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CounterPunch
August
13/19, 2002
Offensive,
Murderous and Righteous
Sharon Must
be the Right Man for the Job
by Gilad Atzmon
From the start, Zionist thought has been divided
into two main schools. On the one hand we have the heavy-handed
school, which favours military solutions to any conflict. The
revisionist leader Ze'ev Jabotinsky was the founder of this school.
In 1923 he published an article entitled 'The Iron Wall' in which
he argued that Arabs would never accept a Jewish state and so
the Jews must "erect an iron wall of Jewish military force".
Zionists must thus have an overwhelmingly superior base of power
to deal with any Arabic tendency to resist.
The other school is the school of reconciliation
adhered to by moderate Zionists like Moshe Sharet. It believes
that all the regional regimes and political powers can accept
the existence of a Jewish state and all available diplomatic
efforts should be made to achieve reconciliation with the Arab
World.
These two conflicting ideologies have
been apparent since the early day so Zionism. After the declaration
of the State of Israel, they lead to harsh political debate.
In practise, Ben Gurion, the first Israeli PM adopted Jabotinsky's 'Iron
Wall' philosophy. This at first seems a bizarre move politically
as Jabotinsky's philosophy is in opposition to Ben Gurion's own
party's policies. However Israeli manoeuvres and operations in
the 1948 war give a clear picture of their endorsement of a military
option together with a denial of any possible diplomatic solution.
Ben Gurion instructed the IDF (Israel
Defence Forces) to follow an offensive military strategy, to
show Israel's military superiority. His instructions were as
follows: 1. Any confrontation between Arab and Israeli must take
place on Arab land--any Israeli offensive must bring the battle
to the Arab territories before it even starts; 2. Because of
limited Israeli funds, any battle must bring victory quickly--the
Israeli army must inflict devastating damage on Arab enemies.
The Israeli military and political leaders
soon defined the criterion by which to measure success--the IDF
'force of deterrence'. It is a scale that determines the Arabic
unwillingness to fight: the greater the unwillingness, the higher
the 'force of deterrence'.
For Ben Gurion and his followers it was
crucial the Arab world clearly understood that Israel preferred
a military solution. Any given battle should end with a clear-cut
Israeli victory. More importantly still was that the Arabs should
know that any confrontation would inevitably lead to their defeat.
Success of the Israeli offensive strategy was measured by the
extent to which the Arab willingness to fight decreased. This
pattern was already evident in the early stages of the 1948 war,
a war in which the Israelis violated the human rights of Palestinian
civilians. The war created more than 700,000 Palestinian refugees
and led to an armistice between Israel and its neighbours, an
armistice that Arabs regarded as a clear defeat.
By the early Fifties Israel had managed
further to refine this offensive doctrine. According to Ben Gurion,
any loss of Jewish life must be compensated for in a disproportionate
way. Arabs had to learn that Jewish blood was of far higher value
than their own. To achieve the best possible results a young,
assertive, aggressive and ambitious commander named Ariel Sharon
was called upon. He was asked to form a small special commando
unit whose role was to show the Arab enemy the extent of Israel's
determination to win under any circumstances.
In 1953, Palestinians crossed the Israeli
border near the Jordanian village of Quibya and murdered a Jewish
mother and her two children. Sharon and his commando unit, now
called the '101', were called to action. They were ordered to
enter the village, to blow up the houses, and inflict as much
damage on their inhabitants as possible. Sharon was very much
the right man for the job. The raid was a complete success. Similar
to the recent violence in the Jenin refugee camp where homes
were destroyed with their inhabitants inside, Quibya was reduced
to a pile of rubble. More than fifty houses were destroyed, and
61 civilians mostly women and children were killed. A UN observer
visiting the site concluded that the villagers had been forced
to stay in their houses, which were then blown up. The Quibya
massacre was internationally condemned. In an Israeli parliamentary
debate, Moshe Sharet, the moderate foreign minister, called for
an official statement of regret for the action. Ben Gurion thought
differently. During a radio broadcast the next day, he denied
IDF involvement in the raid and blamed it on retaliating Israeli
villagers pushed beyond endurance. As we know, Sharon's military
career did not suffer, quite the opposite. Sharon and the '101'
became the role model for the new Hebrew military man, a soldier
who murders, attacks beyond enemy lines, who goes far beyond
orders even if it means disregarding all concept of humanity.
