What
You're Missing in Our Subscriber-only CounterPunch Newsletter
Special Investigation:
Have Journalists Been Deliberately Murdered in Iraq by the US
Military?
Our new
CounterPunch newsletter, just out, Christopher Reed examines
the growing body count of journalists in Iraq and documents numerous
incidents where US troops have deliberately targeted reporters.
Charles Glass offers a
stark comparison of the uprooting of Palestians in the Galilee
during the 1948 war to the lush compensation of Israelis living
on the same land who were displaced by the war on Lebanon. Remember, we are funded
solely by the subscribers to the print edition of CounterPunch. Please support this
website by buying a
subscription to our newsletter, which contains fresh material you
won't find anywhere else, or by making a donation towards the
cost of this online edition. Remember contributions are tax-deductible.Click
here to make a donation. If you find our site useful please:Subscribe
Now
Despite the breathless hype, the Baker-Hamilton
Iraq Study Group (ISG) report did not include any dramatic new
ideas for ending the war in Iraq. In fact, it did not include
a call to end the war at all. Rather, the report's recommendations
focus on transforming the U.S. occupation of Iraq into a long-term,
sustainable, off-the-front-page occupation with a lower rate
of U.S. casualties. Despite its title, it does not provide "A
New Approach: A Way Forward."
George Bush, announcing the
report, said "the country is tired of pure political bickering."
It would be far more accurate to say the country--not to mention
Iraq and the rest of the world--are tired of war. The report
is a reaction to the American people's and the anti-war movement's
rejection of the war in the November 2006 elections. But the
ISG's goal appeared to reflect the elite consensus in U.S. opinion
of the importance of a different goal--getting the issue of the
war off the November 2008 election agenda--not to end the war.
The new catch phrase of spin
around withdrawal used in the report is "responsible transition."
In the introduction, the report states that "this responsible
transition can allow for a reduction in the U.S. presence in
Iraq over time." It is not aimed at ending that U.S. presence.
It is very clear that the Baker-Hamilton team do not propose
a diminishing of U.S. efforts to control Iraq; the focus is very
much on supporting (and keeping in power) the current U.S.-backed
government and its army, despite the fact that neither institution
reflects much of the national consciousness and accountability,
let alone legitimacy, that the report claims to want.
The word "occupation"
appears only five times in the entire report. Three times it
is used to describe what Iraqis "believe" or "think"
about the U.S. presence in their country. Twice it refers to
U.S. troops in the post-World War II Army of Occupation in Germany.
Never does it refer directly to the U.S. occupation of Iraq (nor
to the Israeli occupation of Palestinian land).
The report does differ from
current Bush administration policy, and there are important components
to it. It calls for talking directly with Iran and Syria, something
ardently opposed by President Bush. It admits that the cost of
the war has already approached $2 trillion. Diverging from Bush's
longstanding "we will stand down as Iraqis stand up"
approach, the ISG cautiously suggests that the Iraqi government
should be told that if they do not meet their own "milestones,"
that U.S. support might be reduced. Particularly challenging
the recent escalation in Bush administration threats to the Mahdi
Army leader Moqtada al-Sadr, and contrary to other Bush policies,
the report calls on the administration "to engage all parties
in Iraq, with the exception of al Qaeda. The United States must
find a way to talk to Grand Ayatollah Sistani, Moqtada al-Sadr,
and militia and insurgent leaders."
In fact, the report even acknowledges
the importance of such a national reconciliation process, and
recognizes that the U.S. occupation itself must be discussed
by Iraq's wide-ranging leaders. It states, "The question
of the future U.S. force presence must be on the table for discussion
as the national reconciliation dialogue takes place. Its inclusion
will increase the likelihood of participation by insurgents and
militia leaders, and thereby increase the possibilities for success."
Overall, the report reflects
the steep drop in U.S. and international support for the Bush
administration's Iraq policy, and the desperation of U.S. elites
to somehow rescue foreign policy and declining U.S. influence
and power in the world. It recognizes that the November 2006
elections were about rejecting the war but it does not come close
to reflecting what the American people (62%) AND the Iraqi people
(80%) actually want: a rapid and complete end to the U.S. occupation
and the troops brought home. Instead, it suggests 79 complicated
(and in some cases contradictory) carefully calibrated, moderate,
"bi-partisan" (NOT non-partisan) recommendations for
changing the "stay the course" language without really
making the course that much different for Iraqis and the majority
of U.S. troops.
