| December
6, 2007
Bush's
Iran Debacle
Nuclear
Fallout
By MARWAN
BISHARA
"Dishonest",
"misleading", "lying" and "spinning"
are just some of the measured adjectives used in the mainstream
US media to characterise George Bush, the president, and Stephen
Hadley, his national security adviser, after they embraced the damning
National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) summary report on Iran as proof
of the effectiveness and success of the administration's Tehran
policy.
The
NIE judges "with high confidence that in the fall of 2003,
Tehran halted its nuclear weapons programme", and that "Tehran's
decision to halt its nuclear weapons programme suggests it is less
determined to develop nuclear weapons than we have been judging
since 2005".
NIE
report: Iran Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities
It
further said that "...Tehran's decisions are guided by a cost-benefit
approach rather than a rush to a weapon irrespective of the political,
economic and military costs". And that "this NIE does
not assume that Iran intends to acquire nuclear weapons".
The
White House seems to have known of much of this and more for some
time, but chose to escalate the war rhetoric against Tehran.
Depending
on which version of the story one believes, the White House knew
about the "discovery" any time between last spring and
summer.
Even
when new intelligence compelled the National Intelligence Board
(NIB) to make a 180-degree change in its estimate, rendering the
Iranian threat anything but imminent, administration officials continued
to speak of the threat of Iran's nuclear weapons programme until
hours before its publication.
The
White House sent its third carrier into the Gulf transforming its
"crisis management" mode with Iran into direct "confrontation
management" and sealing the war scenario against Tehran when
the decision comes down.
President
Bush also warned during a news conference on October 17 that an
Iranian nuclear bomb could lead to "world war three" and
asked Congress to pass the highest defence budget in the history
of the country, mostly under the guise of an imminent Iranian threat
that he knew did not exist.
Déjà
vu
In
a repeat of the dreadful and misleading escalation against Iraq
prior to its 2003 invasion, the Bush administration escalated the
war rhetoric against Tehran even though it knew with high confidence
that it had no programme, no capability and, with moderate confidence,
no intention of developing a nuclear weapons programme.
The
leading presidential candidates followed suit.
Rudy Giuliani claimed: "As we all know, Iran is seeking nuclear
weapons and they're threatening to use them."
Likewise, Senator John McCain insisted: "There's no doubt that
[Iran is] moving forward with the acquisition of a nuclear weapon."
And
Hillary Clinton, before giving the president another vote of confidence
to go to war, insisted that "Iran is seeking nuclear weapons,
and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard is in the forefront of that,
as they are in the sponsorship of terrorism."
To
the surprise of many Western observers, it turns out that the policies
of the Iranian and Iraqi leaders were based on realistic "cost
and benefit" grounds, not the irrational behaviour Washington
accused them of as dangerous and unpredictable crazies.
On
the other hand, the Bush administration's war policies towards Iraq
and Iran have proven to be hardly cost and benefit driven even when
calculating the oil and strategic interests.
Worse,
the Bush administration lost all credibility when it went on to
intimidate its allies and foes alike to punish Iran. It also attacked
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Mohamed ElBaradai,
its director, for being soft on Iran, knowing all too well that
they have been right all along.
Condoleezza
Rice, the US secretary of sate, told ElBaradei that his body was
not "in the business of diplomacy".
ElBaradei,
to his credit, has long believed Iran possessed no nuclear weapons
programme and made a deal under which it would answer long-standing
questions about its nuclear activities.
Cover
up?
According
to Senator Jay Rockefeller, chairman of the Senate Intelligence
Committee, Bush knew about the new information regarding Iran's
nuclear programme, because he and his deputy on the committee were
also informed, albeit in a more general manner, by the intelligence
community.
Gary Sick, a US-based Iran expert, estimates that the president
might have known some nine months ago, when according to him the
Iranian deputy defence minister defected to the West.
On
November 14, Mike McConnell, NIE director, told the Woodrow Wilson
International Centre for Scholars that he was not going to make
his report public. Which begs the question, why has the White House
allowed the publication of this embarrassing report?
Two
possible scenarios have surfaced since the publication:
First,
Robert Gates, the US defence secretary, insisted on it. The Pentagon
finances most of the programmes and departments that contribute
to the NIE database.
Unlike
the 2005 pro-war Rumsfeld, Gates does not want another Middle Eastern
war as he told Congress recently, especially in light of the debacle
in Iraq.
Second,
it seems that congressional leaders who oppose Bush's Iran policy
insisted that it be publicised after hearing or reading some of
its preliminary conclusions.
In an election year, any such news is good news for the Democrats.
By
default or by design?
Some
believe that the Bush administration, famous for its political discipline,
is none the less using the NIE in a clever, even if desperate, attempt
to climb down from the hysterical "Carthage must be destroyed"
line.
After
all, how many times can you mention World War Three without eventually
having to start it?
Now
that it is out, the new estimate could neutralise the neo-conservative
fringe, and let the administration out of a rhetorical corner.
The
White House announcement of the president's Middle East trip at
the beginning of next year, following the attendance this week by
Mahmoud Ahmedinejad, the Iranian president, at the Gulf co-operation
summit, underlines the desire to relax tensions in the region following
Annapolis and the relative "improvements" of the Iraq
situation.
Today
and in light of the NIE findings, some observers believe the central
issue for the US and Iran is no longer the nuclear question but
rather the future of Iraq.
The
US understands that it "needs Iran for the endgame in Iraq",
while for Iran, the recent developments in Iraq encourage it to
make a deal with Washington before the latter strikes a deal with
its adversaries.
Three
scenarios
Now
that the new estimate is out, something has got to give.
First,
international and domestic pressure will build up against a pre-emptive
strike and, my guess, at least two permanent members will stand
against another UN Security Council resolution punishing Iran, despite
its civilian programme that contradicts past resolutions.
Second,
the NIE publication might pave the way to bilateral negotiations
between the US and Iran without stiff preconditions in order to
relax the tensions in the Gulf with the participation of Iran's
Arab neighbours, as well as its European allies.
Now
that the nuclear roadblock is out of the way, Washington will find
it ever more necessary and ever more enticing to talk to Iran about
a "helpful" and perhaps beneficial role for itself and
Iraq in the Gulf.
Either
way, the White House will certainly face more questions and inquiries
regarding the discrepancies of timings and policies; as more insiders
come clean on US policy towards Iran. Americans would want to know
what Bush and Co knew, when did they know it and what have they
done or not done about it?
As
so many commentators have said the morning after Bush and Hadley
embraced the NIE report, the central question begging for an answer
revolves around how corrupt politics have lead to dangerous policies.
Marwan
Bishara is a senior political commentator for Al Jazeera.
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