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CounterPunch
March 15,
2003
The
Muslim World and the West
The Roots of
Conflict
by ISMAEL HOSSEIN-ZADEH
To say that an effective cure of a disease
requires a sound diagnosis is to state the obvious. Yet, in the
face of the 9/11 plague, and of the scourge of terrorism in general,
the Bush administration has utterly failed to shed any light
on some of the submerged factors that might have provoked such
heinous attacks. Instead, the simplistic and politically expedient
explanations such as "good vs. evil," "clash of
civilizations," or the "Islamic incompatibility with
the modern world" have shed more heat than light on the
issue.
Aside from their poisonous implications
for international relations, such explanations simply fail the
test of history. The history of the relationship between the
modern Western world and the Muslim world shows that, contrary
to popular perceptions in the West, from the time of their initial
contacts with the capitalist West more than two centuries ago
until almost the final third of the twentieth century, the Muslim
people were quite receptive of the economic and political models
of the modern world. Many people in the Muslim world, including
the majority of their political leaders, were eager to transform
and restructure the socio-economic and political structures of
their societies after the model of the capitalist West. The majority
of political leaders, as well as a significant number of Islamic
experts and intellectuals, viewed the rise of the modern West
and its spread into their lands as inevitable historical developments
that challenged them to chart their own programs of reform and
development.
In light of this background, the question
arises: What changed all of that earlier receptive and respectful
attitude toward the West to the current attitude of disrespect
and hatred? This brief survey of the relationship between the
Muslim world and the Western world, especially the United States,
will show that the answer to this question lies more with the
policies of the Western powers in the region than the alleged
rigidity of Islam, or "the clash of civilizations."
It will show that it was only after more than a century and a
half of imperialistic pursuits and a series of humiliating policies
in the region that the popular masses of the Muslim world turned
to religion and the conservative religious leaders as sources
of defiance, mobilization, and self-respect. In other words,
for many Muslims the recent turn to religion often represents
not so much a rejection of Western values and achievements as
it is a way to resist and/or defy the humiliating imperialistic
policies of Western powers.
Early Responses to
the Challenges of the Modern World
Not only did the early modernizers of
the Muslim world embrace the Western technology, but they also
welcomed its civil and state institutions, its representational
system of government, and its tradition of legal and constitutional
rights. For example, the Iranian intellectuals Mulkum Khan (1833-1908)
and Agha Khan Kermani (1853-96) urged Iranians to acquire a Western
education and replace the Shariah (the religious legal code)
with a modern secular legal code. Secular political leaders of
this persuasion joined forces with the more liberal religious
leaders in the Constitution Revolution of 1906, and forced the
Qajar dynasty to set up a modern constitution, to limit the powers
of the monarchy and give Iranians parliamentary representation.
Even some of the Ottoman sultans pursued
Western models of industrialization and modernization on their
own. For example, Sultan Mahmud II "inaugurated the Tanzimat
(Regulation) in 1826, which abolished the Janissaries [the fanatical
elite corps of troops organized in the 14th century], modernized
the army and introduced some of the new technology." In
1839 Sultan Abdulhamid "issued the Gulhane decree, which
made his rule dependent upon a contractual relationship with
his subjects, and looked forward to major reform of the empire's
institutions."
More dramatic, however, were the modernizing
and/or secularizing programs of Egypt's renowned modernizers
Muhammad Ali (1769-1849) and his grandson Ismail Pasha (1803-95).
They were so taken by the impressive achievements of the West
that they embarked on breakneck modernizing programs that were
tantamount to trying to hothouse the Western world's achievements
of centuries into decades: "To secularize the country, Muhammad
Ali simply confiscate much religiously endowed property and systematically
marginalized the Ulema [religious leaders], divesting them of
any shred of power."[iii] In the face of dire conditions
of underdevelopment and humiliating but unstoppable foreign domination,
those national leaders viewed modernization not only as the way
out of underdevelopment but also out of the yoke of foreign domination.
