|
CounterPunch
October
14, 2002
Islamic
West Asia and US Foreign Policy:
A Tale of Strategic Self-Delusion
by HAROLD A. GOULD
The mounting threat of an impending unilateral
American crusade against Iraq has understandably and rightly
generated a torrent of discussion, speculation and analysis about
whether there is really any justification for such a radical
undertaking at this point in time.
It is well known where the Bush administration
stands. The hawk faction in the White House and the Pentagon
are gung ho for going ahead with an attack, and purportedly have
only been deterred from putting the American military machine
in motion by the magnitude of dissent that has arisen both within
the United States and in the international community. President
Bush and his peripatetic revisionist cold warriors have so far
been unable to drum up enough support for their enterprise to
confer legitimacy upon it, especially in any of the quarters
which a decade ago the father was able to summons.
The principle question persistently being
raised by the critics of waging war with Iraq is whether that
country's military capabilities (both in terms of conventional
weaponry and WMDs) really constitute a dire enough threat to
US security either at home or abroad. to warrant resort to such
extreme measures.
And there is an additional (perhaps the
primary) concern. Based upon past performance, there is a paucity
of evidence to show that United States diplomacy can be counted
on to get things right once the fighting is over. This certainly
has not been the case in the aftermath of previous sorties into
the affairs of Islamic West Asia..
There are five instances over the past
three decades where the United States responded politically on
a major scale to perceived threats to American interests in Islamic
West Asia. All yielded dubious results. These are: (1) Pakistan,
both during the Cold War and in the post-Cold War era that followed,
(2) the Iran-Iraq war during the 1970s/80s, (3) Afghanistan #1
, i.e., the Soviet invasion of the 1980s, (4) the Gulf War at
the beginning of the 1990s, and (5) Afghanistan #2, i.e., the
rise and fall of the Taliban/Al Qaeda. We will turn to these
matters presently. With regard to the immediate issue of waging
war on Iraq, it has been widely suggested that serious doubts
exist as to whether its cost would be worth the investment in
terms of treasure and human life. Experts contend that it would
require the commitment of a quarter million American soldiers.
It would undoubtedly produce hundreds of American casualties,
and thousands of civilian deaths-- so-called "collateral
damage.". It would disrupt the economies and the political
stability of Islamic West Asia. It would spike global petroleum
prices at a time when the economies of most industrial states
around the world (including the American) are already weakened
by recession. It would further exacerbate the pervasive resentment
toward the United States that already prevails throughout Islamic
West Asia.
And all this without a guarantee that
much of anything would be gained that could not be accomplished
on a far less lethal scale by a UN inspection regimen.
Apart from this, however, let us now
consider how previous excursions into Islamic West Asian affairs
have fared for the United States. Going all the way back to the
origins of the Cold War, there is the case of the recruitment
of Pakistan into the alliance systems (CENTO and SEATO) that
were supposed to contain Communism and contribute to political
stability both in Islamic West Asia and South Asia. This led
to the opposite result because of a failure to recognize the
incendiary implications of Pakistan's communal antipathies toward
India, and the anti-democratic forces that were in play in post-Independence
Pakistani politics. Building up the Pakistani military machine
in the name of "containment" consequently ignited an
arms race in the Subcontinent, which by strengthening the Pakistani
officer corp's political hand, helped to facilitate a succession
of four military dictatorships in Pakistan. This resulted in
three major intra-regional wars (1948,1965, 1971), to a pattern
of perpetual saber-rattling between India and Pakistan, a nuclear
arms race on the subcontinent, and since 1990, to state-sponsored
terrorism against the people of Kashmir which continues as we
speak. At the same time, Pakistan's intraregional obsessions
rendered her virtually useless to the strategic purposes for
which she was recruited into the CENTO and SEATO security structures.
In the Iran-Iraq war during the 1980s,
the Reagan administration, in its panicky reaction to the Iranian
revolution, rendered significant assistance to Saddam Husain's
aggression against his radical Islamic neighbor and in this sense
helped lay the foundations for the Frankensteinian monster which
the Iraqi dictator subsequently became.