Not only did Sharon's career not suffer, he was seen as the most
promising young Israeli officer and he was swiftly promoted within
army ranks, inspiring other young officers to follow in his footsteps.
Historically the Quibya massacre was the first in a chain of
retaliation raids carried out by the Israeli army. These raids
shaped Israeli offensive strategy into a new form of murderous
art. A way of thinking that not only led to endless confrontation
with the Arab world but also created an ever growing ignorance
within Israeli society. A society concerned solely with its own
interests while denying anyone else's.
Looking at it from an Israeli perspective,
the offensive doctrine enjoys two major advantages. Firstly,
it communicates with Arabs in the only language they understand--violence.
Secondly, it provokes condemnation from the international community,
something that Israelis translate into immediate political gain.
It is hard to believe but most Israelis
believe that Arabs only understand violence. Throughout Israel's
history, there is very little evidence of diplomacy towards Arabs.
Even the Oslo Accord is rooted in specific historical circumstances:
the PLO was in political and financial ruin (following their
support of Saddam Hussein during the Gulf War). And then, from
the very beginning of the supposed implementation of the Oslo
Accord, Israel used military threats to pressurise the Palestinians.
The vast majority of Israeli cabinet members past and present
are ex-military men. Only a state that has decided to live by
the sword and firmly believes in military solutions, would put
so many generals in its government.
Israeli Prime Ministers actually love
to be condemned by the international community. Any foreign criticism
of Israel is interpreted as 'the pathological anti-semitic behaviour
of gentiles'. Israeli politician learn to use this tool early
in their careers. Ben Gurion laid down the pattern: "It
doesn't matter what the gentile says, what matters is what the
Jews do." With this statement that legendary PM managed
to instantly remind his voters of the history of Jewish persecution,
pushing the Jewish people deeper into their safe-haven of segregation,
to denial of the outside world. Since in Hebrew the world for
gentile--'goy'--is derogatory, Ben Gurion's directive to ignore
the gentile allows Israelis to celebrate their superiority to
the rest of mankind. Ben Gurion's statement is a call for Israelis
to unite behind their leadership and reject any form of foreign
criticism. In the Israeli case, the offensive doctrine leaves
the international community powerless. On the one hand, lack
of criticism is taken by the Israeli public as approval or as
a sign of weakness. On the other, any international condemnation
leads to increased public support for the political leadership.
This may explain the continuous shift to the right in Israeli
politics. It also explains the international community's lack
of means to deal with Israeli oppression and atrocities.
Sharon's military and political career
shows that he follows his mentor Ben Gurion religiously. Sharon
adopted the offensive doctrine in political life and in military
terms. He was the leading figure in the forming and shaping of
Israeli retaliation raids and commando attacks. This strategy
led the Israelis deep into the Sinai desert in the 'Suez Operation'
(1956). Following Colonel Sharon's orders Israeli paratroopers
landed in the 'Mitle Pass' in the heart of the Sinai desert with
the objective to cause heavy losses to the Egyptian army. In
practice the battle cost too many Israeli lives and within a
short space of time Israel had to pull its forces out of the
Sinai. The operation was regarded as a waste of human life. In
the '73 war, General Sharon led his brigade across the Suez Canal.
Again the battle costs too many Israeli lives. Sharon refused
to let his higher command show restraint, he believed the sight
of an Israeli soldier on the western bank of the Suez Canal would
bring the Egyptians to their knees. Egypt brought in some heavy
international pressure and Israel had to withdraw its forces.
Furthermore, the cease-fire talks led to peace talks (1977) in
which Israel 'lost' the Sinai forever.
