|
Recent
Stories
April
7, 2003
David
N. Gibbs
Spying, Secrecy and the University:
The CIA is Back on Campus
Harry Browne
War and Peace Summit a Royal Farce
Gideon
Levy
America is Not a Role Model
Diane
Christian
A Scene from an Obscene War
Jules
Rabin
Remembering Deir Yassin
James Davis
Oddsmaking in Dublin: Will Bush
Shake Gerry's Hand?
Robert
Fisk
The Twisted Language of War
Patrick
Cockburn
Slaughter on the Road to Dibagah
John
Mackay
War and Art
Seth Sandronsky
Wars and the Color Line
Steve
Perry
War Web Log 4/7
April
5, 2003
Alexander
Cockburn
The Iraqi Humanitarian Relief is
in Shambles
Anne
Gwynne
A Drowning in Salem
Uri
Avnery
Roadmap to Nowhere
Chris
Floyd
Hell for Leather: Bombs, Bullets, Bibles and Bush
William
Cook
Would You Have Sent Your Son (or Daughter) Off to War If...
Gila
Svirsky
A Busy Day for Bulldozers
Mike Ferner
Back from Baghdad: What Next for the Peace Movement?
Joanne
Mariner
Civilian Deaths and Official Apologies
John Stanton
Bush Takes His Killing Orders
from the Lord
Romi
Mahajan
Learning to Count the Dead
Aluf Benn
After Iraq, US Vows to Deal with
Other Mideast Regimes
Mary
Ellen Peterson
Gay Marine Refuses to Fight
William
MacDougall
Country Music and the Crimes of Patriotism
Ron
Jacobs
War and Occupation
Bernie
Pattison
Aborigines and the Different God
Mark
Engler
Iraq War as Arms Expo
Adam Engel
Li'l Box of Love: a Novelini
Poets'
Basement
Tripp, Albert, Katz
Jeffrey
St. Clair
Flesh and Its Discontents: the Paintings of Lucian Freud
Norman
Madarasz
Canada and the War
April
4, 2003
Anthony
Gancarski
Colin Powell's Shame
John
Chuckman
Was Einstein Right About Israel?
David
Krieger
The Meaning of Victory
Tom
Gorman
The Mantra of the Troops: Support
or Treason?
Adam
Federman
The Absence of War
Vijay
Prashad
There Are No More Arguments
Tom
Stephens
The End of the Innocence
Mickey
Z.
Makes Me Sic (Sic): Copy Editing
Bush Speak
Pierre
Tristam
War Coverage: a Dishonest Reality
Show
Hammond
Guthrie
The Deadly Mihrab
Steve
Perry
War Web Log 04/04
April
3, 2003
Uri
Avnery
A Crooked Mirror: Presstitution and
the Theater of Operations
David
Vest
Can You Hear the Silence?
Anthony
Gancarski
Colin Powell Telemarketer
David
Lindorff
Takoma: the Dolphin Who Refused
to Fight
Michael
Roberts
War, Debts and Deficits
Ramzy
Baroud
Now That Iraqis Are Being Killed Is Israel Any More Secure?
Jo Wilding
From Baghdad with Tears
Anton
Antonowicz
Cluster Bombs on Babylon
Alison
Weir
Israel, We Won't Forget Rachel Corrie
Bruce
Jackson
Hating Wolf Blitzer's Voice
Eliot Katz
War's First Week
Steve
Perry
War Web Log 04/03
Hot Stories
Paul de Rooij
Arrogant
Propaganda
Gore Vidal
The
Erosion of the American Dream
Francis Boyle
Impeach
Bush: A Draft Resolution
Click Here
for More Stories.
Burn Your Sweatshop Clothes!
Buy Union Made Apparel!
|
April 7,
2003
Spying, Secrecy and
the University
The CIA is Back
on Campus
By DAVID N. GIBBS
The prospect of domination of the nation's
scholars by Federal employment, project allocations, and the
power of money is ever present--and is gravely to be regarded.
Dwight D. Eisenhower 1
The aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist
attack has reignited a longstanding debate about whether academics
should work for the intelligence services, especially the CIA.
In the new atmosphere of patriotic commitment, American academics
have been called upon to serve in the war against terrorism--especially
by serving as consultants to the Agency. In this article I will
argue against collaboration between universities and intelligence
agencies; and I will show that the practice is incompatible with
reasonable academic norms, especially in the social sciences.
