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June
13, 2003
Theocracy Must Go
the Way of the Shah
The
Iranian Revolution, Reloaded?
By RON JACOBS
Not too long ago I wrote a piece that was a reaction
to recent U.S. threats against Iran. The underlying argument
of the article was that even though the Iranian people want a
change in their government, they would be ill advised to look
to the United States government for any genuine assistance. After
all, the history of Washington in regards to Iran in the past
fifty years is a primary reason the Iranians are in their current
situation.
Like most articles I have written on
Iran since the events now known simply as 9/11, this one received
a number of responses from Iranians living abroad. The response
that interested me the most (and one that has led to a few conversations
with its composer) came from a gentleman who has lost two relatives
to Iranian government security forces-one to those of the Shah
and the other to the forces of the theocratic dictatorship now
in power.
This fellow's concerns about my piece
were not with the warnings against seeking and trusting U.S.
assistance. Instead, he was more concerned with my remarks concerning
the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) wherein I implied
that one of the council's founding organizational members-the
Peoples Mujahedin (hereafter the Mujahedin)-were funded by the
now-defunct Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein. According to my acquaintance,
this was fundamentally untrue. He further encouraged me to take
a look at the history of this organization. In response, I asked
him if it was the same group whose supporters I had worked with
during the 1970s in Maryland and California when the movement
to overthrow the Shah was developing. He stated that yes; it
was one and the same, although its leadership and certain parts
of its ideology had undergone some changes. It was apparent to
me, though, that these were the so-called Islamic progressives
who considered Khomeini's Islamic revolution to not only be anti-Islamic,
but also counter-revolutionary. I remembered conversations in
1980 with various Iranian Marxists who took the same position.
Who Are the NCRI?
The NCRI is an organization composed
of five groups opposed to the current government in Iran. The
group was founded by parts of the Mujahedin leadership that fled
Khomeini's Iran in 1981 after a murderous crackdown on protesters
by his regime. In its early incarnations the NCRI was a broad
coalition of groups and individuals who were opposed to the Khomeini
regime. Some of its foremost members were the exiled president
of Iran, Bani-Sadr-a supporter of the revolution who espoused
social democratic policies--, an Iranian Kurdish organization
(both left the coalition after they agreed to negotiate with
the Khomeini regime-a decision that resulted in the Kurdish negotiator
being killed by Khomeini's security forces), and various leftist
popular organizations who were, despite their work in opposition
to the Shah, under continued persecution by Khomeini's regime.
The NCRI's goal is to rid Iran of the
theocratic regime now in power in Tehran and to establish a secular
government. The council is committed to a representative democratic
government that guarantees democratic freedoms like the freedom
of religion, the press, and speech. Furthermore, it is dedicated
to equal status and rights for women (half of its membership
is female), equal access to education, an end to all debts owed
to the government by peasants and workers, the guarantee of basic
necessities to those without them, and a more equitable economic
reality for all Iranians.
The council stands opposed to outside
intervention in the Middle East, and supports a foreign policy
based on cooperation. Furthermore, it recognizes and supports
the rights of national minorities in Iran. It does not support
the aspirations of the shah's son, Reza Pahlavi, and hopes for
a peaceful transfer of power via a UN supervised referendum of
the Iranian people. However, their intention is to rid Iran of
the current regime and the Mujahedin do have an armed force trained
and able to fight in battle should the perceived need arise.
Since they are the driving force behind the NCRI, this piece
will take a deeper look at the Mujahedin.
The Mujahedin were formed in 1965 by
three activists who knew each other at Tehran University. All
three had been active in demonstrations against the rule of the
Shah and all three took part in various ways in the 1963 uprising
against the Shah that ended in failure and a wave of repression.
Through an ongoing series of discussions amongst members of the
expanding underground organization, a form of revolutionary Islam
was developed. Perhaps the best comparison one would find in
Christian theology would be the liberation theology developed
amongst Catholic priests working in the Latin American slums
and poverty-stricken rural villages during the 1960s. This ideology
stands in stark contrast to the reactionary philosophy expounded
by Khomeini and Islamic notables like Osama bin Laden.
Over the years, various factions within
the organization had greater pull than others. This is quite
typical in revolutionary organizations. In the early 1970s, the
three founders (along with most of the central committee) were
executed by the Shah. The rest of the organization split into
two factions-one group becoming, in essence, Marxist urban guerrilla
and the other maintaining their version of revolutionary progressive
Islam. What developed over time in terms of ideology was a program
opposed to western imperialism, for democratic freedoms, equal
rights for women, and the protection of national minorities within
Iran. Three months before the Shah's overthrow, the group's leader,
Rajavi, was freed (along with many other political prisoners)
and took over the leadership of the Islamic branch. The Marxist
wing went on to form a separate group, most of who were killed
by the Khomeini regime's security forces.