Not only the secular intellectuals, the
political elite, and government leaders but also many Islamic
leaders and scholars, known as "Islamic modernizers,"
viewed modernization as the way of the future. But whereas the
reform programs and policies of the political/national leaders
often included secularization, at least implicitly, Islamic modernizers
were eclectic: while seeking to adopt the sources of the strength
of the West, including constitutionalism and government by representation,
they wanted to preserve their cultural and national identities
as well as Islamic principles and values as the moral foundation
of the society. These Islamic modernizers included Jamal al-Din
al-Afghani (1838-97), Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905), Qasim Amin
(18631908), and Shaikh Muhammad Hussain Naini in Egypt and Iran;
and Sayyid Ahmad Khan (1817-98) and Muhammad Iqbal (1875-1938)
in India.
To be sure, there was resistance and,
at times, even violent clashes. But, by and large, nationalist
modernizers in many Muslim countries did manage to pursue vigorous
agendas of social, economic, and political reform. John Esposito,
one of the leading experts of Islamic studies in the United States,
describes the early attitude of the political and economic policy
makers of the Muslim world toward the modern world of the West
in the following way:
Both the indigenous elites, who guided
government development programs in newly emerging Muslim states,
and their foreign patrons and advisers were Western-oriented
and Western-educated. All proceeded from a premise that equated
modernization with Westernization. The clear goal and presupposition
of development was that every day and in every way things should
become more modern (i.e., Western and secular), from cities,
buildings, bureaucracies, companies, and schools to politics
and culture. While some warned of the need to be selective, the
desired direction and pace of change were unmistakable. Even
those Muslims who spoke of selective change did so within a context
which called for the separation of religion from public life.
Western analysts and Muslim experts alike tended to regard a
Western-based process of modernization as necessary and inevitable
and believed equally that religion was a major hindrance to political
and social change in the Muslim world.
Karen Armstrong, author of a number of
books on religious fundamentalism, likewise points out the following:
About a hundred years ago, almost every
leading Muslim intellectual was in love with the West, which
at that time meant Europe. America was still an unknown quantity.
Politicians and journalists in India, Egypt, and Iran wanted
their countries to be just like Britain or France; philosophers,
poets, and even some of the ulama (religious scholars) tried
to find ways of reforming Islam according to the democratic model
of the West. They called for a nation state, for representational
government, for the disestablishment of religion, and for constitutional
rights. Some even claimed that the Europeans were better Muslims
than their own fellow countrymen since the Koran teaches that
the resources of a society must be shared as fairly as possible,
and in the European nations there was beginning to be a more
equitable sharing of wealth.
Armstrong then asks: "So what happened
in the intervening years to transform all of that admiration
and respect into the hatred that incited the acts of terror that
we witnessed on September 11?"
While profound questions of this type
could go some way to help a national debate over some of the
more submerged factors that contributed to the 9/11 atrocities,
the beneficiaries of war dividends--who are closely linked to
the U.S. Defense Department and the Zionist lobby, and who seem
to be in charge of the Bush administration's foreign policy making--have
successfully kept such questions off the national debate. In
fact, these beneficiaries have so far succeeded in preempting
a national debate on the issue altogether.
It is necessary to acknowledge, once
again, that the Muslim world's earlier openness to the modern
world was far from even or uniform: along with advocates of change
and adaptation there existed forces of resistance and rejection.
Focusing primarily on such instances of rejection, proponents
of the theory of "clash of civilizations" can certainly
cite, as they frequently do, many such incidents of resistance
in support of their arguments that horrific acts like those committed
on 9/11 "are due to inherent incompatibility of the Muslim
world with Western values."[vi] But such selective references
to historical developments in order to support a pre-determined
view do not carry us very far in the way of setting historical
records straight. A number of issues need to be pointed out here.
First, contrary to the rising political
influence of "radical Islamists" in recent years, radical
Islamic circles of the earlier periods did not sway much power
over the direction of national economies and policies. Their
opposition to Western values and influences was largely in the
form of passive "rejection or elusion."[vii] They simply
refused to cooperate or deal with the colonial powers and their
institutions (such as modern European schools) spreading in their
midst: "They did not attempt to assume direct political
control but used their position to preserve tradition as best
they could under the rapidly changing conditions of the time."
And while they "remained an important factor in influencing
public opinion, ...they basically used their position to encourage
obedience to those in power."
