Fallout from the Western Offensive in Mali
Plenty has been written and re-written about the events taking place in the Middle East, but it has not always been easy to comprehend that these events are the result of a unique plan that has been developing in the shadows and has only become visible in its final phases. While “analysts” are almost always limited to observing events as they are reported to have occurred, undeclared action is more difficult to perceive. The psychological/media war (Psy/Media Ops) is developed in the shadows and only by understanding its characteristics is it possible to figure out what is really going on. In the current military operation in Mali, all indications are that the real objective is Algeria, included in the priorities of the “Axis of War.”
It may already be fading from memory that this whole story apparently began with the revolts in Tunisia and Egypt, although in reality the beginning was decided upon long beforehand by the members of the “Axis of War” (the United States and its partners, both in the West and Middle East), with the first phases being developed quietly and in some cases with the acquiescence of the future victims.
The Plan, as now known and denounced by the U.S. four star General Wesley Clark included coup d’etats in more than seven Middle Eastern countries, where western interests were endangered for various reasons. In order to accomplish this, first a societal study was performed, where an overview of the ethnic, social, cultural, economic and defense characteristics of the various countries was performed (much as Southcom has done with Latin America through its partner institution, Florida International University). Later, a specific plan was developed for each country, that could be fit together piecemeal as conditions “matured,” for the toppling of the governments not aligned with the United States.
Logically, Psy/Media Ops were planned separately for each country, in accordance with the various societal layers to be influenced, and the potential level of media penetration within western reach. As a result, there was no roadmap that defined which country would go first, and which would follow; the direction would be decided enroute, depending on the degree of “maturity” that the actions undertaken had reached.
In this sense, when the revolts in Tunisia and Egypt were sparked, the West understood that this was the pretext it needed to begin the final assault, as was proven to us definitively by the mainstream “disinformation” media. In all cases, the backstage preparation had already been underway for quite some time, in some cases, for years.
In Tunisia and Egypt, it was necessary to “listen” to the voice of the people and “replace” the dictators that had served U.S. interests for such a long time, but whose public images had worn out their welcome. Their fall from grace would serve to “project discontent” to neighboring countries that had been defined beforehand as objectives of destabilization; Libya, Algeria, Syria and Iran. The first phase of the plan was complete; that which had been developed in Afghanistan and Iraq under the pretext of fighting against Al Qaeda and terrorism.
It’s necessary to point out that both Afghanistan and Iraq served as preparation for the second part of the offensive that would be launched against the rest of the “infidels.” In the Afghan case, where Al Qaeda played an overwhelming role, it was also a breeding ground for many of the combatant-terrorists that would later be employed in Libya, Syria, Iran and Algeria.
We should keep in mind that Al Qaeda was an organization created by the CIA from the worst elements existing in the Middle East, in order to destabilize Afghanistan during the era when it was supported by the Soviet Union, to later serve as a pretext for future aggressions. Al Qaeda has never been outside the CIA’s control and whether serving as a pretext or as executor, it has always been an active participant in all events in the Middle East. As such, in Afghanistan and Iraq, Al Qaeda was a terrorist organization that had to be fought and destroyed. In Libya and Siria, it is an organization that defends “freedom and democracy.”
In the case of Libya, the revolts in Egypt and Tunisia that served to topple corrupt leaders were also used to generate a range of opinion about the Libyan “insurgency.” In this country, which had the highest standard of living in the entire region and where, despite the strategic errors committed, its leaders occupied themselves with the needs of the people, the analysis of the societal layers revealed that in Benghazi, there were certain segments who still longed for King Idris I, deposed by Qaddafi, and these were provided with the conditions to activate their forces, using them as a spearhead for the general “rebellion.”
Furthermore, Qaddafi turned over to the West not only the arms the rebels would use, but also the country’s main strategic businesses, including its oil refineries, ultimately used against him during the western-organized revolts.
The pretext was all that was needed, which in this case consisted of organizing protests that a small minority of the media of mass deception (MMD) would amplify endlessly, in order to immediately deploy the formula used elsewhere and perfected in Afghanistan, a fundamental part of the Psy/Media Ops: preparing the terrain and public opinion for the final phase, where economic, financial and diplomatic measures combined with mercenary-terrorists, special operations forces and air superiority, would deliver the final blow to Qaddafi and those who supported him.
The result is known.
But all these actions were related, given that the revolts in Egypt and Tunisia, moving toward Syria and Algeria, were part of the plan conceived at headquarters in Fort Bragg, except that in the case of Algeria, the Psy/Media Ops had not resulted in the desired effect, and the plan would need to be altered.
In Syria, all the conditions had not been met either, but the West, emboldened by the extremely favorable results achieved with a minimum of resources, and why not, by the tepid resistance from Russia and China, decided to “accelerate” the plan in order to later concentrate on the two more difficult objectives: Iran and Algeria.
