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50 Years After The Flight of the Dalai Lama, Where is Tibet Today?
Half a century ago this month the Dalai Lama fled Tibet as the People’s Liberation Army seized control of Lhasa. Today Beijing orders official rejoicing for the anniversary of “emancipation day for a million serfs”, even as Tibetans chafe under Beijing’s boot. In a brilliant report Chaohua Wang reports on the struggle for the future of Tibet. ALSO, Alexander Cockburn addresses the big question: How prepared is the left with ideas and programs in these days of crisis? It has the opportunity to change the face of America, down to the shopping malls. Is it ready? Get your new edition today by subscribing online or calling 1-800-840-3683 Contributions to CounterPunch are tax-deductible. Click here to make a donation. If you find our site useful please: Subscribe Now! CounterPunch books and gear make great presents.
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Today's Stories March 20-22, 2009 P. Sainath March 19, 2009 Dave Marsh Paul Craig Roberts Mike Whitney Sam Smith Harvey Wasserman Binoy Kampmark Kathy Sanborn Christopher Brauchli George Wuerthner Diann Rust-Tierney Website of the Day
March 18, 2009 Michael Hudson Paul Craig Roberts Nelson P. Valdés Jonathan Cook John Ross Yifat Susskind Dave Lindorff Frances Moore Lappé Richard Grossman Rev. William E. Alberts Website of the Day March 17, 2009 Michael Hudson James G. Abourezk Harry Browne Joanne Mariner Alan Farago Dean Baker Peter Morici Bill and Kathleen Christison Richard Gott Walter Brasch Website of the Day
March 16, 2009 Pam Martens Uri Avnery Mike Whitney Ralph Nader Nikolas Kozloff John Walsh Ron Jacobs Binoy Kampmark Stephen Fleischman Christian Christensen Scott Handleman Website of the Day March 13 / 15, 2009 Alexander Cockburn Peter Lee Diana Johnstone David Harvey Petrino DiLeo David Ker Thomson Eric Ruder Fred Gardner David Yearsley Saul Landau Laura Carlsen Robert Weissman John Goekler / Tom Barry Kathy Sanborn Chris Mobley / Leela Yellesetty David Michael Green Alan Maass / Christopher Brauchli Richard Morse Lorenzo Wolff Poets' Basement Website of the Weekend March 12 , 2009 Sharon Smith Christopher Ketcham Mike Whitney Ray McGovern Eric Toussaint / John Ross M. Reza Pirbhai Chris Floyd Steve Early Quentin Gee Website of the Day March 11 , 2009 Mike Roselle Paul Craig Roberts Henry A. Giroux Nikolas Kozloff Norm Kent Mitu Sengupta Ludwig Watzal David Macaray William S. Lind Martha Rosenberg Website of the Day March 10 , 2009 Franklin Spinney Vijay Prashad Stan Cox Zoltan Grossman Reuven Kaminer Jonathan Cook Dave Lindorff Brian McKenna Harvey Wasserman Corey Pein Website of the Day
March 9 , 2009 Pam Martens Ralph Nader Peter Lee Mike Whitney Peter Morici Dean Baker Steve Ault Stephen Lendman Farooq Sulehria Belén Fernández Website of the Day March 6-8 , 2009 Alexander Cockburn Chris Floyd Uri Avnery Dave Lindorff Mark Weisbrot David Ker Thomson Phil Aliff Rebekah Ward Tracey Briggs Dean Baker Daniel P. Wirt, M.D. Carl Finamore Wajahat Ali David Michael Green David Macaray Michael Dickinson Susie Day Bob Sommer Ben Sonnenberg David Yearsley DC Larson Lorenzo Wolff Poets' Basement Website of the Weekend March 5 , 2009 James G. Abourezk Kathleen and Bill Christison Robert Weissman Patrick Cockburn William Blum Robert Fantina Saul Landau Benjamin Dangl Christopher Brauchli Website of the Day March 4, 2009 Marjorie Cohn Mike Whitney Ron Jacobs Ashley Smith Joanne Mariner Dan Bacher Mark Engler Franklin Lamb Cal Winslow David Mandelzys Website of the Day March 3, 2009 Conn Hallinan Fawzia Afzal-Khan Brian M. Downing Robert Larson Daniel P. Wirt, MD Russell Mokhiber William Loren Katz Kathy Sanborn Pauline Imbach Christopher Ketcham Website of the Day March 2, 2009 Andrea Peacock Paul Craig Roberts Peter Lee John Blair Peter Morici Uri Avnery Michael Donnelly Fred Gardner Sonia Nettnin Andrew Lehman Website of the Day
Feb. 27 - March 1, 2009 Alexander Cockburn Harry Browne Anthony DiMaggio Sasan Fayazmanesh Mischa Gaus Felice Pace Mike Whitney Lee Sustar Peter Lee Nicole Colson Roger Burbach Rannie Amiri Missy Beattie Dave Lindorff Robert David Steele Vivas John Ross Ralph Nader Yves Engler Alan Farago Zulfikar Majid David Yearsley Charles R. Larson Kim Nicolini Lorenzo Wolff Poets' Basement Website of the Weekend February 26, 2009 Dave Lindorff Jonathan Cook Patrick Cockburn Mike Whitney Eamonn McCann Tim Wise Tom Barry Harvey Wasserman Adam Turl David Macaray James McEnteer Website of the Day