The new collaboration between academics
and the intelligence agencies has elicited little debate or negative
comment. On the contrary, such collaboration has been endorsed
across the ideological spectrum. In November 2002, the liberal
American Prospect published an article by Chris Mooney
entitled: "Good Company: Its Time for Academics and the
CIA to Work Together. Again."2 To the best of my knowledge,
there has been no extended response to the Mooney article in
The American Prospect or in any other publication.
While pundits never tire of the cliché
that American universities are dominated by leftist faculty,
who are hostile toward the objectives of established foreign
policies, the reality is altogether different: The CIA has become
"a growing force on campus," according to a recent
article in the Wall Street Journal. The "Agency finds
it needs experts from academia, and colleges pressed for cash
like the revenue." Longstanding academic inhibitions about
being publicly associated with the CIA have largely disappeared:
In 2002, former CIA Director Robert Gates became president of
Texas A & M University, while the new president of Arizona
State University, Michael Crow was vice-chairman of the Agency's
venture capital arm, In-Q-Tel Inc. Current CIA Director George
Tenet delivered the commencement address at the Rochester Institute
of Technology.3 The CIA has created a special scholarship program,
for graduate students able and willing to obtain security clearances.
According to the London Guardian, "the primary purpose
of the program is to promote disciplines that would be of use
to intelligence agencies."4 And throughout the country,
academics in several disciplines are undertaking research (often
secret) for the CIA.
To be sure, such consultation has a long
history, extending back to the beginning of the Cold War. During
the 1950s, the CIA and military intelligence were among the main
sources of funding for the social sciences, having supported
such institutions as the Columbia's Russian Research Institute,
Harvard's Russian Research Center, and MIT's Center for International
Studies. Outside the campus setting, major research foundations,
including the Ford Foundation and the Asia Foundation, were closely
integrated with the Agency. The field of political communications
was transformed during the early Cold War by large-scale U.S.
government funding, in which leading academics helped intelligence
agencies to develop modern techniques of propaganda and psychological
warfare.
Research on Third World development and
counterinsurgency techniques were other fruitful areas of investigation.5
The field of political science appears to have been at the forefront
of such CIA collaboration, and some of the resulting activities
strained the limits of academic propriety. Noam Chomsky provides
the following recollection of his experiences at MIT:
Around 1960, the Political Science Department
separated off from the Economics Department. And at that time
it was openly funded by the CIA; it was not even a secret...
In the mid-1960s, it stopped being publicly funded by the Central
Intelligence Agency, but it was still directly involved in activities
that were scandalous. The Political Science Department was so
far as I know the only department on campus which had closed,
secret seminars. I was once invited to talk to one, which is
how I learned about it. They had a villa in Saigon where students
were working on pacification projects for their doctoral dissertations.6
In a carrot and stick strategy, these
activities were combined with rigorous scrutiny of dissident
professors and, in the words of historian Bruce Cumings: "It
is only a bit of an exaggeration to say that for those scholars
studying enemy countries, either they consulted with the government
or they risked being investigated by the FBI."7 The CIA
also developed remarkably close ties to the field of journalism
and, during the period 1947-77, some 400 American journalists
"secretly carried out assignments" for the Agency,
according to a classic investigative study by Carl Bernstein.
Some 200 of these journalists signed secrecy agreements or employment
contracts with the CIA. "By far the most valuable of these
associations, according to CIA officials, have been with the
New York Times, CBS, and Time Inc."8 Overseas, U.S.
intelligence officers funded academics and writers through a
series of front organizations and publications, coordinated by
the CIA-controlled Congress for Cultural Freedom.
During the 1970s, CIA-academic ties suffered
a blow, in light of the general atmosphere of skepticism toward
U.S. foreign policy associated with the Vietnam war and the massive
student-led opposition to that war. The Agency's image also was
damaged during hearings by a special U.S. Senate committee, chaired
by Senator Frank Church, in 1975. The "Church Committee,"
as it was known, revealed extensive CIA misdeeds, such as efforts
to assassinate Fidel Castro and Patrice Lumumba, as well as extensive
Agency involvement in the overthrow of President Salvador Allende
in Chile. For an extended period, any academic association with
the Agency was viewed as odious. In reality, the academic-CIA
association was not really terminated, but was carried on with
greater discretion.