Second, change almost always generates
resistance. Resistance to change is, therefore, not limited to
Muslims or the Muslim world. In fact, the Christian Church's
nearly 400-year resistance to capitalist transformation in Europe
was even more traumatic than that of the Muslim world. The resulting
travail of transition created more social turbulence than has
been observed in the context of the Muslim world. Whereas the
Church of the Middle Ages anathemized the very idea of gain,
the pursuit of gain and the accumulation of property are considered
noble pursuits in Islam. Opponents of transition to capitalism
in Europe not only tried (and almost hanged) Robert Keane for
having made a six-percent profit on his investment and "prohibited
merchants from carrying unsightly bundles" of their merchandise,
but also "fought for the privilege of carrying on in its
fathers' footsteps."[ix] As Karen Armstrong points out,
during the nearly 400 years of transition, the Western people
often "experienced...bloody revolutions, reigns of terror,
genocide, violent wars of religion, the despoliation of the countryside,
vast social upheavals, exploitation in the factories, spiritual
malaise and profound anomie in the new megacities."
Third, Muslim societies, like less-developed
societies elsewhere, are expected, or compelled by the imperatives
of the world market, to traverse the nearly four hundred-year
journey of the West in a much shorter period of time. Furthermore,
the travails of transition in the case of these belatedly developing
countries (vis-a-vis the case of early developers of the West)
are often complicated by foreign interventions and imperial pressures
from outside. External pressure has included not only direct
colonial and/or imperial military force, but also pressure exerted
from the more subtle market forces and agents such as the International
Monetary Fund and World Trade Organization. Despite its turbulence,
the painful process of transition to capitalism in the West was
largely an internal process; no foreign force or interference
could be blamed for the travails of transition. And the pains
of transitions were thus gradually and grudgingly accepted as
historical inevitabilities.
Not so in the case of belatedly developing
countries. Here, the pains of change and transition are often
perceived not as historical necessities but as products of foreign
designs or imperialist schemes. Accordingly, the agony of change
is often blamed (by the conservative proponents of the status
quo) on external forces or powers: colonialism, imperialism,
and neo-liberalism. Actual foreign intervention, realizing and
reinforcing such perceptions, has thus had a delaying impact
on the process of reform in the Muslim world. For intervention
from outside often plays into the hands of the conservative,
obscurantist religious leaders who are quite adept at portraying
their innate opposition to change as a struggle against foreign
domination, thereby reinforcing resistance to reform, especially
religious reform. Today, for example, U.S. intervention in the
internal affairs of countries such as Egypt, Pakistan, Iran,
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, and Turkey, far from facilitating
the process of reform or helping the forces of change in these
countries, is actually hurting such forces as it plays into the
hands of their conservative opponents and strengthens the camp
of resistance.
Whatever Happened to the Once-Popular
U.S. in the Muslim World?
Prior to World War II, England and other
European powers dominated world politics and markets, not the
United States. In its drive to penetrate into those markets in
competition with European powers, the United States, often citing
its own war of independence from the British empire, frequently
expressed sympathy with the national liberation struggles of
the peoples of the colonial and other less-developed regions.
Unsurprisingly, this made the United States--not just the country,
its people, and its values but also its foreign policy and its
statesmen--quite popular in the less-developed world, especially
the Muslim world, as it portrayed the prospect of an unconditional
ally in a rising world power.
Thus, for example, when the late Egyptian
leader Jamal Abdel Nasser faced the European opposition to his
state-guided economic development program, he turned to the Unites
State for help. Nasser's appeal for the U.S. support had been
prompted by the United States' veiled expressions of understanding
of Egypt's aspirations to chart an independent national policy.
Nasser perceived those sympathetic gestures as signs of genuine
friendship and cooperation. But when the United States revealed
its conditions for the promised cooperation, the Egyptian leader
was deeply disappointed.
One major condition required Egypt to
enter into the then <U.S.-sponsored> military alliance
in the region, the Baghdad Pact. This was one of the early military
alliances that the Unites States established in the region, not
only to counter the Soviet influence but also to supplant its
enfeebled allies, Britain and France. As a savvy statesmen, Nasser
understood the "necessity" of such alliances and was,
in fact, willing to join the proposed military pact. But the
United States expected more. In addition, the U.S. wanted to
"shape" Egypt's economic policies. As Mahmood Hussein
put it, "the United States claimed the right to control
the Egyptian state's economic policies."[xi] Disillusioned--indeed,
with his back against the wall--Nasser turned to the Soviet Union
to temper the pressure thus exercised against Egypt. The turn
to the Soviet Union was, therefore, precipitated more by expediency,
or by default, than by ideological affinity.