February 25, 2009 Chris Sands M. Shahid Alam Chris Floyd Dave Lindorff Norman Solomon Rachel Godfrey Wood Niranjan Ramakrishnan Ron Jacobs Nadia Hijab Dennis Loo Website of the Day February 24, 2009 Paul Craig Roberts Uri Avnery Peter Morici Jonathan Cook Paul Fitzgerald / Andy Worthington Brian Horejsi Julia Stein Norm Kent Rachel Smolker / Dennis Loo James McEnteer Website of the Day February 23, 2009 Michael Hudson Mike Roselle Patrick Cockburn Franklin Spinney Einar Már Guðmundsson Ralph Nader Jordan Flaherty Helen Redmond Dennis Loo Harvey Wasserman Terry Lodge Website of the Day February 20 / 22, 2009 Alexander Cockburn Michael Neumann / Ismael Hossein-zadeh Paul Craig Roberts Linn Washington Jr. Saul Landau Marjorie Cohn Binoy Kampmark Dave Lindorff David Yearsley David Macaray James McEnteer Rick Salutin Wayne Clark Richard Rhames Stephen Martin Mitu Sengupta Charles R. Larson Richard Morse Lorenzo Wolff Poets' Basement Website of the Weekend February 19, 2009 Norman Finkelstein Harry Browne Robert Bryce Brian M. Downing Fred Gardner Andy Worthington Wajahat Ali Laura Carlsen Deb Reich Christopher Ketcham Website of the Day February 18, 2009 Paul Craig Roberts Mike Whitney M. Shahid Alam Patrick Cockburn Conn Hallinan Dave Lindorff Rannie Amiri Gareth Porter Eric Hobsbawm Christopher Brauchli Martha Rosenberg Website of the Day February 17, 2009 Michael Hudson Mike Whitney Ralph Nader Joanne Mariner John Ross Belén Fernández Mats Svensson David Macaray Gregory Vickrey M. Junaid Levesque-Alam Michael Dickinson Website of the Day February 16, 2009 Patrick Cockburn Oscar Guardiola-Rivera Paul Craig Roberts Uri Avnery P. Sainath Dedrick Muhammad / Michael Brown Carla Blank Patrick Irelan Dan Bacher Fidel Castro Harvey Wasserman Website of the Day February 13 - 15, 2009 Alexander Cockburn Joshua Frank Mike Whitney George Ciccariello-Maher Nikolas Kozloff Brian M. Downing Paul Craig Roberts Christopher Ketcham Ron Jacobs Dave Lindorff Alan Maass Chuck Spinney Phil Gasper Stephen Lendman Charles Thomson Kathy Sanborn Saul Landau Len Wengraf Harvey Wasserman David Macaray Tom Stephens Seth Sandronsky David Yearsley Lorenzo Wolff Kim Nicolini Poets' Basement Website of the Weekend
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Weekend Edition Solution of Last ResortIs the Euro Doomed?By LAURENT JACQUE Will the tsunami devastating the global financial system undermine the stability of the euro? Its advocates say not. Doomsday scenarios of a partial break-up of the Eurozone have, as yet, failed to materialise. They argue that, over 10 years, the Eurozone has become a haven of peace and stability giving the second world economy a stable currency. In January, the Eurozone acquired its 16th member, Slovakia. And even the Eurosceptics (Denmark, Sweden and the United Kingdom) who snubbed the launch of the single currency in 1999 are having second thoughts: the Danish crown may join up shortly. The independent European Central Bank (ECB) has single-handedly reined in the growth in the money supply, bringing inflation down to approximately 2 per cent. Average nominal interest rates have stabilised at around 2.5 per cent, while real interest rates are at their lowest since the 1960s. And the abolition of 15 national currencies eliminated exchange risks (1) and transaction costs, galvanizing intra-euro zone trade and investment, which now form a third of its GNP. For all these glittering achievements, there are signs of malaise. During the last decade the Eurozone’s economic growth was sluggish, unemployment continued stubbornly high and many EU members’ budgetary deficit exceeded the 3 per cent GDP ceiling mandated by the Growth and Stabilisation Pact. By contrast, the Eurosceptics had far lower rates of unemployment (half the Eurozone average), higher growth rates and very low budget deficits (if not surpluses). The euro has failed to deliver any significant benefits to Eurozone countries, mainly because of structural economic problems for which the euro was never meant to be the panacea. Even so, hopes of reduced unemployment or higher economic growth have not come true. So could the euro be partly responsible for the vicissitudes of the last decade? And will it survive unscathed the crisis engulfing the global economy? The launch of the euro in 1999 was a politically motivated event which never met the acid test of what economists