During the late 1990s (even before the
attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon), the CIA
made a special effort to increase its influence in the academy.
A November 2000 article in Lingua Franca states that since
1996, the CIA has made public outreach a "top priority and
targets academia in particular. According to experts on U.S.
intelligence, the strategy has worked." The article notes
that highly regarded academics--including Columbia's Robert Jervis,
recent president of the American Political Science Association
and Harvard's Joseph S. Nye--worked for the CIA. Yale's H. Bradford
Westerfield also states: "There's a great deal of actually
open consultation and there's a lot more semi-open, broadly acknowledged
consultation."9 The pace of collaboration accelerated after
September 11.
So what is the objection? The first problem
is that in a democratic society, academia is supposed to have
a measure of independence from the state. Professors, especially
in the social sciences must be able to present critical analyses
of official policy; close relationships with the intelligence
services severely compromise the potential for such criticism.
And second problem is the CIA's unsavory
history. One of the major functions of the Agency has been covert
operations, which includes such practices as the overthrow of
governments, assassination of foreign leaders, and involvement
in massive human rights abuses. One well-documented example of
covert operations was the 1965 coup in Indonesia, in which the
CIA helped overthrow a left-leaning, neutralist government, led
by Sukarno, a major figure in the non-aligned movement. The Indonesian
case was one of the major acts of mass killing during the Cold
War era--substantially larger than those that occurred in Bosnia-Herzegovina
or Kosovo--though it is largely a forgotten event.
During and shortly after this coup, there
was a massive reign of terror against the Indonesian Communist
Party, left-wing organizations, and the families and friends
of leftist figures. Estimates of the death toll have ranged from
250,000 to 1,000,000. In 1984, long after the events took place,
former CIA officer Ralph McGehee stated: "The CIA prepared
a study of the 1965 Indonesian operation that described what
the Agency did there. I happened to have been custodian of that
study for a time, and I know the specific steps the Agency took
to create the conditions that led to the massacre of at least
half a million Indonesians." 10 More recent information,
published in 1990, revealed that CIA and U.S. embassy officials
in Jakarta helped draw up a "hit list" of Indonesians
targeted for elimination, and passed on this information to the
Indonesian military, a point that former US officials have openly
admitted. One U.S. diplomat, associated with the covert program,
said the hit list was necessary during the Cold War: "I
probably have a lot of blood on my hands, but that's not all
bad."11
The CIA also conducted some rather unpleasant
operations within the United States. We are all familiar with
the extensive repression that characterized communist states
during and even after the Cold War, including the abuse of the
psychiatric profession to punish dissidents.
Unfortunately, the United States engaged
in activities that were just as shocking, and the CIA was one
of the principal perpetrators. Consider MKULTRA, a CIA operation
during the 1950s and 1960s, which used patients in psychiatric
hospitals and other unwitting subjects to develop mind control
techniques. This vast operation--authorized by CIA Director Allen
Dulles--was vast in scope and entailed research at dozens of
universities, hospitals, and other institutions in the United
States, and also in Canada. Some of the most distinguished figures
in psychiatry participated in MKULTRA, including the Ewan Cameron,
who served as president of the American Psychiatric Association.
In one set of experiments, test subjects
were administered electro-convulsive treatments at levels that
exceeded the normal therapeutic parameters. Other experiments
involved sensory deprivation, continual playing of recorded voices,
and a variety of drugs including (most famously) LSD. Sometimes,
these techniques were used in combination. The experiments often
reduced test subjects to such degenerated states that they became
semi-comatose, losing the ability to eat, walk, or relieve themselves
without assistance. Many experiments were done without anything
that could be called informed consent and without the test subjects
having any real understanding of what was taking place. The intent
was to break down the test subjects' resistance through massive
over-stimulation, in order to make them more pliable; these activities
were to yield new techniques of interrogation for CIA and military
field operatives. There is also evidence that the Agency sought
the means to "program" people to perform special tasks,
such as assassination. (It is surely ironic that during the time
that the CIA was undertaking these experiments, the 1963 movie
The Manchurian Candidate provided a fictionalized account
of such experiments; in the movie the perpetrator of these crimes
was not the CIA, but our Cold War enemy, the Soviet Union.)