Military
Recommendations
The military recommendations
urge the transformation of the U.S. occupation from the current
large-scale ground deployment of 150,000 troops to a smaller-scale,
less obtrusive occupation where the war's ground troops will
be primarily Iraqi. They suggest that U.S. "combat brigades"
should be largely out of Iraq by early 2008, but that "combat
troops" should remain, primarily "embedded" with
the Iraqi military, and engaged in rapid reaction and special
operations; these combat troops would also be involved in training,
air support, transportation, logistics, intelligence and other
tasks. The rapid reaction and special operations would focus
on al Qaeda in Iraq, but would also undertake other "missions
considered vital by the U.S. commander in Iraq." And the
report goes on to affirm that "even after the United States
has moved all combat brigades out of Iraq, we would maintain
a considerable military presence in the region, with our still
significant force in Iraq and with our powerful air, ground,
and naval deployments in Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar, as well
as an increased presence in Afghanistan." It states that
one goal of those U.S. troops in the region would be to "deter
even more destructive interference in Iraq by Syria and Iran."
It says the President should state that the U.S. does not seek
permanent bases in Iraq, but says nothing about dismantling the
four permanent bases already in use, and leaves a huge loophole
that a "temporary base or bases," if requested by the
Iraqi government, would be considered.
The ISG recognized that "adding
more American troops could conceivably worsen those aspects of
the security problem that are fed by the view that the U.S. presence
is intended to be a long-term 'occupation'." And they admitted
that "there is little evidence that the long-term deployment
of U.S. troops by itself has led or will lead to fundamental
improvements in the security situation." But they still
rejected the logical response of ending the occupation and bringing
home all the troops.
Instead, the report puts significant
responsibility on the Iraqi government. Urging again that the
U.S. threaten the Iraqi government with a decrease in support
if they do not make good on their milestones, the report states
that, "America's other security needs and the future of
our military cannot be made hostage to the actions or inactions
of the Iraqi government."
Inside Iraq, the ISG forwards
two recommendations for the Iraqi military. The first notes that
there are likely not enough Iraqi troops and the U.S. should
do a better job of training them. But the ISG ignores the results
of large increase in trained Iraqi security forces over the last
year. Even as the Iraqi security forces have added 100,000 to
their ranks in 2006, violence has increased. Given the track
record of the forces and their devolution into units more loyal
to sectarian leaders rather than the government, increasing troops
will only heap more fuel on the fire.
The second recommendation focuses
on moving oversight of large segments of the Iraqi police forces
from the Interior department to the Defense department. Blurring
the lines between military and police forces is extremely dangerous
and will lessen the already weak credibility of the police forces.
This recommendation has more to do with taking power away from
the Interior ministry headed by nationalist Shi'te Muqtada al-Sadr's
political party than it does with reforming the troubled Iraqi
police forces and will be seen inside Iraq as yet another attempt
by the Americans to micromanage internal Iraqi politics.
Diplomatic
Recommendations
As anticipated, the report
deals much more extensively with diplomatic approaches to the
Iraq war. But the report assumes that Iraq's neighbors share
the U.S. view of Iraq's "stability," a concept with
far differing definitions. And dangerously, the ISG appears to
assume that all countries in the Middle East, at least all governments,
identify primarily in the context of Sunni/Shi'a rivalry, and
that they will operate in the region on a sectarian basis rather
than on the basis of their self-defined national interests. Key
governments in the region may well be anti-Iran, but Egypt, Jordan,
other Arab countries are far more likely to be uneasy about the
rising power of a wealthy, powerful, influential nation that
challenges their pro-U.S. positions and dependence, than they
are about Iran as a Shi'a country.
Fundamentally, while the ISG
rejects the harshly unilateralist approaches of the Bush White
House, it does not challenge the current understanding that U.S.
power remains primary in Iraq and the region. Recommendation
One calls for a New Diplomatic Offensive, whose goals include
"support the unity and territorial integrity of Iraq; stop
destabilizing interventions and actions by Iraq's neighbors;
secure Iraq's borders...; prevent the expansion of the instability
and conflict beyond Iraq's borders; promote economic assistance,
commerce, trade, political support, and, if possible, military
assistance for the Iraqi government from non-neighboring Muslim
nations."