In terms of practice, the Mujahedin has
usually operated as an underground organization and usually alone,
although it agreed with and operated in spirit along with other
leftist and progressive democratic forces. This practice was
most prevalent during the final years of the struggle against
the Shah and in 1981-1982. This was when many Iranian revolutionary
groups banded together to oppose the clerical dictatorship being
installed by Khomeini after those groups realized that Khomeini's
ideology was fundamentally reactionary, his economics corrupt
and crudely capitalist, and his so-called revolutionary police
supporters even more brutal than the Shah's security forces-the
SAVAK.
In addition to all this, Khomeini's government
was in secret negotiations with the United States. These negotiations
involved trading arms for the hostages that students and others
(some who were members of Khomeini's organization) were holding
at the U.S. Embassy compound in Tehran. The secret negotiations
were taking place at the same time that Khomeini was verbally
attacking the U.S. on an almost daily basis. One result of the
negotiations was that the Mujahedin, who had been in conversation
with various legislators and their representatives in Washington,
were cut off from discussions with anyone in official Washington.
(They eventually ended up on the State Department's "terror
list" in the 1990s.) According to the Tower Commission report
about the Iran-Contra affair, this was one of the preconditions
set by the Khomeini regime before these negotiations began. Also,
according to Mujahedin documents, this was not the first time
the clerics around Khomeini had negotiated with the U.S. Indeed,
these documents claim that some of these clerics were in secret
talks with the Carter administration during the fall and winter
of 1978-1979, as the movement against the Shah held daily protests
in cities across Iran. It was the U.S.' hope that the clerics
could prevent a popular leftist government from taking power
once it became clear that the Shah's days as the ruler of Iran
were numbered.
This was not the only maneuvering the
United States was doing: it was also trying to put together a
government that would not have the taint of the Shah, but would
continue his economic policies while liberalizing the political
process. No matter what, the Carter administration wanted to
prevent a truly anti-imperialist, leftwing revolution-a revolution
that had a very real chance of succeeding. Like so many other
times in the history of the Cold War, Washington was willing
to allow any type of regime to rule in its client states, no
matter how reactionary. Iran was no exception. Unfortunately
for the Iranian people, the anti-leftism of the United States
helped create the vacuum that allowed Khomeini to take power.
In addition, his superficial anti-imperialism and manipulation
of Islamic religious beliefs blindsided many Iranian progressives
into initially supporting him, only to regret that support later.
According to another Iranian source, it was the naiveté
of the Iranian left which prevented them from seeing Khomeini's
ideology for what it was. In the optimism of the revolution,
the left was all too quick to believe the ayatollah.
As the years continued, the hope among
these factions that the revolution could be moved forward and
Khomeini overthrown diminished as the regime consolidated its
power. The NCRI lost some of its members and gained others when
some members left to negotiate with the regime (this was against
the coalition's principles). In Iran, people settled into living
with the theocratic regime as the reality of daily survival set
in. The regime continued a campaign against the Mujahedin, whom
it had always considered the greatest threat to its power, demanding
that the government of France expel them from their headquarters
in Paris. France complied and the group closed its offices there
and moved to Iraq, where they began a series of military operations
against targets in Iran. In addition, Iranian government hit
squads murdered various members in attacks around the world as
part of an attempt to further weaken the organization.
The Mujahedin were one of the most popular
opposition organizations during the struggle against the Shah.
After his exile in 1979 and the return of the Ayatollah Khomeini,
they, like most of the groups in the united front that overthrew
the Shah's regime, supported the government, believing it to
be a popular organization dedicated to the democratic progressive
principles that the revolution was founded on. When it became
apparent that Khomeini's program was, in their words, "medieval
in nature", and counter-revolutionary, they were among the
first to challenge him and his program. Since then, the Mujahedin
and (later) the NCRI, have been among the dictatorship's most
consistent opponents. However, according to some Iranians here
and abroad with whom I have spoken, they are not the most popular
nor are they the regime's biggest threat, although they are certainly
the largest and best-organized grouping opposed to the Iranian
government.
According to these sources, it is the
grassroots reform movement that organized the popular protests
of 2000 and continues to build a nonviolent movement of resistance
in Iran that is the most popular of the resistance forces. These
sources add that much of the Mujahedin's popularity disintegrated
when it moved to Iraq, especially after they attacked some Iranian
military bases on the Iran-Iraq border at the end of the Iran-Iraq
war. Those attacks led to the execution of the Mujahedin prisoners
remaining in Iran's prisons and the further loss of public support
for the organization. One assumes that a portion of that support
has been regained in the years between. Indeed, its supporters
point to popular demonstrations around the world and the continued
enmity of the Tehran theocracy to prove their point. However
a bitter taste remains for other Iranians when it comes to the
Mujahedin because of their move to Iraq.
What About Reza Pahlavi?