These bizarre activities produced little
of real value to the Agency. However they did cause brain damage
and serious personality disorders in some test subjects. The
full details of MKULTRA may never be known since the CIA (understandably
enough) destroyed most of its documents pertaining to the operation.12
But why focus on the distant past? Covert
operations have a contemporary significance. As this article
is being written, the United States is pursuing a war with the
Baathist regime headed by Saddam Hussein in Iraq. This enemy
is at least partly the product of past covert operations: In
a series of coups in 1963 and 1968, the CIA helped the Baathists
consolidate power. British journalists Andrew and Patrick Cockburn
provide this account of the 1963 takeover:
it was the CIA's favorite coup. "We
really had the t's crossed on what was happening," James
Critchfield, then head of the CIA in the Middle East told us.
"We regarded it as a great victory." Iraqi participants
later confirmed American involvement. "We came to power
on a CIA train," admitted Ali Saleh Sa'adi, the Baath Party
general secretary, who was about to institute an unprecedented
reign of terror.13
Former National Security Council staffer
Roger Morris also notes CIA complicity in the Baath Party's earliest
acts of violence in 1963: "Using lists of suspected Communists
and other leftists provided by the CIA, the Baathists systematically
murdered untold numbers."14 The takeover led to the rapid
assent of Hussein himself, who seized full power in a later coup.
A significant number of the enemies the
United States now faces constitute "blowback" (as Chalmers
Johnson has argued) from past CIA operations. Osama bin Laden
was according to Le Monde "recruited by the CIA in
1979" to assist in the Jihad against communism in Afghanistan.
During the 1980s, Bin Laden worked along the Pakistani frontier
with Afghanistan, where he helped funnel aid to the Mujahiddin
guerrillas who were battling the Soviets and Afghan communists.
Jane's Intelligence Review notes that Bin Laden "worked
in close association with U.S. agents." Bin Laden also is
known to have worked closely with Gulbadin Hekmatyar, who as
also the CIA's most favored Mujahiddin commander. In raising
money for the guerrillas, Bin Laden used the Bank for Credit
and Commerce International--which was also the bank that the
CIA used to finance many of its covert operations.15
It is also very likely that Al Qaeda
contains personnel who had previously received CIA-furnished
training, support, and armaments--which include surface to air
missiles. These missiles were openly and publicly supplied to
the guerrillas; this was not even covert.
In light of the recent fears regarding
anti-aircraft missiles and the associated dangers posed to civil
aviation, it is worth recalling the following exchange that appeared
on Cable News Network (CNN) in 1994, between Peter Arnett and
Brigadier General Mohammed Yousaf (retired) of the Pakistani
military:
Arnett: Another legacy of the war --
the Stinger missiles given to the Afghan resistance by the CIA.
The world's most effective anti-aircraft missile, the Stinger
turned the tide of the war against the Soviets. It can also bring
down a commercial airliner?
Gen. Yousaf: Certainly. It can bring
down any airliner.16
Not only did the Agency fail to prevent
the September 11 attacks; on the contrary, it helped to create
the perpetrators of these attacks. It may also have furnished
the necessary training and equipment for new attacks.
One of the most common justifications
for academic collaboration with the CIA is the terrorist danger.
An augmented role for the Agency is seen as part of the solution
to this problem, and this point is frequently cited. One faculty
member at the Rochester Institute of Technology recently defended
collaboration this way: "by and large, these CIA guys are
people whose primary goal is to keep the rest of us safe."17
Such attitudes seem extraordinarily naïve, given the Agency's
past support for Bin Laden and the Baath Party of Iraq.
The fact that the CIA has a considerable
amount of blood on its hands is a sufficient reason that academics
should not become involved with its activities. There are additional
reasons as well. The CIA engages in propaganda practices that
are fundamentally incompatible with academic norms of objective
analysis. It is true that all government agencies engage in public
relations and propaganda to some degree, but there is a key distinction
here: The CIA is an espionage agency, and disseminating
propaganda is one of its central functions. The Agency's output
in this area has indeed been prodigious. According to U.S. Senate
document, "Well over a thousand books were produced, subsidized,
or sponsored by the CIA before the end of 1967." In some
cases, the CIA simply provided financial support toward a book's
publication (often without the author's knowledge); in others,
Agency personnel worked directly with the author and influenced
the actual content of the book. In the latter cases, the CIA
sought to control the author to a considerable degree. According
to an Agency propaganda specialist, the CIA wished to "make
sure the actual manuscript will correspond with our operational
and propagandistic intentions."18
The CIA has never released a title list
of the one thousand (or more) books it helped to publish, in
its elaborate propaganda efforts. However, there can be no doubt
that academics participated in some of these CIA publishing activities.
