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Today's Stories November 18, 2009 John Ross November 17, 2009 Mike Whitney Jayne Lyn Stahl Brian M. Downing Jonathan Cook Joanne Mariner Dean Baker Martha Rosenberg Danny Weil David Macaray Laura Flanders Walter Brasch November 16, 2009 Alan Nasser Jonathan Cook Mark Weisbrot Carol Miller Gary Leupp Harry Clark Ray McGovern Norman Solomon Ron Ridenour Norm Kent Brenda Norrell November 13-15, 2009 Alexander Cockburn Patrick Cockburn Tariq Ali Douglas Lummis Vijay Prashad Carl Ginsburg Manuel García, Jr. Rannie Amiri Mary Lynn Cramer Fred Gardner Dave Lindorff Robert Jensen David Macaray Corporate Crime Reporter Ron Jacobs David Model John V. Walsh Jon Mitchell Stuart Easterling Dan Bacher Franklin Lamb Farzana Versey Charles R. Larson Saul Landau David Yearsley Lorenzo Wolff Poets' Basement
November 12, 2009 Robert Weissman Franklin Spinney Nadia Hijab Afshin Rattansi Paul Craig Roberts Ralph Nader Belén Fernández Allan J. Lichtman Dave Lindorff Jayne Lyn Stahl November 11, 2009 Andrew Cockburn Mike Whitney Rev. Jesse Jackson Jeff Nygaard Stewart J. Lawrence James Ridgeway Eamonn McCann Michael Ortiz Hill Shepherd Bliss Walter Brasch November 10, 2009 Ellen Cantarow Dean Baker Rose Ann DeMoro Ramzy Baroud Peter Lee Dave Lindorff Roberto Rodriguez Winslow T. Wheeler Alan Farago Joseph Grosso November 9, 2009 Patrick Cockburn Linn Washington Carl Ginsburg Jeff Leys John A. Murphy John Halle Bouthaina Shaaban James Ridgeway Dave Lindorff David Macaray Stephen Fleischman Website of the Day November 6-8, 2009 Alexander Cockburn Mark Grueter Paul Craig Roberts Patrick Cockburn Gareth Porter Mike Whitney James Bovard Dean Baker Robert Lawless Saul Landau Jayne Lyn Stahl Stephanie Westbrook M. Shahid Alam Marc Levy Franklin Lamb Ron Jacobs David Ker Thomson John V. Whitbeck Julien Mercille Rannie Amiri John Ross David Michael Green Carl Finamore Farzana Versey Missy Comley Beattie Charles R. Larson David Yearsley Kim Nicolini Poets' Basement November 5, 2009 Pam Martens Vijay Prashad Brian Gallagher Norman Solomon Nadia Hijab Joseph Shansky Andy Thayer Tracy Rosenberg Website of the Day November 4, 2009 Stan Cox Andy Worthington From Gitmo to Palau: Who are the Uighurs? Robert Weissman Susan Galleymore Ralph Nader Michael Leonardi Bitta Mistofi Robert Bryce Martha Rosenberg Dave Lindorff Website of the Day November 3, 2009 Patrick Cockburn Mike Whitney Franklin C. Spinney Laura Carlsen Serge Halimi John Stanton Sophia Weeks Dave Lindorff November 2, 2009 Steven Higgs Ishmael Reed David Macaray Bouthaina Shaaban David Michael Green David Swanson Ellen Brown Adam Federman James McEnteer Stephen Fleischman Website of the Day October 30 - Nov. 1, 2009 Alexander Cockburn Jeffrey St. Clair / Carl Ginsburg Mike Whitney Joe Bageant Gareth Porter Saul Landau Anthony DiMaggio Dave Lindorff Rannie Amiri Niranjan Ramakrishnan Jayne Lyn Stahl Rev. William E. Alberts Alvaro Huerta Martha Rosenberg Binoy Kampmark Norm Kent Charles R. Larson Roth's "The Humbling:" Nothing Like a Novel From an Old Pro Ron Jacobs David Yearsley Lorenzo Wolff Kim Nicolini Poets' Basement Website of the Weekend October 29, 2009 Michael Neumann Mike Whitney Gary Leupp Conn Hallinan Marshall Auerback Laura Flanders Eamonn McCann David Macaray Mark Weisbrot Stephen Soldz Christopher Brauchli Website of the Day October 28, 2009 Moshe Adler Dave Lindorff Frank Joseph Smecker Alexandra Early M. Shahid Alam Vijay Prashad John Ross Franklin Lamb Gregory Travis Susan Galleymore Website of the Day October 27, 2009 Mike Whitney Patrick Cockburn Stewart J. Lawrence Alan Farago Ralph Nader Dave Lindorff Bouthaina Shaaban Brian M. Downing Elections in Afghanistan, the Second Time Around Iain Boal Carl Finamore Jayne Lyn Stahl Website of the Day October 26, 2009 Bill Quigley / Paul Craig Roberts Uri Avnery Mike Whitney Michael Snedeker Shamus Cooke David Michael Green Martha Rosenberg Patrick Bond Binoy Kampmark Website of the Day