The US and the West's role generally
in building up Saddam has been extensively documented by a number
of authors -- e.g., Kenneth R. Timmerman, "The Death Lobby:
How the West Armed Iraq." Kurt Nimmo, writing in Counterpunch,
points out that the Reagan administration was far from negatively
disposed toward Saddam as long as he was deemed useful to US
interests. "George Bush [Sr.]... put [his] hatred [of Saddam]
aside in the name of statecraft...War and death make for good
business." Former Reagan official, Howard Teicher, testified
before the US Congress in 1995 that the US "actively supported
the Iraqi war effort by supplying billions of dollars of credits,
by providing US military advice to the Iraqis, and closely monitoring
third country arms sales," to make sure their "ally'
got the wherewithal needed to stay the course with Iran.
The US role in Afghanistan #1 is virtually
a legendary example of how strategic blunders can snatch defeat
from the jaws of victory. In the process of checkmating the Soviet
invasion, American political naivete, and sloth, paved the way
for the rise of both the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. By walking away
from the hard tasks of economic reconstruction and nation re-building
that should have followed military victory, American remiss played
a decisive role in creating the power vacuum into which the deadly
votaries of radical Islamism ineluctably flowed. September 11
was the ultimate price to be paid for this.
The Gulf War failure is as legendary
as is Afghanistan #1. At the moment the Coalition had pushed
Saddam Husain to the brink of political oblivion, they let him
off the hook, primarily (despite official protestations to the
contrary) because the Bush Sr. administration remained obsessed
with the mistaken, belief that the "stability" provided
by a military dictatorship (even under Saddam) was more in America's
interest than coping with the "messy" complications
associated with promoting pluralism and democratic institutions.
Afghanistan #2 has all the earmarks of
a repeat of Afghanistan #!. The Bush Jr. administration has essentially
lallygagged on all the assurances given to Hamid Karzai that
the rehabilitation and revitalization of post-Taliban Afghanistan
would be Priority Number One, for the expressed reason that the
mistakes made vis-a-vis Afghanistan #1 must not be repeated.
Yet virtually nothing has been or is being done beyond sporadic
military actions against increasingly dispersed, elusive and
irrelevant formations of Taliban and Al-Qaeda fighters. Meanwhile,
strategic vision has fallen by the wayside. Afghanistan is gradually
sliding back toward the patterns of political miasma and economic
stagnation which invited political disaster in the first place.
While this is happening, Mr. Bush and
his coterie of hawks have already diverted themselves toward
still another quixotic adventure in Islamic West Asia: the Iraq
attack!
Faced with the outcomes achieved by the
previous five, one is obliged to ask what hope there is for a
favorable outcome of this one. Three of them (the Pakistan alliance,
support for Saddam in the Iran-Iraq war, and the Gulf War) vitalized
military dictatorships which have for years threatened the peace
and stability of the region. Two (Afghanistan #1 and Afghanistan
#2) produced anarchic breeding grounds for Islamist-driven terrorism
and human rights disasters,
In the face of such a shoddy record,
it would seem appropriate for the Bush administration and indeed
the American foreign policy establishment generally to comprehensively
reexamine the premises of their strategic orientation to Islamic
West Asia. Before the currently authorized adventure is launched,
Washington should consider the most salient lessons to be learned
from its five predecessors. First, the policy of cynically propping
up and manipulating military dictators in this region in the
name of realpolitik rather than following the harder road of
sedulously promoting the evolution of democratic institutions
has consistently been ruinous, as the experience with Saddam
Husain and the Pakistani generals painfully attest. Second, if
military interventions are initiated, they must not be allowed
to leave social and political vacuums in their wake, as was the
case with Afghanistan #1 and is the case with Afghanistan #2.
Finally, integrity and cultural sensitivity still have a significant
part to play in winning hearts and minds in Islamic West Asia,
as the current public alienation with the United States throughout
the region over its record of duplicity and historical ignorance
demonstrates.
Harold Gould
is a Visiting Scholar in the Center for South Asian Studies at
the University of Virginia. He can be reached at: 102062.477@compuserve.com
Yesterday's
Features
Alexander Cockburn
Vindication
Through Violence:
Jimmy Carter and the DC Sniper
Robert Jensen
The American
Political Paradox:
More Freedom, Less Democracy
Ben Tripp
Congratulations! It's a War!