call an “optimal currency area”. A group of countries (or regions) is deemed to constitute an optimal currency area when their economies are closely interwoven by trade in goods and services, and characterised by mobility of capital and labour. The United States is the longest surviving and most successful example of a well-functioning currency area. Is the European Union also an optimal currency area? Intra-EU trade hovers at around 15 per cent of the Eurozone’s GNP – significant but considerably lower than in the US. While footloose capital is increasingly the EU norm, labour mobility across Europe is only a fraction of what it is in the US and remains very low within each of its national economies. Ignoring these problems, the EU launched the euro in 1999 and created a single monetary policy, establishing a central bank and depriving each country of two (out of three) critical policy instruments: an independent monetary policy to tame inflation or spur growth through interest rate adjustments and a flexible exchange rate to keep its economy competitive. Furthermore, fiscal policy – the third critical instrument – is sharply constrained by the Growth and Stabilisation Pact which caps the budget deficit for each country at 3 per cent of GDP. National debt should not exceed 60 per cent of GDP, with notable exceptions such as Italy and Greece, which breached the ceiling at 104 per cent and 95 per cent of their GDP respectively. Structural and cyclical differences between individual EU members are clear; so the Eurozone’s reduced economic policy deftness is of particular concern in the event that one member country suffers an economic shock that does not affect the rest. If the Eurozone were really an optimal currency area, a country in trouble would be able to adjust through the mobility of its labour force within the rest of the Eurozone, the flexibility of wages and prices, and/or a budgetary transfer from Brussels to help it out. None of these conditions were met when the euro was first launched, nor is there any sign that member countries are putting in motion structural reforms to bring the Eurozone any closer to becoming an optimal currency area. The third condition – which is easier to meet – calls for a hefty dose of “fiscal federalism” and would transfer significant taxing and spending power away from national governments to the EU. This transfer remains elusive for fear of further diluting national sovereignty. This stands in stark contrast to the United States where more than 60 per cent of government expenditures occur at the federal level. The US also has high labor mobility and greater wage flexibility than Europe. Even Germany’s reunification, which joined east and west in a single mark in 1991, hardly created an optimal D-mark zone: in spite of fiscal transfer in excess of 200bn euros over a 10-year period, unemployment remained stubbornly high (close to 20 per cent) in East Germany. In its first 10 years the Eurozone has experienced at least two main “asymmetrical” shocks which did not impact all its members uniformly: the overvalued dollar from 1999-2002 and the oil shock from 2005-8. In the case of the dollar, those Eurozone countries dependent on international trade have experienced faster imports-induced inflation than those oriented to Eurozone trade. Ireland – more of an international than a European trader – experienced inflation at the rate of 4.1 per cent over the 1999-2002 period, whereas Germany – more of a European than an international trader – remained in the slow inflation lane at 1.2 per cent over that same period. Similarly, the quadrupling of the price of crude oil is impacting on national rates of economic growth and inflation more or less in proportion to their dependence on oil. France, with its lower dependence on oil (35 per cent of its energy supply because of its high dependence on nuclear power), is less affected than Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal or Spain, which rely on oil for more than 55 per cent of their energy supply. The combination of centralized monetary policy and decentralized fiscal policy is resulting in localized differences in inflation which are affecting the euro’s purchasing power in each Eurozone country. Under a national exchange rate, this is easily corrected through monetary policy and “competitive” depreciation/appreciation of the national currency. But this is no longer a possibility: the straightjacket of the euro