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How to Spot a Police Spy Is it the guy who asks you after the meeting about how the antiwar movement needs to get "serious" and asks you lots of questions about terrorism and "fighting back"? Jennifer Van Bergen reports, first-hand. Part 2 of our series on what really happened on 9/11/2001: the physics of collapse, and how not to make a "pancake" by Manuel Garcia, PLUS Engineer Pierre Sprey on why "controlled demolition" theories are off target. What you just missed, but can still get, in our last newsletter: Paul Craig Roberts on the Collapse of America. CounterPunch Online is read by millions of viewers each month! But remember, we are funded solely by the subscribers to the print edition of CounterPunch. Please support this website by buying a subscription to our newsletter, which contains fresh material you won't find anywhere else, or by making a donation towards the cost of this online edition. Remember contributions are tax-deductible. Click here to make a donation. If you find our site useful please: Subscribe Now! |
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Today's Stories October 11, 2006 John Feffer October 10, 2006 Paul Craig
Roberts Robert Robideau Joshua Frank Dave Lindorff Dave Zirin Heather Gray James Knotwell Missy Beattie Mike Whitney David Rosen Website of the Day
Robert Fisk Norman Solomon Ron Jacobs Gideon Levy Walter Brasch Mickey Z. John Holt Lucinda Marshall Saul Landau Website of the Day
October 7 /
8, 2006 Alexander Cockburn Peter Kwong Ralph Nader Mark Donham Dave Lindorff Peter Bosshard Ron Jacobs Lawrence R.
Velvel Fred Gardner David Green Jim B. Missy Beattie Michael Donnelly Jackson Thoreau Jon Hung CounterPunch
News Service Tom D'Antoni Poets' Basement Website of the Weekend
Alison Weir Tiffany Ten
Eyck / Mark Brenner Corporate Crime Reporter Juan Antonio
Montecino Walden Bello Christopher
Brauchli Brynne Keith-Jennings Jonathan Cook Website of the Day
John Walsh Carol Norris Paul Craig Roberts Ricardo Alarcón James Abourezk Nicola Nasser Kirkpatrick Sale Uri Avnery Website of the Day
Elizabeth Terzakis Paul Wolf Sean Penn Dave Lindorff Diane Farsetta Sharon Smith Felice Pace Sara Roy Website of
the Day
Jennifer Van
Bergen Greg Moses Stan Cox Niranjan Ramakrishnan Evelyn Pringle Fred Wilhelms Michael Abelman Gary Leupp Website of the Day
October 2, 2006 Eric Hazan Mike Whitney Norman Solomon Assaf Kfoury Missy Beattie Arthur Neslen Paula J. Caplan Website of the Day
Sept. 30 /
0ct. 1, 2006 Paul Craig
Roberts Marjorie Cohn Ben Tripp Ron Jacobs Ralph Nader Mike Whitney Christopher Reed Seth Sandronsky Fred Gardner Mokhiber /
Weissman Michael Dickinson Alan Gregory Poets' Basement
September 29, 2006 Bruce Jackson Michael J.
Smith Emira Woods William S.
Lind David Swanson Jonathan Cook Website of the Day
Sen. Russ Feingold Ron Jacobs Mokhiber /
Weissman Lee Sustar Robert Jensen John Chuckman Evelyn Pringle Nicola Nasser Uri Avnery Website of the Day
Patrick Cockburn Camilo Mejia Ben Terrall Ridgeway /
Ng Joe Allen Andrew Wimmer Franklin C. Spinney Website of
the Day
Hani Shukrallah William Blum Niranjan Ramakrishnan Barbara Becnel Paul Rockwell Dave Lindorff Rich Gibson Anthony Papa Nate Mezmer Uri Avnery Website of the Day
Patrick Cockburn Jonathan Cook Joshua Frank Paul Craig
Roberts Robert Jensen Dave Lindorff Norman Solomon Dr. Charles
Jonkel Michael Dickinson Alexander Cockburn Website of
the Day
September 23
/ 24, 2006 Jonathan Cook Jeffrey St.
Clair Dr. Anon Tom Barry Carl G. Estabrook Laura Carlsen Todd Chretien Dr. Charles
Jonkel Debbie Nathan Fred Gardner Fred Wilhelms Seth Sandronsky Ralph Nader Rev. William
Alberts Jon Van Camp Heather Gray David Vest Jeffrey St.
