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October
8, 2001
Mahajan
and Jensen
A
War of Lies
Patrick
Cockburn
Northern
Alliance
Builds an Airport
October
7, 2001
John Pilger
Hitchens'
Slurs
Tariq
Ali
Who
Said History
Stopped Being Ironical?
October
6, 2001
Vijay
Prashad
US
War Aims
Kevin
Gray
The
Trap:
Blacks and 9/11
October
5, 2001
Ronnie
Gilbert
Déjà
Vu: The FBI's War
on Civil Liberties
Patrick
Cockburn
Taliban
Cluster Bombs
Dave
Marsh
John
Brown, Woody Guthrie
and the Secret Music of 9/11
Babak
Nahid
A
Suspect's Perspective
October
4, 2001
David
Vest
Send
in the Cons
Robin
Blackburn
Road
to Armageddon
Noam
Chomsky
Chatting
with Chomsky
Tony
Blair
The
Dossier on bin Laden
Norman
Madarasz
Canada
Kow-Tows to US
Lorenzo Ervin
No Palestinian
Ever
Called Me Nigger
October
3, 2001
Peter Bell
Hitchens
and Coulter:
Love at Last?
Patrick
Cockburn
Waiting
Is the Hardest Part
Jeff
Chang
Clear
Channel Fires
Davey D!
John Chuckman
War
on Terror:
Crusade Without a Definition
Mahajan/Jensen
Tough
Talk Won't Solve
Problems of Terrorism
Ariel
Dorfman:
America
the Wounded
Lennie
Brenner
Dr.
Watson in Afghanistan
Steve
Perry:
Ashcroft's
Scare Tactics
October
2, 2001
Patrick
Cockburn:
Inside
an Afghan Hospital
Richard
Manning:
A
Vietnam Vet on Patriotism
St. Clair/Cockburn:
Tarnished
Star,
Tom Ridge in Vietnam
October
1, 2001
Noam
Chomsky:
Memo
to Hitchens
Hizam
Bitar:
Refuting
Michael Kinsley
David Grenier:
The
Good, The Bad,
and the Ugly
Douglas
Valentine:
Homeland
Insecurity
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October 9,
2001
Colin Powell the Owl:
On Afghanistan
and von Clausewitz
By Lenni Brenner
Below are references to Afghanistan
in Colin Powell's (with Joseph Persico), autobiography, My
American Journey, 1995. I've also appended a discussion of
Powell & Afghanistan from Howard Means; bio, Colin
Powell: Soldier/Statesman-Statesman/Soldier, 1992. It clarifies
material in Powell's opus.
Some quotes are in context,
to give readers a feel for where Afghanistan fit into his thinking
at the time of the crucial US involvement with fundamentalism,
1979-89, when purblind patronage converted an ideology identified
throughout Islam with backwardness, intellectually & militarily,
into a triumphalist movement, capable of forcing the Soviets
out of their country. Bin Laden & the Taliban are the "blowback,"
the CIA's own term for unforeseen negative consequences from
its crimes.
Now that Bush & Powell
have hit Kabul, it is helpful to know something of how Washington
thinks. As crusader George W doesn't think better than he speaks.
Powell is the key player, with military professionalism and
diplomatic position. Therefore I have also included his references
to Karl von Clausewitz, as these give some understanding as
to how he sees war, in light of the Prussian genius' justly
celebrated dictum, "war is the continuation of politics
by other means."
If you haven't read Clausewitz's
book, On War, do so, ASAP. When Powell says it's "like
a beam of light from the past, still illuminating present-day
military quandaries," he's on target. Powell refers to
the presentation of Clausewitz's theories, before the cavalry-era
examples. If memory serves re a book read decades ago, that's
ca 140 pp. Hardly much of a read for a War & Politics for
Dummies praised by both Powell and Karl Marx.
Powell's political limitations
emerge in his seeing Afghanistan as a logistic Problem. While
he, the civilian Defense Secretary's military guy, fought the
important war, within Congress (re: militarily budget priorities
against the Soviets, worldwide), clearly, he hadn't a clue as
to what government should replace the Soviet-backed regime in
Kabul.
However, Clausewitz sees war
as coming out of politics. An alternate reading of Clausewitz
to Powell's stunted interpretation would have the German saying
that if the US, in 1979, didn't have a viable Afghan government
on board to replace the Stalinist Kabul regime, militarily forcing
the Soviets to withdraw couldn't produce political victory in
Afghanistan, regardless of the subsequent political disintegration
of the USSR. In other words, the US fought two political wars
in one military conflict. It beat the Soviets. But it was destined
to lose in Afghanistan, unknowingly, to its own creation.
The best analogy to the US/bin
Laden relationship is that between the German capitalists and
Hitler in 1933. They were backing a kick-ass anti-Marxist. Killing
Jews never entered most of their heads. But disaster is what
you get if you play around with militarist fanatics. The Democrats
and Republicans nurtured snakes at their bosom. Now we all got
bitten.