Reza Pahlavi is the oldest son of the
late Shah. He lives in relative luxury in Maryland with his family.
He missed the final months of the revolution that overthrew his
father because he was studying in the United States, after spending
much of his youth in schools in Europe and the U.S. Although
he claims to represent the forces of democracy in Iran, his website
introduces him as the Heir to the Throne of Iran and extols the
reign of his father. Although supporters of his whom I have spoken
with claim that Pahlavi enjoys the support of fifty percent of
the Iranian people, I have found no evidence to support this
statistic. His basic program calls for a referendum to choose
a government, equality for women, and a free press. The differences
with the NCRI program began to appear when economics are discussed.
Although both formations are committed to a free market, Pahlavi
says nothing about guaranteeing basics like housing, education
and health care to all. One can speculate that this silence is
related to his background-a background that shows little recognition
of how the majority of Iranians live. Another possible reason
for his failure to highlight any economic issues that might be
considered anti-capitalist is his desire to be the choice of
Washington in its search for a titular leader to the "popular
uprising" Washington hopes to design in its endeavor to
replace the clerical regime.
Mr. Pahlavi would be perfect for this
role. Already beholden to the United States for Washington's
support for his father and providing the younger Pahlavi with
a place to organize against the regime, this Pahlavi is a true
believer in the American way of life. Like the U.S., he sees
the choice Iranians face as being between either the reactionary
theocracy of the mullahs or as a capitalist client of Washington
and the global capitalist cabal. He currently sees the latter
as a good thing. In addition, he has no connection to the revolutionary
movement of 1979-a revolution that continues to leave a bitter
taste in Washington's mouth. Other organizations (or individuals
in those organizations) opposed to Tehran's current dictatorship
were either intimately involved in that struggle or had relatives
who were and continue to mistrust the motives of the U.S., with
good reason. Primary amongst those reasons is these groups' desire
to fulfill the revolution's goal of an independent and democratic
Iran. Perhaps this is another reason the Mujahedin remain on
the U.S. and EU's list of terror organizations (although not
the UN's, because the UN does not consider them to be terrorists)-a
status that is currently being challenged by some Iranian exile
groups both here in the U.S. and abroad.
Although there have been some minimal
overtures to the Mujahedin from a few elements inside the Rumsfeld
Defense Department, it appears that Mr. Pahlavi and his supporters
are the preferred Iranians in the developing strategy to overthrow
the theocracy in Tehran. Their politics are more in alignment
with the politics of Washington and their organization seems
shallow in terms of organization and support. Although they may
not see it that way, Washington's courtship of Pahlavi is a blessing
for the NCRI, the Mujahedin and other opposition groups. After
all, given the past role the U.S. government has played in Iran,
any suggestion that it might be explicitly involved in the installation
of their next government would instantly taint that government.
The scenario that would most likely unfold
if the United States keeps its paws off the movement for a new
Iran is that a network of organizations opposed to the theocrats
in Tehran will coalesce around two or three simple demands that
included the release of all political prisoners, restoration
of complete freedom of the press, and an internationally sponsored
and supervised referendum of all Iranians to determine the nature
of a new government. Virtually every organization currently opposed
to the clerical regime could agree to these goals and would hope
to see them occur with little or no violence. However, the regime
is unlikely to go quietly and the more threats that are issued
by Washington and its G8 buddies, the more likely the potential
for war grows. Besides increasing the likelihood of war, threats
from Washington also serve to unite the masses of Iranians behind
their government and provide Tehran with a justification for
further repression of its opponents. Such repression could in
turn, force a situation where the theocracy's opponents align
themselves with those in Washington who wish to invade-a scenario
that is surely a step backwards in the Iranian people's struggle
towards the goals of the 1979 revolution. Of course, the likelihood
does exist that the current campaign by the Pentagon against
Tehran is just a ploy aimed at gaining better oil deals with
the current regime. The NCRI's supporters point out that every
time a western government makes a deal with the regime in Iran,
pressure just happens to be placed on the Mujahedin and their
supporters.
If the Iranian people want to realize
the stalled hopes of their revolution, the theocracy must go
the way of the Shah and the true voices of democracy and independence
must take front and center again. This includes the grassroots
reform movements and organizations like the NCRI. At the same
time, those of us who are not in Iran must do whatever we can
to prevent an armed attack on the Iranian people by the U.S.
and its allies. It stands to reason that supporting those forces
truly interested in a progressive democracy in Iran is the best
way to do this.
A good beginning to such a project is
to join those Iranians around the world calling for these groups'
removal from the US and EU's "terror list."
Ron Jacobs
is author of The
Way the Wind Blew: a history of the Weather Underground.
He can be reached at: rjacobs@zoo.uvm.edu
Today's
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Gary
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The Intel-gate Row in Britain: a Chronology
Ahmad Faruqui
The Tragic Legacy of the Six Day
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