Like Egypt's Nasser, Iran's liberal-nationalist
prime minister Mohammed Mossadeq also initially harbored illusions
of unconditional friendship with the United States. This was
because, in the dispute between Iran and England over the control
of Iranian oil, the United States had originally conveyed signs
of neutrality, even sympathy, with Iran's grievances against
England. Prior to the 1953 nationalization, Iran's oil was essentially
controlled by Britain. As promised during his election campaign,
Mossadeq took steps to nationalize the country's oil industry
soon after being popularly elected to premiership in 1951. As
England resisted giving up its control of Iran's oil industry,
a severe crisis ensued between the two countries. "Mossadeq
had thought that the United States might warn London not to interfere,
and for a while Truman and Acheson maintained the pretense of
neutrality by advising both sides to remain tranquil."[xii]
It soon became clear, however, that while trying to weaken the
British Empire, the United States was pursuing its own imperialistic
agenda. And when Mossadeq resisted compliance with that agenda,
he was fatally punished for "insubordination": His
democratically elected government was soon overthrown by the
notorious 1953 coup, which was orchestrated by the CIA and British
intelligence. The coup also brought the Shah--who had fled to
Rome--back to power, aboard a U.S. military plane with the CIA
chief at his side.
It is now common knowledge that, since
the 1953 violent overthrow of Mossadeq's government in Iran,
the United States has helped or orchestrated similar coups against
duly elected governments in a number of other countries. In each
case, the United States replaced such legitimate governments
with "friendly" dictatorial regimes of its own choice.
A sample of such handpicked regimes includes those of General
Pinochet in Chile, the Somoza family in Nicaragua, Duvalier in
Haiti, and Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines. The list of the
U.S. interventions and adventures abroad is quite long. In his
latest best-seller, Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace: How We
Got To Be So Hated, Gore Vidal lists some 200 such interventions
since WW II.[xiii] Most of today's regimes in the Muslim world
(such as those ruling in Pakistan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan,
Kuwait, and a number of smaller kingdoms in the Persian Gulf
area) are able to maintain their dictatorial rule not because
their people want them stay in power but because they are useful
to some powerful interests in the United States.
It is not surprising, then, that many
people in these countries are increasingly asking: Why can't
we elect our own governments? Why can't we have independent political
parties? Why can't we breathe, so to speak? Why are our governments
so corrupt? Why are our people, especially Palestinians, treated
like this? Why are we ruled by regimes we don't like and don't
want, but cannot change? And why can't we change them? Well,
the majority of these countries' citizens would say, because
certain powerful interests in the United States need them and
want them in power!
Nor is it surprising that many people
in the Muslim world, especially the frustrated youth, are flocking
into the ranks of militant <anti-U.S>. forces, and employing
religion as a weapon of mobilization and defiance. It is also
no accident that desperate violent reactions are usually directed
at the symbols of U.S. power--not at those of the Japanese, for
example. Correlation between U.S. foreign policy and such reactions
was unambiguously acknowledged by the members of the United States'
Defense Science Board, who wrote in a 1997 report to the undersecretary
of defense for acquisition and science, "Historical data
shows a strong correlation between U.S. involvement in international
situations and an increase in terrorist attacks against the United
States."
Calling such tragic and often destructive
reactions to U.S. international involvements "blowbacks
from imperialistic U.S. foreign policies," Chalmers Johnson
in his illuminating book, Blowback, lists many instances of U.S.
interventions in the domestic affairs of other countries, as
well as some of the violent responses to such interventions:
What the daily press reports as the malign
acts of 'terrorists' or 'drug lords' or 'rogue states' or 'illegal
arms merchants' often turn out to be blowbacks from earlier American
operations.... For example, in Nicaragua in the 1980s, the U.S.
government organized a massive campaign against the socialist-oriented
Sandinista government. American agents then looked the other
way when the Contras, the military insurgents they had trained,
made deals to sell cocaine in American cities in order to buy
arms and supplies. If drug blowback is hard to trace to its source,
bomb attacks, whether on U.S. embassies in Africa, the World
Trade Center in New York, or an apartment complex in Saudi Arabia
that housed U.S. servicemen, are another matter.