The US beat that day's economically
declining foe by tooling up today's military enemy. It gave
fundamentalism unrestrained leave to take the country, destroy
what progress, particularly re women's rights, the USSR defended,
however well and badly, and establish an Islamic equivalent of
a Crusader or Zionist state, a sovereign entity from which to
expand, as triumphant fanaticism always tries to.
Today Bush & Powell, with
the support of the Democrats, militarily war on their own creation.
But, given their obviously disastrous Afghan record, who can
have any confidence that they will have any lasting political
success? What will they do with the country if they take it
and/or kill bin Laden? What will be their relationship thereafter
with the Muslims of the world, 19.3% of the planet?
Note well: The key players
in the present drama are Powell, the American people and the
world Muslim public. As Powell's a military pro, he read the
required text, even if he misunderstands it. If we are to beat
him at his game, we must be more professional. That means this
antiwar movement must read off the same page from Clausewitz
that he does, but better than he does.
Excerpts
Colin Powell (with Joseph Persico),
My
American Journey, 1995. p 250:
"I had supported Jimmy
Carter in 1976. This time I could not.... [O]n the whole, the
vibrations coming out of the Carter White House were not comforting
to the military profession.... [Then] Carter withdrew the meat
cleaver and started to build up the country's defenses, but
it was too late. By then, the December 1979 Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan had made his administration look naive in its expectations
of a harmonious era of East-West relations in which we could
drop our guard.... That November 1980, I checked my absentee
ballot for Ronald Reagan."
pp 296-7:
"As one committee chairman
put it to me, no matter how high-flown the debate, at the end
of the day, he had to have one vote more than 50 percent, or
no budget passed. And what swung votes was what some people
called pork and others called national defense. I soon understood
the difference. Pork was national defense spending in another
member's district."
"It was not easy to stand
up to members of congress, since we needed their votes. But
the line had to be drawn somewhere. Once, while serving as Weinberger's
military assistant, I got a call from Congressman Charles Wilson
of Texas. Charlie Wilson was a defense stalwart and a particular
rainmaker in winning aid for the mujahedin who were fighting
the communist regime and Soviet forces in Afghanistan. Charlie
had earlier called our Legislative Affairs Office to arrange
military transportation for a trip to the region. He wanted
to bring along his girlfriend. He had, quite correctly, been
turned down. He then called me. He complained about nitpicking
bureaucrats, and I knew I would straighten them out. I was well
aware that Wilson was a vote we counted on, and I took a deep
breath before answering. "Charlie," I said, "that's
unauthorized use of government aircraft. The Secretary cannot
approve it."
"The girlfriend episode
marked my first serious run-in with a member of Congress, and
I came away with this conclusion. You can afford adversaries,
but not enemies. Today's adversary may be tomorrow's ally. I
managed to remain friends with Charlie and to accommodate his
substantive requests. And we continued to get his vote on key
issues."
pp 338-9
"The next big question
was what to do about the contras, who were still fighting the
Marxist Sandinista government in Nicaragua. The backdoor aid
to the contras that Ollie north had arranged to get around a
congressional ban had created the messiest part of the Iran-contra
affair. But that fact did not detract from the justice of the
contra cause. How to deal with the contras, however, produced
a fault line that split the administration right down the middle,
even among those who supported them. George Sultan at State
saw the contras as useful for keeping pressure on the Sandinistas
to come to the bargaining table, where we hoped to persuade
them to democratize their country and stop exporting communism.
Cap Weinberger saw the contras in a romantic vein, like the
mujahedin fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan. To him, these
Nicaraguans were freedom fighters deserving our full support
in a serious bid to throw off the Marxist yoke in Managua."
pp 340-1:
"Overarching all other
concerns was our relationship with the Soviet Union. Our defense
strategy and budget were almost wholly a reflection of Soviet
capabilities and intentions as we read them.... Our choosing
sides in conflicts around the world was almost always decided
on the basis of East-West competition. The new Soviet leader,
Mikhail Gorbachev, however, was turning the old Cold War formulas
on their head. Gorbachev appeared to be more intent on solving
the Soviet Union's internal failings than in embarking on fruitless
adventures from Angola to Afghanistan.... Only by reducing East-West
tensions could he cut the Soviet Union's voracious defense spending
and turn the country's resources to crying civilian needs....
Ronald Reagan was operating from a position of political and
military strength."
"It was now time for substance
over ceremony. Gorbachev still wanted to derail SDI, and he
wanted to make a pitch for economic aid for his country. We
wanted the Soviets out of Afghanistan and wanted Jews to be free
to leave the Soviet Union. I had arranged for the principals...to
meet in the Oval Office at 2:30 PM. But the State Department
wanted so many people included...that, at the last minute, George
Shultz asked to move to the much larger Cabinet Room. My antennae
started quivering. Sudden changes threw Ronald Reagan off his
form. Unwisely, I yielded to Shultz."
p 377:
"We were going to Moscow
with high hopes. On May 15, the Soviets had started to pull
their troops out of Afghanistan. And during this summit, we expected
to complete the nuclear arms reduction breakthrough.... We expected
approval, but not without a fight from conservatives, Republican
and Democrat. The treaty was bitter for these people to swallow
because we would have to give up some weapons and because a
residue of distrust of the Soviet Union persisted."
p 481:
"He was most moved, however,
at our last stop...the Vietnam Veterans Memorial.... Moiseyev
was quiet as we trooped along the wall. At the end he said,
'We need to do more. We don't remember enough.'"