In the Lebanon War (1982), Sharon, now
Minister for Defence, led the cabinet to believe that the Palestinian
issue could be silenced forever by a military assault against
the PLO in Lebanon. He was determined to generate a light conflict,
a mini war with Syria in order to wipe their forces out of southern
Lebanon. The Israeli offensive doctrine does not dissociate between
Arabs. From the perspective of the 'Iron Wall', all Arabs are
the same. From the very early stages of the Lebanese campaign
it was evident that Israel was being drawn into a vicious civil
war between the different Lebanese ethnic and religious groups.
As predicted by some Israeli intelligence experts, shortly after
the invasion of Lebanon, the most terrible massacres of Palestinian
refugees in Sabra and Shatila took place. The Christian militias
who carried out the massacres, received approval from Israeli
high command to enter the camps. While Israeli forces were not
directly involved in the massacres themselves, Israel was regarded
as responsible for the atrocities taking place within its invaded
territory. The massacres were condemned by the international
community. In Israel, the leftwing movement 'Peace Now' managed
to bring thousands of people into the streets to demonstrate
against the government. In a speech to the Israeli parliament,
reflecting on the left's opposition to the Lebanese campaign,
Menachem Begin, the then Prime Minister complained that "gentiles
kill gentiles and the Jews are blaming each other". This
again follows the Israeli right-wing pattern, using the international
outrage to de-legitimise the Israeli left. Begin blamed the Israeli
left for collaborating with the gentile anti-semites against
the Jewish Sharon. So again international outrage generated by
an Israeli offensive was used within Israel as a political weapon
against any opposition. Menachen Begin eventually agreed to a
public inquiry into the massacre and the committee lead by supreme
justice Achoen found Sharon unfit for ministerial duty. In the
short term, Sharon's conviction was regarded as a victory for
sense. In the long term, the conviction was taken by the right
wing as proof of Sharon's devotion to the 'Iron Wall' philosophy.
In other words it made him the ideal Israeli Prime Minister when
the time came.
The result of the Lebanon war is not
yet clear as the war is not completely over. What is clear is
that it took Israeli forces almost twenty years to get out of
Lebanon. While being in Lebanon the Israeli army has managed
to lose its 'power of deterrence'. The Israeli army--the best-equipped
army in the Middle East--found itself totally defeated by the
Hizbulah, a small, devoted group of guerilla fighters. In the
shadow of the Israeli defeat in Lebanon, the Palestinian people
within the occupied territories started to redevelop their nationalistic
aspirations. In 1987 this aspiration matured into the first Palestinian
uprising, the first Intifada.
Since the Lebanon war, the Israeli 'power
of deterrence' has continued to deteriorate. The IDF has not
managed to develop the fighting skills to overcome Lebanese civil
resistance. On top of this, following the Oslo Accord, the Israeli
civilian population has faced a growing threat of terror inside
Israel. For the first time in Israeli history, the civil population
found itself within a war zone. This is an important point. In
the Israeli world-view it is Arabs who are supposed to die, not
Israelis. There are two main reasons: 1. it calls to mind (and
takes as its justification) the holocaust in which Jews were
dying just because they were Jews; 2. it goes directly against
the idea of 'offensive doctrine'. Israelis had become used to
the fact that any confrontation with the Arab world took place
on Arab land. Suddenly the confrontation was starting to take
place in the centre of Israeli cities--a catastrophe and totally
unacceptable. In the light of Palestinian terror, a strong right
wing slogan appeared: "Let the IDF win", meaning: Let
us once again erect the Iron Wall. Who is the right man for the
job? Without doubt Ariel Sharon: the master of the offensive
doctrine, and Israel's most celebrated war criminal; the man
who proved to know no mercy. And the Israelis were right. It
took Sharon just one year in office to commit the massacre in
Jenin.
The operation in the Jenin refugee camp
was, more or less, the embodiment of what the offensive doctrine
is all about. It was taking place, more or less, on enemy land.
It was, more or less, fast, and it was, more or less, a 'clear
cut' victory. The 'more or less' is crucial. Jenin is not really
on enemy land, it is territory invaded by Israel. It looks as
if the Israeli colonial forces are the first colonialists to
destroy and demolish their own colonies. It took the Israelis
a little too long to declare that the battle in Jenin was over,
the might of the Israeli armed forces was not enough to break
the spirit of the few determined Palestinian freedom fighters.