In addition, there is the problem of self censorship: During
the 1950s, a common practice at MIT's Center for International
Studies was for researchers to publish a classified study on
a specific topic, and then to publish a "sanitized"
version of the same study, as a regular academic book study for
public use.19 To the best of my knowledge, the book publications
that resulted from this process never acknowledged CIA support,
nor did they acknowledge that the publication had omitted information.
Particularly troubling is the CIA's use
of "black" propaganda, a common intelligence practice
in which deliberately false information is released, and the
true origin of the disinformation is obscured. One example of
black propaganda is The Penkovsky Papers, a 1965
book that purported to be the published diary of a Soviet military
officer. The book portrayed the Soviet system in general and
the Soviet intelligence services in particular in a most unflattering
light. As it turns out, the CIA actually wrote the book. Former
CIA officer Victor Marchetti wrote: "The Penkovsky
Papers was a phony story. We wrote the book in the CIA."20
More recently, the CIA helped coordinate a massive black propaganda
operation during the 1980s, to influence U.S. and world opinion
against the Nicaraguan government and other adversaries in Central
America.21 Overall, the propaganda activities of the CIA, which
are part of its normal operations, are contrary to and deeply
corrosive of some of the most basic standards of academic integrity.
Another problem with the Agency is its
extreme secretiveness and lack of public accountability. Contrary
to popular misperceptions, this proclivity toward secrecy has
not changed substantially with the end of the Cold War. Efforts
by researchers to obtain documentation on covert operations have
largely been unavailing, even for operations that occurred many
decades ago. In 1997, University of Kentucky historian George
C. Herring wrote a caustic account of his experiences as a member
of the CIA's Historical Advisory Committee, which is supposed
to provide independent advice and supervision for the Agency's
declassification activities. Herring viewed his role this way:
"Now I'm from Kentucky, and I'm not supposed to be swift,
but it didn't take too long even for me to realize that I was
being used to cover the Agency's ass while having no influence."22
The Agency's unwillingness to release information suggests that
it has a great deal to hide. And of course, recent changes associated
with the war on terrorism will increase secrecy even further.
This secretiveness extends to the CIA's
involvement with the academy. Consider the Agency's Officer in
Residence Program, which sends intelligence officers to teach
at selected universities for a semester or two. The Agency likes
to say that this program is completely public and open: "there
is nothing clandestine about an officer's assignment as a visiting
faculty member," according to a CIA description of the program.23
Yet, when a researcher filed a Freedom of Information Act letter,
asking for a list of participants in the program, the universities
with which they were affiliated, and the dates of affiliation,
the request was denied.24
Overall, the Agency's secretiveness is
unsurprising. Covert operations have enabled the United States
to undertake "dirty" actions that advance specified
policy objectives, without the need to pay the price, in terms
of loss of face. Fortunately, secrecy efforts are not always
successful, and we have excellent documentation pertaining to
dozens of these operations, based on such sources as Senate hearings,
investigative reports in the New York Times and other
papers, and memoirs and public statements by retired intelligence
officers. Nevertheless, it is clear that the CIA still has much
to hide. And the continuing proclivity toward secrecy poses a
special problem for scholarship, which is supposed to be committed
to open inquiry and research.
A final danger is that academic collaboration
with the CIA will present a conflict of interest, and this danger
is especially serious for social scientists who specialize in
the study of international relations. The CIA is after all a
major player in many of the international conflicts that social
scientists must study. Working for the CIA--especially if it
is done clandestinely--can compromise researchers' independence.
This objective was recently suggested by CIA official John Phillips,
in an interview with the Wall Street Journal. His choice
of words is revealing: "We don't want to turn [academics]
into spies... We want to capture them intellectually."25
Phillips' comments referred to academics in the "hard"
sciences, but there is no reason to assume that the Agency's
objectives are any different in the social sciences.
The possibility that academics have been
intellectually captured by an agency of the state is disturbing.
However, this process was well established during the Cold War.
