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One of Aesop's fables recounts how once
upon a time Mount Ida, the birthplace of Zeus, experienced a
huge earthquake. "The earth commenced to tremble and shake-and
huge boulders flew off the mountain top into the sky," the
fable goes. "It seemed as if the mountain was about to give
birth." Then the sky blackened and the thunderous sound
became even worse. Finally, "an earthquake more violent
than any ever before it set everything in motion-and in one terrifying
moment, the mountain's peak split wide open!" Some people
got on their knees and began to pray. Others couldn't take their
eyes off the mountain, wondering how it would end.
Suddenly the roaring, the shaking,
and the shocks simply stopped. The whole region went silent.
And then, slowly, "and with hardly a whisper of sound out
of the huge cleft in the mountain peak there slowly emerged
a tiny little mouse."
I was reminded of Aesop's fable
about the mountain that birthed a mouse as I finished reading
the long-awaited-what an understatement-report from the bipartisan
Iraq Study Group (ISG), co-chaired by those two Washington fixtures,
ex-Secretary of State and chief and Bush family consigliere James
Baker and former Indiana Democratic Rep. Lee Hamilton, who also
co-chaired the 9/11 Commission. Working together with eight other
"formers," "exes," and "has beens"
(the kind of distinguished elderly gentlemen and one lady who
under the British system would have probably been taking naps
in the House of Lords), Baker and Hamilton were supposed to lead
the ISG in producing what one might have expected, based on the
suspense built up by the members of the chattering class, was
a report akin to a cure for cancer, or the discovery of life
on Mars, or the vanishing of Britney Spears and Paris Hilton.
Looking anew at Iraq with their "fresh eyes," as one
pundit described the perspective that panel members were reputed
to bring to the issue, they were supposed to devise a plan to
extricate the U.S. troops from Iraq, fix the mess in Mesopotamia,
secure Iraq's stability, and maintain U.S. hegemony in the Middle
East. A tall order if ever there was one. Baker and Hamilton
tried to lower public expectations by insisting that they weren't
going to offer a "magic bullet." But the hope was that
their bullet would hit close to the target.
And apropos of Mount Ida, Zeus,
and ancient Greek civilization, a favorite theatrical device
of many ancient Greek tragedians was the machine, "mechane,"
which served to hoist a god or goddess on stage when they were
supposed to arrive flying. This device gave origin to the phrase
deus ex machina (god from a machine), that is, the surprise intervention
of an unforeseen external factor that
changes the outcome of a tragic event. In the sad and depressing
story we refer to as the Iraq War, the ISG was expected to play
the role of the god from the machine, providing the opportunity
to change the tragic ending unfolding before us.
U.S. officials, lawmakers,
journalists, and citizens have discovered that they are acting
in a tragic farce, as highlighted by the foundering nature of
the war, the continued violence in Iraq, and the poor Republican
showing in the November 7 midterm elections. And they are hoping
that someone could show up with the ability to write a new denouement.
But unfortunately, when it comes to real world tragedies, there
are no stage props to save the story.
Nevertheless, there was an
element of historical drama in what took place in Washington
in the first week of December 2006. When the grand narrative
of the American Empire is written decades from now, it will describe
the preparation and the issuance of the Baker-Hamilton recommendations,
together with the replacement of Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld
with Robert Gates, as elements in a powerful political coup staged
by the members of the old American foreign policy establishment
against the neoconservative ideologues who had taken control
of the Bush administration's national security apparatus and
much of official Washington after 9/11.
Indeed, Baker, Hamilton, and
other ex-officials and lawmakers who were associated with the
more Realpolitik-oriented administrations of George Bush Senior
and Bill Clinton published on December 6 what Glenn Kessler and
Thomas Ricks of the Washington Post described as "the Realist
Manifesto." The ISG authored a scolding repudiation of the
diplomacy and national security policies that were drawn up by
neoconservatives like Paul Wolfowitz, Douglas Feith, Richard
Perle, and their allies in the administration, Congress, and
the media, and advanced by President George W. Bush, Vice President
Richard Cheney, and Rumsfeld. If Baker were a university professor
and the current White House occupant his student, Bush's term
paper, "What I've Done in Iraq in the Last Three Years,"
would have been graded with a big red "F." And in an
attached note, Professor Baker would have added: "Avoid
collaborating with your neocon pals. Next time, consult your
dad." While Bush Senior is not quoted in the reports, there
is little doubt he would have approved of most of the ISG's assessments
of Junior's performance, along with the group's 79 recommendations
to Junior.
The situation in Iraq is "grave
and deteriorating," the ISG's report concludes, and "the
ability of the United States to influence events within Iraq
is diminishing," it warns, basically accusing those responsible
for the policies in Iraq of incompetence, disorientation, and
even deceit. The report criticizes U.S. officials for underreporting
the number of attacks by Iraqi insurgents-now about 180 each
day-by failing to count individual Iraqi slayings and attacks
on U.S. troops that do not result in serious injuries. It notes
that on one July day the military counted 93 acts of violence;
the ISG's reexamination of the data found 1,100. "Good policy
is difficult to make when information is systematically collected
in a way that minimizes discrepancy with policy goals,"
the report states, underscoring one of its major points: "Our
leaders must be candid and forthright with the American people."
