The United States has given Israel $51.3 billion in military grants since 1949, most of it after 1974- more than any other country in the post-1945 era. Israel has also received $11.2 billion in loans for military equipment, plus $31 billion in economic grants, not to mention loan guarantees, joint military projects like the Arrow missile, and such. But major conditions on these military grants have meant that 74 percent of it has remained in the U.S. to purchase American arms. Since it creates jobs and profits in many districts, Congress is more than ready to respond to the cajoling of the Israel lobby. This vast sum, especially when calculated on a per capita basis, has both enabled and forced Israel to prepare to fight American-style war. But the US has spent immense sums of money since 1950 and it has failed to win any of its big wars.
In early 2005 the new chief of staff of the Israel Defense Force, Dan Halutz, embarked on the most extensive reorganization in the history of IDF. Halutz is an Air Force general and enamored with the doctrines that justify the ultra-modern equipment the Americans showered upon the Israelis. Attack helicopters, unmanned aircraft, advanced long-range intelligence and communications, and the like were at the top of his agenda. His was merely a variation of Donald Rumsfeld’s "shock and awe" concepts. [H, 02/26/07; Bard, "U. S. Aid to Israel;" Dec 28, 98, BESA Seminar, Bar-Ilan U.]
The 34-day war, starting July 12, Israel fought in Lebanon in 2006 was a disastrous turning point for it. Until the Eliyahu Winograd Commission, which Olmert set up in September 2006, delivers its report in the latter half of April and resolves these matters, we will not know precisely the orders sent to specific units or the timing of all of the actors, but there is already a consensus on far more important fundamentals. The Israelis did not lose the war because of orders given or not given to various officers. It was a war of choice, and it was planned as an air war with very limited ground incursions in the expectation that Israeli casualties would be very low. Major General Herzl Sapir at the end of February said that "the war began at our initiative and we did not take advantage of the benefits granted to the initiator." H, 27/02/07 and also H 12/03/07]; 12/03/07 Planning for the war began November 2005 but reached high gear by the following March before the expected kidnapping of two IDF soldiers-the nominal excuse for the war. [H, 08/03/07-july 12 ] There is no controversy over the fact that it was a digitized, networked war, the first in Israel’s experience, and conformed to Halutz’-and American-theories of how war is fought in this high-tech era. [Defense ews, 01/22/07] The US has fought identical wars in Afghanistan and Iraq-and in the process of losing both.
What were the Israeli objectives-war aims if you will. While the Winograd Commission report may clarify this question, at the very least a number of goals are obvious/known already. Halutz wanted to "shock and awe" the Hezbollah and their allies with Israeli power and establish a marker-all within a few days. It was to be a very short war based on the application of power. There were lesser aims, such as moving the Hezbollah rockets well away from the borders or even getting its two kidnapped soldiers returned, but the at the very least Halutz wanted to make a critical point. Instead, he made the opposite and revealed Israel’s vulnerability based, in large part, on the fact the enemy was far better prepared, motivated, and equipped. It was the end of a crucial myth, the harbinger of yet more bloody but equal armed conflicts or a balance of power conducive to negotiations. Olmert and his generals very likely expected to have a great victory within five days, thereby increasing his popularity with the hawkish Jewish population that is a growing majority of the voters, to reverse his abysmally low poll ratings-he received three percent popularity in a TV poll in early March–thereby saving his political career. They [H, march 13; he spoke July 17 to Knesset re longer war] FT, march 14 re popularity]
