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February 17, 2000
Tens of thousands of high-flown words have
now been devoted to the IRA's supposed As a practical matter the IRA could have only agreed to disarmament if such a process is mutual, part of the above-mentioned "overall settlement". Though in fact there has been distinct lack of such mutuality, the IRA has indeed honored its commitment to peace, ensuring the longest period of tranquillity now in its third year -- in the recent history of Northern Ireland. Amid this tranquillity the capacity for organized violence remains overwhelmingly with the Unionists and with the British. Just visit south Armagh where IRA units are being asked to turn in their weapons. British forts dot the hillsides. British patrols still deploy. British helicopters fill the sky. The Royal Ulster Constabulary is still a standing, unreformed force with an awful history still vivid in Catholic minds. There has been abundant testimony that RUC officers were implicated in assassinations and bombings of Catholics, in conspiracies with other Protestant terror groups. Now many Ulster Unionists are insisting that the RUC never be disbanded and its name survive. On one well-informed count last year there
were about 135,000 legal guns in the north, There is no reason to believe that when Trimble accepted his slice of the Nobel peace prize he traded in his instincts and outlook as a Unionist, leader of a party adamantly opposed to power-sharing or anything other than absolute Protestant dominance. The truth is that Trimble was dragged to the negotiating table, and forced to accept the coalition cabinet with its two Sinn Fein members. After as short a time as ten peaceful weeks Trimble found this situation intolerable. His sudden flourishing of a previously non-existent decommissioning "deadline" overstepped by the IRA was a maneuver to destroy the coalition and in this tactic he was backed by Mandelson and Blair, who lost all room for maneuver by making it known that they were entirely in Trimble's corner. Worse still, Mandelson chose to suspend the new coalition government in northern Ireland and restore direct rule, even though he was well aware that General John de Chastelain, the former Canadian officer heading the international disarmament body, was about to report that he was confident of the IRA's good faith.
There are some signs that the British realised they had overreacted on Trimble's behalf. Some vague noises were duly made about the possible withdrawal of some British forces. When the British did finally suspend the new power-sharing institutions they began to downplay the significance of the whole affair, insisting that suspension was not necessarily an epochal event. But by that time they had prompted the IRA to distance itself from a process in which its leaders thought they were being unfairly stigmatized. If the British government wanted to settle the decommissioning issue once and for all, it would propose that the RUC be abolished in favor of a recomposed police force which would be evenly divided between Catholics and Protestants. 50 per cent of such a force could include decommissioned IRA volunteers. That's actual reconciliation, beyond the level of high-flown speeches at Nobel prize-givings. The announcement of such a force would then be the green light for the IRA to decommission on a grand scale. Exactly this process happened in several decolonizations India, Kenya, Zimbabwe -- pushed through by Britain. Today, members of the ANC's armed wing have been recruited into the South African army in large numbers. One can understand the British dilemma. Blair and Mandelson no doubt feel that if Trimble goes, there'll be no Unionist they can deal with. So once again Trimble holds the old, ever-familiar Ulster veto. There's no reason why the United States should be suckered into playing along with this veto too. CP |
© Copyright: 2000. All rights reserved.
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flouting of the l998 Good Friday agreement,
the IRA's lack of good faith, Sinn Fein's duplicity. Yet as Britain's
Secretary for Northern Ireland, Peter Mandelson, finally admitted
as he returned the province to direct rule, suspending its ten-week
old coalition government the IRA is not in breach of that agreement,
which stated that decommissioning of IRA weapons should occur
"in the context of the implementation of the overall settlement".
This was what the IRA said once more on February 11 and its leaders
may be forgiven for feeling somewhat baffled when they got some
grudging praise the following weekend for merely reiterating
a position they signed on to nearly two years ago.
90
per cent of them in the hands of RUC and the British army. What
army with the function of guaranteeing the safety of Catholic
communities in the North could blithely lay down its arms amid
these conditions? More precisely, what IRA commander could order
such a course without facing the likelihood of mutinous dissent?
In the view of many Republicans, only a beaten army unilaterally
lays down its guns and only an antagonist acting in bad faith
would try to force the decommissioning issue at this time.