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Now!
I just read your article in
"Counterpunch", October
17, 2006 .
As you know the US claims that
it has detected radiation that "confirms" that North
Korea actually did explode a nuclear device. I presume that detecting
Pu239 wouldn't prove that a Plutonium fission reaction was achieved.
Instead, you'd need to detect fission products that aren't present
normally at the measured levels. What are these fission products,
and what do you think the possibility is that these products
could be detected in the air (probably a number of miles from
the test site) after an underground test? Does a small underground
nuclear explosion cause an EMP that could be detected by nearby
aircraft at the time of the explosion?
Thanks!
Tony Heatwole
Damascus, MD
The US has claimed that airborne
waste products from DPRK's recently detonated nuclear device
has been detected. The only radioactive gas I know of is Radon.
Would there be any others such as rare isotopes of naturally
occurring non radioactive elements? -- J. Johnson
Dear Tony Heatwole and John
Johnson,
Thank you for your letters.
Air sampling for nuclear explosion
traces focuses on the collection of xenon and helium. There are
short-lived (radioactive) isotopes of these gases that occur
as trace products from fission (e.g., alpha emission, a helium
nucleus), and as activated species from the air around the explosion,
which was irradiated.
Also, if the bomb was "boosted,"
which is to say if there was a small quantity of tritium, or
a mixture of tritium with helium or xenon gas, within the initially
hollow plutonium shell, then there would be radioactive byproducts.
Boosting is a method of increasing yield by putting a small fusion
core within a much larger fissile mass. The U.S. spy planes would
certainly be on the lookout for any evidence of boosting. This
would say a great deal about the DPRK program's level of development.
Trace quantities of noble gases
are difficult to eliminate because they are so resistant to reaction
(e.g., oxidation) and because they are so light, hence buoyant
and quite penetrating through porous media. A buried nuclear
explosion will create a hot high-pressure cavity, and of any
of the species within it, the noble gases are the most likely
to leak. Other species will "stick" to the earth because
of their mass (slower, less energetic, less able to migrate through
pores) and reactivity (chemically combine with static material).
The pressure of a nuclear explosion cavity can strain the earth
and open cracks, allowing gases to migrate from the explosion;
the pressure dies down as the cavity cools, so after a few days
the pressure to expel gas has gone.
It should be noted that the
emission of these noble trace gases is a normal effect of every
underground nuclear test; these emissions are not considered
a breaching of the containment. Sniffing for these gases was
done on many U.S. tests, as a planned part of the measurements.
Electro-magnetic pulse (EMP)
would be "small" (above ground) for the NK test, and
probably contained within the cavity and emplacement shaft.
You may find other answers
at the FAS (Federation of American
Scientists web site. They are an excellent source for information
on all aspects of nuclear energy and weapons.
Manuel Garcia, Jr.
* *
*
[threaded response follows]
Dear MB:
MB writes
Dear MANUEL GARCIA, Jr.
I refer to your article today...
Is it possible that N.Korea acquired a nuclear bomb from the
Black Market, and having done a routine time-overhaul on it,
then detonated it last week?
MG, Jr. replies
I think this very unlikely.
A working nuclear bomb is a very complicated thing, it requires
controlled storage conditions, and any professionally made unit
would have a very sophisticated electronic locking/disable harness,
requiring a code to access to enable activating the unit. Any
government in possession of such a unit would find it far more
profitable to keep under its control than to sell on the black
market; too much liability in that kind of sale in any case.
How about everybody's favorite
black market supplier, Khan (?) of Pakistan? As I recall, he
sold equipment and know-how, but no "turn key" units.
The industrial nations possessing
nuclear weapons also have means to track them, not foolproof,
but always being improved. Aside from tagging the units electronically
(an assumption on my part), they are difficult to hide from radiation
sensors, since they have kilograms of highly radioactive metal.
Also, they heat up, requiring cooling, but visible to infrared
detectors, which are now so common. Ah ha!, thick cases to shield
it, but then it become a bulky thing to haul about.
