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June 28/30, 2002
Kathleen Christison
The True Story of Resolution
242 or How the US Sold Out
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N.D. Jayaprakash
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June 26, 2002
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June 25, 2002
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Weekend
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June 28/30, 2002
A CounterPunch
Special Report
From LBJ to GWB
The Full Story
of Resolution 242:
How the US Sold Out the Palestinians
by Kathleen Christison
former CIA political analyst
Henry Kissinger writes in his memoirs that when,
upon entering the Nixon administration as national security adviser
in 1969, he first heard the phrase "a just and lasting peace
within secure and recognized borders", he thought the incantation
so platitudinous that he accused the speaker of pulling his leg.
But Kissinger quickly learned that this central tenet of UN Security
Council Resolution 242, which calls for the withdrawal of Israeli
forces from territories occupied during the 1967 war in return
for an Arab pledge of full peace and recognition, was deadly
serious. The resolution had been adopted more than a year before
Kissinger arrived on the scene, but he played a key role in setting
it, and the land-for-peace doctrine that is its centerpiece,
into concrete as the basis for U.S. policy on the Arab-Israeli
conflict. For 25 years, the resolution remained the bedrock of
all efforts to forge a peace agreement through every subsequent
U.S. administration--until President Bill Clinton arrived on
the scene and until, ironically, the peace process revved up
in earnest.
Although Clinton and his team of negotiators
paid lip service to Resolution 242, in fact they consistently,
throughout seven years of peacemaking, undermined it by abandoning
the land-for-peace concept that was fundamental to it. President
George W. Bush and his policymakers also occasionally mention
the resolution, but the Bush administration is demonstrably  ignorant of the history and
background of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and it can fairly
be said that, by now, Resolution 242 and the approach to peace
that it outlined have basically been forgotten, consigned to
the filing cabinets of history and remembered only by Palestinians
for whom the U.S. memory loss constitutes a grave breach of contract.
This is a story of remarkable foreign
policy duplicity. When Resolution 242 was negotiated and finally
adopted in November 1967, a few months after Israel captured
territory from Egypt, Syria, and Jordan in the 1967 war, President
Lyndon Johnson and his policymakers were anxious primarily to
ensure that Israel not be required to withdraw from captured
territory, as had happened in 1956 following the Sinai campaign,
without an explicit, guaranteed promise from the Arabs of peace
and an end of belligerency. The resolution stipulated this exchange,
calling unequivocally for "termination of all claims or
states of belligerency" and explicit acknowledgement of
all states' (meaning in particular Israel's) territorial integrity
and "right to live in peace within secure and recognized
boundaries free from threats or acts of force"--all in return
for Israel's withdrawal "from territories occupied in the
recent conflict".
The extent of Israel's required withdrawal
was deliberately not specified in the resolution--an example
of "creative ambiguity" made possible by omitting the
definite article in front of the phrase "territories occupied
in the recent conflict". Internal documents and the rare
public pronouncement, however, make it clear that, although U.S.
policymakers never definitively spelled out the exact boundary
envisioned between Israel and any Arab entity, the basic assumption
of successive administrations was that Israel would not keep
the occupied territories. Johnson said publicly in 1968 that
whatever borders were finally agreed to "should not reflect
the weight of conquest". The U.S. envisioned a virtually
full withdrawal on all fronts, excepting only some possible "minor
border adjustments" in the 1967 lines to straighten and
rationalize boundaries. In fact, on the Egyptian front, under
the 1979 peace treaty, Israel withdrew totally from the occupied
Sinai Peninsula--a point not lost on other Arabs still negotiating
their own agreements.
With respect specifically to the occupied
West Bank, U.S. policymakers gained Jordan's acceptance of Resolution
242 on the promise that the U.S. would seek an Israeli withdrawal
from the entire territory except for minor border changes. When
in 1988 Jordan formally relinquished its claim to the West Bank
in favor of the Palestinians (Egypt had previously relinquished
any claim to Gaza), Palestinians assumed that the promise reverted
to them and that the U.S. remained pledged to work for a virtually
total Israeli withdrawal. This is in fact the basis on which
the U.S. proceeded.
