, 2002
The "War on Terrorism" in Yemen
by Gary Leupp
Soon after September 11, government officials
and journalists suggested that Yemen might be an appropriate
target in the endless "war on terrorism" launched by
the Bush administration. Unlike Iraq, Somalia, Iran and some
other candidates (but like the Philippines and Georgia, which
have also become stages for the terror war), Yemen had a friendly
government. Although it had once been included in the State Department's
list of nations "sponsoring terrorism," it had been
removed from that list after the Gulf War, and had briefly hosted
100 U.S. troops involved in the disastrous military operation
in Somalia beginning December 1992. (The troops had been withdrawn
from Yemen in January 1993 following bomb attacks on the U.S.
Embassy and the hotels where they resided. Osama bin Laden had
issued a fatwa against them.) During the 1994 civil war
in the country, the U.S. had backed the current leadership against
the "leftist" opposition. (So had anti-U.S. Muslim
fundamentalist factions, whom the leadership cannot now afford
to alienate.)
Yemen had received a U.S. AID mission--withdrawn,
to the chagrin of the government, due to U.S. security concerns
in 1996. It had, under U.S. pressure, dismantled its adherence
to the secondary and tertiary Arab boycotts of Israel beginning
that year, and maintained a generally friendly stance towards
the U.S.. In April 2000, President Ali Abdullah Saleh (who had
become head of state in 1990 after the opposition Socialist Party
was banned from participation in the poll), visited President
Clinton in Washington DC to strengthen what the State Department
called "the close bonds between the United States and Yemen."
At that time, Saleh sought U.S. aid (only recently granted),
including thirteen patrol boats worth $6.5 million, and other
military assistance.
But Saleh's government has never fully
controlled all of Yemen's territory, and in "lawless"
regions, al-Qaeda forces may operate. Bin Laden's family is of
Yemeni origin, and in 1998 bin Laden even contemplated moving
his operation from Afghanistan to Yemen. (Thereafter, General
Anthony Zinni, U.S. military commander in the region, made the
first of several trips to the capital Sana'a.) In October 2000,
commandos thought to be al-Qaeda operatives rammed a small boat
loaded with explosives into the USS destroyer Cole, then refueling
in Aden, killing 17 U.S. sailors. This ranked with the bombing
of the Khobar Towers complex in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia in June
1996 (which killed 19 Americans), and the attack on the U.S.
embassies in Nairobi and in Dar es-Sala'am in August 1998 (which
killed 224, including 12 Americans) as a major al-Qaeda action
prior to September 11.
While Sana'a cooperated in the investigation
of the Cole incident, U.S. authorities were not entirely satisfied
with the Yemeni response. Saleh initially denied that "terrorists"
had conducted the attack; later, Yemen suggested that the U.S.
bore partial responsibility for it, having trained terrorists
in Afghanistan in the 1980s. ABC News reported that a Yemeni
security surveillance camera that might have filmed critical
evidence had been pointed in the wrong direction, and that a
tape turned over to the FBI authorities by Yemeni officials might
have been partly erased. FBI officials complained of lack of
cooperation from the Yemenis, who insisted on controlling the
investigation, and for security reasons the bureau conducted
its own inquiry from U.S. ships offshore. A London-based "expert
on the region" who had lived for six years in Yemen told
ABC: "The FBI and Scotland Yard are clever enough to know
that the Yemen government has been feeding these people"
responsible for the attack.
Thus the Saleh regime, while seeking
U.S. aid and investment, is viewed in Washington as less than
a reliable friend. But Yemen must walk a tightrope. There was
and is widespread anti-U.S. sentiment in the country, formed
from the union of formerly pro-Soviet South Yemen and pro-West
North Yemen in 1990. On October 10, 2000, two days before the
Cole attack, over 50,000 in Aden protested against U.S. support
for Israel. Some of the opposition is indeed "terrorist"
in the sense the State Department uses the term; the Islamic
Jihad organization (based in Egypt and Palestine), linked to
al-Qaeda, has operated there, and one of its offshoots, the Aden-Abyan
Islamic Army, has attacked Westerners. Zein al-Abidine al-Mihdar,
leader of the latter group, was executed in 1999 after being
convicted of abducting 16 foreign tourists and killing four of
them. The State Department, in a report issued in April 2000,
contended that a host of other "terrorist" groups,
including Hamas, al-Gama'at al-Islamiyya, and the Algerian Armed
Islamic Group are officially represented or maintain a presence
in Yemen. The same report noted that Yemen had for several years
made efforts to tighten its security, and signed various international
antiterrorist conventions, but "lax and inefficient enforcement
of security procedures and the government's inability to exercise
authority over remote areas of the country continued to make
the country a safe haven for terrorist groups."