But the Syrian adventure turned out to be far too complicated, and appears mired without a solution in sight. Russia and China’s ever so slight change in position has blocked the West from developing the plan as designed, and despite the “insurgents” purchased with funds from Qatar and Saudia Arabia who have managed to destabilize the country, the resistance from the Syrian people and their armed forces has not been liquidated. Apparently the Axis of War will have to involve itself more directly in the conflict, but this implies the danger of internationalizing it and that poses certain dangers, considering that it’s not just Syria in play but Syria plus Iran and possibly Russia.
These are the circumstances that have led the West to decide to move toward applying the variant that consists of accelerating its actions against Algeria, and this is where the Mali option comes into play.
Although the conflict in Mali has been going on for some time, it is still a comparatively recent creation, and the West has not given it a second thought since it already has the region’s resources under its absolute control.
The abrupt appearance of the “Islamic” threat in Mali is in reality a pretext, as in so many other cases, used by the West to insert its forces into a country that shares a large border with Algeria, and precisely on the side of Algeria that is least populated and most vulnerable.
The north of Mali, where part of the Sahara desert is located, is inhabited mainly by ethnic Tuareg, who in March of 2012 led a rebellion against the corrupt government of Amadu Toumani Touré, who was ultimately defeated not by the rebels but by a military coup d’etat in which he was accused of being soft on the rebels. The military junta that took over installed Dioncounda Traoré as president, who remains in that position.
But in reality, the Tuareg had been marginalized by “Islamist” groups promoting the most radical sharia. Although only the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (NMLA) is mentioned, there are three groups in the fight and the dominant one at the moment is the Movement for Unity of Jihad in Western Africa (MUJAO, by its initials in French), that along with the AQIM (Al Qaeda of the Islamic Magreb), managed to displace the Tuareg and the MUJAO in the region, taking control of the main population centers in the north of the country.
It’s important to clarify that these Islamic groups are mostly composed of terrorist combatants that the West used in its war against Libya and just as with the Taliban in Afghanistan, employed at its convenience, in order to later be used as a pretext for invading the country.
These groups are loosely organized and badly armed, and as a result their military capacity is very poor. This is proven by the way in which France launched its campaign, first through the MMD intermediaries, exaggerating the “danger” that these “Islamist” groups represented, and then jumping in with a limited contingent and no previous preparation, to a confrontation where the combat, victims and even the wounded are absent. A true virtual war.
As we’ve been able to see through pictures and reports, there is no evidence that the cities have put up any resistance at all; the main victims are the civilian population, practically trampled by the occupying French troops; creating a problem more serious than the one that previously existed, with the displacement of some 200,000 people.
The attack on the Algerian gas refinery at In Amenas, amazingly coincidental with the French invasion of Mali is yet another piece of evidence that points to a confirmation of the Algerian option being the true motivation behind the French actions in Mali.
It’s worth recalling that Algeria was France’s most important colony in Africa and its loss has remained a dagger in the throat of the French ruling class. For the West, eliminating the governments aligned against its interests means the possibility of reducing the support base for Russia and China.
Another revealing element is to be found in the accords that the insurgents had already achieved in Mali, that appeared to offer a negotiated resolution of the conflict and which were torpedoed by the French decision to invade, functionally approved by the resolution from the U.N. InSecurity Council on December 20, 2012, which although it did not authorize the invasion, also did not prohibit it.
The political chessboard has multiple variants for these kinds of conflicts and here we are seeing how Algeria, in its eagerness to curry favor with the West and with France in particular, conceded permission to French planes to use its airspace in the actions against the rebels in Mali. The French Foreign Minister thanked the Algerians: “Algeria allowed overflights of its airspace which are appreciated,” he said, going on to state: “France needed urgently to intervene, otherwise Mali would have ceased to exist, with a terrorist state in its place […]. Algeria’s decision to open its airspace to the French aircraft based in [France] and which attacked the Islamists in northern Mali is significant, taking into account the traditional mistrust of the Algerian authorities against any kind of military intervention by Paris in the region.” Once the African forces take over in northern Mali “it will be necessary for Algeria to close its borders to cut Islamist combatants off from their bases.”
This is precisely where the trap is set. Reading between the lines the pretext can be glimpsed that will be used against Algeria once the French forces in Mali are positioned with the collaboration of the United States and Great Britain: the possible presence of Islamist combatants in Algerian territory.
Facts are stubborn things, and time will tell. Very soon we’ll be able to see whether or not a destabilization process is underway in Algeria.
English language translation from the original Spanish by Machetera.
Machetera is a member of Tlaxcala, the international network of translators for linguistic diversity. This article and translation may be reprinted as long as the content remains unaltered, and the source, author, and translator are cited.