But the proposed diplomatic
campaign is thoroughly coercive. A later recommendation calls
for creation of an Iraq International Support Group, "as
an instrument of the New Diplomatic Offensive," meaning
as an instrument of U.S. diplomacy. That group "should consist
of Iraq and all the states bordering Iraq, including Iran and
Syria; the key regional states, including Egypt and the Gulf
States; the five permanent members of the United Nations Security
Council; the European Union; and, of course, Iraq itself...."
And there is a specific reference to a potential Iranian refusal
to join the "Support Group" would "demonstrate
to Iraq and the rest of the world Iran's rejectionist attitude
and approach, which could lead to its isolation. Further, Iran's
refusal to cooperate on this matter would diminish its prospects
of engaging with the United States in the broader dialogue it
seeks."
The ISG's call for the U.S.
to talk with Iran and Syria represents one of the strongest points
of departure from the Bush agenda. It is important that the report
calls for these talks. However, there is little serious discussion
of changing the U.S. diplomatic posture that could make such
talks fruitful. On Syria, there is a recognition that a qualified
end to Israel's occupation of the Golan Heights must be on the
table. But the ISG refused to include discussion of Iran's nuclear
issues in any new talks and the overall approach to Syria and
Iran emphasizes that the reason they should negotiate with the
U.S. is because of "prospects for enhanced diplomatic relations
with the United States; and the prospect of a U.S. policy that
emphasizes political and economic reforms instead of (as Iran
now perceives it) advocating regime change." In other words,
they should negotiate with Washington because if they don't the
U.S. will continue to isolate and threaten them. Not exactly
a model of "new diplomacy."
And on Israel-Palestine, the
ISG again rejects Bush's position by linking the Iraq crisis
with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. There is a general call
for a renewed U.S. commitment to Bush's 2002 claimed support
for a two-state solution for Israel and Palestine. But the report's
recognition that "in diplomacy, a nation can and should
engage its adversaries and enemies to try to resolve conflicts
and differences consistent with its own interests," including
Syria and Iran, still leaves out Palestine. The ISG supports
the U.S. refusal to talk to the democratically-elected Palestinian
Authority government led by Hamas, using the language of a call
for "direct talks with, by, and between Israel, Lebanon,
Palestinians (those who accept Israel's right to exist), and
particularly Syria...."
But the real problem is the
ISG's refusal to acknowledge or call for an end to the Israeli
occupation, instead only urging new negotiations aimed at an
unspecified resolution. Unlike the report's explicit call to
"return the Golan Heights" to Syria, there is no call
for Israel to end its occupation and "return the West Bank,
Gaza and East Jerusalem" to the Palestinians. Reassertion
of UN Resolutions 242 and 338, which U.S. and Israeli routinely
do is insufficient. Further, the proposed negotiations would
once again be under the control of the U.S., thus insuring that
U.S. policies would dominate any outcome.
The only reference to Israel's
escalating violence in the occupied territories, especially in
besieged Gaza, comes in the form of an even-handed call for "consolidating
the cease-fire reached between the Palestinians and the Israelis
in November 2006." The report's call for "support for
a Palestinian national unity government" does not indicate
what happens if Hamas continues leadership of such a government.
Interestingly, the report's
listing of issues to be included in any Israeli-Palestinian negotiations
does include a specific reference to the "right of return."
The use of that term, as opposed to the usual generic reference
to "the problem of Palestinian refugees," may well
be its first use in a quasi-official U.S. diplomatic statement.
Of course there is no recommendation that discussing the right
of return (guaranteed in UN resolution 194) should lead to implementation
of the right, but even acknowledgement is a step Bush has always
rejected.
Ironically, the report does
seem to acknowledge the Israeli threat in the region. In the
section dealing with regional diplomacy, the ISG recognizes that
"none of Iraq's neighbors--especially major countries such
as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Israel--see it in their interest
for the situation in Iraq to lead to aggrandized regional influence
by Iran. Indeed, they may take active steps to limit Iran's influence,
steps that could lead to an intra-regional conflict." While
the Arab countries certainly remain wary of Iran's rising influence,
only Israel has both the political approach and the military
capacity to take "steps that could lead to an intra-regional
conflict," referring clearly to a possible Israeli strike
on Iran.
