home / subscribe / donate / tower / books / archives / search / links / feedback / events / faq
The New Print Edition of CounterPunch, Only for Our Newsletter Subscribers! ISRAEL'S IRON HEEL It began when Harry Truman was in the White House. It has continued under every U.S. President since, and in this extended report we lay out the consequences of 60 years of brutal Israeli occupation of Palestinian land. Feroze Sidhwa details the human price of systematic, intentional destruction of the Palestinian social and economic fabric: physical and mental deterioration, traumatized youth, a savaged environment. Nancy Glass and Reem Salahi describe the Kafka-esque conditions in which Palestinian lawyers try to defend their people in Israel's courts. Get your copy today by subscribing online or calling 1-800-840-3683 Contributions to CounterPunch are tax-deductible. Click here to make a donation. If you find our site useful please: Subscribe Now! CounterPunch books and gear make great holiday presents.
Order CounterPunch By Email for Only $35 a Year and Receive a Free Copy of
"Imperial Crusades: a Diary of Three Wars" by Cockburn and St. Clair
|
December 1, 2007 Jeffrey
St. Clair November 30, 2007 Peter
Stone Brown Wajahat
Ali Allan
Nairn Alan
Farago John
Ross Corporate
Crime Reporter Lucia
Alvarez James
Rothenberg Website
of the Day
November 29, 2007 R.
F. Blader Ismael
Hossein-Zadeh Stephen
Soldz Sheldon
Richman George
Wuerthner Felice
Pace Col.
Dan Smith Harvey
Wasserman Nikolas
Kozloff Paul
Krassner Dave
Lindorff CP
News Service Website
of the Day November 28, 2007 James
Petras Jeff
Halper Pam
Martens Peter
Morici Mohammed
Khatib Helen
Redmond William
S. Lind Ben
Tripp Liaquat
Ali Khan Jeff
Berg Website
of the Day
November 27, 2007 Joe
DeRaymond Paul
Craig Roberts Marjorie
Cohn Mike
Whitney Ron
Jacobs Col.
Dan Smith Ralph
Nader Karim
Makdisi Christopher
Ketcham Ronan
Bennett Website
of the Day
November 26, 2007 Kathleen
and Bill Christison Paul
Craig Roberts David
Macaray Sameer
Dossani Roger
Burbach Mark
Scaramella Brian
McKinlay Rick
Kuhn Binoy
Kampmark Monica
Benderman Brenda
Norrell Website
of the Day
November 24 / 25, 2007 Alexander
Cockburn Robert
Fisk Saul
Landau Jeffrey
St. Clair Rannie
Amiri Christopher
Brauchli Daniel
Gross Mike
Whitney Marjorie
Cohn David
Rosen David
Michael Green Kenneth
Rexroth Muhammad
Iqbal Website
of the Day
Gary
Leupp Laura
Carlsen David
Macaray Andy
Worthington Clifton
Ross Seth
Sandronsky Dan
Bacher William
A. Cook Website
of the Day
November 22, 2007 Alan
Farago Greg
Moses Dave
Lindorff Mike
Ely Omar
Azfar
November 21, 2007 Vijay
Prashad Martha
Rosenberg Manuel
Garcia, Jr. John
Ross Brian
McKenna Stephen
Soldz Monica
Benderman Ben
Terrall Website
of the Day
November 20, 2007 Oren
Ben-Dor Wajahat
Ali Alan
Farago Marjorie
Cohn Ralph
Nader Andy
Worthington Sara
Olson Dave
Lindorff Paul
Krassner Website
of the Day November 19, 2007 Winslow
T. Wheeler China
Hand Allan
Nairn Uri
Avnery David
Macaray Dave
Lindorff Bill
Quigley Ron
Jacobs Sunsara
Taylor Binoy
Kampmark Heather
Gray Website
of the Day
November 17 / 18, 2007 P.