Lastly, if it was a clear victory, it is not entirely clear who
won. The Israelis? As T. Larson, the UN envoy to the Middle East,
put it "in Jenin, Israel has lost its moral high-ground".
For this statement Mr Larson became persona non grata in the
Jewish state. If anything is clear it is that, after Jenin, the
Palestinians are determined to fight and do what ever it takes
to achieve their freedom.
Analysing the Jenin battle and the Israeli
decision making process in the light of the offensive doctrine
gives us the following: on the morning of April 3, Israeli ground
forces enter into the Jenin refugee camp. From the start they
encounter some fierce Palestinian fighting. Naturally the Israeli
High Command provides more support, and more tanks and helicopter
gun-ships move in. It is unusual to use tanks and helicopter
gun-ships in highly populated areas but within the IDF offensive
doctrine, the end (victory) is far more important than the means
(war crimes). In the mean time, Israeli commanders on the ground
are coming under severe pressure to complete their mission. They
use heavier weaponry, air-to-ground missiles as well as tanks,
and they care less and less about who is getting killed as long
as they are Arabs. As a result more civilians get hit: the scene
on the ground starts to look wantonly destructive. The Israeli
High Command decides to seal the area. Press and rescue forces
are not allowed in. Now the forces on the ground are working
against time. They must provide a clear-cut conclusion. So they
decide to wipe out the centre of the camp suspected to be a 'pocket
of resistance'. In doing so they kill many civilians, mainly
old and disabled people who could not run away. When the battle
is over Jenin is a slaughterhouse; the streets show the most
terrifying scenes imaginable. Civilian corpses all over the place,
the many Palestinian wounded bleeding to death. Still the Israelis
show no mercy, still the Red Cross and rescue forces are not
allowed in. The Israelis must decide whether to show mercy, to
save those who can be saved or whether to try to conceal the
evidence of shocking crimes against humanity. Naturally, following
Sharon's history of crimes against humanity, the decision is
fairly simple. The Israelis decide to bulldoze the centre of
the Jenin refugee camp. They turn the Jenin camp into a 'Palestinian
Ground Zero'. Occupied houses are blown up with their inhabitants
inside, like the Quibya massacre fifty years earlier.
But, although the similarities are obvious,
there are important differences. In Quibya, Sharon was a platoon
commander, in Jenin he is an elected Prime Minister. He commits
his crime in the name of all the Israeli people. As expected,
as soon as international criticism is voiced, Sharon defines
the current battle as the 'war for the existence of the Jewish
nation'. So, according to Sharon, the massacre in Jenin was carried
out not only in the name of all Israelis but in the name of all
Jewish people. And if this was not enough, Sharon declares that,
like George Bush, he is conducting a holy war on terror. This
kind of talk is directed at the American people. Sharon becomes
an American messenger or, at least, an American platoon commander.
As we have seen both the Jewish world and American administrations
have restrained from criticising Sharon publicly. We can conclude
that Sharon is committing his war crimes both in the name of
the Jewish people and the American nation unless proved differently.
Unless some major Rabbis stand up and firmly denounce Sharon's
atrocities; unless the American administration decides to stop
supporting the Jewish state; unless these two happen soon, Sharon
will seem to be acting in the name both of the Jewish people
and the American nation.
Clearly, seen through Israeli eyes, Sharon
is the right man for the job. He is the embodiment of everything
Israel is about. He is offensive, murderous and righteous. Sharon
has proved once again that he acts as a self-sufficient Iron
Wall. The only real question remaining is whether we want to
live in a world in which Israel, a criminally offensive state,
is accepted amongst nations.
Gilad Atzmon
is an acclaimed jazz musician (saxophonist/clarinettist), the
top selling jazz musician in the UK. His group is the Orient
House Ensemble. He is also the author of a novel, Guide to the
Perplexed, just published in Israel to great acclaim.
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