Confronted after September 11 by Bush's
demand to be "for or against" the U.S. or risk association
with terrorism, Saleh's regime was placed in a quandary. On September
26, Saleh told a domestic audience that he would not let foreign
troops use Yemeni territory, and warned outsiders not to interfere
in the country. But pressure from the U.S. mounted; on October
3 CNN quoted a U.S. official as stating that Yemen had "one
of the most significant" al-Qaeda organizational links in
the world, and cited diplomatic sources as stating that "thousands
of veterans of the Soviet-Afghan war," capable of launching
"uncoordinated or coordinated attacks" on U.S. interests,
were living in the country. In response, Yemen noted that it
had deported 5000 non-Yemeni veterans of the U.S.-subsidized
anti-Soviet war since 1998--the year of the embassy bombings
in Kenya and Tanzania attributed to al-Qaeda--and was cracking
down on Yemenis suspected of having had al-Qaeda ties while in
Afghanistan. (Presumably these efforts drew on the assistance
of FBI agents, in Yemen since the Cole incident.)
Thus, in November, when Saleh met with
Bush in Washington, he pledged to further crack down on al-Qaeda
members operating in Yemen. In order to indicate its sincerity
in fighting "terrorism," the government sent forces
to al-Hosun village December 18 to attempt the capture of suspected
al-Qaeda member Mohammad Hamdi al-Ahdal and twenty others. The
effort was a disaster; 18 government troops were killed by local
forces, and four villagers were killed, but no al-Qaeda forces
were captured or eliminated. Thereafter, as if persuaded of the
incompetence of the Yemeni "anti-terror" forces, the
U.S. proposed joint Yemeni-U.S. action against al-Qaeda. The
U.S. announced on January 3 that it would train local forces
to attack al-Qaeda-linked groups in the country. Press reports
in early March stated the U.S. was preparing to send several
hundred troops to Yemen to assist government in destroying al-Qaeda
forces in the north. The Yemeni government announced that about
200 Americans would train local troops.
The official fiction is that the Yemenis asked for these
U.S. troops. Vice President Cheney meeting with President Saleh
in Yemen March 14, "indicated that in addition to being
responsive to Yemen's request for training its special forces
in their counter-terrorism mission, the United States is planning
to address essential military equipment needs and to increase
assistance to Yemen's Coast Guard and economy" (Yemen
Times, March 18-24). But on April 11 Saleh told al-Jazeera:
"As for the American anti-terror security experts and technical
equipment, it is not we who requested them. It is the U.S. government
that said 'prove your genuineness and let the experts in' so
we let them in." He indicated that 40 experts had already
completed their tasks and left the country. (Strangely, CNN only
reported on May 17 the arrival of 30 U.S. troops to train Yemeni
soldiers. The same day, the Yemen Times reported, "here
are over 60 U.S. military experts training Yemeni special tasks
forces on how to launch a crack down on terrorists.") On
April 21, as Saleh confirmed the arrival of more U.S. troops,
he declared that there were no al-Qaeda training camps in Yemen,
but "hidden cells here and there," especially in the
tribal areas of Mareb, Al Jawf and Shabwa. Whether or not this
is true, it is clear that Yemen is receiving these troops under
duress, and risking popular resentment in doing so.
To date, the U.S. has drawn up plans to install computers and
cameras to monitor Yemeni airports and seaports; they will be
linked to a central office in Sana'a. The U.S. has recommended
that Yemen establish a marine patrol police, equipped with 250
boats with night watch systems, to be paid for by the U.K., Saudi
Arabia, Germany and the Netherlands. All intelligence gathered
will of course be passed along to the U.S. Heavy-handedness seems
to have characterized the whole U.S. mission, the arrogance of
the U.S. ambassador provoking particular opposition in the country.
Agence France-Presse reported March 9 that:
Yemen's ruling General People's Congress
(GPC) party on Tuesday accused U.S. ambassador Edmond Hull of
'interfering' in domestic affairs and threatened to expel him.
'Since he was appointed (last September), ambassador Edmond Hull
has behaved like a high commissioner, not like a diplomat in
a country which is opposed to any form of interference' by a
foreign state, said the Al-Mithaq weekly, a GPC mouthpiece. 'Edmund
Hull adopts a very haughty behaviour, far-removed from his diplomatic
duties, when he speaks to certain Yemeni officials,' the newspaper
added. Al-Mithaq urged Hull to 'respect Yemen in order not to
become persona non grata.'
Coming just days before Vice President
Cheney's visit (to pressure Yemen into acceptance of the planned
U.S. attack on Iraq) this statement indicates the depth of antipathy
towards the U.S., even at the top echelons of government. More
recently, the Nasserite Unionist Party, a major opposition group
with representatives in Parliament, issued a statement demanding
that the government issue an official warning to Ambassador Hull,
to stop his "undiplomatic behavior in Yemen."