Sainath David
Rosen Mike
Whitney George
Wuerthner Brenda
Norrell George
Ciccariello-Maher Karim
Makdisi Marie
Trigona Valerio
Volpi Fred
Gardner Robert
Fantina Mike
Ferner Missy
Comley Beattie Kenneth
Couesbouc Patrick
O'Hayer Poets'
Basement
November 16, 2007 Cockburn
/ St. Clair Dave
Zirin Gary
D. Barnett Alan
Farago Dave
Lindorff Russell
Mokhiber Robert
Ovetz Brenda
Norrell David
Swanson Peter
Letheby Website
of the Day
November 15, 2007 Cockburn
/ St. Clair Adolfo
Gilly Peter
Bohmer Andy
Worthington Gray
/ Derks Liaquat
Ali Khan Dave
Lindorff Christopher
Brauchli Anthony
Papa Martha
Rosenberg Ben
Terrall Website
of the Day
Cockburn
/ St. Clair James
Petras Al
Giordano Paul
Craig Roberts Andy
Worthington Stephen
Lendman Fatima
Bhutto Martin
Smith Jeff
Leys Website
of the Day November 13, 2007 Alexander
Cockburn Jeffrey
St. Clair Robert
Bryce David
Macaray Mike
Whitney Ralph
Nader Nikolas
Kozloff Jordan
Flaherty B.
R. Gowani Website
of the Day
November 12, 2007 Vicente
Navarro Ben
Brown Omar
K. Sadia
Abbas Farzana
Versey Richard
W. Behan Paul
Krassner Cindy
Sheehan Peter
Stone Brown Dave
Lindorff Website
of the Day
November 10 / 11, 2007 Alain
Gresh Mike
Whitney Ron
Jacobs Jeffrey
St. Clair Alan
Farago Binoy
Kampmark Robert
Fantina Fred
Gardner Ayesha
Ijaz Khan Nicola
Nasser Philip
Rizk Michael
Dickinson Joel
S. Hirschhorn Paul
Krassner Wadner
Pierre /
November 9, 2007 Patrick
Cockburn Mohammed
Hanif John
Ross Mike
Whitney Tom
Barry Corporate
Crime Reporter Badruddin
Khan David
Macaray Martha
Rosenberg Website
of the Day
November 8, 2007 Kathleen
& Bill Christison William
Loren Katz Mike
Whitney Sheldon
Richman Liaquat
Ali Khan Marc
Gardner Jackie
Corr Brenda
Norrell Dave
Lindorff China
Hand Sen.
Russ Feingold Website
of the Day
November 7, 2007 Paul
Craig Roberts Russell
Mokhiber Vijay
Prashad Niranjan
Ramakrishnan Alan
Farago David
Macaray Nikolas
Kozloff Charlotte
Laws Daniel
White William
Cook Website
of the Day
November 6, 2007 Mike
Whitney Ralph
Nader Andy
Worthington Pam
Martens Liaquat
Ali Khan William
Schroder Stephen
Lendman William
Blum Former
US Intelligence Officers
November 5, 2007 Alexander
Cockburn Russell
Mokhiber David
Macaray Gary
Leupp Dave
Lindorff Ludwig
Watzal Patrick
Cockburn Peter
Stone Brown Michael
Simmons Website
of the Day
November 3 / 4, 2007 Tariq
Ali David
Price Jeffrey
St. Clair Alan
Farago Paul
Krassner Rannie
Amiri P.
Sainath Ayesha
Ijaza Khan Robert
Fantina Seth
Sandronsky Ron
Jacobs Ramzy
Baroud Heather
Gray
November 2, 2007 Dr.
Mary Pipher Saul
Landau Andy
Worthington Sharon
Smith Gary
Leupp Gregory
Harms Christopher
Brauchli Peter
Morici Dave
Lindorff David
Penner Website
of the Day
November 1, 2007 Paul
Craig Roberts Patrick
Cockburn Dave
Lindorff Jonathan
Feldman Mike
Ferner William
S. Lind Diana
Johnstone Jacob
Hornberger A..K.
Gupta Lyuba
Zarsky / Felice
Pace Website
of the Day
October 31, 2007 Bill
Quigley Rev.
William E. Alberts Ray
McGovern Eric
Walberg V.
G. Smith Luis
J. Rodriguez Sheldon
Richman Walter
Brasch Website
of the Day
David
Price M.
Shahid Alam Andy
Worthington Patrick
Cockburn Anthony
Papa Floyd
Rudmin Sherwood
Ross Website
of the Day
October 29, 2007 Lisa
Hajjar Joe
DeRaymond Patrick
Cockburn Isabella
Kenfield / Fred
Gardner Farzana
Versey Stephen
Fleischman Marcelle
Cendrars Eamonn
McCann Martha
Rosenberg Website
of the Day
October 27 / 28, 2007 Alexander
Cockburn Jeffrey
St. Clair James
Bovard Ralph
Nader M.