How about a "homebuilt"
unit? The tough part is getting hold of the plutonium. The more
amateur the design, the more plutonium you need to ensure some
part of it forms a critical assembly. Can an amateur get hold
of 12 kg of plutonium? And, could an amateur with so much plutonium
put together his unit without being noticed?
If you wanted to imagine a
rogue organization putting together its own bomb, something with
the flavor of a James Bond plot, then you would have to imagine
a corporation with technical means, closed facilities, and a
reliable group of committed people -- SPECTRE -- and you arrive
at a remote physical possibility, though still (to me) a psychological
impossibility.
So, no, I don't see a black
market bomb. I think North Korea did it all on its own. That
is their message to everyone else nervous about having the U.S.
come down on them: "we did it, you can too."
It is known the North Koreans
were harvesting plutonium from their reactors. This was confirmed
by the IAEA, and precipitated the Clinton administration to make
extraordinary conciliatory offers, leading to a breakthrough
in relations with NK, including a cessation of their fuel enrichment
activities. The Clintonians accomplished this in the 90's. Sadly,
the U.S. did not follow through on the promises made, the deal
was abandoned, and NK resumed its plutonium production. A week
ago, we saw the result.
Why should the North Koreans
be unable to make their own bomb? Look at the South Koreans,
they are very capable as regards modern technology. The same
type of people, a few hundred kilometers north, and under a different
political regime, should seem equally capable. We can assume
that the technical experts involved, perhaps as little as a few
thousand people, would be the intellectual cream of the crop
in NK, and so regardless of how bizarre the public face of their
ideology, they would have been afforded the necessary training
and tools to be able to accomplish this, their life's work. I
suppose in a "Manchurian Candidate" type of plot, the
NK scientists and engineers would have been identified in 2nd
grade as sharp minds, and carefully groomed up a very special
educational ladder leading to their roles today. For those so
privileged in an otherwise poor land, there would be little temptation
to do otherwise.
Pretty much everything you
need to know to make a sophisticated nuclear weapon is out in
the public domain, somewhere. The really hard part is in the
actual doing. This takes time and money, which buys energy and
equipment, which is used to produce material and a wide array
of parts and sub-systems, all leading to integration in a unit.
This is the DPRK's moonshot, they're very proud of themselves,
they didn't fake it.
I would guess they would be
loathe to sell it because that would water down their investment
of money and time (why give away exclusivity?). Missiles they
might sell, but I'll bet they hold tight to their bombs and bomb
designs.
MB writes
The Korea Times reported last
week that N.Korea has an H-Bomb to detonate shortly. Surely such
a high-tech device as this would be way beyond North Korea's
manufacturing capability??
MG, Jr. replies
Not after you've produced a
fission bomb. One could "boost" a hollow-shell fission
bomb, that is fill the interior with tritium gas, which gets
compressed by the implosion, ignites fusion reaction in the gas,
which emit a flood of high energy neutrons and as these stream
through the fission shell, multiply the number of fission reactions
by orders of magnitude -- vavoom, big yield.
Also, a "hydrogen bomb"
is simply a supply of tritium gas (a radioactive isotope of hydrogen)
in close proximity to a fission bomb, which is compressed and
ignited by the energy of the fission bomb. This is accomplished
in a heavy case, which reflects the energy radiated by the fission
back in, so the hydrogen volume is compressed and heated to thermonuclear
temperatures. A "hydrogen bomb" is like "turbo-charging,"
in a manner of speaking; the fission bomb is the essential engine.
Tritium is produced from water
circulating through nuclear reactors. If NK set off a plutonium
fission bomb, then they have produced an implosion system, and
reactor-based production of nuclear fuel. They have everything
needed for tritium production -- so we must assume they have
tritium -- and they have everything needed to produce a "hydrogen"
bomb -- a fusion bomb. Just as with the U.S.S.R. in 1951 (2?),
we can expect another test soon, and probably that of a fusion
device.
MB writes
In 1991 others found, and therefore
the USAF certainly had lost some type W-69M H-Bomb warheads as
attached to SRAMS, and carried on a B-52g plane......I am told
that the Initiators on them have a half-life of only 12-years?
MG, Jr. replies
I have no idea about this.