There are many reasons the Israelis lost the war in Lebanon, but there is general agreement within Israel that the war ended in disaster and the deterrent value of the once unbeatable, super-armed IDF gravely diminished in the entire Arab world for the first time since 1947. [Ynet news, Feb 1, 07]Defense News, Jan 6; jan 22, 07] But the Israelis were defeated for many of the same reasons that have caused the Americans to lose the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan-and in Vietnam as well. Both their doctrine and equipment were ill suited for the realities they confronted. There was no centralized command structure to destroy but small groups, lightly armed, mobile, and decentralized, able to harass and ultimately prevail over the enemies. [guardian, mar 11, 07] The Hezbollah also had highly effective Russian anti-tank missiles, and the IDF admits that "several dozen" tanks were put out of commission, if not destroyed, including the Merkava Mark IV, which Israel claims in the best protected tank in the world-and seeks to export. [, march 2, 07] They also fired around 4,000 rockets at Israeli population centers and the IDF could not stop this demoralizing harassment. Hezbollah bunkers and arsenals were largely immune to air attacks, which caused the Israelis to "stretch the target envelope" to attack more targets in densely populated areas, with over 1,000 civilian dead. [Crooke and Perry, pp. 2-3] "Israel lost the war in the first three days," an American military expert concluded, expressing a consensus shared by many US Air Force analysts. "If you have that kind of surprise and you have that kind of firepower you had better win. Otherwise, you’re in for the long haul." [ibid., p. 5, pt 1; p 4, pt 2]
The problem, though, was not merely a new Arab prowess, though changes in their morale and fighting organizations should not be minimized. Halutz’ drastic reorganization of the IDF since early 2005, one that was supposed to attain the promises of all its American-supplied equipment, "caused," in General Sapir’s words, "a terrible distortion." [H, Feb 27,07] The IDF was an organizational mess, demoralized as never before, and on January 17, 2007 Halutz resigned, the first head of the IDF to voluntarily step down because of his leadership in war. But neither the public nor military had any confidence in him; had he not resigned he would have been fired. [Defense News, jan 22, 07] His successor has annulled his reorganization of the IDF, which is now sorely disorganized. [H, Feb 27] The American way of warfare had failed.
The Next War
The Lebanon War is only a harbinger of Israeli defeats to come. For the first time there is a rough equivalence in military power that
Technology is now moving far faster than the diplomatic and political resources or will to control its inevitable consequences-not to mention traditional strategic theories. This is true everywhere and the Middle East is no exception. Hezbollah has far better and more rockets-over 10,000 short-range rockets is one figure given–than it had a few years ago, and Israel’s military intelligence believes it has more firepower than it had last spring, before it was attacked. Israel has tried to convince Russia not to sell or give their highly effective anti-tank missiles to nations or movements in the region but they have failed. They fear that even Hamas will acquire them. Syria is procuring "thousands" of advanced anti-tank missiles from Russia, which can be fired from five kilometers away, far better rockets that can hit Israeli cities, and they are moving them closer to its borders.
If the challenges of producing a realistic concept of the world that confronts the mounting dangers and limits of military technology seriously are not resolved soon there is nothing more than wars to look forward to. The IDF intelligence branch does not think a war with Syria is likely in 2007; other Israeli military commentators think that any war with Syria would produce, at best, a bloody standoff-just like the war in Lebanon last summer. Israel has about 3,700 tanks and they are all now highly vulnerable. Its ultra-modern air arm, most of which the US has provided, only kill people but it cannot attain victory. [H, Feb 20; 21 [2 items]; Feb 22; Feb 23; Mar 2, 07; Martin van Creveld in Forwards, Mar 9, 07; Y net News, Feb 23; Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Middle East Military Balance , 2003=04, p. 1 ]
The New Israeli-A "Normal" Nation
In the past, wars produced victories and more territory for the Jews; now they will only produce disasters for everybody. The Lebanon War proved that.
Zionism was a concoction of Viennese coffee houses, Tolstoy’s idealization of labor, early ecological sentiment in the form of the wanderfogel that influenced Zionism but various fascistic movements as well, militarism, and varieties of socialism for parts of it, including bolshevism. Jews sought to go to Palestine not only because of the Holocaust but also the changes in American immigration laws in the first half of the 1920s. Without vast sums the Diaspora provided Zionism would never have come to fruition. Every nation has its distinctive personality reflecting its traditions, pretensions, and history’s caprices, and in this regard Israel is no different. It exists but it is becoming increasingly dangerous to world peace-and itself.