"I knew he was not speaking
of World War II, which is commemorated in practically every
Russian village. He was thinking of the Soviet Union's own Vietnam,
Afghanistan, which had cost over 13,000 lives and which his
government blotted from public awareness as though it had never
happened, leaving only the families of the dead to grieve. The
visit to the wall brought us together as brothers in the profession
of arms, no matter what flag we served, 'content to fill a soldier's
grave,' as the old poem goes."
p 207:
"That wise Prussian Karl
von Clausewitz was an awakening for me. His 'On War'... was
like a beam of light from the past, still illuminating present-day
military quandaries. 'No one starts a war, or rather no one in
his senses should do so,' Clausewitz wrote, 'without first being
clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and
how he intends to achieve it.' Mistake number one in Vietnam.
Which lead to Clausewitz's rule number two. Political leaders
must set a war's objectives, while armies achieve them. In Vietnam,
one seemed to be looking to the other for the answers that never
came. Finally, the people must support a war. Since they supply
the treasure and the sons, and today the daughters too, they
must be convinced that the sacrifice is justified. That essential
pillar had crumbled as the Vietnam War ground on. Clausewitz's
greatest lesson for my profession was that the soldier, for
all his patriotism, valor, and skill, forms just one leg in a
triad. Without all three legs engaged, the military, the government,
and the people, the enterprise cannot stand."
p 303:
"Weinberger addressed
the national Press Club on November 28. I went with him to hear
him describe the tests he recommended 'When we are weighing the
use of US combat forces abroad. (1) Commit only if our or our
allies' vital interests are at stake. (2) If we commit, do so
with all the resources necessary to win. (3) Go in only with
clear political and military objectives. (4) Be ready to change
the commitment if the objectives change, since wars rarely stand
still. (5) Only take on commitments that can gain the support
of the American people and the Congress. (6) Commit US forces
only as a last resort.'
"In short, is the national
interest at stake? If the answer is yes, go in, and go in to
win. Otherwise, stay out. Clausewitz would have applauded."
p 419:
"I consoled myself with
the words of Clausewitz: 'The vividness of transient impressions
must not make us forget that such truth they maintain is of a
lesser stamp.'"
p. 444:
"The night the coup ended,
I left the Pentagon feeling good. I had applied Clausewitz's
teachings, or Weinberger's Maxim No. 3, and my own rule in forming
military advice: take no action until you have a clear objective.
We had applied restrained, proportionate, calibrated force,
linked to a specific goal. And it had worked."
Howard Means,
Colin
Powell: Soldier/Statesman-Statesman/Soldier
pp 208-10:
"Perhaps the most compelling
testimony to Powell's capacity as an honest broker comes from
someone who might be construed as a hostile witness. Michael
Pillsbury was Assistant Under-Secretary of Defense...until 1986,
when he was fired for allegedly leaking classified information
regarding the US effort to supply Stinger anti-aircraft missiles
to rebel forces in both Afghanistan and Angola."
"Pillsbury says.... '[I]f
Colin Powell wasn't present there wouldn't be any follow-up....
He was very well known for his skills as a referee.'"
"In the particular instance
of supplying Stinger missiles to the Afghan rebels, it was Powell's
own Army that was most opposed, Pillsbury goes on. 'The Stingers
were being taken from the Army; that was one of the biggest
obstacles we faced. The Army was extremely bitter and opposed.
It fell to Colin at several points to adjudicate.... [T]he Joint
Chiefs had raised two big points. One was that there were only
a few thousand Stingers then in existence, and they felt we
should have Stingers before we gave them to foreigners.... The
second big issue was that if the Stingers should fall in the
hands of the Soviets in Afghanistan, they could study the technology
and make copies and would be able to shoot down American fighters
in Europe in a World War Three and we would lose World War Three.'"
"Under our system the
Joint Chiefs are not permitted to know what the CIA (to whom
the missiles were to be provided for shipment to Afghanistan)
is doing."
"'On the Hill we all thought
the uniformed military officers were hawks,' Pillsbury says,
'and nothing could be further from the truth. A lot of left-liberals
wear uniforms with four stars on their shoulders. Colin had
heard Reagan talk for years about the Afghan rebels and their
suffering. If he was a hawk he would have just said, Mr. Secretary,
I think you should just sign here (approving the Stingers for
the rebels). A dove with guile would have killed it without
telling us why. Here's a case study of Powell's style: he's
not a hawk; he's not a dove; he's an owl, in between."
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