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Why did Israel remain in southern Lebanon
after the departure of the PLO in 1982? The publicly stated
reason was to assure the security of its northern border by neutralizing
the resistance forces and by maintaining a "buffer"
zone. However, it is clear that the most secure period for northern
Israel since 1978 and perhaps earlier has been the period from
2000 to the present, when it had no occupation forces in Lebanon
except for the Shebaa farms.
Many Lebanese and international
observers suspect that the real purpose of Israel's leadership
(as distinct from that of its population) was to seize and ultimately
annex southern Lebanon up to the Litani river. If so, it is
plausible to speculate that this may not have been the original
intention, but rather evolved from the initial successes of Ariel
Sharon, then commander of Israeli forces in Lebanon, in occupying
the territory in question. The historical record seems to show
that the Israeli leadership was divided about the wisdom of this
action at the time, indicating that any possible thoughts of
annexation would have to have been a later development.
Given Israel's withdrawal from
Lebanon in 2000, it may appear that such ideas were abandoned.
However, it is prudent to recall that Israel's first prime minister,
David Ben Gurion, always argued that Israel's "natural"
northern frontier should be the Litani river, and that Moshe
Dayan drew up the first plans for its conquest as early as 1956.
Is the current invasion another
attempt to make this portion of the early Zionist dream come
true? The Israeli military has already acknowledged that it
has had a plan in place for Lebanon, which it is now implementing.
In itself, this is not surprising; any competent military organization
will keep a variety of contingency plans on the shelf. However,
a closer look at the way the plan is unfolding provides clues
to its (possibly unstated) intentions.
First, this invasion differs
from all others in terms of the numbers of refugees. More than
any other, it has successfully cleared south Lebanon of its inhabitants,
and that process is continuing. The ostensible reason is to
humanely continue its war against Hezbollah without harming the
civilian population. However, if the absurdity of creating 750,000
refugees for humanitarian reasons is not self-evident, the civilian
death toll belies the contention. How would Israel respond to
an argument that it should remove 750,000 of its inhabitants
in the north so that Hezbollah rockets could safely strike targets
without harming civilians?
Second, some of the earliest
targets of the invasion were the bridges, roads and sea access
connecting the south with the rest of Lebanon and the outside
world. The stated purpose was to deny Hezbollah the chance to
bring in more rockets and munitions. However, military and paramilitary
forces are usually much better equipped to cope with terrain
challenges than are civilian traffic and commerce. An equally
or more compelling reason would be to create the initial stages
of a new border.
In these respects, Israel's
current invasion resembles previous ones in Lebanon less than
it does Plan Dalet of 1948, which cleared 78 per cent of the
British mandate of Palestine of most of its Palestinian Arab
population in order to create the state of Israel. Palestinians
know this as al-nakba ("the catastrophe"), and the
Palestinians thus evicted were never permitted to return to their
homes.
A Lebanese nakba is taking
shape in much the same way; even the numbers of refugees are
roughly the same. The only other comparable Israeli action was
in the Golan Heights in 1967, where nearly the entire population
of 130,000 was put to flight. In both of the previous cases,
the territories thus emptied of most of their indigenous populations
were then incorporated into the state of Israel.
A similar process is happening
in the occupied Palestinian West Bank, where native Palestinians
are being driven from their lands by onerous restrictions, demolitions
and land confiscations to make way for Jewish settlements so
that the land may be annexed in the proposed "convergence"
plan.
Will the newly created Lebanese
refugees be permitted to return to their homes?
It can of course be argued
that Israel's acceptance in principle of an eventual multinational
force to take over the policing of south Lebanon shows its lack
of territorial aspirations. However, it initially spurned such
a suggestion and then acceded only under advice from the U.S.,
and even then only in return for U.S. assurances that there would
be no ceasefire until Israel had been given time to accomplish
its objectives. Furthermore, there is evidence that Israel
is counting on such a force to fail. No international force
would accept to go without an invitation from the Lebanese government,
of which Hezbollah is a part, and Israel was counting on Hezbollah
to veto the idea.
When Hezbollah accepted, Israel
immediately accused it of insincerity and disregarded its acceptance.
Chances are that Hezbollah
will not accept disarmament as part of the arrangement until
its demands are satisfied, and that Israel will not accept to
evacuate the Shebaa farms and release all Lebanese prisoners
until Hezbollah disarms and the multinational force satisfies
Israel's requirements, leaving a stalemate that Israel can try
to use as justification to stay indefinitely.
Of course, Israel also recognizes
that things do not always go as planned and that strategic retreats
are sometimes necessary. The entire history of Israeli actions
in Lebanon provides such lessons, as does the unanticipated tenacity
and effectiveness of Hezbollah ground combat fighters in the
current engagement. Furthermore, the Israeli public may be less
than patient with such a plan, and might not tolerate it unless
it achieves early successes with a minimum of casualties.
Israel may therefore find its
ambitions frustrated once again. However, we should not underestimate
the patience and persistence of the Israeli leadership in pursuing
its long- term objectives, even if they may be at odds with those
of the Israeli public. It therefore behooves the U.S. to recognize
that Israel's interests are not the same as its own, and to inform
its policies accordingly. Such recognition necessarily requires
consideration of the legitimate rights and grievances of the
peoples and states directly affected by Israel's territorial
ambitions and military actions.
Paul Larudee is the former supervisor of a Ford
Foundation project in Lebanon, a Fulbright-Hays lecturer to Lebanon
and a contract U.S. government advisor to Saudi Arabia. He is
one of seven volunteers of the International Solidarity Movement
wounded by Israeli gunfire on April 1,2002. He can be reached
at larudee@pacbell.net
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