Consider the case of Professor Conyers Reed, who served as president
of the American Historical Association. In his 1949 presidential
address, Professor Reed made the following statements:
Discipline is the essential prerequisite
of every effective army whether it marches under the Stars and
Stripes or under the Hammer and Sickle... Total war, whether
it be hot or cold, enlists everyone and calls upon everyone to
assume his part. The historian is no freer from this obligation
than the physicist... This sounds like the advocacy of one form
of social control as against another. In short, it is.26
The attitudes expressed above are surely
remarkable for a prominent academic working in a democratic society.
Recent work in political science has
been remarkably flattering to the CIA, since it omits virtually
any mention of the Agency's most controversial activities. I
surveyed the five top journals in political science that specialize
in international relations during the period 1991-2000.27 I did
not find a single article in any of these journals that focused
on CIA covert operations. Mentions of covert operations were
very rare and, when they occurred at all, they were confined
to a few sentences or a footnote. In effect, an entire category
of international conduct has been expunged from the record, as
if it never occurred.
Political science's neglect of covert
operations is also evident in many of the datasets that are used
as the raw material for research. Consider for example the Militarized
Interstate Disputes (MIDs) dataset, which compiles quantitative
information on international conflicts throughout recent history,
and is one of the most widely used datasets in political science.
The MIDs dataset contains an exhaustive catalogue of conventional
wars and military conflicts (many of which were relatively minor).
Yet there is virtually no mention of CIA covert operations. True,
the MIDs database defines conflict in a way that rules out most
covert operations.28 This would not in itself be a problem, if
there were some other standard dataset that did include a significant
number of covert operations. The problem is that such a dataset
does not exist (or if such a dataset does exist, it has elicited
no notice in the top journals). The resulting scholarship can
be summarized as an extended exercise in selection bias, because
it omits covert operations, which constitute a major category
of international conflict. This selection bias is far from innocuous;
it virtually guarantees that U.S. actions will appear in a more
favorable light.29
There are of course counter-arguments
to be considered. One objection, offered by Robert Jervis, is
that political science has avoided covert operations because
there is so little public information on the topic.30 This is
not a valid objection. As seen above, the Indonesia and Iraq
operations have been admitted by former CIA officers and diplomats,
in public statements. The CIA's involvement in the 1973 overthrow
of the Allende government has been documented at length in a
U.S. Senate report. The Agency's involvement in the 1953 coup
against the Mossadegh government in Iran was officially acknowledged
by former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright. And there are
many other equally well-documented cases.31 Political science's
neglect of covert operations is certainly not the result of a
lack of source material. The problem is that political scientists
have ignored source material pertaining to covert operations.
During the Cold War, a major objection
to the social systems of the Soviet Union and its allies was
that the universities lacked independence from government doctrine,
and that social scientists in those countries acted as mere adjuncts
to the propaganda, intelligence, and security agencies of the
state. Such practices resulted in a lack of internal criticism
of state policy. Let us hope that American academics can hold
themselves to higher standards than this--and will avoid classified
work for the CIA and other intelligence services.
David N. Gibbs
is Associate Professor of Political Science at University of
Arizona. He can be reached at dgibbs@arizona.edu.
1 Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Farewell
Address," January 17, 1961.
2 Chris Mooney, "Good
Company: It's Time for the CIA and Scholars to Work Together.
Again," The American Prospect, November 2002.
3 Daniel Golden, "After
Sept. 11, the CIA Becomes A Force on Campus," Wall Street
Journal, October 4, 2002.
4 "Spooky Scholarships," London
Guardian, December 17, 2002.
5 Irene Gendzier, "Play it Again
Sam: The Practice and Apology of Development," in Christopher
Simpson, ed., Universities and Empire (New York: New Press, 1998).
6 Noam Chomsky, "The Cold War and
the University," in David Montgomery, ed, The Cold War and
the University (New York: New Press, 1997), 181. Note that Chomsky
adds: "Certainly, nothing like that is true now [regarding
the MIT Political Science Department]; it is a much more open
department."
7 Bruce Cumings, "Boundary
Displacement: Area Studies and International Studies During and
After the Cold War," Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars
29, no. 1, 1997.
8 Carl Bernstein, "The CIA and the
Media," Rolling Stone, October 20, 1977.
9 Chris Mooney, "For
Your Eyes Only: The CIA Will Let You See Classified Documents--But
at What Price?" Lingua Franca, November 2000.
10 Quoted in "Should the CIA Fight
Secret Wars?" Harpers, September 1984.
11 Quoted in Christopher Reed, "U.S.
Agents 'Drew up Indonesian Hit List,'" London Guardian,
May 22, 1990.