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Why General McChrystal's Plan Will FailStrategic TownsBy CONN HALLINAN Before the Obama Administration buys in to General Stanley McChrystal’s escalation strategy, it might spend some time examining the Aug. 12 battle of Dananeh, a scruffy little town of 2,000 perched at the entrance to the Naw Zad Valley in Afghanistan’s southern Helmand province. Dananeh is a textbook example of why counterinsurgency won’t work in that country, as well as a study in military thinking straight out of Lewis Carroll’s “Through the Looking Glass.” According to the U.S., the purpose of the attack was to seize a “strategic” town, cut “Taliban supply lines,” and secure the area for the presidential elections. Taking Dananeh would also “outflank the insurgents,” “isolating” them in the surrounding mountains and forests. What is wrong with this scenario? One, the entire concept of a “strategic” town of 2,000 people in a vast country filled with tens of thousands of villages like Dananeh is bizarre. Two, the Taliban don’t have “flanks.” They are a fluid, irregular force, not an infantry company dug into a set position. “Flanking” an enemy is what you did to the Wehrmacht in World War II. Three, “Taliban supply lines” are not highways and rail intersections, they’re goat trails. Four, “isolate” the Taliban in the surrounding mountains and forests? Anyone in the Pentagon ever read the story of Brer Rabbit? “Please don’t throw me in the briar patch, Brer Fox”? Mountains and forests are where the Taliban move freely. Pinned down, the Marines brought in air power and artillery and, after four days of fierce fighting, took the town. But the Taliban had decamped on the third night. The outcome? A chewed up town and 12 dead insurgents, if you accept that there is no difference between an “insurgent” and a villager who didn’t get out in time, so that all the dead are automatically members of the Taliban. “I’d say we’ve gained a foothold for now, and it’s a substantial one that we’re not going to let go,” says Martin. “I think this has the potential to be a watershed.” Only if hallucinations become the order of the day. The battle of Dananeh was a classic example of irregular warfare. The locals tip off the guerrillas that the army is coming. The Taliban set up an ambush, fight until the heavy firepower comes in, then slip away. “Taliban fighters and their commanders have escaped the Marines’ big offensive into Afghanistan’s Helmand province and moved into areas to the west and north, prompting fears that the U.S. effort has just moved the Taliban problem elsewhere,” writes Nancy Youssef of the McClatchy newspapers. When the Taliban went north they attacked German and Italian troops. Actually, the Afghans have been doing that for some time, as Greeks, Mongols, British, and Russians discovered. One Pentagon officer told the Post that the Taliban has been using fighting in the Korengal Valley that borders Pakistan as a training ground. It’s “a perfect lab to vet fighters and study U.S. tactics,” he said, and to learn how to gauge the response time for U.S. artillery, air strikes, and helicopter assaults. “They know exactly how long it takes before…they have to break contact and pull back.” Just like they did at Dananeh. General McChrystal has asked for 40,000 new troops in order to hold the “major” cities and secure the population from the Taliban. But even by its own standards, the plan is deeply flawed. According to the military’s “Counterinsurgency Field Manuel, one needs a ratio of 20 soldiers for every 1,000 residents. Since Afghanistan is slightly over 32 million, that would require a force of 660,000 soldiers. The U.S. will shortly have 68,000 troops in Afghanistan, plus a stealth surge of 13,000 support troops. If 40,000 additional troops are sent, that will bring U.S. forces to 121,000. Added to that are 35,000 NATO troops, though most alliance members are under increasing domestic pressure to withdraw their soldiers. McChrystal wants to expand the Afghan army to 240,000, and there is talk of trying to reach 340,000. One does not need a calculator to conclude that the counterinsurgency formula—even with the larger Afghan army—is 150,000 soldiers short. And can you really count on the Afghan army? It may indeed reach 340,000—although it doesn’t have the officers and sergeants to command those numbers— but the counterinsurgency formula calls for “trained” troops, not just armed boots on the