Zionism always had a military ethos, imposed only in part by Arab hostility, and its political and military leaders were one and the same at the inception of Zionism’s history. Generals were heroes and they did well in politics. The logic of force merged with an essentially Western, colonialist bias. Its founders were Europeans, and it was an outpost of European culture until the globalization of values and products made these cultural distinctions increasingly irrelevant. It always has been a militarist society, proud of its army. And notwithstanding the Cold War and the increasing flow of arms from the US, which, merged with its élan, meant it won all its post-1947 wars until last summer, it still retains a strong element of hysteria about the world it faced, and it is often messianic-especially its politicians-because messianism is very much influential among a growing portion of the religious and traditional population.
Israel has ceased being "Zionist" in the original sense of that ideology. For the sake of ceremony it retains Zionism as a label, just as many actual or aspiring nations have various myths which justify their claims to a national identity. But it is a long way from the original premises, in large part because its war with its neighbors-especially the Arabs who live in its midst or nearby-made its military ethos dominant over anything else. The kibbutz movement was always tiny, although it provided the nation most of its political and military leaders and ideology. The kibbutz’ essential function was often military and strategic, although some engaged in industry with hired, usually Arab labor. Less than three percent of the population now live on kibbutzim-it was never much more than that-but they changed their eating and child-rearing customs to retain members. Some went into business, from tourism and cottages, and several have even gone into the cemetery business. They borrowed very heavily in the 1970s and 1980s and by 2007 owed 27 billion NIS. Faced with the alternative of throwing 120,000 on the street with no pensions or jobs, at the beginning of 2007 the state bailed them out but took 5,000 acres in return-it has a real estate value. [H, march 7, 12, 2007; 2 google items; Ben-Ami, passim]
Most of Israel today is only not Zionist but it well on its way to becoming a failed state. Were it not for the fact that this outpost of fewer than five million Jews is a critical factor of war and peace in the much larger and vital region it would not be important or at all unusual. But it is terribly confused and has a very mixed identity; the US has since the late 1960s protected on it’s the terms presented to it-and world peace, to some critical extent, now depends on this place, its idiosyncrasies, personality, and growing contradictions.
Israel is a profoundly divided society and its politicians are venal cynics. Many nations-and surely the Palestinian leaders until Hamas, by default, took over–are no better/different. As Shlomo Ben-Ami, the former foreign minister, describes it, on one side there are economically disadvantaged Oriental Jews, Russian nationalists who were motivated above all by a desire to leave the USSR (an appreciable minority is not Jewish), and Orthodox Jews of every sort united only by their intense dislike of "assimilationists;" on the other hand we have secular Jews, some leftists and modernizers, more skilled and of East European parentage who were once crucial in the formation of Zionism. There are an increasing number of "Jerusalem-Jews," as Ben-Ami calls them, motivated to come by primarily by economic incentives, and they are bringing the Right to power more and more often. They fear the Arabs who live in Israel and 63 percent of the Jews-most from this constituency-refuse even to enter Arab towns in Israel. [ h, mar 12 ] "Tel Aviv" Jews are assimilating to a global, modernizing culture, more akin to the "normal" existence the early Zionists preached, and they are also the migrants out because they have high skills. [Ben-Ami, 236-39] Israel now has as many people leaving as migrate to it, and North America alone is home to up to a million of them.