For years, a succession of U.S. administrations
demanded, as a precondition for Palestinian entry into the peace
process, that the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) formally
accept the UN resolution and recognize not only Israel's existence
but its "right to exist". In negotiating the 1975 Sinai
II accord, the agreement for a second partial Israeli withdrawal
in the Sinai Peninsula, Henry Kissinger, responding to Israel's
fear that it would be forced to deal with the PLO as the next
step in the negotiating process, added a codicil promising that
the United States would not negotiate with the PLO unless it
met these conditions. Two years later, President Jimmy Carter
and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance made a serious attempt to
gain PLO acquiescence to the conditions in order be able to bring
the Palestinians into negotiations, but the effort ultimately
failed, largely because the PLO felt unable at the time to make
these major concessions without any expectation of concessions
from Israel. Palestinians specifically objected to 242 because
it did not address them in national terms, referring to them
only as "the refugee problem".
It would be another decade before the
PLO, buoyed by the political successes of the first intifada,
made what it considered to be a major compromise and finally
accepted Resolution 242. In November 1988, the PLO formally relinquished
all Palestinian claim to territory inside Israel's 1967 borders
and, in the belief that the resolution required Israel's withdrawal
from the occupied territories and that the United States supported
such a withdrawal, declared its goal to be the establishment
of an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza,
existing alongside Israel, with a shared capital in Jerusalem.
In a formal public statement, PLO leader Yasir Arafat recognized
Israel's "right to exist" at the same time. The Palestinians
thus relinquished claim to 78 percent of Palestine, demanding
independent statehood only in the remaining 22 percent. Three
years after this, and only because of their acceptance of 242,
Palestinians were included for the first time in peace negotiations,
participating as part of the Jordanian delegation to the Madrid
peace conference in October 1991.
The principal point that should be emphasized
throughout these two decades of fitful negotiations is that the
United States, through six administrations from Johnson to George
H. W. Bush, consistently adhered to Resolution 242, explicitly
endorsed its central land-for-peace thesis, and therefore explicitly
led the PLO to believe that Palestinian adherence to the resolution
and an expressed willingness to live in peace with Israel would
bring U.S. support for the other half of the deal--land for the
Palestinians, in the form of an independent state in the West
Bank and Gaza, with a capital in Jerusalem, following a virtually
complete Israeli withdrawal.
This is not to say that all U.S. administrations
supported the idea of trading land for peace to the same degree.
The Reagan administration, for instance, was notably unenthusiastic
about working for an end to the Israeli occupation and missed
several opportunities to move forward on the basis of Resolution
242. Most notably, the Reagan team rejected as a non-starter
the Fez Plan of September 1982, an initiative originated by Saudi
Arabia and based on land for peace that was adopted at an Arab
summit by all heads of state except one, as well as the PLO.
Nonetheless, even the Reagan administration insisted on PLO adherence
to Resolution 242 and agreed to open a formal U.S. dialogue with
the PLO when the organization accepted the resolution in 1988.
As late as the first Bush administration,
policymakers regularly reaffirmed Resolution 242 as the basis
for a peace settlement and specified U.S. support for an end
to Israel's occupation. In an official letter of assurance given
to the Palestinians in advance of the 1991 Madrid peace conference,
Secretary of State James Baker asserted the U.S. belief that
"a comprehensive peace must be grounded in" Resolution
242 and "the principle of territory for peace". Baker
further pledged that "the United States believes that there
should be an end to the Israeli occupation". Bush senior
himself, in a rare instance of a president venturing publicly
into the political minefield of the occupied territories, affirmed
in 1990 that the U.S. did not support the establishment of Israeli
settlements in either the West Bank or East Jerusalem.
The long and the short of this extended
chapter in U.S. diplomacy is that, after being beaten about the
head and shoulders for years about the need to accept the UN
resolution and recognize Israel's right to exist, Palestinians
had every reason to expect that the U.S. would follow through
with its part of the bargain when they did finally accede to
these demands--first in 1988, then again in 1991 when they accepted
the terms for entering peace talks at Madrid, and yet again in
1993 when they negotiated and signed on to the Oslo accords.
In fact, the terms of the Oslo agreement, signed on the White
House lawn with much pomp and ceremony under the complacent eye
of President Bill Clinton (who in reality had had nothing to
do with negotiating the agreement), specified that negotiations
would "lead to the implementation of" Resolution 242.
