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December
31, 2001
Ramzi
Kysia
Iraq
Goes Radioactive
December
28, 2001
John Chuckman
Observing
George Bush
Suren
Pillay
Civilian
Bodies
Aaron
Lehmer
Inviting
Future Terrorism
December
27, 2001
Patrick
McNamara
Palestinian
Children Bear Brunt of Mideast Violence
Nelson
Valdés
A
Possible Scenario on the Location of bin Laden
Jensen
and Mahajan
Remember
the Afghan Dead
Philip
Farruggio
A
New Year's Resolution
Ramzi
Kysia
The
People of the Valley
December 26, 2001
John Chuckman
In
Praise of the Unspeakable
Sam Bahour
2002:
Year of the Twos
December 25, 2001
Jennifer Loewenstein
Israel's
Human Rights Record
December 24, 2001
Sam Bahour
It
Happened One Morning
Yair Khilou
Why I Resisted
Being Drafted into the Israeli Army
Michael
Chisari
War
as Diversionary Tactic
Cockburn/St. Clair
Enron
and the Green Seal
December 21, 2001
Tom Turnipseed
War
Good for Bush
John Chuckman
The
First Victim in the
War on Terror
December 20, 2001
Lawrence
McGuire
Killing
Other People's Children
Miriam Rozen
Foundation
Without Representation?
Kenneth
Roth
A
Letter to Rumsfeld on
Military Tribunals
William Blum
Casualties:
Theirs and Ours
December 19, 2001
Marjorie
Cohn
Don't
Pre-Judge John Walker
Sam Bahour
Palestine
and You
A Photographic Journal of Life
in an Afghan Refugee Camp
By Judith Mann
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Six Decades of Memphis Music Photographs
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Text by Daniel Wolff
The New Intifada:
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Edited by Roane Carey
A Pocket Guide to
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December
31, 2001
An Alternative to War in Iraq
By John Absood
As the impressive U.S. military rout of the Taliban
regime and the terrorists they harbored enters a new phase, some
in Washington propose a similar strategy for Iraq. I argue against
this for several reasons and propose a non-military solution.
Indeed, a carefully revamped weapons inspections process may
well provide the answer.
As a primary matter, all of Iraq's neighbors
prefer a united Iraq to a fractured one. It would be difficult
to guarantee Iraq's unity by arming Kurdish forces in the North
and Shiite forces in the South. The Shiite rebels in Iraq maintain
ties with Shiite Iran. Iraqi Kurdish groups have a long history
of struggling for Kurdish autonomy from Baghdad and a newly formed
Iraqi Kurdistan could incite the restless Kurdish minority in
Turkey to rebel against Istanbul. This eventuality could well
spiral into a wider and undesired conflagration. While U.S. military
superiority is certain to unseat the Baghdad regime, the aftermath
is far less clear and America could well loose control of the
situation on the ground.
More importantly, war should be the last
resort and not the first priority. This leads to the question
of why weapons inspections have failed and whether they can be
redrafted to work. It is difficult to answer the first part precisely.
Although UNSCOM has admitted to destroying much of Iraq's weapons
of mass destruction (WMD), it was unable to certify full Iraqi
compliance. Certainly, the fact that the U.N. commission dismantled
more chemical and biological weapons than the allies had destroyed
during the Gulf War is evidence that weapons inspections have
worked and can work.
But attitudes need to change if a new
weapons inspections regime is to be effective. Clearly, Baghdad
must demonstrate greater willingness to cooperate than it has
in the past. Political roulette is a sure recipe for failure.
But equally important, Washington must unequivocally declare
its respect for Iraq's independence and integrity. This would
require that the United States abandon its long standing commitment
to the overthrow of Saddam Hussein and embrace the U.N. mandate
to disarm Iraq instead.
Clinton administration affirmations that
the United States had no intention of lifting the crippling economic
sanctions on Iraq until the Baath regime was overthrown served
to undermine the weapons inspections process. The public debacle
over Washington's alleged interference with UNSCOM's mandate
and the resignation of key members of the commission only reinforced
the perception in Baghdad that Washington was not really after
Iraq's compliance or disarmament but after the regime's ouster.
Baghdad's perception that it is "damned if it does and damned
if it doesn't" must change if weapons inspections are to
be effective.
Therefore, what is called for right now
is a serious reexamination of each side's attitude and of the
inspections process itself. A newly reconstituted inspections
regime must address a few loopholes in the original formulation.
First, the specific steps that Iraq must
take to satisfy the commission's requirements of "full compliance"
must be spelled out in detail. Any ambiguity can create a situation
of an ever moving "goal post." This scenario would
cause each side to question the motives of the other and would
frustrate the process.
Second, some oversight would be required
to ensure that the new inspections team remains wholly scientific
and independent of any external pressure or interference. Secretary
General Kofi Annan may even assume this oversight role himself
or delegate a trusted associate. The possibility that the new
team could be comprised of capable inspectors from "neutral"
countries (particularly European) should be seriously considered.
Third, the new mandate must unambiguously
endorse the lifting all economic sanctions once Iraq has fully
complied.
Fourth, some meaningful monitoring mechanisms
need to be put in place after economic sanctions have been lifted
to ensure that Iraq does not reconstitute its weapons programs.
Finally, I believe that these collective
steps can form the basis of a long overdue resolution to the
Iraq dilemma. The economic sanctions have exacted a heavy toll
on the Iraqi people. We have a moral obligation not only to protect
ourselves from weapons of mass destruction but also to end the
decade of suffering of the Iraqi people. This proposal can form
a blueprint for achieving both.
John Absood
lives in Ann Arbor, Michigan.
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