Are there published accounts? I would have thought this would
be a big news story.
I have no idea about component
lifetimes. As I recall, most everything in professionally made
bombs have quite long lifetimes, though the metal does oxidize.
Also, tritium decays fairly quickly, in fact this is never sealed
in the units, but injected just before use from an external supply.
Maintenance includes replacing tritium supplies periodically,
as they go flat (I guess like club soda)
MB writes
We will have to wait and see
what happens in North Korea. Maybe they bluff??
MG, Jr. replies
I think not.
MB writes
The logical time for N.Korea
to detonate such a devices would be before the US mid-term elections.
MG, Jr. replies
They may, or may punctuate
one of their own anniversaries. They first have to do their data
analysis from the first test, make any corrections to units being
planned now, and then initiate an actual test schedule once they
feel confident of their state of knowledge again. At that point,
they'll look at the calendar, and pick out a desirable coincidence.
MB writes
This is the only record that
we can find of a B-52 type G that fits everything else with regard
to the nukes found in May 1991 off the coast of Somalia.
B-52G
(59-2593). No B-52Gs were lost as a result of enemy action. However,
several were damaged. One B-52G (59-2593) was lost on February
3 (1991) when it experienced a catastrophic electrical system
failure while returning to its base at Diego Garcia. While responding
to the failure, improper fuel management on the part of the crew
caused five engines to flame out, and the aircraft began to descend.
Three of the crew members ejected safely before the aircraft
crashed into the Indian Ocean, but three others ejected too late
and were killed.
These planes carried Short
Range Attack Missiles (SRAMS) that have a range of about 115
miles. A forensic expert who did investigations on a consultancy
basis for the FBI and CIA told me last year that the nuclear
warheads on the SRAMS would have been type W-69M?
MG, Jr. replies
On your questions about "W-69,"
I do not know. Certified U.S. warheads carry shorthand labels
"W-2-digit-year." Since no warhead has been certified
since the 20th century, there is as yet no confusion with this
system. There are web-sites of nuclear weapons watchers with
a great deal of information as to the labeling and deployment
of warheads and bombs (labeled "B-yy"). Also, one can
look into congressional records and information about the NNSA
part of the DOE, and probably find out what warhead goes to what
missile. There are a few authors who specialize in these matters,
and they have large books and web-sites. A little time with "Google"
will easily yield many leads in this regard.
U.S. warheads dropped into
the sea (especially deep water) would probably be unusable. At
best one could salvage the fissile material (if not overly oxidized/corroded
by sea water). The state of the HE (high explosive) and electricals
might not be reliable again. Also, it is possible the PAL (enable/disable
locking system) could have automatically ruptured key components
as a "safing" procedure during the unplanned departure
from storage and/or a planned sortie.
My knowledge is more about
the physics, and much less so about the military application,
and the many systems external to the actual nuclear core.
* *
*
Andy Pyle wrote:
Could they have deliberately
moderated the force of the bomb with Lithium or something to
create ambiguity?
MG, Jr. replies:
Speculation # 2, "spoof."
Covered in the article. What's the point of spoofing?
* * *
Ian Kaplan wrote:
I hope that the article is
not a "career limiting move". Not only is it a comment
in the press or North Korea, but it's in Alexander Cockburn's
Counterpunch. Someone commented once that you don't get into
as much trouble for publishing in, say, a fascist publication
as you do in a leftist one. Sort of an interesting commentary
on values. Finally, I'll note that, for reasons that escape me,
the United States has never been terribly committed to nuclear
non-proliferation.
Ian
[Ian is a colleague of MG,
Jr. at work, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory; we are both
members of SPSE/UPTE, the union group]
MG, Jr. replies:
It depends on what kind of
career you wish to have. On looking back, I see that "career"
was the limit.
[Note to the reader: if we
don't practice our 1st Amendment rights to free speech, then
we don't have them, regardless of what it says on a piece of
paper under glass in a mausoleum of history -- "use it or
lose it." Also, stop being afraid, that is how you are enslaved.
MG, Jr.]
Manuel Garcia, Jr. is a physicist and can be reached
at mango@idiom.com
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