It soon became clear, however, that Clinton
and his team of negotiators--led by Special Middle East Coordinator
Dennis Ross and Martin Indyk, who served at different times during
Clinton's terms on the National Security Council staff, as ambassador
to Israel, and as deputy assistant secretary of state--had dramatically
altered the game plan. Having obtained a Palestinian commitment
to full peace, including not simply recognition of Israel's existence
inside its 1967 borders, but recognition of its "right"
to exist, the U.S. dropped any requirement for full or nearly
full Israeli withdrawal. The decades-long U.S. commitment to
the concept of land for peace changed from a promise made to
both sides to work for what each most wanted--for the Palestinians,
the return of all occupied territory with the exception of minor
border adjustments; for Israel, full peace and the right to live
within secure borders--to a promise instead to Israel that, now
that the Palestinians had already committed to full peace, Israel's
virtually full withdrawal would no longer be necessary.
The backgrounds of Ross and Indyk are
relevant to the policy they developed during the Clinton years.
Before entering government, both had been connected with the
pro-Israeli think tank, the Washington Institute for Near East
Policy, a spin-off from the American Israel Public Affairs Committee
(AIPAC), the principal pro-Israel lobby organization. Ross was
a senior fellow at the institute in the mid-1980s, was an adviser
to the Bush presidential campaign in 1988, and served as James
Baker's senior State Department adviser on both Soviet and Middle
East affairs. He stayed on as principal Middle East negotiator
throughout Clinton's years in office and since then has returned
to the Washington Institute as a senior counselor. Indyk, an
Australian citizen who came to the U.S. in the 1970s and had
worked for AIPAC, was the Washington Institute's director from
its creation in 1984 until he moved into the Clinton administration
in 1993, an appointment that necessitated his rapid acquisition
of U.S. citizenship.
Both men had lived in Israel in the 1970s,
and Indyk has told interviewers that he moved to the United States
after the 1973 war because he came to believe during that war
that the U.S. was the key to Israel's defense, an objective clearly
of surpassing importance to him personally. Although both men
prided themselves on being able as Jews to understand Palestinians
better than most, it was clear that they approached Middle East
policymaking from an Israel-centered focus that did not in fact
permit as clear an understanding of Palestinian concerns as of
Israeli interests. One can get an idea of the perhaps unconsciously
skewed perspective from which they operated by imagining the
policy approach of a chief mediator who was of Palestinian descent,
had lived in the West Bank, and unabashedly proclaimed that his
primary aim in life was to ensure the defense of Palestine.
The Clinton policy approach, formulated
largely by Ross, quickly became clear when the United States
drafted a proposed Israeli-Palestinian declaration of principles
in mid-1993, before the Oslo agreement was adopted. The draft
U.S. declaration essentially abandoned the principles behind
Resolution 242. It stated as one of its fundamental points that
"the two sides concur that the agreement reached between
them on permanent status will constitute the implementation"
of Resolution 242 in all its aspects.
Although written in the legalistic language
of a diplomatic brief, the meaning of the Ross draft was clear:
whatever Israel as the overwhelmingly stronger power could force
the Palestinians to accept would constitute the "implementation
of Resolution 242" as far as the United States was concerned.
In other words, the Clinton administration now intended to treat
the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem not as occupied territories
but only as territories under dispute. The United States no longer
regarded these areas as occupied territories from which Israel
was required to withdraw, but now regarded the territories as
disputed lands whose almost full retention Israel had the right
to negotiate if it could get away with it. The United States,
for its part, would leave the two sides--one overwhelmingly stronger
militarily and in total possession of the land in question--to
negotiate a disposition of the land without any intervention
by an honest broker or mediator.
The quarter-century-old bedrock U.S.
policy of supporting the exchange of full peace for full withdrawal
had thus been reshaped by Clinton administration policymakers
to supporting the exchange of full peace for a mere partial withdrawal.
The promise to the Palestinians that had always been part of
the demands on them to accept Resolution 242 was abandoned without
a by-your-leave by a team of U.S. negotiators whose main interest
lay in guaranteeing Israel's security and seeing to the furtherance
of Israel's interests, and by a president who may not have understood
and apparently did not care about the nuances of decades of U.S.
policymaking.