In terms of recommendations,
the ISG's report addresses diplomatic and military solutions
in Iraq, and it calls on the new Iraqi government headed by Nouri
al-Maliki, whom Bush described as the "right guy" for
Iraq, to shoulder more of the load of ending the violence and
restoring order. And by setting milestones that measure improvements
in Iraqi security, governance, and reconciliations, the ISG suggests
that Washington make it clear that its support will be reduced
if the milestones are not met. The recommendations also call
for revamping the number of U.S. troops providing training to
the Iraqi military in the short term from about 4,000 to as many
as 20,000, with the goal of withdrawing most of the U.S. combat
troops by early 2008.
Though it intended to offer
a rescue plan for the failing U.S. military mission in Iraq,
the ISG delivered a broader rebuke of the Bush administration's
policies there and throughout the Middle East, including the
goal of spreading democracy. More specifically, the ISG suggests
that the time has come to set realistic goals for U.S. Mideast
strategy and to launch a new "diplomatic offensive."
Notably, the study group's chief recommendation is that Bush
pursue a diplomatic dialogue with Syria and Iran, countries that
border Iraq and have been criticized by the administration for
aiding violence there. "The United States should embark
on a robust diplomatic effort to establish an international support
structure intended to stabilize Iraq and ease tensions in other
countries in the region," the report states. "This
support structure should include every country that has an interest
in averting a chaotic Iraq, including all of Iraq's neighbors-Iran
and Syria among them."
In addition to calling for
a dialogue with Tehran and Damascus, including inviting them
to take part in an "Iraq International Support Group,"
the ISG urges the Bush administration to revive the Israeli-Palestinian
peace process and negotiations between Israel and Syria that
would lead to Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights in exchange
for peace with Damascus. "The United States will not be
able to achieve its goals in the Middle East unless the United
States deals directly with the Arab-Israeli conflict," the
report notes.
These and other elements in
the Realist Manifesto make a lot of geostrategic sense. They
might have worked if implemented in the immediate aftermath of
the ousting of Saddam Hussein in 2003. At the time, Iran expressed
a willingness to cooperate with the United States in stabilizing
Iraq (in the same way it helped the Americans in Afghanistan
following the ouster of the Taliban regime). Syria was signaling
its desire to join the pro-American camp in the Middle East,
and the Palestinian Authority was still under the control of
the moderate Fatah group. Since then, the political and strategic
conditions in the Middle East have changed dramatically, as the
U.S. policies in Iraq and the Middle East helped to strengthen
the power of Iran and its Shiites allies in Iraq and Lebanon
and to cement its ties to Syria, while the radical Islamist Hamas
came to power in Palestine. Hence, it is doubtful that a more
assertive Iran has any incentive to make a deal with a weakened
United States that seems to be losing its credibility in Iraq
(especially among the Shiite parties), in Lebanon (where Hezbollah
seems to be gaining power), as well as in Israel/Palestine. And
there is certainly no indication that Bush is even willing to
adopt the notion of a "diplomatic offensive." Nor is
there any sign that either the administration or Congress would
be willing to exert diplomatic pressure on Israel two years before
critical U.S. presidential and congressional elections. In short,
the Realist Manifesto is based on some unrealistic assumptions.
Moreover, most military analysts
seem to agree that the U.S. military will not be able to train
the Iraqi military and security forces in two years, as the ISG
proposes, and many experts on Iraq are doubtful that the Iraqi
government will succeed in embracing the set of improvements
in security, governance, and reconciliation by 2008, as the report
suggests. Cynics might argue that Baker, Hamilton, and colleagues
are creating the political conditions under which Iraq can be
blamed for the mess and for the inevitable withdrawal of U.S.
troops.
In the best-case scenario,
the ISG report would provide the Bush administration and Congress
with the outlines for a strategy of gradual military disengagement
from Iraq that will permit Washington to cut its losses while
consolidating its influence in the Middle East through alliances
with the moderate Arab states (perhaps including Syria), Turkey,
and Israel-and not to mention containing Iran. Such a scenario
would fit very much with the "Empire Lite" approach
favored by the U.S. foreign policy establishment that wants Washington
to maintain its Mideast hegemony through indirect military influence
(via military bases in the Persian Gulf) and more direct diplomatic
engagement. But a realist would point out that it's not clear
whether Washington has the power or the will to advance even
a low-cost strategy like the one proposed by the ISG. The Realist
Insurgency may have come too late.
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unforeseen external factor that
changes the outcome of a tragic event. In the sad and depressing
story we refer to as the Iraq War, the ISG was expected to play
the role of the god from the machine, providing the opportunity
to change the tragic ending unfolding before us. 