Susan Davis
Proverbial
Wisdom:
Red!
David Krieger
A Bleak Day for America
Anis Shivani
George W. in Therapy
Ken Paff
Where Do Hoffa's Tactics Belong in a Mob-Free Teamsters?
Carol Norris
The Politics of Fear
Elaine Cassel
The Lynne Stewart Case:
When Representing an Accused Terrorist Can Land a Lawyer in Jail
Musa AlShaer
Scenes
from an Occupied Wedding
Anthony Gancarski
Concerned Citizen: a serialized
novel (Episode 3)
M. Shahid Alam
I Will Fight Your Enemies
New
Print Edition of CounterPunch Available Exclusively
to Subscribers:
- How to Change the Subject: Corporate Scandal and Pension
Reform as Weapons Against Warmongering;
- Padilla's Predecessor: Court Ruling Cites 1904 War
Against Mining Union;
- Adios Hitchens: the Dorian Gray of Our Time;
- Object of Suspicion: How the FBI Watched Janis Ian
From Birth;
- First Carter, Then Clinton,
Now Sen. John Edwards:
Another "New South" Slimeball;
- Corporate Crooks: Nature or Nurture?
Remember, the CounterPunch website is
supported exclusively by subscribers to our newsletter. Our worldwide
web audience is soaring , with about seven million hits a month
now. This is inspiring, but the work involved also compels us
to remind you more urgently than ever to subscribe and/or make
a (tax deductible) donation if you can afford it. If you find our site useful please: Subscribe
Now!
Or Call Toll Free 1 800 840 3683
home / subscribe
/ about us
/ books
/ archives
/ search
/ links
/
|
October 9,
2002
Hesham Hassaballa
Here
We Go Again:
Rev. Falwell's Slurs
Ann Pettifer
Brainwashing
in America
Anita Ramasatry
Airline Security Run Amok
Josh Frank
Iraq: It's
About Globalization
Rep. Cynthia
McKinney
Iraq:
the Double Standard
Robert Jensen
Bush's
Illogical War Speech
David Vest
Dylan in
Eugene
October 4,
2002
Ahmad Faruqui
The Anvil
of War and the Ailing American Economy
Norman Madarasz
The
Truth and Violence
of a Symbolic Act
William Hughes
Political
Show Trial for
Marwan Barghouti
Ron Jacobs
The Struggle
Against
Another Oil War
Sen. Robert
Byrd
Bush War
Plan:
Blind and Improvident
Michael Schwalbe
The
Costs of American Privilege
Ralph Nader
Holding
Politicians' Feet to the Fire on Corporate Crime
Robert Buzzanco
Pacifica
Caves in to Zionist Smear Campaign
October 3,
2002
Gary Leupp
Talking
to Your Kids About Fascism
Will Youmans
The New
Anti-Apartheid Movement: The Campaign to Divest from Israel
Deb Reich
Report from a Mad World
Todd Chretien & Sue Sandlin
"It's All About Power on the
Docks"
Kurt Nimmo
Poetry
as Treason
Amiri Baraka
Somebody
Blew Up America
Alexander
Cockburn
October Surprises
October 2,
2002
Carol Wolman,
MD
Is the
President Nuts?
Diagnosing Dubya
Jeffrey St.
Clair
Something
Rotten in Klamath
Resources:
100s of Links
About 9/11
CounterPunch:
Complete
Coverage of 9/11 and Its Aftermath
Five
Days That
Shook The World:
Seattle and Beyond
By
Alexander Cockburn
and Jeffrey St. Clair
Photos by Allan Sekula
(Click Here to Order from CounterPunch
Online at 20% Off Amazon.com's price!)
Read
Whiteout and Find Out
How the CIA's Backing of the Mujahideen Created the World's Most
Robust Heroin Market and Helped to Finance the Rise of the Taliban
and Osama bin Laden
Whiteout:
CIA, Drugs & the
Press
by Alexander
Cockburn
and Jeffrey St. Clair
|