This failure of understanding is the
primary reason the peace process collapsed at the Camp David
summit in July 2000. The myth of Israeli Prime Minister Ehud
Barak's "generous offer" has created the widespread
misapprehension that Yasir Arafat rejected out of hand, without
even offering a counterproposal, an extremely good deal that
he should clearly have accepted. Arafat's rejection supposedly
proved, according to the prevailing wisdom, that the Palestinians
were unwilling to conclude any deal that would allow Israel to
live in peace and that they were still irreconcilably opposed
to Israel existence.
According to the myth, Barak's proposal
would have given the Palestinians, as New York Times columnist
Thomas Friedman is fond of repeating, "95 percent of the
West Bank and half of Jerusalem, with all the settlements gone".
In fact, what Barak actually offered at Camp David was to withdraw
from 89-90 percent of the West Bank, not 95 percent; to give
the Palestinians sovereignty in a few non-contiguous neighborhoods
of East Jerusalem, not half of Jerusalem; and, far from assuring
that all the settlements would be gone, to annex to Israel settlements
housing fully 80 percent of the 200,000 Israeli settlers in the
West Bank and 100 percent of the 170,000 settlers in East Jerusalem.
The resulting Palestinian "state"
would have been broken up in the West Bank into three almost
completely non-contiguous sections, each connected only by a
narrow thread of land and each surrounded by Israeli territory,
plus Gaza. This so-called state would have been a colony, not
a state--with no real independence, no ability to defend itself,
no control over its borders, no control over its water resources,
no easy way even for its citizens to reach one section from another,
and a capital made up of separate neighborhoods not contiguous
to each other or to the rest of the state. Israel would never
have agreed to live in a disjointed, indefensible state like
this, but Israel and the United States thought it fine to offer
this to the Palestinians. This Israeli offer, made with U.S.
support and participation, turned the promise of Resolution 242
on its head.
The myth of Camp David has been almost
impossible to overturn, largely because Clinton spawned it himself,
blaming Arafat, and Arafat alone, for the summit's breakdown.
The U.S. media and particularly leading media commentators quickly
took a cue from Clinton, stridently piling on Arafat, and it
has now become an automatic, almost casual part of the media's
mantra to observe that Arafat rejected a remarkably forthcoming
Israeli offer at Camp David. Clinton and his negotiators, no
doubt unwilling to assume any of the responsibility themselves
for years of misguided policymaking, have continued to put out
the line that everything was Arafat's fault.
Should Arafat and Palestinian negotiators
have seen this betrayal coming and better prepared themselves
to counter it? Should Arafat have made it clear at Camp David
that Resolution 242, along with a quarter century of U.S. policy
supporting land for peace, constituted his counterproposal and
that, although Palestinians were prepared to negotiate minor
border adjustments in the 1967 lines, they were not prepared
to concede Israel's right to trisect the West Bank and render
it indefensible? When U.S. officials began to say, in the run-up
to Camp David, that neither side could expect to get 100 percent
of its demands, should Arafat have reminded those officials,
and Israel, that the Palestinians had already formally compromised
78 percent of their demands by repeatedly recognizing Israel's
right to exist and that compromise on the remaining 22 percent
would necessarily be minimal? Should Arafat have been a better
negotiator?
The answer is yes to all of these questions.
But the fact that Arafat is not a skilled negotiator, or an adequate
communicator, or even a decent leader cannot negate the right
of a Palestinian nation, as laid out in Resolution 242, to "live
in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats
or acts of force".
The word "occupation"--and
the concept that lay behind it, that Israel is a foreign military
conqueror in temporary possession of the West Bank, Gaza, and
East Jerusalem--disappeared entirely from the diplomatic lexicon
of the Clinton administration. President Bush has reintroduced
the word and made occasional references to Resolution 242--most
notably in his June 24 speech calling for a truncated, ill-defined,
"provisional" Palestinian state--but neither in this
speech nor in previous iterations of his so-called vision of
a Palestinian state has Bush given an indication that he has
any appreciation of the reality of occupation or what to do about
it, or any depth of understanding of what occupation means to
Palestinians. He never mentions the notion of trading land for
peace.