Helping
the Iraqi's Help Themselves
As the situation in Iraq has
deteriorated in 2006, it has become fashionable to blame the
Iraqis and the ISG report is no different. The report fails to
examine how sectarian cleavages were exacerbated by Paul Bremer,
the U.S. appointed "administrator" of Iraq, through
his appointment of Iraqi advisors by ethnic and religious background
during the onset of occupation. Indeed, it was Bremer who designed
the illegal framework for the Iraqi "unity government"
which is now crumbling. Instead of recognizing the weak foundation
of this house of cards, the ISG puts Iraq's future squarely on
the shoulders of Iraq's elected leaders, suggesting they should
be measured on their ability to meet benchmarks for national
reconciliation, security and governance.
Politically, the ISG's strongest
recommendation for reconciliation is to encourage talks between
the different groups and to involve the international community.
But with popular support for the government lacking within Iraq
because of its close alliance and dependence on the U.S. occupation,
there is little that outside players can do to provide the popular
legitimacy that would be needed for it to function.
As divisions have intensified
between the Sunni's, Kurds, and Shi'ites (not to mention the
other minority groups inside Iraq) national reconciliation is
certainly needed. Indeed, Iraqis themselves began this process
earlier in 2006. Ironically it was the U.S. who vetoed four provisions
in the national reconciliation plan, two of which are now resurfacing
in the ISG: discussions around U.S. withdrawal, and amnesty (the
two other provisions dealt with compensation and a cease-fire).
On a positive note, the ISG
recommends that the U.S. put aside one of the most divisive issues
in Iraq, the future of the contested and oil-rich city of Kirkuk,
suggests reducing or even ending the policy of de-Baathification,
advocates for provincial elections, and argues for further review
of the Iraqi constitution.
While the ISG is eager to have
Iraqis take up security issues by themselves, they are not so
quick to have Iraqis take charge of their economy or more importantly,
the development of their massive oil reserves. The ISG team advocates
for the sharing of oil revenues throughout the country, a departure
from the current Iraqi constitution that states revenue from
new oil fields goes to local provinces. If carried out, this
reform would help lessen the pressure for division within the
country.
Following this sensible proposal
is one much more radical--complete privatization of the oil industry,
combined with foreign investment, and technical assistance by
the U.S. government. This directly contradicts the ISG's earlier
recommendation that, "The President should restate that
the U.S. does not seek to control Iraq's oil" and guarantees
that the U.S. and multinational corporations will be vying for
control and power in Iraq for decades. Clearly this section of
the report was heavily influenced by commission members James
A. Baker III and Lawrence Eagleburger, whom have sought access
to Iraqi's oil for most of their political careers, as well as
by the longstanding consensus of U.S. corporate and government
opinion about the importance and claimed legitimacy of maintaining
U.S. control of Iraqi oil.
On the economic and reconstruction
front the report advocates for funding for Iraqi reconstruction
to continue to the tune of $5 billion a year and proposes that
the President appoint a "Senior Advisor for Economic Reconstruction".
Reconstruction is a lynchpin to improving life for Iraqis but
given the poor performance and corruption of so much of the reconstruction
undertaken by U.S. companies in Iraq, oversight of reconstruction
is clearly needed. The ISG's recommendation for a Senior Advisor
and an extension of the Special Inspector General will provide
some oversight but their mandate is limited. A better approach
could be modeled upon the "Truman Committee" that not
only investigated all war contracts during WWII but had the power
to punish war profiteers.
Most important, Iraqis themselves
need to be invested in the reconstruction process both in the
planning and implementation. The ISG is silent on the critical
need to have reconstruction planned, led, and staffed by Iraqis.
Phyllis Bennis is a fellow of the Institute for Policy
Studies in Washington and of the Transnational Institute in Amsterdam.
Erik Leaver is the Carol and Ed Newman Fellow at
IPS and the policy outreach director for Foreign Policy In Focus.
CounterPunch
Speakers Bureau Sick of sit-on-the-Fence speakers, tongue-tied and timid?
CounterPunch Editors Alexander Cockburn and Jeffrey St Clair
are available to speak forcefully on ALL the burning issues,
as are other CounterPunchers seasoned in stump oratory. Call
CounterPunch Speakers Bureau, 1-800-840-3683. Or email beckyg@counterpunch.org.