12 Harvey Weinstein, Psychiatry and the
CIA (Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association, 1990);
and Elizabeth Nickson, "Mind Control," London Observer,
October 16, 1994.
13 Andrew Cockburn and Patrick Cockburn,
Out of the Ashes: The Resurrection of Saddam Hussein (New York:
Harper, 1999), 74-75. Patrick Cockburn is the Middle East correspondent
for the London Financial Times and the London Independent.
14 Quoted in Roger Morris, "A
Tyrant 40 Years in the Making," New York Times, March
14, 2003.
15 I have discussed these matters at
length in David N. Gibbs, "Forgotten Coverage of Afghan
'Freedom
Fighters': The Villains of Today's News were Heroes in the '80s,"
Extra, January/February 2002.
16 See CNN, "Terror Nation, U.S.
Creation?" five part series on Afghanistan, Transcripts
373-1 through 373-5, August 21, 1994. The quoted portion is taken
from sections 373-4. Print versions available through Lexis-Nexis.
17 Quoted in Daniel Golden, Wall Street
Journal, 2002, above.
18 Both quotes from U.S. Senate, Foreign
and Military Intelligence, Book I (Washington, DC: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1976), 193.
19 Christopher Simpson, Science of Coercion
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 82.
20 Quoted from "An
Ex-CIA Official Speaks Out: An Interview with Victor Marchetti
by Greg Kaza," 1986. I telephoned Marchetti and confirmed
the authenticity of this interview. See also discussion in Victor
Marchetti and John D. Marks, The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence
(New York: Dell, 1980), 161-62.
21 Robert Parry and Peter Kornbluh, "Reagan's
Pro-Contra Propaganda Machine," Washington Post, September
4, 1988.
22 George C. Herring, "My
Years with the CIA," transcript of speech at the annual
meeting of the American Historical Association, 1997.
23 Quoted in Jon Elliston, "CIA's
Man on Campus," Durham Independent, November 29, 2000.
24 Mooney, American Prospect, 2002, above.
The FOIA request was made by Daniel Brandt of Public Information
Research Inc. A
scanned copy of the FOIA letter is available online.
25 Quoted in Daniel Golden, Wall Street
Journal, 2002, above.
26 Conyers Reed, "The Social Obligations
of the Historian," American Historical Review 55, no. 2,
1950, 283-85. There is no specific evidence that Conyers actually
consulted for the military or the CIA. However, the opinions
expressed in the narrative do elucidate the general phenomenon
of the "captured" intellectual.
27 The journals were: World Politics,
International Organization, International Security, Journal of
Conflict Resolution, and International Studies Quarterly.
28 Daniel Jones, Stuart Bremer and J.
David Singer, "Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1816-1992:
Rationale, Coding Rules, and Empirical Patterns," Conflict
Management and Peace Science 15, no. 2, 1996, 169-70.
29 For further discussion of this problem
see: David N. Gibbs, "Social Science as Propaganda? International
Relations and the Question of Political Bias," International
Studies Perspectives 2, no. 4, 2001. See also Peter Monaghan,
"Does
International Relations Scholarship Reflect a Bias toward the
U.S.?" Chronicle of Higher Education, September 24,
1999.
30 This statement was made in a radio
debate between me and Robert Jervis on the
radio program Democracy Now, November 13, 2002.
31 Probably the best general account
of covert operations is in William Blum, Killing Hope: U.S. Military
and CIA Interventions since World War II (Monroe, ME: Common
Courage Press, 1995). Well documented with extensive references.
Yesterday's
Features
Anthony
Gancarski
Colin Powell's Shame
John
Chuckman
Was Einstein Right About Israel?
David
Krieger
The Meaning of Victory
Tom
Gorman
The Mantra of the Troops: Support
or Treason?
Adam
Federman
The Absence of War
Vijay
Prashad
There Are No More Arguments
Tom
Stephens
The End of the Innocence
Mickey
Z.
Makes Me Sic (Sic): Copy Editing
Bush Speak
Pierre
Tristam
War Coverage: a Dishonest Reality
Show
Hammond
Guthrie
The Deadly Mihrab
Steve
Perry
War Web Log 04/04
Keep CounterPunch
Alive:
Make
a Tax-Deductible Donation Today Online!
home / subscribe
/ about us / books
/ archives / search
/ links /
|