ground. And according to a recent review, up to 25 percent of recruits quit each year, and the number of trained units has actually declined over the past six months. And by defending the cities, exactly whom will U.S. troops be protecting? When it comes to Afghanistan, “major” population centers are almost a contradiction in terms. There are essentially five cities in the country, Kabul (2.5 million), Kandahar (331,000), Mazar-e-Sharif (200,000), Herat (272,000), and Jalalabad (20,000). Those five cities make up a little more than 10 percent of the population, over half of which is centered in Kabul. The rest of the population is rural, living in towns of 1500 or fewer, smaller even than Dananeh. But spreading the troops into small firebases makes them extremely vulnerable, as the U.S. found out in early September when eight soldiers were killed in an attack on a small unit in the Kamdesh district of Nuristan province. The base was abandoned a week later and, according to the Asia Times, is now controlled by the Taliban. While McChrystal says he wants to get the troops out of “armored vehicles” and into the streets with the people, the U.S. will have to use patrols to maintain a presence outside of the cities. On occasion, that can get almost comedic. Take the convoy of Stryker light tanks that set out Oct. 12 from “Forward Operating Base Spin Boldak” in Khandar province for what was described as a “high-risk mission into uncharted territory.” The convoy was led by the new Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles designed to resist the insurgent’s weapon-of-choice in Afghanistan, roadside bombs. But the MRAP was designed for Iraq, which has lots of good roads. Since Afghanistan has virtually no roads, the MRAPs broke down. Without the MRAPs the Strykers could not move. The “high-risk” mission ending up hunkering down in the desert for the night and slogging home in the morning. They never saw an insurgent. Afterwards, Sergeant John Belajac remarked, “I can’t imagine what it is going to be like when it starts raining.” If you are looking for an Afghanistan War metaphor, the Spin Boldak convoy may be it. McChrystal argues that the current situation is “critical,” and that an escalation “will be decisive.” But as former Defense Intelligence Agency analyst A.J. Rossmiller says, the war is a stalemate. “The insurgency does not have the capability to defeat U.S. forces or depose Afghanistan’s central government, and…U.S. forces do not the ability to vanquish the insurgency.” While the purported goal of the war is denying Al-Qaeda a sanctuary, according to U.S. intelligence the organization has fewer than 100 fighters in the country. And further, the Taliban’s leader, Mullah Omar, pledges that his organization will not interfere with Afghanistan’s neighbors or the West, which suggests that the insurgents have been learning about diplomacy as well. The Afghanistan War can only be solved by sitting all the parties down and working out a political settlement. Since the Taliban have already made a seven-point peace proposal, that hardly seems an insurmountable task. Anything else is a dangerous illusion. Conn Hallinan can be reached at: ringoanne@sbcglobal.net
Inside the New Print Edition of Our Subscriber-Only Newsletter! Obama and Black America Ten months into Obama-time, the plight of black Americans is terrible. Yet overwhelmingly they rally behind the president. In a powerful report from the Deep South Kevin Alexander Gray asks the question: what should the black political agenda be? Mark Rudd counterposes “organizing” with “activism” and describes what it will take to build a movement. H. Bruce Franklin gives a chronology of the march into Afghanistan. Get your new edition today by subscribing online or calling 1-800-840-3683 Contributions to CounterPunch are tax-deductible. Click here to make a donation. If you find our site useful please: Subscribe Now! CounterPunch books and t-shirts make great presents.Order CounterPunch By Email For Only $35 a Year !
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Now Available from CounterPunch Books! Yellowstone Drift:
"Powerful and shocking ..
Waiting for
Lightning
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