Some indications of these trends range from the banal to the tragic. In Petah Tikva the abandoned Hashomer Hatzair office has been given to about 150 punks, "anarchists," who originate in what was the USSR; there is also a club of punks that calls itself Nazi-"boneheads" in skinhead parlance– and paints swastikas on synagogues. Both dislike the ultra-Orthodox and like the same music. [h, feb 27, 07] As for the former, the ultra-Orthodox, some have placed "curses" on those who advocate disengaging from any settlements in the West Bank or Gaza; they will be punished by heaven. One of four ultra-Orthodox Jews believe this is precisely why Sharon was struck with a coma. [h, Mar 12, 07] Martin van Creveld, who is professor of military history at the Hebrew University and knows many IDF leaders, a man whose fame was made studying the role of morale in armies, thinks the morale of the conscripts in the IDF is "almost to the vanishing point; in some cases crybabies have taken the place of soldiers." "Feminism" in the armed forces has intensified the rot, but "social developments" have destroyed much of the army-as have officers "who stayed behind their computers" last summer. [Forwards, Mar 9, 07]
Never before has Israel been wracked by so many demoralizing scandals. The president of Israel just resigned because of rape charges against him, Prime Minister Olmert is being investigated by the comptroller’s office on four charges of corruption, the new chief of police was once accused of accepting bribes and fraud and his appointment has created an uproar, and other sordid cases too numerous to cite. Israel is "stewing in its own rot," a Haaretz writer concluded; the police, retired judge Vardi Zeiler commented after heading a committee to investigate the state’s operation, were like Sicily and the state was on its way to becoming a mafia-style regime. [mar 8, 07 also WP. March 13; H, march 8 Ynet,Feb 20] H, Feb 21]
In this "anarchy" wars are motivated for political reasons but now they are lost because the society is disintegrating and-again to quote a Haaretz writer-the government "lacks both direction and a conscience." [H, Mar 8 ] Worse yet, its leaders are incredibly stupid and Olmert can only be compared to Bush in political intelligence. There is a consensus among Israeli strategists that the Iraq War was a disaster for Israel, a geopolitical gift to Iran that will leave Israel in ever-greater danger long after the Americans go home. [DefenseNews, jan 6, 07; "Israel has nothing to gain from a continued American presence in Iraq," the director of the Institute for National Security Studies of Tel Aviv University stated last January. The US ousted the Taliban from Afghanistan and Saddam Hussein from Iraq and created an overwhelming Iranian strategic domination. Its campaign for democracy has brought Hamas to power in Palestine. "It’s a total misreading of reality," one Israeli expert is quoted when discussing America’s role in the region. American policies have failed and Israel has given a carte blanche to a strategy that leaves it more isolated than ever.
On March 12th Olmert told the American Israel Public Affairs annual conference by video link that "Those who are concerned for Israel’s securityshould recognize the need for American success in Iraq and responsible exit." "Any outcome that will not help America’s strengthwouldundercut America’s ability to deal effectively with the threat posed by the Iranian regime." [H, Mar 13] His foreign minister was even stronger. "Stay the hell out of it," a Haaretz writer concluded. [H, mar 13] No group is more antiwar than American Jews, Congress-in its own inept way-is trying to bring the war to an end, his own strategists think the Iraq War was a disaster-and Olmert endorses Bush’s folly.
The Syrian Option
It is in this context that the peace of the region will or will not evolve. Olmert will do what is best for his political position domestically, and retaining power will be his priority-no less than his predecessors and most politicians everywhere. It is not at all promising. But for technical, social, and morale reasons Israel will not win another war. At every level, it has become far weaker. It can inflict frightful damage on its enemies but it cannot change the fundamental balance of all forces that leads to victory.
Making peace with Syria would be a crucial first step for Israel, and although the Palestinian problem would remain it would nonetheless vastly improve Israel’s security-and disprove the Bush’s Administration’s contention until very recently that negotiations with Syria or Iran on any Middle East question involves conceding to evil. The Israeli press reported in great detail the secret 2004-05 Israel-Syria negotiations, which very advanced and involved major Syrian concessions-especially on water and Syrian neutrality in a host of political controversies with the Palestinians and Iranians– in return for merely making the Golan Heights a demilitarized park with Syrian attendants. It also reported that Washington followed these talks closely and that it-especially Cheney’s office-opposed bringing them to a successful conclusion. At the end of January many important members of Israel’s foreign policy establishment publicly urged reopening these talks.
Olmert dismissed Syria’s gestures categorically after they became public. "Don’t even think about it" was Secretary of State Rice’s view of a treaty when she saw Israel officials in mid-February. [H, feb 23. Also Ynet, Feb 21 olmert] But though Mossad supported the obdurate Rice-Olmert view, military intelligence argued that Syria’s offers are sincere and serious. Moreover, its head warned that Syria is growing stronger and peace was very much to Israel’s interest.[H, march 3 ] He was supported by most of the Foreign Ministry and Defense, including Minister of Defense Amir Peretz. Olmert demanded, and got, their acquiescence.