After General Tommy Franks, commander of the U.S. Central Forces,
told an Egyptian satellite channel that Saleh had offered to
provide military facilities to U.S. ships, opposition parties
published an open letter to the president opposing such cooperation.
Saleh's office responded that the parties should not have made
such protest "without any verification"-implicitly
denying Franks' statement-and warning that such statements might
incite anti-Western violence.
But that, of course, is what many would
like to do. On March 15, a man threw a grenade at U.S. embassy
in Sana'a. He was arrested, described as mentally ill. On April
12 a bomb was exploded near the U.S. embassy, and on April 23
a huge explosion rocked the Civil Aviation Authority building
and damaged several other buildings in the capital. A group calling
itself Sympathizers of al-Qaeda took responsibility, demanding
the release of 173 Mujahadeen (i.e., Afghan war veterans who
once worked with U.S. operatives and CIA Frankensteins like Gulbuddin
Hekmatyar) held prisoner by the government. They declared that
if the prisoners were not released by May 12, they would attack
high-ranking officials (as "agents for the U.S.").
In a statement, they advised the people living near the Political
Security building, the prison holding the Mujahadeen to leave
the area "until the war is over." The Sympathizers
pledged to give compensation for any damage to neighboring properties,
and called upon all al-Qaeda elements in Yemen, mainly Fawaz
al Rabee, Abdu Ali al Harithy and Abu Asem al Ahdal, to join
them in their mission. (The Yemeni government is searching for
these men.)
From mid-April to May 9, five bomb explosions
occurred in Yemen, the last near the house of Prime Minister
Abdulqader Bajammal in the Sufan Quarter of Sana'a.
It shattered windows of surrounding homes but otherwise did no
damage. The Sympathizers issued a statement indicating that the
attack was originally intended to target the nearby home of Ali
Mansour Rashad, the man they accuse of torturing Mujahadeen inside
the Political Security building. According to the Yemen Times,
"The al-Qaeda sympathizers' statement warned all members
of the Political Security whom they described as agent[s] of
Americans that their explosion operation [would] be the last
one not causing bloodshed and human loses, before termination
of the ultimatum date."
Yemenis have repeatedly demonstrated
their solidarity with the Palestinians, protesting, in large-scale
rallies, the intensification of violence on the West Bank and
Gaza strip since March 12. Since Israel and Prime Minister Sharon
are universally associated throughout the Arab world with the
United States, such demonstrations also feature anti-U.S. slogans
and manifestations. On March 26, hundreds of thousands marched
in support of Palestine in Sana'a. More recently, members of
parliament have marched on the U.S. embassy; Yemen's parliament
has called for a boycott of all U.S. and Israeli goods. On April
19, 5000 protesters, led by Jarallah Omar of the Socialist party,
Ali Saif Hasan from the Nasserite party, and members of the Yemeni
Writers Union, marched on the U.S. embassy to demand a severance
of diplomatic ties. This was broken up by police using batons
and tear gas and firing into the air. On April 24 the embassy
was shut down due to security concerns following more pro-Palestinian
demonstrations.
So intense is official fear of further anti-U.S./anti-government
actions, Yemen has cancelled plans for the Reunification Day
celebration on May 22, which marks the twelfth anniversary of
the merger of South and North Yemen. (Officially, the cancellation
is to manifest solidarity with the Palestinian people.) Meanwhile,
all shops dealing in explosives and fireworks have been shut
down, and additional military forces dispatched to all governorates
in the country to enhance security. Elaph.com, an Arabic-language
web directory excelling in news reportage, has been blocked by
the government. The latter measure is supposedly intended to
exclude websites with pornographic content, but more likely is
designed to curb access to critical reporting (Yemen Observer,
May 11, 2002).
Unlike the Philippines and Georgia, where
U.S. training operations ostensibly targeting "terrorism"
("Operation Balikatan" and "Operation Train and
Equip") continue, Yemen is an Arab, Muslim country. In all
three countries, even ranking officials have questioned the need
and desirability of the U.S. presence; but in Yemen, opposition
(Marxist/secular as well as Islamist) seems especially widespread.
Continuing carnage in Palestine, supported by the U.S., and preparations
for another imperialist attack on Iraq, make it likely that the
U.S. military presence, however low-key, will generate more violent
resistance and make Saleh's position increasingly uncomfortable.
In sum: the U.S. "war on terrorism"--in
Yemen and elsewhere--will not make the world a safer or freer
place, for Americans or anyone else.
Gary Leupp
is an Associate Professor in the Department of History at Tufts
University. He is also coordinator of the Asian Studies Program.
He can be reached at: gary.leupp@tufts.edu
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