Clair Poets' Basement Website of
the Weekend Video of the Weekend
September 22, 2006 Patrick Cockburn Michael Donnelly Ramzy Baroud Evo Morales Stanley Howard Sarah Leah
Whitson JoAnn Wypijewski Website of the Day
Mahmoud Ahmadi-Nejad Justin E. H.
Smith Mike Roselle Amira Hass Deborah Rich Mickey Z. Saul Landau Website of
the Day
Sharon Smith Christopher
Reed John Ross Joshua Frank Arthur Neslen Norman Solomon Michael Carmichael Evelyn Pringle Hugo Chavez Website of the Day
Patrick Cockburn Jeff Leys Brian M. Downing Col. Dan Smith Liaquat Ali
Khan Ron Jacobs Nik Barry-Shaw
/ Yves Engler Lucinda Marshall Saul Landau Photo of the Day Website of
the Day
Carl Boggs Uri Avnery Mike Stark / Jim Bullington Joshua Frank John Murphy Ramzy Baroud Dave Lindorff Bill Quigley Website of the Day
Tariq Ali Eliza Ernshire Jeffrey St.
Clair Mairead Corrigan Maguire Brian Cloughley Ben Tripp Laura Carlsen Ralph Nader Ron Jacobs John Chuckman Robert Fisk Gary Leupp Lawrence R.
Velvel Missy Comley Beattie Adrienne Johnstone Mickey Z. Jeffrey St.
Clair Poets' Basement Website of
the Weekend
Diana Johnstone Diane Christian William S. Lind Lee Sustar Dave Lindorff Ramzy Baroud Mokhiber / Weissman Jeffrey St.
Clair Website of the Day
Franklin Lamb Tim Wilkinson Dick J. Reavis Sam Husseini Doug Giebel Bill Berkowitz Diane Farsetta Mary Turck Patrick Cockburn J.L. Chestnut,
Jr. Website of
the Day
Jack Bratich John Ross Christopher
Brauchli Dave Lindorff Antony Loewenstein Al Krebs Leonard Peltier Jim Bensman Website of the Day
Norman Finkelstein Seth Sandronsky John Walsh Alan Maass David Krieger Nate Mezmer Kathleen Christison
Uri Avnery Patrick Cockburn Col Dan Smith Dr. Susan Block Anthony Alessandrini Dave Lindorff Niranjan Ramakrishnan Joshua Frank Jean Bricmont Sprague / Emesberger Website of
the Day
September 9/10,
2006 Alexander Cockburn Jeffrey St.
Clair Greg Grandin Peter
Stone Brown Ralph
Nader Brian
Cloughley Col.
Chet Richards David
Model Dave
Himmelstein Ron
Jacobs Fred
Gardner Mike
Whitney Josh
Gryniewicz Daniel
Gross / Joe
Bageant Nicole
Colson Alexander
Billet Poets'
Basement
September 8, 2006 Uri
Avnery Paul
Craig Roberts Bill
Quigley Robert
Jensen Norman
Solomon Keith
Bolin
September 8, 2006 Uri
Avnery Paul
Craig Roberts Bill
Quigley Robert
Jensen Norman
Solomon Keith
Bolin Kristin
S. Schafer Jeffrey
St. Clair Patrick
Cockburn Website
of the Day
Marjorie
Cohn Sharon
Smith René
Drucker Colín Michael
Donnelly John
Borowski Lucinda
Marshall Charles
Sullivan Jeffrey
St. Clair Jonathan
Cook Website
of the Day
September 6, 2006 Stephen
Soldz Dave
Zirin Ramzy
Baroud Noel
Ignatiev Dave
Lindorff Norman
Solomon Binoy
Kampmark Jeffrey
St. Clair John
Ross Website
of the Day
September 5, 2006 Jonathan Cook Patrick Cockburn Mike Whitney
Roland Sheppard James Petras Alexander Cockburn
September 4, 2006 Clancy Sigal Jeffrey St.
Clair Anthony Alessandrini Dennis Perrin
Daniel Cassidy
Paul Craig
Roberts
September 2 / 3, 2006 Uri Avnery Jeffrey St.