As has so often been the case with U.S.
policymakers, Bush appears to be taking his cue from Israel on
this issue. Just before his arrival in Washington for a meeting
with Bush in early June, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon authored
an op-ed article in the New York Times praising the wisdom of
Resolution 242, hailing its call for "secure and recognized
boundaries" and claiming that the resolution "established
that these were disputed territories where Israel had legitimate
rights to defensible borders." Implying that Israelis had
already carried out all of their obligations under the resolution,
he observed that Israel "withdrew its military government
over the Palestinian population" under the Oslo agreement
in accordance with 242. In view of the disdain in which Sharon
and his Likud party have always held Resolution 242, this praise
for the resolution is an audacious and highly cynical turnaround.
But it apparently worked on Bush, for although his new "peace
plan" mentions the long-term goal of a peace settlement
based on Resolution 242 and calls for Israeli withdrawal to positions
held before the start of the intifada in September 2000, it does
not deviate from Sharon's revisionist interpretation of the resolution.
Neither man bothered to mention that the resolution is premised
on the "inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory
by war", which removes any justification for Israel's retention
of the captured territories. Bush echoed Sharon in explicitly
mentioning only one of the resolution's several provisions--that
endorsing the idea of secure and recognized borders for Israel.
Furthermore, Bush's only mention of the need for Israeli withdrawal
was to pre-intifada positions--a territorial configuration that
saw Israeli in full control of 60% of the West Bank and Palestinian
autonomous areas covering the remaining 40% broken up into more
than 200 separate, non-contiguous areas.
Once again, an Israeli prime minister
has skewed the original intent of Resolution 242 to suit Israel's
interests, and an uninformed and uninterested American president
has willingly followed along. The real import of the resolution
has long since been discarded and forgotten. If mentioned at
all, the idea of land-for-peace now tends, in political discourse
throughout the U.S., to be treated as a quaint anachronism, as
when many commentators dismissed the significance of the recent
Arab peace proposal based on Resolution 242 and land-for-peace.
Only historians and Palestinians truly remember the significance
of the 35-year-old resolution.
We hear much these days about how Israelis
have lost trust in the Palestinians since the beginning of the
intifada in September 2000. This loss of trust is undeniable,
but in the usual one-sided, Israel-focused approach of U.S. media
commentators and policymakers, the fact that this sense of betrayal
goes both ways has been almost totally ignored. Palestinians
have also experienced a betrayal--not only a loss of trust in
Israel because it has done nothing, despite seven years of a
so-called peace process, to end decades of settlement building,
land confiscation, checkpoints, and house demolitions, but more
significantly a loss of trust in the United States as an honest
and reliable mediator prepared to address the concerns of both
Israelis and Palestinians equally and prepared to carry through
with long-standing diplomatic obligations. The land-for-peace
betrayal stands as a shameful example of diplomatic double-dealing
and is the primary reason for the perpetuation of the tragic
conflict between Israelis and Palestinians.
Kathleen Christison worked for 16 years as a political analyst with
the CIA, dealing first with Vietnam and then with the Middle
East for her last seven years with the Agency before resigning
in 1979. Since leaving the CIA, she has been a free-lance writer,
dealing primarily with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Her
book, "Perceptions
of Palestine: Their Influence on U.S. Middle East Policy,"
was published by the University of California Press and reissued
in paperback with an update in October 2001. A second book, "The
Wound of Dispossession: Telling the Palestinian Story,"
was published in March 2002. Both Kathy and her husband Bill,
also a former CIA analyst, are regular contributors to the CounterPunch
website.
Other CounterPunch articles by Bill and
Kathleen Christison:
Kathleen Christison:
Israel
and Ethics, May 11, 2002
Bill Christison: The Disastrous Foreign
Policies of the United States,
May 10, 2002
Kathleen Christison: Before There
Was Terrorism, May 2, 2002
Bill
Christison: Oil and the Middle East, April
6, 2002
Bill
Christison:
Why
the War on Terror Won't Work,
March 5, 2002
This
Weekend's Features
Cockburn / St. Clair
Death,
Juries and Scalia
Tarif Abboushi
Bush's
Double Standard
on Israel
N.D. Jayaprakash
Seething
with Rage:
The Palestinian Saga
Michael Yates
Taking
the Pledge:
Teachers and the Flag
Stephen Zunes
Bush's
Speech a Setback
for Peace
Walt Brasch
The Pledge
v. The Constitution
Cockburn / St. Clair
Strikers
as Terrorists?
Tom Ridge Calls Longshoremen
Kathleen Christison
The True Story of Resolution
242 or How the US Sold Out
the Palestinians
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