Reza Pirbhai Robert
Sandels Jacob
G. Hornberger Missy
Beattie John
Ross Robert
Fantina Ron
Jacobs Ali
Moayedian David
Michael Green Poets
Basement Website
of the Day
October 26, 2007 Brian
Cloughley Saul
Landau Ahmad
Al-Akras Franklin
Lamb Mike
Whitney Dave
Lindorff Alan
Farago Yifat
Susskind Website
of the Day
Jeffrey
St. Clair / Manuel
Garcia, Jr. Paul
Craig Roberts Col.
Dan Smith Alan
Farago Chris
Kutalik Brian
McKinlay Cindy
Sheehan Website
of the Day
![]()
![]()
Subscribe Online
|
December 1, 2007 How Much Credit Goes to the Surge?The Quiet on the Middle Eastern FrontBy BRIAN M. DOWNING In recent months, US casualties and Iraqi deaths have dropped markedly. Americans and Iraqis welcome the news but are perplexed by it as well. This is especially so in the US Congress, where confusion and indecision have deepened, and opposition to the war is even more tepid and incoherent than a year ago. The administration and the military have cautiously claimed progress; sympathetic figures in Congress and the media have incautiously trumpeted it. They advance a readily understood explanation with an intuitive plausibility that a war-weary public is willing to accept. But momentous shifts rarely have simple causes. Sunni Arabs The most common explanation is that the Surge, the US counterinsurgency program designed and implemented by Gen. Petraeus, is working very well. Based on counterinsurgency doctrines developed late in the colonial era, the Surge used US troops to drive out insurgents from an area and hold it. Iraqi troops and officials were then to win popular support by providing services and inducements. The process was to be repeated in contiguous areas, gradually spreading government control across the country, as an oil spot would spread across water. Whatever success the Surge has thus far enjoyed in Baghdad, it has not spread out from the capital--largely because of the ineptitude or insouciance in the Iraqi military and state, both of which are Shi'a-dominated and hostile to Sunnis. Services and inducements are more often provided by the Americans than by the national government--hardly in keeping with counterinsurgency doctrine. Violence has declined for several other reasons, many of which might be reckoned more important than the Surge. Sunni-Shi'a violence, which spiraled out of control following the Samarra mosque bombing in early 2006, has eased. This has not been due to any reconciliation between the sects, but rather because sectarian violence over the last two and a half years has turned most of Baghdad and a few other major cities into homogeneous semi-fortified enclaves. Mixed neighborhoods have all but disappeared. Furthermore, 2 million or so Sunnis have fled to foreign countries. With so much forced dislocation, the opportunity for sectarian violence is down. Bruited along with the good news of the Surge--and mistakenly or disingenuously lumped together with it--have been the changes in Anbar and Diyali provinces around Baghdad--once insurgent and al Qaeda havens. Over the last year or so, tribes there have solicited and received US assistance to fight al Qaeda, which had incurred the wrath of the tribes because of its disrespect for local authorities, customs, and women. Tribal forces and GIs now work together to finish off al Qaeda. Former insurgents even draw pay from American coffers. And Anbar and Diyali have seen remarkable declines in US casualties. Proximity to Baghdad invites inference that this resulted from the spreading oil spot of the Surge--an inference that US officials are unlikely to discourage. However, the tribal volte-face preceded the Surge's operationalization; the potential for turning the Sunnis was recognized and exploited by local field commanders (and foreign powers), not by the Surge's directors in the Green Zone; and there has been little if any follow-up into the areas by the Iraqi state. Changes in Sunni Arab provinces might be best considered in two contexts. First, since the country's inception following the First World War, the Sunni Arabs were a minority of the population, yet they controlled the state, army, and oil revenue. This suddenly and irreversibly ended when the US-led coalition ousted Saddam and regarded the Shi'as as natural allies, the Sunnis as defeated enemies harboring varying degrees of hostility. During years of insurgency and sectarian fighting, Americans troops and Shi'a militias, separately and without coordination, inflicted hundreds of thousand casualties on the Sunni Arabs and helped drive many into nearby Sunni countries, reducing their population from 18% to about 13%. Without some sort of political change, the Sunni Arabs faced marginalization, if not extermination. The Shi'a-dominated state was hardly amenable to a deal with their former oppressors, but by late 