killed the exchange rate policy instrument and froze monetary policy at the national level. Because of this inability to respond flexibly to inflation, the purchasing power of the euro is rapidly eroding in several countries. On the basis of labour cost indices in Italy and Germany over the period 1 January 1999 to 30 September 2008, the euro in Italy is overvalued by 41 per cent against the euro in Germany, and Spain and Greece are not far behind. Unless countries suffering from overvaluation can correct the problem through faster gains in productivity and/or wage and price downward flexibility, the problem is not reversible. More importantly, overvaluation is a cumulative process which becomes harder to correct over time. In this vein, the latest round of EU enlargement may – to a limited extent – bring about some price and wage downward flexibility to the Eurozone as firms can make increasingly credible threats to outsource from or to relocate manufacturing operations to Eastern Europe to take advantage of cheaper labour. To make matters worse, EU countries cling to their own electoral calendars for presidential, parliamentary or municipal elections. This exacerbates cyclical discrepancies across the Eurozone: the run-up to an election is often accompanied by expansionary fiscal policy. As the world economy digs itself in a deeper hole, the main economic policy goal is becoming to combat the relentless rise of unemployment, which could rapidly reach 10-12 per cent. Spain’s unemployment has already skyrocketed to 13 per cent in the last six months. But fighting unemployment will result in massive budget deficits, which will unravel the Stabilisation Pact and jeopardise the stability of the single currency. Stimulus plans that are being implemented are blowing big holes in the deficit ceiling set at 3 per cent of GDP, pushing national debts way beyond the threshold of 60 per cent of GDP and raising new threats to the independence of the ECB. Under duress, and facing the bleak prospect of a prolonged economic crisis and deepening structural unemployment, some countries may be tempted to follow the example of the brutal devaluation of the pound. Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain (whose unemployment often exceeded 10 per cent in the last decade) will not agree to remain “under-competitive” because of the “over-valuation” of the euro. However traumatic it may be to reinstate national currencies, some countries could decide to abandon the euro to recover their economic competitiveness. This scenario is reminiscent of the major currency crises that rocked the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates between 1944 and 1971, and more recently the European Monetary System from 1979-99 (3). But this is unlikely in the short term, if only because national debts denominated in euros would become very expensive to service with a newly restored but devalued currency for the seceding country. Even so, further deterioration of an already fragile social climate (such as the recent demonstrations in Greece) fuelled by a brutal acceleration of unemployment, may push some countries to this solution of last resort. Laurent Jacque is the Walter B Wriston professor of international finance and banking at the Fletcher School (Tufts University, US) and HEC School of Management (France) Notes. (1) Risks due to exchange rate fluctuations. Prior to the creation of the euro, investors would routinely speculate against the franc, lire or pound. In September?1992, George Soros successfully speculated against the pound as the United Kingdom abandoned the European Monetary System. (2) Interview in Die Zeit, Hamburg, 23?July?2007. (3) The European Monetary System was established in 1979and aimed at stabilising exchange rates among European currencies, in effect re-enacting on a European scale the Bretton Woods system of pegged exchange rates. Each currency was pegged to an artificial currency unit known as the ecu, the predecessor of the euro. This article appears in the March edition of the excellent monthly Le Monde Diplomatique, whose English language edition can be found at mondediplo.com. This full text appears by agreement with Le Monde Diplomatique. CounterPunch features one or two articles from LMD every month.
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Now Available from CounterPunch Books! Spell Albuquerque: Waiting for
Lightning
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