Clair Ralph Nader Noam Chomsky Allan Lichtman Stanley Heller Rana el-Khatib Peter Montague Laura Carlsen Dr. Susan Block Joe Bageant Scott Stedjan / Matt Schaaf Gary Leupp Stephen Fleischman Paul Balles Ingmar Lee Jane Stillwater Ron Jacobs St. Clair /
Bossert Poets' Basement Website of
the Weekend
September 1, 2006 Uri Avnery Paul Craig
Roberts Bill Ayers Kevin Zeese Xochitl Bervera Norman Solomon Alexander Cockburn Richard Neville Website of the Day
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October 11, 2006 Wave Stick, Get StungPyongyang 1, Bush 0By JOHN FEFFER Five years ago, when George W. Bush took office, North Korea didn't claim membership in the nuclear club. Its plutonium reprocessing facilities were frozen. It was even willing to negotiate away its missile program. Instead of pursuing the diplomatic route, the Bush administration tried to ignore Pyongyang. Then came the schoolyard taunts such as lumping North Korea together with Iraq and Iran in an "axis of evil." When indifference and insult failed to move the isolated East Asian country, the administration accused North Korea of enriching uranium, which led to the unraveling of the 1994 Agreed Framework and the reigniting of a major crisis. To top it off, Washington began to squeeze Pyongyang economically with sanctions. Pyongyang has refused to cry "uncle." Instead, it has replied in kind. With its missile launches in July and its recently announced nuclear test, Pyongyang has demonstrated that it can be as stubborn and as enamored of military playthings as the Bush administration. With such a miserable track record in inducing behavior change, why has the United States continued to speak loudly and wield a big stick against a hornet's nest like North Korea? It might be, like North Korea's recent test, a fundamental miscalculation. The Bush administration, after all, has shown a pathological inability to learn from its mistakes. Or there might be a deeper, more malign intent at work. Wave Stick, Hornet Stings At first, the Bush administration followed the logic of its predecessors. It looked at North Korea through the prism of Eastern Europe. With a little nudge, the regime was supposed to topple just like the communist governments in Warsaw, Bucharest, and East Berlin. But North Korea showed remarkable resilience, surviving the collapse of its Soviet trading partner, several years of extreme famine in the mid-1990s, and then the containment-plus tactics of the Bush administration. In the absence of a dramatic coup or military putsch in Pyongyang, the Bush administration had to demonstrate that it was not just twiddling its thumbs while North Korea unfroze its plutonium reprocessing facilities and moved full-speed ahead toward a nuclear arsenal. The faintest whiff of weapons of mass destruction had justified U.S. military intervention in Iraq. And all the United States could do with North Korea was call it names? Thus were born the Six Party
Talks, a multilateral effort involving the two Koreas, China,
Russia, Japan, and the United States. A remarkable group of diplomats
gathered to talk, but alas, not to negotiate. Guided by the Here's what the problem with the strategy of pointless talking was: North Korea was not satisfied with cat-and-mouse maneuvers. Its economy reeling and its population malnourished, the North Korean government wanted a deal. And the only thing worth trading that it possessed-or that the world thought it possessed-was a nuclear program. The recent nuclear test is the logical consequence of the North's policy over the last four years. It developed a nuclear program to deter U.S. attacks, but it also needed a bargaining chip to trade for status, cash, and other goodies. It froze its nuclear program under the 1994 Agreed Framework, but probably kept some reprocessed plutonium in reserve just in case and began a covert uranium-enrichment program as a similar insurance policy. When the Agreed Framework collapsed in 2002, North Korea changed tactics, declaring that it did in fact have nukes, which served to strengthen its deterrent capabilities and increase its ask at the negotiating table. But the Bush administration wasn't dealing. So North Korea ended its self-imposed missile moratorium last July. And when that didn't get the United States into one-on-one negotiations, it raised the ante once again with a nuclear test. Such tactics should surprise no one. Pyongyang has begun giving the world advance notice of its actions. Psychologists call these signals a "cry for help." North Korea wants to negotiate, wants to avoid options that are clearly suicidal. But global 911, staffed by the inattentive Bush administration, is just not responding. External Signal, Internal Audience The nuclear test is a signal to the international community that North Korea refuses to be disrespected, have its sovereignty abridged, or suffer a full-frontal military assault. But the test also serves various internal purposes. The staff of the country's nuclear complex-scientists, military officials, and government representatives-have an important stake in seeing their project through to completion. As George Perkovich perceptively argued in his book India's Nuclear Bomb, the team developing nuclear weapons is not simply a group of technicians that can be turned on or off depending on government whim. The nuclear complex develops political power within the overall government system. Tasked to create a bomb, it must demonstrate its success or it will lose that power. A nuclear test translates into bonuses and promotions, and consolidated political power within the system. Another internal rationale is provided by the date of the test: October 9. North Korean leader Kim Jong Il formally took the helm of the Korean Worker's Party on that date in 1997. There have been only two leaders in North Korean history. Kim Il Sung founded the country and, despite often horrendous policies, enjoyed the adulation of the population. With the famine that took place on his watch and the near collapse of the country, Kim Jong Il has squandered his father's legacy. The nuclear test is, in other words, a rather large example of overcompensation. Economic news out of North Korea hasn't been very positive. Heavy rains and flooding over the summer damaged the country's capacity to feed itself. Financial sanctions applied by the United States have helped stall any economic reforms. Even China, outraged over the July missile launches, has begun to put a gentle squeeze on its neighbor. There's not a lot of bread in North Korea and, though the Pyongyang Circus is quite good, such performances will not distract the population. Kim Jong Il might have as much charisma as a chunk of anthracite but only a handful of world leaders have pushed their countries past the well-guarded gates of the nuclear club. But did North Korea really test the bomb? The verdict isn't yet in. The recent test might have been just a lot of TNT or it could have been a very small weapon tested unsuccessfully. However, from North Korea's point of view, the perception of deterrence is more important than the reality. It wants to prevent an attack. If the United States and others are scared off by empty underground caverns-like Kumchang-ri in 1999-or by a whole lot of dynamite, so much the cheaper. To Strike or Not to Strike Will an attack on North Korea be the administration's October surprise? The rally-around-the-flag effect of bombing North Korea would be overwhelmed by the sheer scope of the immediate consequences, not to mention the longer-term blowback. The Bush administration has insisted on keeping all options on the table, even though the Pentagon has made it clear that a military strike against North Korea would lead to retaliatory attacks that would kill tens of thousands of U.S. and South Korean soldiers and civilians. The Pentagon has also confessed that it would have great difficulty eliminating the dispersed nuclear facilities in North Korea. For military, economic, and electoral reasons, it doesn't make sense for the Bush administration to launch an attack against any country at this moment. Alas, the administration seems to be singing only one tune these days, that old Talking Heads favorite: Stop Making Sense. The administration ignored the top-level Pentagon advice on Iraq. It could do so again with North Korea. If the military option is not really on the table, the Bush administration is running out of choices. It is unveiling a new set of financial sanctions and wants inspections on all cargo going in and out of North Korea. But Pyongyang, while not exactly reveling in its isolation of late, is accustomed to being the odd man out. Kim Jong Il's regime endured several famine years; perhaps it calculates that two more cold-shoulder years from the Bush administration are survivable. For some in the Bush administration, the nuclear test is cause for celebration. The coterie around Dick Cheney rejoices at the growing divide between North Korea and China, the more aggressive military and foreign policy of Japan, and the compromised efforts of South Korea to engage the North. The nuclear test is the most effective argument the Cheney crowd can use to defeat calls for diplomacy. An amplified North Korean threat works wonders on Capitol Hill and with our allies to push missile defense, more military spending, and the like. But the recent test has not destroyed the diplomatic option. Pyongyang has reiterated its willingness to negotiate. It doesn't have much choice. A nuclear weapon can't feed its people or rebuild its factories. The international community, through the UN, should by all means register its outrage at North Korea's act and translate that outrage into some concrete actions. But many years of sanctions haven't brought North Korea to its knees or back to the negotiating table. It's time for the Bush administration to make up for a half-decade of failed policies by talking seriously with Pyongyang, both bilaterally and multilaterally. Just inside the door, North Korea can still be persuaded to back out of the nuclear club. John Feffer is the co-director of Foreign
Policy In Focus for the International Relations Center, North
Korea, South Korea: U.S. Policy at a Time of Crisis (Seven
Stories Press).and the editor of The Future of U.S.-Korean Relations
(Routledge, 2006).
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from CounterPunch Books! The Case Against Israel By Michael Neumann  Grand Theft Pentagon: Tales of Greed and Profiteering in the War on Terror by Jeffrey St. Clair          Sick of sit-on-the-Fence speakers, tongue-tied and timid? CounterPunch Editors Alexander Cockburn and Jeffrey St Clair are available to speak forcefully on ALL the burning issues, as are other CounterPunchers seasoned in stump oratory. Call CounterPunch Speakers Bureau, 1-800-840-3683. Or email beckyg@counterpunch.org.                        |
uncompromising
Vice President Dick Cheney, the Bush administration has viewed
any meaningful negotiations with North Korea-and the prospect
of any serious agreement-as simply prolonging the lifespan of
Kim Jong Il's regime. The State Department was on a short leash.
The Bush administration refused to negotiate bilaterally, North
Korea's negotiating process of choice. In the Bush-Cheney lexicon,
compromise equals appeasement and "Munich" stops all
conversations. 