The point here is, of course, not to
condone or justify, in any way, the destructive or terrorizing
reactions to U.S. foreign interventions--legitimate grievances
do not justify illegitimate responses. Nor is it meant to disrespect
the innocent victims of such atrocious reactions, or to disparage
the pain and agony of the loss of the loved ones. The point is,
rather, to place such reactions in a context, and to suggest
an explanation. As Gore Vidal puts it, "It is a law of physics...that
in nature there is no action without reaction. The same appears
to be true in human nature--that is, history."[xvi] The
"actions" Vidal refers to here are U.S. military or
covert operations abroad, which are sometimes called state or
wholesale terrorism. "Reactions," on the other hand,
refer to desperate individual, or group, terrorism, which are
also called retail terrorism.
Summary.
Close scrutiny of the Muslim world's
early responses to the challenges of the modern West reveals
that, despite significant resistance, the overall policy was
moving in the direction of reform and adaptation. That policy
of adaptation and openness continued from the time of the Muslim
world's initial contacts with the modern world in the late eighteenth
and the early nineteenth centuries until approximately the last
third of the twentieth century. During that period, the majority
of the political elite and/or national leaders viewed the rise
of the modern West, and its spread into their territories, as
an inevitable historical development that challenged them to
chart their own programs of reform and development. Not only
did the political elite, the intellectuals, and government leaders
view modernization as the way of the future, but so did many
Islamic leaders and scholars, known as "Islamic modernizers,"
It is true that obscurantist conservative
forces, both religious and otherwise, have always defied reform
and resisted change. It is also true that, at times, religious
nationalism played an important role in the anti-colonial/anti-imperial
struggles. But because Islamic leaders often lacked clear programs
or plans for the reconstruction and development of their societies,
political leadership on a national level often fell into the
hands of secular nationalists who offered such nation-building
plans. After WW II, those plans were fashioned either after the
U.S. model of market mechanism, as in the cases of the Shahs
of Iran and the Kings of Jordan, or after the Soviet model of
"non-capitalist development" and/or Arab "socialism,"
as in the cases of Nasser's Egypt and Qaddafi's Libya. Both models
nurtured dreams of economic progress, democratic rights, and
political/national sovereignty. Accordingly, secular nationalist
leaders who promoted such models, and promised economic well
being and social progress, enjoyed broader popular support than
the conservative religious leaders who lacked plans of economic
development and national reconstruction.
As long as the hopes and aspirations
that were thus generated remained alive, promises of an "Islamic
alternative" remained ineffectual in their challenge of
the plans of the secular nationalist leaders. But as those hopes
gradually and painfully turned into despair and hopelessness,
such promises began to sound appealing. By the late 1960s and
early 1970s, most of the national governments' hopeful and auspicious
plans that had hitherto nurtured dreams of economic progress,
democratic rights, and political sovereignty turned out to be
hollow and disappointing. Frustrated, many Muslims turned to
religion, and sought solace in the promise of an "Islamic
alternative."
Equally disappointing were the policies
of the United States in the Muslim world. Before supplanting
the European imperial powers in the region, the U.S. promised
policies of neutrality and even-handedness in the Muslim world.
Once it firmly replaced its European rivals, however, the United
States set out to pursue policies that have not been less imperialistic
than the policies of its European predecessors. U.S. imperial
policies in the region have, therefore, strongly contributed
to the nurturing of the Islamic revival of the recent decades.
These historical observations refute
the claim that Islam and/or the Muslim world are inherently incompatible
with modernization, and that, therefore, the rise of an Islamic
militancy in the last few decades, and the violent reactions
such as the 9/11 attacks, are essentially manifestations of "the
clash of civilizations." The claim that attributes the Islamic
resurgence to the "inherently confrontational nature of
Islam" tends to downplay, or overlook, specific socioeconomic
factors and geopolitical policies that underlie the rage and
reactions of the majority of the Muslim people.
Dr. Ismael Hossein-zadeh teaches economics at Drake University, Des Moines,
IA. He can be reached at: ismael.zadeh@drake.edu.
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