A treaty could be finalized with Syria within four to six months, Alon Liel, former director general of the Israeli Foreign Ministry who negotiated with the Syrians, reported the Washington Times on March 7. Liel was asked to come to the US embassy in Tel Aviv about this time and tell the entire political staff of his talks. The reports in Haaretz, which included the draft treaty, were by then quite definitive. Then the Knesset, Israel’s parliament, invited Ibrahim Suleiman, Syria’s representative to the talks, to speak to the foreign affairs and defense committees. Such invitations are very rare, not least because Syria and Israel are legally in a state of war. [, mar 8, 9; Wash Times, Mar 7} But if the Syrians and Israelis go to war again, the normally hawkish Martin van Creveld concluded at this time, Israel "could wreak much destruction, but it could not force a decision." In three or four years the Syrians would be ready for a protracted war that would prove too much for Israel. After running through its bizarre alternatives, and the state of its morale, van Creveld concluded that reaching a peace with Syria was very much to its interests-and that even the Americans were coming to the position that talking to Syria and Iran (as the Baker-Hamilton panel had recommended last December) was rational. "Where the master leads," he predicted, "the follower cannot be far away-or else." [forwards, arch 9]
Syria has been attempting desperately to improve its relations with Washington, if only to forestall some mad act on its part. When Israel attacked Lebanon last July, Elliott Abrams, in charge of the Middle East at the National Security Council, along with other neocons in Washington, urged it to expand the war to Syria. [Lobe, IPS, Mar 14] At the end of February Syria renewed its appeal to the US to discuss any and all Middle East issues with it in "a serious and profound dialogue." [Daily Star Feb 21] For over two years it has made similar attempts; Baker knew all about these. [AT, March 15] Talking to alleged adversaries is perhaps the most fundamental point of difference between Cheney, his neocon alliance, and Rice, and it covers North Korea, Iran, and many other places. Basically, the issue is less the nature and goals of American foreign policy but how to conduct it-by the application of material power and even the threat of war versus more traditional means, such as diplomacy.
In the past several weeks, taking her cue from the Republican Establishment in the Iraq Study Group last December, Rice has been winning points in this debate but her successes are transitional only. Cheney is a powerful, determined and cunning man who knows how to succeed all too well with the President.
America’s overwhelming problem is Iraq and, above all, Iran, and apparently the Bush Administration has now decided that Syria can help it in the region. Ellen Sauerbrey, an Assistant Secretary of State, was in Damascus on March 12, nominally to discuss refugees but she heard from the Syrians "that all the questions are linked in the Arab region and that a comprehensive dialogue is needed on all these questions." [Yahoo, Mar 12] Syria has also mobilized the European Union, which now favors a return of the Golan Heights to it. [, arch 14] On March 13 the US ambassador to Israel publicly stated a bald lie that the Americans had never "expressed an opinion on what Israel should or should not do with regard to Syria." [H, Mar 14]
It is now entirely in the hands of the Olmert government whether to negotiate with Syria. At least for this moment, the Bush Administration has reversed itself.
Israel has ignored Washington on at least four very important issues, starting with the Sinai campaign in 1956, and acted in its own self-interest. The Americans were Olmert’s alibi but he can use them no more. [H, March 3] There are other crucial issues, such as the Saudi plan for the resolution of the Palestine question as well, and never has Israel had a greater need for peace than at the present. Instead, like the US, its head of state may be the worst in its history, motivated by short-term political advantage and a consummate desire to retain power.
But the Syrian option is there for the taking. If there is war then the brain drain out will accelerate and migration in will fall; demography will take over. Israel will then become the only place in the world a Jew is in danger precisely because he or she is a Jew. If this opportunity is lost there will eventually be a mutually destructive war that no one will win-the Lebanon War proved that Israel must now confront the fact that its neighbors are becoming its military equals and US aid cannot save it.
Indeed, America’s free gifts caused Israel to begin a war last July with illusions identical to those that caused the Bush Administration to embark on its Iraq folly.
GABRIEL KOLKO is the leading historian of modern warfare. He is the author of the classic Century of War: Politics, Conflicts and Society Since 1914, Another Century of War? and The Age of War. He has also written the best history of the Vietnam War, Anatomy of a War: Vietnam, the US and the Modern Historical Experience. His latest book is After Socialism.