2006 the Americans, mired in a vicious and domestically unsustainable insurgency, were amenable to a deal. And so US commanders and tribal councils forged working arrangements. The Americans got reduced casualties, the Sunni Arabs a protector. Historians might well ask someday, who turned whom? International dynamics constitute a second context. Sunni states around Iraq were wary of ousting Saddam. He had been a useful counter to the Shi'a revival begun by revolutionary Iran in 1979, and so they financed his long war with Iran in the eighties. Since then, Sunni states have continued to beware Iran and have looked upon domestic Shi'as as potential fifth columns. Following Saddam's ouster, the region braced as the Shi'a of Iraq and Iran filled the vacuum. Sunni states, especially Saudi Arabia, established or strengthened ties with tribal leaders in the Sunni regions of Iraq. Their diplomatic and intelligence services, whose practical knowledge of tribal politics in and out of their lands greatly exceeds the ken of American counterparts, were almost certainly critical in effecting the volte-face in Anbar, Diyali, and elsewhere in Iraq. Again, who turned whom?
Shi'a Arabs and Iran Violence in Shi'a areas has been based on militias fighting US and British forces and on the militias fighting each other, most notably Sadr's Mahdi Army and Hakim's Badr Brigades. Both forms of violence are down sharply. Shi'a efforts to marginalize or drive out the Sunni Arabs have dwindled as the latter sidled up to the US. Skirmishes between Shi'a militias and US and British troops have also dwindled. Until recently, US forces had been hammering Shi'a militias in Baghdad, wreaking havoc on their neighborhoods, suggesting to many Shi'as that the US now saw the Sunnis as natural allies. Shi'as saw the fearsome specter of renewed Sunni power in a truncated but nonetheless dangerous state, backed by the US and Saudi Arabia, and one day enriched by recent oil finds in Anbar. Sobered by this, Sadr and Hakim recently inked an agreement to end fighting between their forces, fighting that a few months ago seemed about to engulf the south as the British withdrew. Iranian pressure might have brought about the agreement. Many of the key Shi'a parties and militias were formed under Iranian tutelage and continue to receive money and advice from their co-religionists, so Iranian influence has naturally if covertly shaped recent events. Iran has been seeking a golden mean in Iraq: to inflict enough casualties on the US to bring about an eventual pullout, leaving a coherent Shi'a majority there; but to avoid inflicting so many casualties as to bring on harsh economic sanctions or devastating air strikes. Supplies to Shi'a militias over the years have never been very high--Iran wishes to demonstrate that it has supply lines into Iraq, and it can expand them, raising US casualties to domestically intolerable levels. In other words, Iran has considerable control over American casualties. But Iran's policy is in disarray. Israel's air strike in September 2007 on a possible nuclear facility in Syria weighs heavily on Iran. It implied Israeli and American willingness to attack Iran, but more importantly it demonstrated their ability to defeat the best Russian-made air defense systems, upon which Iran has based much of its national security. In other words, Iran is virtually defenseless. Heretofore, the US feared the loss of too many aircraft and planned to strike with only cruise missiles. But its aircraft can almost certainly penetrate Iranian air defenses, devastate nuclear facilities and military bases and economic infrastructure, and return to their carriers and bases with relatively few casualties. Iran could retaliate in several ways: send its special forces into Iraq to attack American troops and supply lines from Kuwait; encourage Hizbullah to launch strikes across the Middle East; and press the Shi'a factions in Iraq to order the US out or at least squeeze supplies. Some analysts suspect that Iran has Russian-made missiles capable of inflicting grave damage on American aircraft carriers, two of which patrol just outside Iranian waters. Iran has no desire to suffer the devastation the Israeli air force visited upon Lebanon in 2006, which American airpower can now easily repeat. It would rally the nation, but the economic damage would be frightful. And so Iran might have blinked recently. US generals have reported a decline in Iranian arms entering Iraq. Iran realizes that these supplies, limited though they are, constitute a rationale for the US to launch protracted air strikes across it--several thousand targets according to some sources. And although US policy toward Iran is probably independent of Iran's actions in Iraq, it sees no point in helping the US contrive a casus belli.
Stability and Instability The absence of political compromise between the sects is oft-noted, leading some to conclude that stability in the region is not in the offing and that recent developments have no lasting meaning. However, another form of stability is possible, one based on the US abandoning mediation between Sunni and Shi'a in Iraq and aligning with the Sunnis in and out of Iraq. The region might be headed for a standoff between the US, Saudi Arabia, and the Sunni Arabs of Iraq opposed to Iran and the Shi'a Arabs of Iraq and elsewhere. A new cold war, with uneasy frontiers stretching from Mosul in the north to Basra in the south, might be falling into place. This standoff would necessitate stationing a considerable portion of the US's available combat divisions in the region for an unfathomable amount of time, possibly making the duration of its antecedent in Central Europe seem ephemeral. For better or worse, there might be too many instabilities for this standoff to come about. One source of instability lies in the make-up of Iraqi tribes. The tribes of Anbar and Diyali are confederations comprising numerous tribes, hence they are subject to fissures along tribal, clan, and personal lines. Tribal leaders cooperating, or to some collaborating, with Americans and receiving emoluments from them can worsen these fissures. Related to this, al Qaeda, though ostensibly on the run in Iraq, has enjoyed considerable success in recent weeks in assassinating tribal leaders working with the US. Chastened by its blunders, it might learn to exacerbate fissures and find allies. And increased use of air strikes to keep American casualties down has predictably led to many inadvertent deaths of civilians and friendly forces that could worsen uneasiness regarding cooperation with the US. The Shi'a tribes also have serious fissures. Saddam played one off against the other and prevented the Shi'a majority from coalescing into a threat to his regime. Presently, Shi'a leaders nominally command militias and even some regular army formations, but they rely on traditional and charismatic appeals, making mutiny and infighting by lieutenants disaffected by recent events far more likely than in militaries based on rational-legal authority. A further source of instability lies in the recent return of many Sunni Arabs. As middle-class Sunnis who fled to Syria and Jordan return, they will politically and financially strengthen the old oppressors of the Shi'as. Many Shi'as will find this ominous and demand preemptive action. Most Shi'a have never heard of Santayana, but they know his famous message from long experience. The showdown over Iran's nuclear program is perhaps the most critical source of instability. A formidable group within the US government, centered on the vice president, is pressing for air strikes on Iran, regardless of its actions in Iraq. There is of course an opposing group, centered on the secretary of state, stressing negotiations and international pressures, which has the upper hand for now. But the correlation of forces within the administration remains opaque to most observers. Iran's president or the supreme leader, neither of whom seems well acquainted with the norms of world politics, could take action that would alter politics in Washington. However, against expectation, the supreme leader has recently rebuked the president for his sharp denunciation of domestic figures who oppose the nation's nuclear program--perhaps another blink. The decline in violence in Iraq rests uneasily on several unrelated and loosely related processes. The Surge is certainly one of them, but it is not foremost --maybe not even in Baghdad where it began. The number of these processes and their fragility do not inspire confidence that the decline in violence can continue, let alone help to promote desirable political development. Nor are they likely to allow the US to leave Iraq gracefully in the foreseeable future. Brian M. Downing is a veteran of the Vietnam War and author of several works of political and military history, including The Military Revolution and Political Change and The Paths of Glory: War and Social Change in America from the Great War to Vietnam. He can be reached at: brianmdowning@gmail.com © Brian M. Downing ![]()
|
How the Press Led the US into War ![]() Buy End Times Now! CounterPunch Books of the Crossroads: HOW THE IRISH INVENTED SLANG By Daniel Cassidy AMERICAN BOOK AWARD! ![]() Click Here to Buy! Click Here for Dates & Venues Michael Neumann's Devastating Rebuttal of Alan Dershowitz ![]() Click Here to Buy! Saul Landau's Bush and Botox World with a Foreword by Gore Vidal ![]() Click Here to Order! How They Made a Killing on the War on Terrorism ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() The Occupation by Patrick Cockburn ![]() ![]() ![]() Humanitarian Imperialism By Jean Bricmont ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() CITY BEAUTIFUL By Tennessee Reed ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() Bruce Springsteen On Tour By Dave Marsh ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |